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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNlY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
















) _____________________ ) 
CLERK'S RECORD 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock. 
Before HONORABLE Robert C. Naftz District Judge. 
For Appellant: 
TITLE PAGE 
Michael D. Gaffney 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 




Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
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Sixth Judicial District Court- Bannock County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, etal. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Portneuf Medical Center LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Forrest Preston 
Date Code User 
12/13/2012 LOCT MAR LEA 
NCOC MAR LEA 
COMP MAR LEA 























Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Filing: A- All initial civil case filings of any type not Robert C Naftz 
listed in categories 8-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: merrill and merrill Receipt 
number: 0042941 Dated: 12/13/2012 Amount: 
$96.00 (Check) For: 
Plaintiff: Pocatello Hospital, LLC Attorney 
Retained Kent L Hawkins 
Plaintiff: Portneuf Medical Center Attorney 
Retained Kent L Hawkins 
Motion for personal service on out of state 
defendant; aty William Hancock for plntf 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Affidavit of counsel in support of motin for Robert C Naftz 
personal service on out of state defendant: aty 
William Hancock for plntf 
Order allowing personal service on out of state Robert C Naftz 
defendant s/Judge Naftz 1-7-2013 
Acceptance of service - srvd on Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors on 1-7-2013 
Robert C Naftz 
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Robert C Naftz 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: beard st 
clair gaffney Receipt number: 0002837 Dated: 
1/29/2013 Amount: $66.00 (Check) For: Quail 
Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, (defendant) 
Answer and Jury Demand; aty John Avondet for Robert C Naftz 
defs 
Defendant: Preston, Forrest Attorney Retained Robert C Naftz 
John M Avondet 
Defendant: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Robert C Naftz 
Attorney Retained John M Avondet 
Order for submission of information for Robert C Naftz 
scheduling order; s/ Judge 2-1-2013 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/04/2013 01:30 Robert C Naftz 
PM) Motion for Stay (Defendant's) 
Defendants Motion for stay; aty Michael Gaffney Robert C Naftz 
for def 
Defendants Memorandum in support of motion for Robert C Naftz 
stay ; aty Michael Gaffney for def 
Affidavit of counsel in support of defs motion for Robert C Naftz 
stay; aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Notice of hearing; set for 3-4-2013@ 1:30pm: Robert C Naftz 
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Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, etal. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal. 
User: DCANO 



































Amended agreed response to order for Robert C Naftz 
submission of information for scheduling order; 
aty Kent Hawkins 
Plaintiff objection to defs motion for stay and Robert C Naftz 
alternatively request for Bond: aty Dave 
Gallafent for plntf 
Affidavit of counsel in support of plaintiffs Robert C Naftz 
objection to defs motion to stay; aty Dave 
Gallafent for plntf 
Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty Dave Gallafent for Robert C Naftz 
plntf 
Defendants Reply Memorandum in support of 
motion for stay; aty John "Avondet for defs 
Robert C Naftz 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Robert C Naftz 
03/04/2013 01:30 PM: District Court Hearing Hel( 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Motion for Stay (Defendant's); court granted 
Defendant's motion but requires them to post a 
bond in the amount of declaratory judgment 
signed by Judge Brown in a separate matter 
Affidavit of counsel in support of motion to 
compel; aty William Hancock for plntf 
Robert C Naftz 
Motion to compel; aty William Hancock for plntf Robert C Naftz 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion to Compel Robert C Naftz 
07/08/2013 01:30 PM) Plaintiff's motion 
Notice of hearing; set for Plntfs Motion to compel Robert C Naftz 
on 7-8-2013 at 1:30pm: aty William Hancock 
Defendants Memorandum in oppposition to Robert C Naftz 
Motion to compel; aty Michael GAffney for defs 
Hearing result for Motion to Compel scheduled Robert C Naftz 
on 07/08/2013 01:30PM: District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 1 00 pages 
Plaintiff's motion granted; counsel for Plaintiff to 
prepare order; bond posted by 7-22-13 at 5:00pm 
or stay lifted; attorney fees and costs also 
awarded 
Minute entry and order; plaintiffs motion to 
compel is granted; s/ Judge Naftz 7-11-2013 
Robert C Naftz 
Amended Order for submission of information for Robert C Naftz 
scheduling order; sf Judge Naftz 8-2-2013 
Agreed response to Order for submission of 
information for scheduling order; aty Kent 
Hawkins for plntf 
Robert C Naftz 
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ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, etal. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Portneuf Medical Center LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Forrest Preston 
Date Code User 
8/22/2013 HRSC NICOLE 
HRSC NICOLE 
8/26/2013 CAMILLE 














Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/15/2014 09:00 Robert C Naftz 
AM) First setting 
One day requested 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 10/14/2014 09:00 Robert C Naftz 
AM) Backup setting 
One day requested 
Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial setting and 
initial pretrial order; s/ Judge Naftz 8-25-2013 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 10/21/2013 01:30 PM) Plaintiff's 
motion 
Plaintiff motion for summary judgment; aty 
William Hancock for plntf 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
Affidavit of Don Wadle; aty William Hancock for Robert C Naftz 
pint! 
Brief in support of plaintiffs motion for summary Robert C Naftz 
judgment; aty William Hancock for pint! 
Affidavit of counsel in support of plaintiffs motion Robert C Naftz 
for summary judgment; aty William Hancock for 
plntf 
Notice of hearing; set for Plaintiffs Motion for Robert C Naftz 
summary judgment on 10-21-2013@ 1:30pm: 
Defendants Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment; aty John Avondet for defs 
Robert C Naftz 
Defendants Memorandum in support of Cross Robert C Naftz 
Motion for Summary Judgment; aty John 
Avondet for defs 
Affidavit of John M Avondet in support of defs Robert C Naftz 
cross motion for summary judgment; aty John 
Avondet for defs 
Notice of hearing; set for Defs Cross Motion for Robert C Naftz 
Summary Judgment; 10-21-2013@ 1:30pm: 
Affidavit of Michael Gaffney in opposition to 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment: aty 
Michael Gaffney 
Robert C Naftz 
Defendants Memorandum in opposition to motion Robert C Naftz 
for summary judgment; aty Michael Gaffney for 
defs 
Plaintiffs reply in support of its malin for summary Robert C Naftz 
judgment; aty William Hancock for pint! 
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Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Robert C Naftz 
scheduled on 10/21/2013 01:30 PM: District 
Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: more than 100 pages; 
Plaintiff's motion granted by the Court; counsel 
will submit order for the Court's review 
Defendants objection to proposed judgment; 
aty Michael Gaffney for defs 
Robert C Naftz 
Judgment; Defendant are hereby ordered to pay, Robert C Naftz 
jointly and severally unpaid current annual rent for 
the 2010 rent adjustment period in a sum of 
$416,812.50: s/ Judge Naftz 10-22-2013 
Plaintiffs memorandum of costs and attorney 
fees; aty Dave Gallafent for pint! 
Robert C Naftz 
Plaintiffs motion for costs and attorney fees: aty Robert C Naftz 
Dave Gallafent for pint! 
Filing: L4- Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Robert C Naftz 
Supreme Court Paid by: Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
Receipt number: 0035253 Dated: 11/8/2013 
Amount: $109.00 (Check) For: Preston, Forrest 
{defendant) and Quail Ridge Medical investors, 
Lie, (defendant) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court Robert C Naftz 
NOTICE OF APPEAL: Michael D. Gaffney, Robert C Naftz 
Attorney for Defendants Quail Ridge Medical 
Investors, LLC and Forrest L. Preston. 
Received Check # 1 05804 in the amount of Robert C Naftz 
$100.00 for deposit of Clerk's Record on 11-7-13. 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL: Signed Robert C Naftz 
and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme Court on 
11-8-13. 
Respondent's Request for Additional Records and Robert C Naftz 
Reporter's Transcript: R. William Hancock, 
Attorney for Plntfs. (Mailed copy to SC on 
11-21-13) 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 12/16/2013 02:30 Robert C Naftz 
PM) Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees 
Defendants Motion to disallow costs and fees; 
aty John Avonder for defs 
Defendants Memorandum in support of defs 
motion to disallow costs and fees: aty John 
Avonder 
Robert C Naftz 
Robert C Naftz 
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ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, etal. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, etal. 
User: DCANO 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Portneuf Medical Center LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Forrest Preston 
Date Code User 
11/21/2013 MISC DCANO 
CAMILLE 
11/26/2013 MISC DCANO 
11/27/2013 CAMILLE 
12/11/2013 KENDRAH 







IDAHO SUPREME COURT: Received notice of Robert C Naftz 
Appeal. Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcripts due 2-14-14. (Due 5 weeks prior to 
Counsel on 1-10-14) Docket#41589-2013. 
Transcripts to be lodged with Court Records: 
Summary Judgment held 10-21-13. 
Notice of hearing; set for 12-16-2013@ 2:30 Robert C Naftz 
pm: aty R William Hancock for plntf 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Received a Cert. Robert C Naftz 
Copy of Respondent's Request for Additional 
Records and Reporter's Transcript filed in Dis!. 
Court 11-25-12. (Respondent counsel failed to 
identify the reporter for each additional transcripts 
requested and did not serve the reporter as 
required by the Idaho Appellate Rules, Thus no 
additional transcripts will be required at this time) 
Transcripts and Clerk's Record Remains Due 
2-24-14. (Counsel's due 1-20-14, 5 weeks prior) 
Amended respondents request for additional Robert C Naftz 
records and reporters transcript; aty William 
Hancock for plntf 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Comparing And Robert C Naftz 
Conforming A Prepared Record, Per Page Paid 
by: Beard StClair Gaffney Receipt number: 
0038574 Dated: 12/11/2013 Amount: $1.50 
(Check) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on Robert C Naftz 
12/16/2013 02:30PM: District Court Hearing Hel< 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees; court will 
prepare written order with final judgment 
IDAHO SURPEME COURT; Transcript and Robert C Naftz 
Clerk's Record Due 2-24-12 ** 3-4-13 Stay; 
07-08-13 Compel; 10-21-13 Summary Judgment. 
Order regarding attorney fees; Plaintiffs motion Robert C Naftz 
for costs and attorney fees is GRANTED, for 
$16,830.93: s/ Judge Naftz 1-7-2014 
Final Judgment; Plaintiff is awarded judgment in Robert C Naftz 
the amount of $462,033.80: s/ Judge Naftz 
1-7-2014 
Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Robert C Naftz 
action 
Miscellaneous Payment: Copies Paid by: Merrill & Robert C Naftz 
Merrill Chartered Receipt number: 0001006 
Dated: 1/10/2014 Amount: $11.00 (Check) 
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Sixth Judicial District Court- Bannock County 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2012-0005289-0C Current Judge: Robert C Naftz 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, eta/. vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, eta/. 
User: DCANO 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC, Portneuf Medical Center LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, Lie, Forrest Preston 
Date Code User Judge 
1/21/2014 MISC DCANO Notice of Lodging(E-mail only, couldn't open with Robert C Naftz 
her computer program) received from S.Davis 
1-21-14. 
MISC DCANO REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS received in Court Robert C Naftz 
Records on 1-21-14 for the following: 
Plntfs Motion Summary Judgment and Dfdts. 
Corss Motion Sum. Judg. held 10-21-13. 
2/5/2014 CAMILLE Amended Notice of Appeal; aty John Avondet for Robert C Naftz 
Defendants 
2/7/2014 MISC DCANO AMENDED CLERK'S CERT. OF APPEAL: Robert C Naftz 
Signed and Mailed to Counsel and Supreme 
Court on 2-7-14. 
2/11/2014 DCANO IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Filed Amended Robert C Naftz 
NOtice of Appeal. Transcripts and Clerk's Record 
due 4-3-14. Transcripts: 
Summary Judgment held 10-21-13 
Costs & Fees held 12-16-13. 
2/21/2014 MISC DCANO Stipulation re: Record on Appeal: Michael D. Robert C Naftz 
Gaffney, Attorneys for Defendants. 
ORDR DCANO Order Re: Record on Appeal: The Reocrd on Robert C Naftz 
Appeal be augmented to include the Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted 
on Oct. 8, 2013 and Defendant's Reply 
Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Submitted on 10-14-13. 
Signed Judge Robert C. Naftz on 2-21-14. 
2/25/2014 MISC DCANO SENT CERT. COPIES OF STIPULATION AND Robert C Naftz 
ORDER REGARDING RECORD ON APPEAL 
TO SC ON 2-25-14. 
MISC DCANO CLERK'S RECORD (cd) Received in Court Robert C Naftz 
Records on 2-26-14. 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
.. ,·,:;:-:.T 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 









) FEE CATEGORY: A 





COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC, 
by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the 
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, an individual, alleges as 
follows: 
I. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), is a 
Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho with its 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho at 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho 8320 I. 
2. Defendant, Quail Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail"), is a Tennessee limited liability 
5975: Complaint Page I 
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company authorized to do business in the State ofidaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 
Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Forrest L. Preston ("Preston"), is an individual residing in Tennessee and 
whose business address is 3001 Keith St., Cleveland, Tennessee. Preston is an owner of Quail. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a dispute regarding the amount of rent due under a Ground Lease 
Agreement, dated January 27, 1983 ("Lease Agreement"). That dispute was resolved by a 
declaratory judgment entered, following a two (2) day bench trial, by the Honorable Mitchell W. 
Brown, District Judge for the Sixth Judicial District, which judgment declared the amount of rent 
that was past due. 
5. The declaratory judgment action was filed June 29, 2010 by PMC seeking, among other 
things, to have the court declare the rent that Quail should have paid to PMC under the Lease 
Agreement for the period between February 1, 2010 and January 31, 2013 (the "2010 Rent 
Adjustment Period"). 
6. PMC is the successor in interest to the lessor in the Lease Agreement, succeeding to the 
interests of Intermountain Health Care, Inc., and was the plaintiff in the declaratory judgment 
action decided by Judge Brown. 
7. Quail is the successor in interest to the lessee in the Lease Agreement, succeeding to the 
interests of Sterling Development Co., and was the defendant in the declaratory judgment action 
decided by Judge Brown. 
8. Judge Brown entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum 
Decision and Order, and then on November 26, 2012 entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment. 
A true and correct copy of the Amended Declaratory Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit 2, and 
is incorporated herein by this reference. 
9. In his Amended Declaratory Judgment, Judge Brown declared that " ... Quail Ridge is 
obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease 
Agreement." Pursuant to the Amended Declaratory Judgment, that sum is the amount of rent that is 
now past due for the 201 0 Rent Adjustment Period. 
10. This lawsuit further arises from the Guarantee in Payment and Performance, dated June 
1, 2001 ("Guarantee"), in which Preston Guaranteed payment of the rent due in the 1983 Ground 
5975: Complaint Page2 
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Lease. A true and correct copy of this Guarantee is attached hereto as Exhibit 1, and is 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
11. PMC is the successor in interest to IHC Health Services, Inc. in that Guarantee in 
Payment and Performance. 
12. Both Quail and Preston have failed to pay the amount stated to be due in the Amended 
Declaratory Judgment, even though on November 26, 2012 the court served Quail with a copy of 
the Amended Declaratory Judgment and said judgment stated that the unpaid rental amount of 
$416,812.50 was "promptly" due. 
13. Because of Quail's and Preston's failure to make prompt payment, PMC on November 27, 
2012 sent a written demand to both Quail and Preston for payment of the remaining rent that Judge 
Brown had declared in his Amended Declaratory Judgment to be promptly due. Although more 
than ten days have passed since the court served the Amended Declaratory Judgment on Quail, and 
more than ten days have passed since the demand Letter was sent to Quail and Preston, neither 
Quail nor Preston have paid any portion of the amount due .. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
14. PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through 13 above as if they 
had been set forth fully herein. 
15. Pursuant to Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment, Quail is obligated under the 
Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC the sum of$416,812.50. 
16. By failing to promptly pay the rent that Judge Brown declared to be due under the contract, 
Quail breached the Ground Lease Agreement. 
17. Quail owes PMC a sum of $416,812.50 in unpaid rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment 
Period, plus interest on this liquidated amount at a rate of 12% per annum from and after 
November 26,2012, plus attorney fees and costs that PMC has had to incur in collection of these 
unpaid rents. 
COUNT II 
BREACH OF PERSONAL GUARANTEE 
18. PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraphs 1 through17 above, as if they 
had been set forth fully herein. 
5975: Complaint Page 3 
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19. Pursuant to the Guarantee Preston "unconditionally guarantee[ d] the payment and 
performance of any and all obligations of Quail Medical Investors, LLC, a Tennessee Limited 
Liability Company ("Quail Ridge") ... under the Ground Lease." 
20. Furthermore, under the terms of that Guarantee, Preston agreed that "upon any default, [the 
landlord], at its option [may] proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against [Preston] 
without proceeding against Quail. .. or any other person." 
21. Preston also agreed that "without demand, [he would] immediately reimburse and pay for 
all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney fees, incurred in the enforcement of this 
Guarantee." 
22. Although written demand has been made upon Preston for the payment of unpaid rents for 
the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period, Preston has failed to pay the $416,812.50 currently due and 
owing as he was obligated to do under the terms of the Guarantee. 
23. Preston is in breach of his obligations under the Guarantee and is jointly and severally 
obligated to pay the full amount due. 
24. Preston owes PMC the unpaid rent of $416,812.50 for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period, 
plus interest in an amount of 12% for this liquidated account from and after November 26, 2012, 
plus reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses involved in bringing this action. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
25. PMC has retained the services of Merrill and Merrill, Chtd. to bring this suit. PMC is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs pursuant to the terms of the Lease Agreement; 
pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee; pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123; 
and, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC, prays 
that judgment be entered in PMC's favor and against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Defendants should be ordered to pay, jointly and severally, unpaid current armual rent for 
the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period in a sum of not less than $416,812.50; 
2. Defendants should be ordered to pay interest on this amount from and after the date of the 
Amended Declaratory Judgment, November 26, 2012, at an armual rate of 12% until the date the 
Court enters its judgment. 
5975: Complaint Page4 
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3. Defendants should be ordered to pay PMC's attorneys fees and costs associated with the 
bringing of this current action; and 
4. For such and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the circumstances of 
this case. 
DATED this 0 day of December, 2012. 
5975: Complaint 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By -----='%""'.'-":·"'re.?::~';J----:-;-<:;}L.;~=/ ··=~"'--·::..::.__:__:;-::._____ 
Kent L. Hawkins 






GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE 
By the· exeeuiioii hereof, and as a condition precedent to, and as inducement for, the 
execution and delivery by me Health Services, Inc., a Utah nonprofit corporation ("fiiCHS"), of 
that certain Landlord Consent and Estoppel, dated as of June 1, 2001, and the foregoing 
Amendment, FORREST L. PRESTON, individually, unconditionally guarantees the payment and 
performance of any and all obligations of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, U.C, a Tennessee 
limited liability company ("Quail Ridge'') and/or Pocatello Medical Investors Limited 
Partnership, a Tennessee limited partnership ("PMI''), under the "Ground Lease" and the 
"Sublease" (each as defined in the foregoing Amendment). To the fullest extent possible, the 
undersigned expressly waives notice of the acceptance of this Guarantee, notice of demand for 
payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of other default, notice of suit, and all other notices to 
which the undersigned might otherwise be entitled in connection with this Guarantee. Further, 
the undersigned waives any responsibility or duty lHCHS may have to the undersigned to 
proceed against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or to pursue any other legal remedy available. Upon any 
default, niCHS may, at its option, proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against the 
undersigned without proceeding against Quail Ridge and/or P:MI or any other person. In 
addition, the undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for 
all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this 
Guarantee. 
DATED" of the t• "''"'"-200~ 
at:-.O!""'RREII!!I,jO:':-sffibL..._.-:>t:~~T~~:=...---
Saltl.alce·142021.4 0033566-00001 7 14 of 447
NOV·26·201Z 05:14PM FROM-Bannoc~~pth Dist.Crt 
t 1· 
\ 
208·236-7012(~,, T-502 P.OOl/003 F-752 
FILED 
BA.i..:/JOCK COUNTY 
CLEiV r = :t·!E C')URT 
IN THE DISTRICT COUR.T OF TliE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRU:'.T. .oF .l'BE. 
-ZUTl"NIJ'v' i::b t'H 5: 06 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ;' BANNOCK 
****** 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba ) 
PORTNEUF MEDiCAL CENTERS, LlC, ) 
BY 
-0;:;-;E:-;:P:;-;iJn':;::--:-C~L-=E~RI,..( -· 
) Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C 
Plaintiff: ) 
) 
vs. ) AMENDED 
) DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) 
LLC and CENTURY PARK ) 




Following a two (2) day bench nial conducted before the Court commencing on May 14, 
2012 and concluding on May 15, 2012 and the Court having rendered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order the Court hereby enters this 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 through 10-1203. This 
Declaratory Judgment declares the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect those 
issues. This Declaratory Judgment deals specifically with the rent atljustment provisions of the 
parties' Ground Lease Agreement (Section 1.3Jb) and generally with sections l.l, 1.2 and I.3(a) of 
the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. 
The Court hereby ORDERS ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
(1) Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Pormeuf Medical Centers (PM C) is entitled to an 
adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail 
Ridge) under the parties Ground Lease Agreement from $9,562.50 annually to 
$148,500.00 annually. 
DECLARI\ 1'0RY JUDCMEN'r • l 
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(2) This rent adjustment is for the three (3) period commencing on february 1, 2010 and 
concluding on January 31, 20 !3 .. Therefore the total rent due PMC from Quail Ridge is 
the amowt of $445,500.00 for this three (3) year period. 
(3) Quail Ridge has already paid I'MC $9,562.00 annual rent on or about February I 
each year during that three year period for a total amount paid of$28,687.50. 
( 4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay 
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. 
(5) The rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27, 
1983, of which PMC is the successor Lessor and Quail Ridge is the successor Lessee 
remains in full force and effect. The next rent adjustment, which is scheduled to take 
effect February I, 2013, shall proceed consistent with section !.3(b) of the Ground 
Lease Agreement. 
IT IS SO OIU>ERED. 
Dated this 26111 day ofNovember, 2012. 
DECI.ARATOR.Y JllDGMENT • 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day of November, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Form of Judgment to be served upon the following persons 
in the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
I<ent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 99! 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2499 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael b. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 529-9732 






Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 




) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
vs. ) ORDER ALLOWING PERSONAL 
) SERVICE ON OUT OF STATE 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 









THIS COURT having received the Motion for Service on Out of State Defendant, and 
supporting Affidavit of Counsel, in accordance with the statutes and Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, and the Court being otherwise fully advised in the premises and good cause appearing 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a copy of the Summons and Complaint be personally 
served on Forrest L. Preston in the state of Tennessee, or elsewhere where he maybe found. 
DATED this _2_ day ofJanuary, 2013. 
~C.~ 
Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
5975: Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant Page 1 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned Clerk of Court, does hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant was this ..J_ day of 
January, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
R. William Hancock 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
[/u.s. Mail 
[__] Hand Delivery 
[__] Overnight Delivery 
[__] Telefax 
Deputy Clerk 
5975: Order Allowing Personal Service on Out of State Defendant Page2 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
\. 
r·~i .. EJJ 
- ;· ij' :; :r y 
, ... ') 
In the Sixth Judicial District ofthe State ofldaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Answer and Jury Demand 
The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge) through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
P A, respectfully submit the following Answer to the Complaint filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello 
Hospital, LLC db a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (PMC). Any paragraph not specifically 
admitted is denied. 
Answer 
1. Admit paragraph 1. 
2. Admit paragraph 2. 
3. Admit paragraph 3. 




4. Deny paragraph 4. 
5. Deny paragraph 5. 
6. Admit paragraph 6. 
7. As to paragraph 7, deny that Quail Ridge was the sole defendant in the declaratory judgment 
action. Admit the remainder of the paragraph. 
8. Admit paragraph 8. 
9. Deny paragraph 9. 
10. Deny paragraph 10. 
I1. Quail Ridge is without knowledge as to the allegations contained in paragraph II; therefore, 
Quail Ridge denies paragraph li. 
I2. Deny paragraph I2. 
13. Deny paragraph 13. 
14. Paragraph 14 realleges the prior paragraphs of the complaint. Quail Ridge incorporates its 
answers to the preceding allegations herein. 
15. Deny paragraph 15. 
16. Deny paragraph 16. 
17. Deny paragraph 17. 
18. Paragraph 18 realleges the prior paragraphs of the complaint. Quail Ridge incorporates its 
answers to the preceding allegations herein. 
19. Deny paragraph 19. 
20. Deny paragraph 20. 
21. Deny paragraph 21. 
22. Deny paragraph 22. 
Answer and Jury Demand PAGE 2 
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23. Deny paragraph 23. 
24. Deny paragraph 24. 
25. Deny paragraph 25. 
Affirmative Defenses 
1. The complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 
2. The complaint is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. 
3. The complaint is barred by res judicata. 
4. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
5. The complaint is barred by waiver. 
6. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of contract modification. 
7. The complaint is barred because the subject contract alleged herein lacked a meeting of the 
minds. 
8. The complaint is barred by laches. 
9. The proceedings should be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal in Barmock County 
Case No. CV-10-2724-0C, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012. 
I 0. The complaint is barred because there has been no breach of contract. 
11. The complaint is barred because the guarantee is not enforceable. 
12. The complaint is barred on the basis that it has failed to mitigate its damages, if any. 
13. The complaint is barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
14. The complaint is barred because the plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible 
parties. 
15. The complaint is barred because the plaintiff is not the real party in interest. 
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16. The plaintiffs claims are barred because the defendants' conduct was not the proximate 
cause of the plaintiffs harms, if any. · 
Jury Demand 
The defendants demand trial by jury pursuant to Rule 3 8 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure on all issues so triable. 
Prayer for Relief 
Wherefore, Quail Ridge prays for the following relief from this Court: 
1. Entry of judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff with the plaintiff taking 
nothing thereby. 
2. Awarding Quail Ridge its full attorney fees and costs pursuant to the Ground Lease 
Agreement, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54, and Idaho Code§ 12-120. 
3. Entry of an order dismissing the plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. 
4. Granting the defendants any other relief as deemed just and proper under the circumstances. 
DATED: January 28, 2013 
'"'h~ 
John M. Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
Answer and Jury Demand PAGE 4 23 of 447
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on January 28, 2013, I served a 
true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following by the method 
of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 





05 Hand-delivered Ill ·· ·· Facsimile 
Hand-delivered ~csimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
JohnM. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Defendants' Motion for Stay 
The defendants, through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A, respectfully move 
this Court for a stay in this action pending the outcome of Quail Ridge's appeal identified as 
Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012. The basis for this motion is set forth in and 
supported by the memorandum and affidavit of counsel filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
Mic e D. Gaffney 
John . Avondet 
OfBeard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
Defendants' Motion for Stay PAGE 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on February6;:_, 2013, I served 
a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY on the following by the 
method of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
Mich I . Gaffney 
John . Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA 
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' 
Michael D. Gaffuey, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Bonneville ) 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of 
Defendants' Motion for Stay 
John M. Avondet, having been duly sworn on oath, deposes and states: 
I. I am an attorney with the law firm, Beard St. Clair Ga:ffuey P A, and counsel for the 
defendants in the above entitled action. 
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge. 
Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay PAGE 1 27 of 447
3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Defendant's Amended Notice of 
Appeal, dated November 28, 2012. 
DATED: February (# , 2013 
Jo~tv~~K 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this _&~February, 2013. 
Not Pu lie for Idaho 
Resi ·n t: Idaho Falls, Idaho 
My CofMmmsion Expires: 9/11114 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on February b, 2013, I served 
a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR STAY on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 8320 I 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
POBox 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
~k~ Mich l:GaffileY 
John . Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA 
Attorneys for Defendants 
~ _,. U.S. Mail Q Hand-delivered a '%• Facsimile 
U.S. Mail Hand-delivered & · . .; Facsimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendant/Respondent 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC, 
Defendant! A ellant. 
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE 
OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENTS, POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC 
d/b/a PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, AND THE PARTIES' 
ATTORNEYS, KENT L. HAWKINS AND R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, 109 NORTH 
ARTHUR-5TH FLOOR, P.O. BOX 991, POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204, AND THE 
CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named appellant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, appeals against 
the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law entered October 17, 2012, the Declaratory Judgment entered, 
EXHIBIT 
A 
Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal Page 1 
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November 13, 2012, and the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered on November 26, 
2012, in the above entitled action, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown, presiding. 
2. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and the orders from which this appeal is taken is appealable pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule ll(a)(l). 
3. The issues raised on this appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether the district court erred by disregarding language contained in the 
contract in declaring the rights and obligations of the parties arising under 
that contract; 
b. Whether the district court erred by failing to find that the rent adjustment 
clause of the Ground Lease had been waived or modified by the 
subsequent conduct and/or transactions of the parties; 
c. Whether the district court erred by failing to find that the plaintiff was 
estopped from seeking any adjustment in rent due to the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate; 
d. Whether the district court erred by creating a new contract term that was 
unsupported by the evidence; 
e. Whether the district court erred by finding an absence of course of dealing 
by the parties; . 
f. Whether the district court erred in the method, manner. evidence relied 
upon, and calculation of any adjusted rent amount; and, 
g. Whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Brad 
Janoush. 
Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal Page 2 
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4. The appellant requests a standard transcript of trial in this matter, held on May 14-
15, 2012. In addition to the standard transcript, the appellant requests the preparation of 
the following portions of the reporters transcript 
a. A standard transcript of the hearing held on March 26, 2012; 
b. A standard transcript of the hearings held on April30, 2012; 
c. A standard transcript of the hearing held on May 4, 2012; 
d. A standard transcript of the hearing held on May 10, 2012. 
5. The appellant requests the following documents be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules: 
a. Copies of all deposition transcripts accepted by the Court and admitted in 
lieu of live testimony during trial; 
6. The appellant requests that the following documents, charts, or pictures admitted 
as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme Court: 
a. All exhibits admitted during trial. 
7. I certify: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal and any request for additional 
transcript have been served on each reporter of whom an additional 
transcript has been requested as names below at the address set out on the 
Certificate of Service; 
b. That the clerk of the district couri has been paid the estimated fee for 
preparation of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents 
requested in the appeal; 
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served 
pursuant to Rule 20. 
Defendant's Amended Notice of Appeal Page 3 
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Mic ae . Gaffney 
John M. Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on November 
27, 2012, I served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANT'S AMENDED NOTICE 
OF APPEAL on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax: 232-2499 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Honorable Mitchell Brown 
Caribou County Courthouse 
POBox775 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Fax: (208) 547-2147 
Rodney Felshaw 
Conrt Reporter 
Caribou County Courthouse 
POBox775 
Soda Springs, ID 83276 
Mic ae D. Gaffney 
Jo . Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorney for Defendants 
Q U.S.Mai1 
0 U.S.Mai1 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





County of Bannock ) 
) 
) 
) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
) SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
) OBJECTION TO DEFENDANTS' 





I, Kent L. Hawkins, being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of the November 27, 2012 
demand letter our firm sent to legal counsel for Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forest L. 
Preston. 
3. Our firm never received a response to this written demand letter. 
5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Stay Page I 
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4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy ofthe Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order, entered by Judge Mitchell L. Brown 
on October 16,2012, in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of relevant experts from the 
Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, taken in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of relevant experts from the 
Deposition of Jodi Thomas, taken in Bannock County Case No. CV -2010-2724. 
DATED this :l-S'""day of February, 2013. 
By ~-;J...._~~ 
Kent L. Hawkins 
,fh 'feb, oJ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this ;il5- day ofJam!af.y, 2013. 
5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of PlaintifPs Objection to Motion to Stay Page 2 
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j 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was this ;;1s;-day of February, 2013, served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
U U.S. Mail 
U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Mail 
M"Facsimile 
Kent L. Hawkins 
5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Motion to Stay Page3 
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT 
KENT L. HAWKINS' 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR 
KENT A. HIGGINS' 
JARED A. STEADMAN 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK 
TYLER H. NEILL 
*ALSO AD:MITTED IN UTAH 
Via Facsimile: 529-9732 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Bread St. Clair 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
109 N. ARTHUR· 5TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX991 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991 
November 27,2012 
A.L. MERRILL (1886·1961) 
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972) 
W.F. MERRlLL (1919-2005) 
TELEPHONE:208-232-2286 
FAX:208·232-2499 
Founded in 1913 
Re: Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC 
(Bannock Couoty Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C) 
Dear Mike: 
We are in receipt of Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered yesterday in the 
above-referenced action, which judgment declares that your client "is obligated to promptly pay 
PMC $416,812.50 uoder the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement." Accordingly, 
formal demand is hereby made on Quail Ridge and/or Forest Preston, individually, to "promptly" 
pay that amouot to PMC. 
Although we acknowledge receipt of your Notice of Appeal, we do not believe that the filing of 
such appeal has any impact on PMC's right to immediate payment of the past due rent which has 
now been declared by the Court as currently due and owing. Quail Ridge is obligated to make 
prompt payment of this amouot uoder the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement and 
Forest Preston, individually, is liable for this past due rent amouot pursuant to the 2001 
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him. 
As such, Quail Ridge and Forest Preston, individually, are hereby put on notice that if payment 
to PMC in the amouot of$416,812.50 is not made within ten days, then PMC will consider Quail 
Ridge in breach of its rent obligations under the Ground Lease Agreement and Forest Preston in 
breach of his payment obligations under the Guarantee of Payment and Performance. If you do 
not consider yourself as legal counsel for Mr. Preston and are not authorized to accept this 
demand for payment on his behalf, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make 
direct demand upon him. Quail Ridge and Mr. Preston should be aware that if full payment is 
not received within ten days, PMC will seek all legal remedies available to it uoder Idal10 law, 
including but not limited to filing a legal action for collection of this outstanding rent. If such 
legal action becomes necessary, PMC will seek attorneys fees pursuant to Section 10.3 of the 
37 of 447
Michael D. Gaffney 
November 27, 2012 
Page2 
Gronnd Lease Agreement; pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee of Payment and Performance; 
and, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123. Quail Ridge should take 
particular note that Section 10.3 of the Ground Lease Agreement provides that "such attorney's 
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid 
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment." Forest Preston should take note that the 
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him specifically provides that "the 
undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this Guarantee." 
Additionally, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, interest is accruing on the amonnt due at 12% 
per annum. 
For your information, PMC is in the process of appraising the Quail Ridge Property to determine 
the rental rate for the 2013 rent adjustment period. We will share the appraisal with you as soon 
as we receive it. 
In the meantime, if you have questions or if you wish to make additional arrangements for the 
payment of the remaining rent due for the 20 I 0 rent adjustment period, or if you have any input 
regarding the market value of the property for the 20 13 rent adjustment period, please do not 
hesitate to contact me or Kent Hawkins. 
Sincerely, 
i:~•;;;t;;m/ 
WaveR. Gallafent ~ 
DRG/R WH/5975 
cc: Client (via e-mail) 
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) FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLlJSIONS 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) OF LAW AND MEMORA!'{])UM 






This action eame beibre the Court for a twQ (2) day CQurt trial commencing on May 14 
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at tril!l by counsel, Kent L. Hawkins and R. 
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investor$, LLC (Qwil Ridge) and CenLury 
Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were· represented by Michael D. Gaffney and 1obn M. 
Avondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set fonh a post-nial briefing schedule. The parties 
agreed tO share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance of post-
trial brienng. See Minute Entry and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order 
regarding remitting pa;yment to the Court Rewrter and pteparation of the tranSCript ofthe trial. See 
Order entered on June S, 2012. the parties were instructed to $llbmit post-trial arguments along 
with their proposed findings of. fact and conclusi~ oflaw. There were four (4) depositi~ which 
were subrni~d to the Court for its review as part of the trlal record. Pursuant to stip111ation of !he 
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process contemplated by the ~ase Agreement Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Summary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summaxy judgment in its 
favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the yeatS 2007 through 2011 in the 
amount of$735,187.50 and rent in the sum of$148,500.00 for2012. Id. at p. 5. PMC argued 
that this result was justified under the clear and unambiguous language of the parties' Lease 
Agreement. Quail Ridge also :flied a counter-motion for summary judgment. Quail Ridge 
argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and gxant summary 
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in .2001, "the ability to adjust rent was removed 
from the partics' agreement." Defendants' Motion for SUIIliDllrY Judgment, p. 1. 'The Court 
denied both parties' motions for slliJilllary judgment finding that the parties' Lease Agreement 
contained ambiguities that would require exllinsic evidence concenring the patties' intenr, 
gpecifically as it related to Article I, section l.)(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are 
procedurally significant. The fJrst was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and tha second was 
FMC's Motion to Enforce Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord CoDSent 8lld Esroppel 
Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge. 
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Complaint. The 
Court likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enforce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate.3 
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the oriQinal 
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The. Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for 
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PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case 
on rebuttal. PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimooy: (I) 
During Quail Ridf,e's Cross-examination ofKroest:he the following question was asked: 
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in 
the 2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right. 
Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response. 
Further, Kroesche' s response is uon-responsive. IllStead. he explains that typically esto{lpel 
cen:ificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However. Kroesche fails to respond 
to the specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been iosened in the 
2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just-as it had been in the 1996 certi£icate. Quail Ridge 
moved to Strike this response as non-responsive. !d. at p. 35, LL. 10-11. PMC arg11es Kroesche 
was entitled tct explain his reasons for not being able to answer ''ye!t' or "1\o." The Court w:ill 
SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that KrOesche's answer was noo-responsive and will 
strike the same.5 
PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct 
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-examination. This exchange 
centered on the following questions: 
First of all, there was a question about whether if there hacl been a modification 
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, would it have been included in the estoppel 
certificate. Can you ariswer that? 
"PMC withdn.'W any of the objections to ques1ioM askod by Quail R.k(ge: during Kro*h~~s deposition. PMC's ObJecrfons to 
oeoo&1ion Testimony, p. 3. Thcre!bre.. tile Court will address only those issu,. mi«d by PMC In !>MC's Objections to 
DtpoSjli!!Jt Tcsdm""l'' _ _ . 
'The Coll.tt luls <tOssed dtmuab ll!;it pOI!i<>n of Kro...,ru,•. respons~·>W;Oh bjiS 1n:cn Slrick<n by 111\1 c~ $1!6 ori&lnal ~· 
®pooftlon at p.l4. Ll,.!$-2$.. p. 35. LL.I-6. 'l'hc..,. quCSiion isc~ an p. 37 ofKr<!escho's 4cposil!011 WbOI\ h* is Ukt4 
"you ceuld ••liVe. wben you pr;opan:d tile 'OJ ~pel teRi/iQllc 1lllli !he '1)2 -ppel <:pli~ or wll!\11 you lllerc wl'icWing 
rlt<m.lMorte<ll"'au>~&> ID;o !hat lllund l!uho 19% es!OpJ)Ol ~care rellll$lto lllo te~~tal!iustmcnt pr~>Vlsloo, •am:ot?" Tha 
response was "[y]es, I could 1unv put DlllliJI di!ferem words in !hi$ oswwel ~ ... lilcludlne I QOiilcllia:vi> wrilton- that 
[refeO'lng 10 Jfte language ftom the 19!16 <!$t0pptl <:otti!i"""'J in as well." This 'OS!'"""' wUI beAD MITrE!) OVI!l !It< objo:cti011S 
of c:ounsel as stnutd in the deposidon. · 
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the full owing question, on leading 
grooods, should be overruled because the question is not leading: 
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge 
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you 
would waive or limit the rights Ullder the 1983 contract to limit or increase the 
rent provision - the amooot of rent under that agreement? 
Goodwin Depo. p. 18, LL.lS-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the 
answer to stand.1 The Court concludes that this question i$ nat leading because it does not 
suggest the answer. 
Quail Ridge reassertS all of the oQjecrions made during the course of Goodwin's 
deposition. The only objection asserted by Qutril Ridge that has not been addressed above is its 
objection, on the ground oflack of foundation, to the following question: 
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of 
this sqjlJS1:ment provisiOJl in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement 
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.18-2I. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question 
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment provision found in the Lease Agteement. He 
answers that he ''was not specifically aware of this arrangemertt." The Court will allow this 
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer 81!Y futtber questions aboijt the so 
called "adjustmc.nt provision" of the Lease Agreemc.nt based upOll his ac!missio11, but he cenainly 
can testify to what he testified in response to this question. 
'G<JodwJn•s answer!<> tltis qoestion wao "no, .u-.• However. Goodwin then adds this unsoliciiCd rcopoose "In 11101, in paragraph 5 
ofihat docum~ lite Ia# HnlenceoflhBl piii'JI&!SPh says. 1\<mt 11M been paid throut~t and including l'obn.uny 28, I Q%, Under 
Sc<>li\lll 1.3(b) oftheleose, lho ""'' llhall be a<~~_ on lho ~ l!l)ltad.;-t dale. March 1, 1999-1998.- 'l'hisi'OSpOliJc is 
Dl!ll"""ll'l>slve and Will be STlUCKEN by the Collt!. PMC's qut~St~!in VIIS l!ini\ed in scope to wlledlllJ Goodwin ever made aey 
P''""is<s or rtp.....,ratiODS ro .S!<rllJill or Quail!Udgc. The question oolh:.d fi>r a yes or no I<BP""""· GoadWin's "llo. sit' 
o:o!j10IISC will b .. JII)WO(I; lhO balancc is non....,ponsive and will be stru.ck. The Coutt has Cro""d through the Slriokcn ponlon of 
lhc testimony In rhc orfgirlal dcJ)O.$itiOn ufGaodwin . 
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Jd. at p. 6, LL.16-18. Again, 'QwUl Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes 
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation. 
The Court will OVERRULE both objections. The answers are really of no evidentiary 
value. Anton responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement 
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO ofPMC from !981 through 1984. Anton 
Depo., p. 5, LL.l0-11. This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of 
speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition 
establishes thet he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or 
circumstances leading to its creation. 
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer: 
Q. Do you know what involvement he [Gerald O!sonJ had, if any, in the drsfting 
of this Agreement? 
A. I do not, but he may have drafted the Agreement 
ld at p. 7, LL.6-8. Qtlail Ridge objects to this response as being non-responsive. The Coun will 
OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he does not know what involvement Olson 
may have had in drafting the Lease Agreentent. The balance of the answer and the objection 
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED. The balance of this response is 
speculative and apparently beyond Anton's Personal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore, 
it will beSTRICKEN.8 
Next, Quail Ridge objects to the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, Jack of 
foundation, and as$\lllleS facts not in evidence; · · 
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all from 
1983? 
'The Court hru: Cl'OSS~ lhrough lh~ portion of tnis response Untt has hem stricken 1n the original depOSition on (d~ with the: 
Collrt. 
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that the call of the question, seeking Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific 
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The 
Court has previously foUild that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as 
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding 
his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation. 
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court oveiTUies on 
the speculation, basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty 
(3 0) years ago, that will go to weight. To the extent he remembers the circumstances 
snrro\lllding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
To the extent that any of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to he Conclusions of 
Law, they are incmporated in the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
(l) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to d<;> business in the state 
ofidaho. PMC's principal place ofbusiness is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended 
Complaint, p. 1, 'lfl, Answerto Amended Complaint, p. I, 'If!. 
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in 
the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland 
Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, 1!2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. I, ~I. 
(3) Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho. The 
assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by 
PMC. 
(4) The building from which t."te assisted living cent~x is ruu and operated ig owned by 
45 of 447
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(5) PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in i.rrte:cst to a certain Ground Lease 
Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on Januacy 27, 1983. 
(~) The Lease Agreement was origirial!y entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby 
IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee. 
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to lHC ·and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease 
Agreement ami occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling 
and occupies the role of lessee. 
(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year tenn of years collllllencing on February 
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one 
(I) ten (IO) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by 
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the 
Term."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, §1.2) 
(9) The Lease Agreement also proVides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as 
follows: 
An initial illllllual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(l So/o) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the f!ISt lhree (3) years 
from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the 
rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/1 00 Dollu:S ($15,000.00) per acre.10 
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2·3, §l.3(a)). 
(10) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the 
first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement was $9,562.50. 
'The op~.ion app~ to be personal to Sterling. However, this docs not upptar to be an Issue between th.c pmics. despite the tact 
tbat th=n: was no evidenca at IriaJ conccmfn.e the Pl.T50nBI nat~ of lbc: option Mel the opdon having been exercJsec&. the part:lcs 
se<:m to ~ lbl!l 1he Option Ms loeon exercise<~, tltaz It is assig.nablo to Quail Ridge. an4 "'" tite L""'e Agrumon1 is and Will be 
In place mrough Januwy 31, 2<UJ. "lnis"""" ofaf!IWs seems to be further conrnmed by the Landlord Consont and Estopjlel 
Certifio>te en"""d io 2001 wbcre the par~ies slOte that the ~· Apeement has b""' oxtend<4 thruu/111 and inoluding!anuftlj' 31, 
2023. Therefore, these Issues will no1 be ad<fresso<l or oonaklered -by~~· Court. 
''The Commenoemolnt Dale ofrhe Lease Agmcmcnt is dolined as the I" doy ofl'obn:wy, !983, or on or before thirty (30) d•y• 
after a building pmnit r.s issu~d whichever is Jeter. See LCMC Agreement. p.2. §1.2. No evid~t:~ ha! been ll1h'04uccd Je&at£hng 
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration 
as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Funher. the parties freely admit that there has not been 
any attempt to arbitrate. 11 
(16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three 
(3) years, the parties shollld consider the following: 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (IS%) percent [sic J of the 
fair market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the 
premise. Detenni!llltion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and 
best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the 
leasehold into account The determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to 
a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($1 5,000.00) per acre 
and shall also take into account any determinations of market value made under 
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent 
adjustment date. 
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §J .3(b)). 
(17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions 
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an acljustment in tbe rent. 
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides tbat "iftbe determination of adjusted rent is 
made after the applicable rem adjustment date; lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate 
applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is deterinined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3, 
§1.3(b)). 
(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that 
Qual! Ridge has paid rent. annually, in the Orlgi:!!al and WJadjusted amoWit of $9,562.50 and is 
currant on its annual obligation. 
11Wben !he Court inquired of !he pard" concerning 1his maner !hey both a4vised the Coott that lhoy were waivi~ this 
requitement ofthe Lease Agreement. "fhe Coutt telied Llpon whul 1h1 Court detgnnincd\0 bi: a mamhuory Blbitradon pl'OVI:!IIon 
wh<11 iL t~=•ed PMC's mollon .eq•..Ung !hOI QIOii) Ridge bo dCnlcd iiSjUI)' domand. 
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(24) Finally, the 1996 Estoppel Certificate provides that the "Landlords consent to the 
Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's 
perfonnance of any term or condition of the Lease [Agreement]." ( 1996 Estoppel Certificate, 
(25) No rndence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year 
annual rent adjustment in 1998 as referenced by the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. 14 
(26) Between 1996 and 2001 the relationship between the parties and Lease Agreement 
remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PMI was the Sub-tenant or 
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed. 
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the 
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their 
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold. 
Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building. 
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a nwnber of reasons, not particularly gennane to 
this litigation, in order to facilitate the 1ramss.ctio~ between Sterling and PMI wherein PMI would 
purchase the building located on the leaseh<?ld, a new emity was created. This entity was Quail 
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then plll'cll.ased the building located on the 
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge. 
(29) Richard Faulkner testified that the tranSaCTion was complex and involved a number 
of parties (IHC, Sterling, Quid! Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of 
f"Thc only evidence Introduced at trial rc.garding a dcmiUld by JHC or any of jts .succcss:om in interest was in O~ober I)( 2009 
wh'n PMC ma.dw a demand for a. rc:nt. Rlumncnt. whio;;:h 1~ to r.hc: present ~ntrovmy and lldgQdon. 
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Under the Lease [Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of 
NJNE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and 
including FEBRUARY 28,2001. 
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,5). This provision contains twO (2) dramatic alterations from the 
1996 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "is 
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "currently" has 
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to 
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annwn." Further, while the 1996 Estopplrl Certificate 
provides that ''under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease [Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the 
next rent acljustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. 
(35) Rich~ Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Quail Ridge, why the 
language of 200! Estoppel Certificate differs froni the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. At trial, the 
following dialogue occurred: 
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to 
paragraph five, it says that ''under the leas~ tenant is obligated to pay rent at the 
current rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and 
including February 281h, 2001." 
Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estOppel 
certificate is not in this certificate here? 
A. That's con:ect. I did not include it in the first draft. 
Q. And why was that left out? 
A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for 
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment 
mechanism had never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling 
Development Group and understood that in the entire 13 yeafs preceding our 
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjusnnent in erder to 
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that 
that had been waived. 
Faulkner Tria! Testimony, p. 165, LL.22-25, p. 166, LL.l·17. 
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(40) In 2009, shonly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease 
Agreement, as part ofits larg~ purchase of the hospital operated and known as PortneufMedical 
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous 
adjustment bad not taken place and asked to determine the appropriateness of making an 
adjustment to the annual rent. 
( 41) Don Wadle detennined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate 
and rhat there was a process in the Lease Agreement ro obtain an adjustment. 
(42) In 2009, PMC began the process of having the 4.25 acre leasehold appraised and 
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in 
accordance with the Lease Agreement. 
(43) At trial Brad Janoush, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho 
·. 
testified regarding the market value of t11e 425 acres of property which is the subject of the 
Lease Agreement. 
· (44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testifY at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and 
consultant. 
(45) Mr. Janousb opined, after discussilig his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of 
property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of$1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He 
further testified that on Januaiy 27, 2010, the value of this 4.25 acre Jeasehol(l had declined in 
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000.17 
(46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of depositiOil iniJOcitiCed at trial, 
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the pazties as the "iilir market 
"PMC has lltiiUed mat !he applfcablc modlftcallon date I• Janulll'y as. Tho Court is rtOI sure whm: !his d""' comes from. The 
copy of tho: Lease= Agreemertt -admhwllnta evidence ai trial reflects a slgnarurc- date or Januat)' 27. 1983. Howatcr4 the Lease 
Agrccmontlu.:lf provides that the applicable dii!O for !be nmt adjusunrnt is Fclmuuy I. See Coutt'S Findiup of Fact Numba: 9 
ond l'ootnole I Q, 
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affirmarlve or negative in fonn and effect, and such declarations shall have the 
force and effect of a final judgment or decree. 
(2) Idaho Code §10-1202 provides as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, writtcu coutract or other writings 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, status or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have detennined any" question of construction or validity arisin3 under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or lh!nehlse and obtain a declaration of 
rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. 
[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court] 
(3) Finally, Idaho Code §10-1203 provides as follows: 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof. 
( 4) Pursuant ro the foregoing. the Court has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights 
ofPMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement. 
(5) In 1983, IHC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement 
whereby Sterling leased 4.25" acres of property :from IHC. 
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreemenl PMC is 
the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee. 
(7) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Walehailt LLC. 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 
(2005), the Idaho Suprem~ Court discussed contract interpretation. in doing so it stated as follows: 
When the language of a contrliCt is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of law. An unambiguous contract will be given irs plain 
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a contract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent 
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. If a contract is found 
ambiguous, its interjiretation is a question of fact. Whether a contract is 
ambiguous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations. 
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b) of the 
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footnote I 0 to the Court's Findings of Fact. Therefore, the Lease Agn:ement .called for 
adjustments to the annual rent on the following dates: 
February l, 1986 
February l, 1989 
February I, 1992 
February 1, 1995 
February 1,1998 
February 1, 2001 
February l, 2004 
February 1, 2007 
February 1, 2010 
It also calls for adjUSTments to the annual rent on the following prospective dates: 
February 1, 2013 
FebrUary;, 2016 
February 1, 2019 
February 1, 2022 
(13) No adjustment to the annual rent under the Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuam 
to the terms of the Lease Asreement between t986 and 2010. Further, no pany to the Lease 
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent IDltil September and October of 2009 when 
PMC attempted to invoke sectionl.3(b) ofthe Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the 
!lllllual rent amotl11t. 
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section !.3(b) is clear and 
' 
WJambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the rent adjustment process is implemented. It 
allows for the parties to negotiate and ·submit by WilY of ''written agreement" th!;ir asrectnent 
concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25 '!Cte leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year 
adjusnnent period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon 
"fair market value" of the 4.25 acre leasehold is to (>Ccur within ninety (90) days of rent adjustment 
date. If the parues are succ~ in this en~vor, their agreed upon value is "a conclusive 
determination •.• offilir market value fur the period to which the adjustment applies." If the parties 
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The 
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract provision 'is to be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstances under 
which it was made, the objective and purpose Df the particular provision, and any construction 
placed upon it by the contmcting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus, 
151 Idaho 235, 238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011). 
(18) The Court concludes that "fltir market value" is a tenn of art in the legal and real estate 
fields. Black's Law Dictionary defines fair market value as ''the price that a seller is willing to 
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open market and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's 
Law Dictionary, Seventh Edition. In Logan v. Orand Junetion Allsociates, 111 Idaho 670, 671, 726 
P .2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals considered a case where the trial court 
applied a. nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal definition of fair market value is 
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appeals did not 
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the couect 
definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving 
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, ,PMC's real estate appmser expert, testified that 
fair market vall!C' is an antiquated term that was created and used back in the 1980's. He testified 
that the tenn now used is ''market value." He defined market value as ''the property's most 
probable sales price." He :furlher testified that although the tenn "f8ir market value" "is hardly ever 
used cuttently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with market value." 
( 19) The Court concludes that these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market 
value are consistent and appear to be manageable dc:llnitions for the rent adjostment provision of the 
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone. 
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that 
there was no course of dealing between rn:c and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly 
with the t1uee (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate that IHC 
never sought a rem adjustrncntbecause it determined that the value of me leasehold acreage had not 
increased in value. Therefore, m a<lji!Stment process would have resulted in no change in the 
annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease 
Ajieelllent would have: required that they advise Sterling that they did not believe the value of the 
leasehold ju.stif!ed an increase in rent rather than just ignoring or forgetting about the rent 
adjustment provision. 
(23) As stated in Beus v. Bew;, supra, under Idaho law the parries' intent is to be determined 
by the express l.allguage of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue 
of law. If there are ambigllities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of me 
parries. In ascertaining that irttent, the fact finder may consider extrinsic evidence touching upon the 
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. fn discerning the intem of the parries, by 
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the 
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision. and any 
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings. 
Beus v. Beu.s, lSI Idaho 235.238,254 P.3d 1231,1234 (20ll)(Beus). 
(24) As stated and disci!Ssed above, there is almost no credible or relevant evidence on 
these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find no controlling case law in Idaho that 
discusses how the Court should proceed when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of 
prior course of dealings ®dlor the parties' original intent. 
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is that there were no course of dealing for the following reasons: (I) Sterling, and later Quail 
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of spealdng if Sterling or Quail 
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had nothing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated 
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor 
management and/or having forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent 
adjustment. 20 
(28) Therefore: (I) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen 
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a 
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language 
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease 
Agreement. 21 
(29) The Court will apply the current market value to the 4.25 acres of property which 
make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current marlcet 
value of the 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February l, 2007 as being $1,080,000. 
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinionwith respect to the cun:ent market value of the 4.25 
acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February!, 2010 as being $990,000. 
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted to in,voke section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for 
purposes of modifYing the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in imerest to the original 
"Again <h< Cou~ recognize$ that Christison u:srlficd that he ll."VIcw.:d all of mc•s CXO<Uior oon-.. ~ m .. during his \<n!UC 
no lncreur: in rent was sought because he bcliaved. that the w.luc in: the ptopcrty was not there to support a rtl'lt inerease. While 
this"""' be an acc1lll>l1: >illlc of a!rairs donng Christison's Tel\\11$ at IIIC. 1969 tbroush 2000; as lanoush's tCSiimony OSIIIblisbod, 
In recent )'cars. this ~ cASt of f-159 has become a bot-bed of' commercial development in Poca\eUo, Idaho. For lit~ rQISOn$.. 
the Coun ;oncludc:s t:hQt there is no course of dcalins with rc:sp~ to IHC ind Bat)flock Couney in their capa.ciey ns lessors due 
SDlcly to mi5marttlgement and the fact that the provisions of the Lea!!~ Agreement were forgotten an two (2) occasions in 198j 
after the L~c Agr~mi:nt was creared and in 1996 after ll:iC agreed to .f'MI becoming a $\lbll!lnant. 
;nCcrtainly 1h~ facwr.s ma.y play a ralc in fuiUrc rent adjustments under &he- Leese Agreement,. but there Is no e.videtlcl!: in the 
record to allow them to play a role in <he a<Uus<mcn< proc:css this Coun. iS being osl<ea ro consider a.• part of t~o aoelaratory 
]udgm.:n< proeeedin(l. l'or ewnplc, ifrhc panics wctc. by written BU•'I:m<nl. obi• 10 osreo to rent adjustment tllat was lx>$ed on 
a value I~ than IS% of marl:ec value as that term wu defined by Janoush or Blaek't Law Dic!ianary~ that would certainly b~ a 
rclcvunl ctlUr.l:e: ordealillg.IWiOOncc g.oing. forward. 
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(1961). As with all modifications, tbe terms of a contract cannot be altered by 
one party without the other patty's approval. !d. at 296, 362 P 2d at 386. 
Additionally, the minds of the parties must meet as to the proposed modification. 
!d. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in 
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one 
party ill. accordance with the tenns of a change proposed by the other." !d. 
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to 
decide." Re.s. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler. 94 Idaho 935, 938,500 P.2d 836, 839 (1972). 
1bis Court, as the finder of fuct, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by 
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement. Both the 1996 Esroppel 
Certificate and the 200 I Estoppel Certificate recite as follows: 
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in 
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the 
Ollly agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord and the Tenant relating 
in any way to the Demised Premises. 
1996 Lease Agreeme11t, 112 and 2001 Lease Agreement, fl. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and 
the 200 I Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows: 
Landlord's consent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be 
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants d1.1ties or 
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tenants perfotma11ce of any 
tenn or condition of the Lease (Agre~ent], or (b) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord to any rights, ·under the "Lease [Agreement], including without 
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement. 
1996 Estoppel Certificate, 1110, ancl2001 Estoppel Certificate, ,10. 
(35) The only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease Agreeme11t is 
the lillbjective intent of Faulkner. Faulkner, testified as the individual dtafting the 2001 EstOppel 
Certificate that he purposefully left oin certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court 
would suggest that removing language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing 
the same or maldng the other party aware of its deletion does nOt establish ''mutual assent" In fact, 
some might q1.1estion the propriety of such conduct. The Court finds that this WJi!ateral act of 
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land 
Co. v. Robemen, IS! Idaho 449, 457-58, 259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as 
follows: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered his position to his 
detriment." Fullrmon v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291,295 (2006) 
(internal quotation omitted). ~waiver is foremost a question of inlellt.'' Seaport 
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.l987). 
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be estsblished. 
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estoppel." ld. 
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect to Quail Ridge's claim of col11ll!Ct 
modification, the Court, as the finder of fact, finds no facts to support the claim that ll:IC or 
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has 
found is that IHC and Bannock Couney, through poor management and oversight, neglected 
and! or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the Lease Agreeme11t. Such condu<:t does 
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease 
Agreement. 
( 40) Finally, Quail Ridge asserts thin the Court should apply the equitable dQctrine of 
laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modifY the rent either 
rctrQactively or prospectively. The CoUrt will' ax:c.ept Quail'Ridge's laches defense in pan and 
finds it to be inapplicable in part. 
(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 43 P.3d 1241, 1248 
(2002). the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense oflaches. In addressing this affirmative 
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving 
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Agreement Wltil October of 2009. This was two (2) years end over seven (7) months into the 
current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the cx:pTCss 
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to lmve its 
annual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period. 
( 44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent 
adjustment. In October of20Q9, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking to adjust the rent 
in accordance with section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was 
consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by 
section 1.3 (b) of the Lease Agreement These attempts were l!llsuccessful, and in June of 2010 
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's 
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 2Q 1 0 rent adjustment period as well as future tent 
adjustment periods. The Court collCludes that although both parties failed to comply with the 
mandatory arbittation provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the 
provisions of the Lease Agreeinent sufficient to justify an adjustment to the llll!lual rent. 
(45) Therefore, the Court concludes t4at PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for 
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of$148,500.00 annually. Therefore, fortbe three 
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three (3) 
years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 20 l3, a:ssumlng lhat Quail Ridge remains current on its annual 
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the annual rent for this three {3) year period. As such it is 
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $44s',soo.oo. This credit results in Quail Ridge being 
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period ofFebruazy I, 2010 
through January 31,2013. 
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Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
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Michael D. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. NO: · CV-10-2724 OC 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 






April 11, 2012 
DEPOSITION OF FORREST L. PRESTON 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
KENT L. HAWKINS, ESQ. 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered 
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(Appearing via Skype) 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ESQ. 
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 557-5203 
(Appearing via Skype) 
ALSO PRESENT: Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Esq. 
Richard J. McAfee, Esq. 
Joanna Crooks 











I N D E X 
Forrest L. Preston: Page 
Examination by Mr. Hawkins 3 
The deposition of Forrest L. Preston, 
a witness called at the instance of the Plaintiff, for 
purposes of discovery/use in evidence, pursuant to the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, taken by agreement on 
the 11th day of April, 2012, at Life Care Centers of 
America, 3001 Keith Street, NW, Cleveland, Tennessee, 
before Beth Ann Pell, Court Reporter and Notary Public. 
S T I P U L A T I 0 N S 
It is agreed that Beth Ann Pell, Court 
Reporter and Notary Public, may swear the witness, 
report his deposition in machine shorthand, and 
afterwards reduce the same to typewriting. 
All objections, except as to form of 
the questions, are reserved until the time of trial. 
It being further agreed that all 
formalities as to notice, caption, certificate, and 
l transmission, et cetera, and the reading and signing of 
the completed deposition by the witness, are expressly 
waived. 
___________________________________________ _! 




FORREST L. PRESTON, 
called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, 
having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
testified as follows: 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HAWKINS: 
Q My name is Kent Hawkins. I'm one of 
the three attorneys representing the Pocatello Medical 
Center in this case. If the witness would please state 
your full name for the record. 
A Forrest L. Preston. 
Q And what is your, what is your address 
there? 
A Business address? 
Q Business would be fine. 
A Okay. 3001 Keith, K-E-I-T-H, Street, 
Cleveland, Tennessee. 
Q All right. Tell me a little -- and 
let's just briefly -- a little bit about yourself 
starting with --well, we're hearing it in a little 
different order. I understand there's two corporations 
in this suit. I'm going to -- if I refer to them as 
Quail Ridge and Century Park, is it clear to you of the 
two entities that I'm speaking of? 
A Yes. 
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY (423) 267-6000 





Q And do you hold positions in both of 
these corporations? 
A Yes. 
Q What are -- what is your position in 
5 each, each of those companies? 
A Quail Ridge is the ownership entity of 
v the actual building itself and operation. Century Park 
'8 is a management company that I formed about six years 
~ ago with my youngest son, Bryan. 
Q So when you say that you formed 
Century Park, are you the sole owner of Century Park? 
Q A I share an ownership with my youngest 
~: 
' 


















My youngest son, Bryan. B-R-Y-A-N. 
Just the two of you? 
Yes. 
All right. Would the same be true of 
Quail? Who are the owners of Quail? 
A I have not reviewed that recently, but 
I believe that I am a 99 percent owner, and there is a 
one percent ownership of which --
By the way, our video went off here, 
so I don't know if that's meaning -- can you still hear 
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY (423) 267-6000 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE E X A M I N A T I 0 N 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
PO~ELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 





QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, 
and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF JODI THOMAS 
Thursday, April 12, 2012, 1:00 p.m. 
Pocatello, Idaho 
Lanice M. Lewis 
PAGE 2 
DEPOSITION OF JODI THOMAS 
BE IT REMEMBERED that the deposition of JODI 
THOMAS was taken by the attorney far the plaintiff at 
the office of MERRILL & MERRILL, located at 109 North 
Axthur, Pocatello, Idaho, Lanice M. Lewis, Court 
Reporter and Notary Public, in and for the State of 
Idaho, on Thursday, April 1~, 2012, commencing at the 
hour of 1:00 p.m., in the above-entitled matter. 
AE'E'EARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD 
BY: R. WILLIIIM HANCOCK 
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor 
Post Office Box 991 
pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
For the Defendant: 
BEARD S'l'. CLAIR GAFFNEY 
BY: MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY 
2105 coronado Street 
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April12, 2012 1 :00 p.m. 
(The following deposition proceeded as follows:) 
JODI THOMAS, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the 
Plaintiff was sworn, examined, and testified as 
follows: 
MR. HANCOCK: And let the record reflect that 
this is the deposition of Jodi Thomas, and it's the 
lime and place that was set by a prior notice of 
deposition. 
EXAMINATION 
BY MR. HANCOCK: 
Q. Will you please state your full name for 
the record, Jodi. 
A. Jodi Dawn Thomas. 
Q. And spell your last name. 
A. T -H-0-M-A-S. 
Q. And I asked you before we went on the 
record if I could call you Jodi during the 
deposition. Is that okay? 
A. Absolutely. 
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1 A. Yes. 1 Q. And was that in another legal matter? 
2 Q. Okay. So you know that there's a few 2 A. II had to do with residents in our 
3 rules that apply here. I'm going to review those, if 3 community fighting over an estate that we were pulled 
4 thafs okay,Justto - 4 into. 
5 A. Sure. 5 Q. Okay. 
6 Q. -to make sure that we make a good 6 A. I guess I'm just lucky. 
7 record for the court reporter, and we make II easier 7 Q. Yes. 
8 for her to do her job. 8 Other than conversations that you may 
9 Firs~ as you know, everything that 9 have had with your legal counsel, Jodi, what steps 
10 we're saying today is being taken down by the court 10 have you taken to prepare for your deposition today? 
11 reporter. Thafs important because in normal 11 A. None. 
12 everyday conversation, Jodi, we have a tendency to 12 Q. Okay. You haven't reviewed any 
13 speak over each other. 13 documents? 
14 We anticipate what the other person is 14 A. I did review three letters and some 
15 going to say, and then we immediately respond. 15 fax - I mean, some e-mail strands, I guess you call 
16 Durinq the deposition, we need to slow it down a 16 them. 
17 little bit so that the court reporter can make a 17 Q. Okay. What letters in particular did 
18 complete record because she can only take down one 18 you review? 
19 person ala time. 19 A. Three letters from Portneuf Medical 
20 So that means I'll have to be patient 20 Center. 
21 and make sure that you're done answering your 21 Q. And you •• 
22 question before you -I start - answer my question 22 A. They were --they were addressed to 
23 before I go on to a next question. And I'd ask that 23 me -
24 you please make sure that I've completed my question 24 Q. Okay. 
25 before you start answering, even if you think you 6 2;.;;.5 =......;.A.;;.. ~-...:;a;,;,;nd;.;;Q;;;;ua;;;;.ii.;,;;Riddg6,;ee . ..;.A.;;.;nd;;_;t;.;.;he;;;.n ;;;.an;.;;e-..:.:m.;:;ai:;,_l =~ 
~ PAGE 6 ~~=~~--~~~~-, ~ PAGE B ~~~-~-===--., 
1 know what I'm about to ask. Is that okay? 1 strand from Dod- -- Don Wadley and myself. 
2 A. Sure. 2 Q. Now, were these letters and e-mails 
3 Q. Another thing is that everything that 3 going back to October of 2009 and early •• 
4 happens here today has to be verbal. So sometimes we 4 A. Yes. 
5 want to nod our heads in everyday conversation. Here 5 Q. •• 2010? 
6 you'll need to give verbal responses. And if you 6 A. Yes. 
7 think a question lends itself to a yes/no answer, I'd 7 Q. Okay. Now, Jodi, as I understand i~ 
8 ask that you please just use r.es or no. Because if 8 you actually work - or at least on your e-mails, it 
9 you do uh-huh or uh-uh, !hats hard to tell on the 9 shows you working for an entitv named Quail Ridge 
10 record sometimes. Okay? 10 Assisted living; is that correct~ 
11 A. Okay. 11 A. Correct. 
12 Q. The next thinP., Jodi, is if I ask a 12 Q. How is that related to Quail Ridge 
13 question that you don t understand, my question makes 13 Medical Investors, LLC? 
14 no sense to you, please just tell me tha~ and I'll 14 A. We are- we operate the building. 
15 try to reword ftso that it makes sense. 15 Quail Ridge Medical Investors is the company, the 
16 · A. Okay. 16 management company. 
17 Q. Otherwise, if you go on and answer, I'm 17 Q. And so is Quail Ridge Assisted living 
18 going to assume that you understood what I was 18 wholly owned and operated tiy QuaH Ridge Medical 
19 asking. Okay? 19 Investors? 
20 A. Okay. 20 A. Yes. 
21 Q. You indicated that you'd had your 21 Q. Okay. When did you start working for 
22 deposition taken before. When was the last time you 22 Quail Ridge? 
23 had your deposition taken? 23 A. December of 2003 -I take that back. 
24 A. The one and only time was about a month 24 Well, for Quail Ridge, yes, December of 2003. I've 
25 ago, I think. 25 been with the company longer, but for Quail Ridge, 
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1 December of '03. 1 January of1983? 
2 Q. Okay. What makes you say you've been 2 A. No, I do not. 
3 with the company longer? 3 Q. Have you spoken to any of the 
4 A. I started out at our community in Twin 4 participants involved with drafting this ground lease 
5 Falls Bridge View Estates as director of sales and 5 back in January of 1983? 
6 marketin~ before taking the promotion as GM to Quail 6 A. No, I nave not. · 
7 Ridge in 03. So 1-yeah. 7 Q. Is it fair to say, then, Jodi, that you 
8 Q. So you came to the facility here in 8 have no personal knowledge regarding the drafting of 
9 Pocatello, the Quail Ridge facility in Pocatello, in 9 this ground lease back in January of 1983? 
1 0 December of 2003? 10 A. Yes, thafs fair. 
11 A. Correct. 11 Q. Andspecifically,isitfairtosaythat 
1.2 Q. And you mentioned GM. Is that the only 12 you have no personal knowledpe concerning the rent 
13 title that you've had here? 13 adjustment language that was mcluded in that ground 
14 A. At Quail Ridge, yes. 14 lease? 
15 Q. Okay. Whatare your job 15 A. Yes. 
16 responsibilities as the general manager? 16 Q. Jodi, do you claim or believe that the 
17 A. I basically manage the daily operations 17 rent adjustment provisions of the 19831ease 
18 of the community. Oversee everything that takes 18 agreement was ever orally modified by any parties to 
19 place in every department. 19 the agreement? 
20 Q. Sure. Where, ifany, of the 20 A. Notthatl'm aware of. 
21 organization of Quail Ridge Medical Investors do you 21 Q. Do you claim that any other written 
22 fi~ Jodi? 22 document modifies the rent adjustment provisions of 
23 A. I run the community. It's- the 23 the 1983 ~ound lease? 
24 company owns and operates 45 buildings in 28 states, 24 A. ain-
25 21 states. And so 1-- we have a GM in each 25 MR. AFFNEY: I'm going to object. Her 
~~~~~~~db~~~~~~ 
F"' PAGE 10 -~~-~~~~~~-----. r- PAGE 12 ~~~~-~-~~--, 
1 community across the country, and we manage the daily 1 opinion is not relevant. 
2 operations and then report to our corporate offices 2 BY MR. HANCOCK: 
3 for any major decisions. 3 Q. You can P.O ahead and answer. 
4 Q. Okay. Whom do you directly report to 4 A Not that I m aware of. 
5 with Quail Ridge? 5 Q. You had indicated, Jodi, that you looked 
6 A. Cody Tower is my regional director of 6 at this correspondence back from --well, e-mail 
7 operations, and he's out of Salt Lake City, Utah. 7 strains back from October of 2009 and then letters 
8 Q. HowdoJOU spell Cody's last name? 8 from the hospitalto you at Quail Ridge after that 
9 A. T-0-W-E-R. 9 period and in to early 2010; is that-
10 Q. I didn't wantto assume anymore - 10 A. Yes. 
11 A. First name, C-0-D-Y. 11 Q. -correct? 
12 Q, And he's a regional manager out of Salt 12 So you're familiar with those documents 
13 Lake Ci~? 13 as you sit here today? 
14 A. Yes. 14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. Jodi, how old were you in January 15 Q. Were you the main contact person for the 
16 of1983? 16 hospitalatthattime? 
17 A. January of 1983, I would have been 13, I 17 A. I was the local contact, yes. 
18 guess, because lwas 18 in '88, so... 18 Q. And so was itty~icalforthe hospital 
19 Q. So it's fair to say, then, that you were 19 to contact you with anythmg related to this lease? 
20 not involved in any way with the drafting of this 20 A. We had never had any communication prior 
21 ground lease? 21 to that, other than business, talking to doctors and 
22 A. Absolutely not. 22 nurses as far as admissions go, so ... 
23 Q. Okay. Do you personally know any of the 23 Q. And is that- was that your experience, 
24 participants who were involved in the drafting of 24 then -I think you said you started in December of 
25 !his ground lease at issue in this lawsuit back in '='2"'-5 """""'20""03;;..-~~-~~-~· 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
POR TNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO 
) DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR STAY, 
vs. ) and alternatively, REQUEST FOR BOND 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 









COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC 
("PMC") by and through its attorneys of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., and for its objection to 
Defendants' Motion for Stay, respectfully states as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
I. The court should allow PMC to proceed to obtain judgment and collect 
such judgment. 
PMC brought the present action to enforce the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by 
Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724 (the "declaratory judgment"). That 
Judgment declared the amount of past due rent owed by Quail Ridge during the last3 years but 
·, 
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stopped short of issuing a money judgment for the amount due, finding instead that there can be no 
breach of contract until the amount of rent had been deciared. 1 Despite the declaratory judgment 
ordering that rent was immediately due, Quail Ridge did not pay the rent. 2 This suit was filed to 
obtain a money judgment for the unpaid rent, so that collection could proceed for the amount 
declared due in the declaratory judgment. Thus, this action is premised entirely on Judge 
Brown's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order and his 
Amended Declaratory Judgment. 
This action is, however, a new and separate breach of contract claim which has arisen since 
Judge Brown's ruling in the declaratory judgment. Quail's failure to immediately pay the unpaid 
adjusted rents for the prior 3 years as required by the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement is a new and 
current breach of its obligations under the ground lease. Furthermore, this action involves a new 
party, Forrest L. Preston. Preston executed a Guaranty in Payment and Performance ("200 I 
Personal Guaranty"), wherein Preston personally guaranteed Quail's performance and payment 
under the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement.3 Despite a written demand being made upon Preston to 
pay the adjusted rents that Quail had failed to pay,4 Preston has not responded,5 nor has he paid 
the rent declared by Judge Brown as currently due and owing.6 Preston's failure to pay the rent is 
a new and ongoing breach of his obligations to PMC under the 2001 Personal Guaranty. 
PMC is concerned about whether it can collect from Quail and/or Preston. Quail is a 
Tennessee Limited Liability Company leasing land in Pocatello, Ida:ho.7 Preston is an individual 
1 See Amended Declaratory Judgment, dated November 25, 2012 (Bannock Counly Case No. CV -20 I 0-2724-0C; 
Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge), attached as Exhibit 2 to PMC's Complaint. 
2 See Affidavit of Don Wadle, at 112. 
3 See Guaranty in Payment and Performance, attached as Exhibit I to PMC's Complaint. 
4 See November 27, 2012 Letter, attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel. 
5 See Affidavit ofCounse1, at1f 3. 
6 See Affidavit of Don Wadle, at 11 3. 
7 See Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order, dated October 16, 2012 (Bannock 
Counly Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C; Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge), at p. I 0,1\112-4, attached as Exhibit 2 to 
Affidavit ofCounse1 ("Memorandum Decision"); see also Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as 
Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel. 
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residing in and primarily doing business out ofTennessee.8 Defendant Quail's primary interest in 
Pocatello, Idaho, is the leasehold that is at issue in this action.9 Given Defendants' minimal 
connections to Pocatello, Idaho, PMC is reasonably concerned that it will be without adequate 
protection should it not be allowed to quickly proceed to a money judgment in the present action 
and further be allowed to immediately collect on such money judgment. 
In contrast, it is without dispute that PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company whose 
principal place of business is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. IO It is further without 
dispute that in addition to owning the 4.25 acre leased premises at issue in this action, I I PMC 
owns and operates its hospital located in Pocatello, Idaho. I2 Given PMC' s substantial connection 
to and presence in Pocatello, Idaho, this Court should recognize that Defendants will have 
sufficient protection with this court to obtain a refund of any judgment collected by PMC in this 
action should PMC not prevail on appeal. 
Should PMC be allowed to proceed to and prevail on summary judgment in this matter, this 
Court should also allow PMC to immediately collect on any money judgment entered in this 
action. This Court should find, considering that PMC is allowing Quail to continue to occupy the 
leased premises, that Quail be required to pay the full amount of rent ordered by Judge Brown. 
Furthermore, based upon Defendants actions in this matter, PMC is reasonably concerned that 
these out-of-state Defendants will simply abandon the leased premises should Defendants not get 
the outcome they desire in the appeal. 
8 See Deposition ofForrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel. 
9 See Memorandum Decision, at p. 10, ~~ 2-4; see also Deposition of Forrest L. Preston, at pp.3-4, attached as Exhibit 
3 to Affidavit of Counsel; see also Deposition of Jodi Thomas, at pp. 8-10, attached as Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of 
Counsel 
10 See Memorandum Decision, at p. I 0, 1)1. 
ll See Memorandum Decision, at p. 10, ~ 3. 
12 See Memorandum Decision, at p. 20, ~ 40. 
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II. In the alternative, the conrt should wait to stay the case until a 
judgment is obtained. 
Typically, a case on appeal already has a judgment that becomes immediately enforceable 
if the appeal fails. PMC requests that it be allowed to do the same in this case and that it at least be 
allowed to obtain a money judgment so as to avoid any further delay after the appeal. This 
approach is the most efficient course for all the parties. 
The parties agree that this case hinges on Judge Brown's declaratory judgment. Thus, if 
Judge Brown's rulings and judgment are upheld on appeal, Defendants are without legal argument 
or excuse in the present action. Alternatively, if Judge Brown's judgment is not completely 
upheld on appeal, then PMC will be without a basis for the current action. This simple reality 
clearly demonstrates that the present action is ripe for a summary judgment and should be quickly 
resolved by this Court with little additional expense to the parties. 
Indeed, PMC is willing to quickly resolve the present action by entering into a stipulation 
with Defendants that a money judgment can be entered in the present matter based upon Judge 
Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment with an understanding that the Judgment should be 
stayed until the conclusion of the appeal. PMC is further willing to stipulate with Defendants that 
the judgment is immediately enforceable if Judge Brown is upheld on appeal or, in the alternative, 
is void if Judge Brown's declaratory judgment is not upheld on appeal; subject to a bond, as 
discussed below. 
The above described approach is not costly to either party and will greatly expedite the 
finalization of this dispute at the conclusion of the appeal in the declaratory judgment. Otherwise, 
if Defendants are not willing to stipulate to a judgment as outlined above, PMC should be allowed 
to immediately proceed to a summary judgment in this matter. Contrary to Defendants assertions 
in their motion, no depositions will be required to support such motion for summary judgment 
because the motion will be based primarily on the declaratory judgment. Allowing this case to 
proceed to summary judgment at this early stage will cost the parties a relatively minimal amount 
of additional expense at this point while it avoids the additional delay after the appeal of the 
declaratory judgment. IfPMC is not allowed to immediately proceed to a summary judgment in 
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this matter, Defendants may be inclined, if their Answer and motion are any indication, to 
unnecessarily drag out this dispute between the parties for many months even if the Idaho Supreme 
Court decides in favor of PMC on the appeal. Such continued delay will be prejudicial and unfair 
toPMC. 
Allowing the case to proceed to judgment brings the case to the same point at which an 
appeal is usually filed, which is after the money judgment is entered; the stay is merely to delay 
enforcement of the judgment during the appeal. There is no reason to not allow this case to go 
that far. 
III. Either way, the court must order Quail and Preston to post a bond. 
If the court chooses to allow the case to proceed to judgment, but to then stay collection of 
the judgment, the court should order a bond on the amount of the money judgment in this case, or 
on the amount declared due by Judge Brown in the declaratory judgment, which is the same 
amount. Even if this Court will not allow PMC to immediately collect on any money judgment it 
obtains in this action, this Court should recognize that it has broad discretion under I.R. C.P. 62( d) 
and I.A.R. 13(b)(l4)-(15) to require the Defendants to post a supersedeas bond as a condition to 
granting any stay. Requiring the Defendants to post such a bond in this case will ensure that PMC 
is able to quickly collect on its judgment once Judge Brown's rulings and declaratory judgment are 
upheld on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, this court should not stay the present action as requested by 
the Pefendants, but rather should allow this action to proceed to a money judgment and allow 
PMC to collect the rent on the land being occupied by Quail. Alternatively, PMC should be 
allowed to proceed to obtain judgment, with an understanding that such money judgment will be 
stayed during the pendency of the appeal of the first case, subject to Defendants posting a bond for 
the amount of that judgment. 
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DATED this ;uctay of February, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
,./ ~ ~~:;;_ 
By __ ~~~~~~~----~-----­
Kent L. Hawkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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. --I s;'.l.u..t\. 
Sujl!'lmie Collrt of Jll<lj,je .Drown wlllnu!llf.r ·the l'lemlillllllllot by I!'MC. Thm.lllls Court slli>\Wd 
wail umil. the SllPfl!ll1il Court has decided llle ~~~ befu!<lnm~ forwl\rd will! !his ;:ase. 
PMC's NqUIIS! 1\:>r a b\tllld sbould ho dooonl hoClllll!\l (a) ·lllo <:ll$6& where the bend slwllid baw 
been Nq~ Is prim- CllSe <l!ld (b) ~ ill no ol1lip!loo to _.,. ll!l!iln$1.. A supemdl)!l1; oond 
i!$fillm!1 llpinst JW. ~ ~ Here, lllel<lllllll ~~- liD flliliillg !bel Qu!ill·~ hilS 
blucllild the~!. Umil ~is suah a tw~ lllm i1; ~to-· 
Argument 
A$ll!llild In p!iw brl~ilntl, !be~~ is emwly premU;ild Ill! tile validity of Jlldge 
BroMl's r~ ofl11ct llllll concl~~Sllllll! ofla.w in BmlllOCk Caooty Clwl No .. CV·l3o2724:. 
Qwil Ridge b!l$ !IP!lfll!led Jm:lp &:19i11' s fi~· ood. Clll!Cill$iO!l$ til the ldalw s~ COlllt 
Wid dl!ll~ llle validity md JmlPI'i"!Y of !hall¢ lllldi!lSl'. tt •ill ~ ftim;lhe Ill~ ill. the 
com,lllil!l WI I'MC !l!at the efli'*Y oflllii; laWillli~ is ~sea !ltl tba wliclilf of tl!e·llntllnp .in 
llle psi« law$!lil. ffi>'II'I>Vft, lfdle !dllho s~ Colli:! 0~ lu.lltQWII'$ :li!!dlnp lht.m 
lllc en'iire baois for lllc I~~WSul! wl!l be ulldOM. Too c!lml!lt c• wm -10 llX$$t il!ld lllc aelioo 
will be t1100!el!. Thw, lbelc is no seuse ln~dlng wilh Ibis laWilllit oo!ll ~·is a decis!Oll 
ll:um llle fdobe Supreme Court in lllc ~ Fllfllna 10 .W.V lbis !ilii~llt:m wouW lm!llll(i<lmpll!lh 
!be milo of judicia!~ orajuola® i~w~on of !be !Ml!llr. /ill¢ ·!d!!Uo It Civ. 
P. l{aH21l!2). 
1 There Is no basis fl:lf requiring a bond If the maltw Is l!ltayed. 
J>MC llllll cilild oo ~ !hat wouM1 leq!UB Qwil ~ to poot a bood U'lllc· Cwrt W!~ 
!bla ~- The rules ei!etl by PMC do lld appl.rtll !llis ~:a~~e; ~. 1lley i!pply W !be prior 
C~~Se tri!ld l:lll!'iltll JudS!' Brown. ~ DtQWii's filld~, b()-, d!llnoiCl!lilbiWu t!Bacll of 
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!!lillie.!' ju~m. The ·C®rlooly gnmled dooll!tl!tury mitt and lllsmlsll<ld the breach <>f ~ 
claim by !'MC ~Qual! Ri~'<' il)ttlu> otfiiiSI!llelt! period lit issue ln!M C81!e. In sh<m, ~ 
ill no basis f<>r to~~£Ulri~J& a !l!lperm:lem; bood tn. tl!is-. !f 11 holld were 11:> M"'' hoau J1!1'$Wd. il 
should have hoau in ll$$0Cilltioo willl tba appeal 11:> a-a II!U!!I>Yjuilpnt Si!ICII thm WS$ no 
lllUtley ji'IJ!gmem 11Will'®cl, tba $1,1jl<lrsedem; holld requi~d!ICII twtnpply. 
However, l'MC lliWel' ~ a hofld tu. posted in tba afjlW be!la81ie it 1m$ oo money 
.iudJ!mmt. iUIIes 13(b)(14)-(lS)apply !)Illy to a~ lakenlrom II tlnlll J~ ThlHIIIle m 
a~ laMmlt ad ill :IIlli M!IPJ)tllete ~adi~. Rn;le ll(b)(l4) I\PJIIies 11:1 etaYhil! ordem 
otbar theu moooy judp1«1!s m l1lll!llClalioo with on. ~Ill ad doe.~ oot apply m tl!is -· Rule 
IJ(b)(lS).IIjljllim m tba sQ!y t~fmooey j~, wlli<lli is ek.l;rly iupp!IMble be_., J>MC 
lru:ks a mwey j.udgmlmt in both -. 
PMC ~a~~ it Wlm!S ro ~qJI!IIkly Cllll®t on ill!~" foJJowWg thll' 
appeal. H!lwc¥er, following tba ~ PMC wll! sill! baWl 1<1 prove a breolt of~ ad 
OOlaln a judgmeat. There Ism j~ llp<ll> wlllch PMC ma,y q~ oollellt. ··'!lmllllUII¢r 
willlllilllllllle ro ~ ro trill I Mll Quai! Ridge will-It Ill! de.limses illcludillg res j~ll! 
Mll eollli!emllll110pplll. There is a sigaificmt RI'IIOOIII of~ that wll need to be jllll'furil!<ld 
~ PMC lllm:~ll bepe In Mq;uire ajudpl«<t lu tills-. Q.- Ri.dp bllJ1 ~sa~ 
af!im'lllllive defe- that (:(l!lld preclude all ml!®tlu!l lllltlrity by l'MC. s.uch work wlU be 
~ tftbe S~Colllltm~J~Brown. 
2 PMC concedes tllat ll'lll cauea of action Ia balled on Judge Brown's fiilldtngs. 
In its brletlll!f. PMC eaiiCIIdes ·tlmt 1his entire case is promi.l'ed 1111 !be ll!llidi!y of Jwl!!i> 
llmwa.'$ filldillgs of lirolll 1i!ll.dcooclusloml of law. (1'1. Mem. 1112.) Thlio 11ulllWile of !be ~ i.q 
vlilll m ~~~that lbis <1:lml provides a Cl:lllll!i!l<ltllliii!Ult. Til= ill oo ~fur· tha plll'llns Ill 
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kn.:rw metllct !he ~n bmg cleinied b)' PMC iii valid Wllil!he S~ <.'mlrt lms mloo 
oo Judge llrown'a findings. Allow !his cue to Jl'IO'*'Ii 10 judgment l!l!wretllll~~ppeal has beon 
decided risks m. i®onsistent result 11 is !ilsn ool the 1110s1 <>flrelent lll!e ofjudiWI! resn-. 
Walling mttll !he ;appel.latl\1 decli!ioo saves !he pill'lie~~' lime and tesnaree~~lhat Wllll!d be <llllerwlllie 
Wll$1cd. If Ju~ DooWII Iii MVerood, !hen !he j:llll)!iqcm 001it with lh3l iof{)!'lllafitm. If J~ 
Br<lwn is affinood, then !he slay 0011 be lilll:ld ad lhe j:llll)!ie!l mil}' Jl'IO~ will! dist'overy, 
dispositiw molioos, illlil, if lleelli!!Sary, ttial. It is only a1hst !he appeal ls complllred.lhal•lhc 
)lill1ie!lcmlmow wll.!!lher lhe emire lllwsu!t remain$ valid. P~"ll will'! litis. e- -lil 
pmlll!lllille md inooru!iili!IM w!lh the~ of j!ldioial eoo~y. 
3 Quail Rkl.ge hee valid lflirmatill(l defen11n. 
Quail Ridplms. \'1illid de~ in litis eliSe, J;llill'llllily res jndiellla lll!d oolllltet!!l es10ppel. 
J>MC oom'I!Dielnly !ililsto dill!:l01'10 tile ll!lll: tbat It JliiOvimmly saed Quail Rldp ~U>dw It ll1ell!y af 
broo~h oJ'eoo!rll!:t IUid llrmmP~< :for !lie l·Y!IV ru:ijuS!Imem period at lllmlil l!IIMs c_, I'MC aloo 
d- not disclose to tile Court &a !'Me Wlllll tolriul with that ~h <.>£ C®lmOI <llaim p!m~ 
moo its -e. IUid In mS]lellH t11 a "direO!oo verdictM moline, wllh!ll'l!w !be breallh uf C®treel 
ellllm, IUid J~ a-eamrud· a diree!OO verdictdii!mi!ISII!g thai c!nim. The illsw mbreallh of 
contract waslrlOO t11 !be Com! lll!d I'MC lOlii its brooch of oommctlllaim. l'lllls, reprdl- of me 
appeel, the \'1illidi.ty of litis ooliec!!on~~e!i.onli! <llilpll1lld. 
Thll$., llllo~ PMC Ill file a l!lOfton for SLmmllll}' J•td!lDlll! will only inclll' OOi1lls llml can 
lll!d iilloold be <lelaylid Ulllil !he IIJlpeal is msolwd. ~ OOi1lls may not evlm be neoot!illl:t)riflbe 
Su~ Coultl'l'vemes .Illidge Bmwn. If they me~. !hen maitiog Wlril tbair lliltlm!IJ! 
bi!C®leli clellr Jmljodice& no pmy In th!• ~ The oosm are defllm:d llll!il the jli!.)J>lll: time 
moo me pa!li«< mow wlm! i~ !fay, reO!lliulh~lhe!!ppe3!. ~11li !he~-
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Conclu&km 
Ail a mlllt llf !he foregoing, !lllllll!.ltiou lilt smy ;bould illo pi!IOO and !he req~~es! IW a bt:>ml 
llbould oo ®nJad, 
DA"fEO: l!ellnmy 28, l~l3 
JOOn voodet 
Ofhm Sl. Clalr~ PA 
At~;;Jrneysti>rtltc Defelldlmls 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (lSB # 7938) 
MERRILL & M.ERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Poc!ltello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Te!efllX 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 









COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC, 
by and through its coWlSe! of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), and 
hereby respectfLilly moves this Court for an order compelling the Defendants, Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, an individu!ll, to comply with this Court's Order 
dated March 6, 2013. Specifically, in the Minute Entry and Order dated March 6, 2013, this Court 
granted Defendants' Motion to Stay pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62(b), "pending the posting of 11 bond by 
the Defendants in the amount of$416,812.50, the amount Judge Brown declared to be due." 
More than three months have passed since the time this Court ordered Defendants to post a 
bond in the am01.mt of$416,812.50 and Defendants have still failed to post such bond with the 
5975: Motion to Compel Page l 
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Court. Plaintiff has attempted in good faith for several months to get the DefendatJ.ts to comply 
with the requirements of the Court's March 6, 2013 Order and Defendants have still failed to post 
the bond ordered by the Court. 
Plaintiff now respectfully requests this Court to order Defendants to post a bond within 5 
days of the hearing of this Motion and. for the court to further order Defendants to pay all of 
Plaintiff's attorney's fees associated with pursuing and bringing this Motion to Compel and for 
any such further relief the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances of this case. 
This motion is made and based on the pleadings and documents on file with the Court as 
well as the &ffldavit submitted simultaneous herewith. 
Or&l argument is requested. 
DATED this \Zih d!ly o'fJune, 2013, 
5975; Motion to Compel 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CI-ITD. 
--
. William Hflllcoc 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the tbregoing 
document was this L day of June, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael D. Gaffhey 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, !D 8320 l 
(Chambers Copy) 
5975: Motion to Compel 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 793 8) 
MERIULL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
I 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telef:ax 
Attorneys for Plaintit); 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 





) Case No. CV-20!2-5289 
) 
) 
) AFFIDA VlT OF COUNSEL IN 
P. 02/18 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an 
individual, 







STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
I, R. William Hancock, Jr., 'being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
I, I am. one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter. 
2, On March 6, 2013, the Comt entered a Minute Entry and Order granting the 
Defendants' Motion to Stay, "pending the posting of a bond by the Defendants bt the amount of 
$416,812.50. 
S97S: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for PersonRI Sen-ice on Out of StRte Defendant Page 1 
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3. A true and correct copy of the Court's March 6, 2013, Minute Entry and Order is 
attached hereto as Exhibit l. 
4. On March 12,2013, Kent Hawkins, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the 
above-captioned matter, sent COlTespondence to attorney Mike Gaflhey, one of the attorneys for 
the Defendants, .requesting that the bond be posted or a check deposited with the Court within 14 
days o:fthe court's mling, which would have been March 20, 2013. 
5, A true and correct copy of Mr. Hawkins' March 12, 20131etter as is kept in the files 
of the Merrill & Merrill law :firm is attached hereto as Exhibit 2. 
6. On March 20,2013, attorney Michael Gaf61ey responded to Mr. Hawkins' March 
12, 2013, letter, stating: "With regard to the bond requirement in this matter, my client will most 
likely be posting a cash deposit with the clerk in the court and we will keep you apprised of the 
status of the deposit." 
7. A trtJe and correct copy of Mr. Gaffhey's March 20,2013, letter is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 3. 
8. On or about AprillO, 2013, I telephoned attorney John M. Avonclet, one of the 
attorneys for the Defendant, inquiring about the status of the bond and stressing the need to timely 
get a bond deposited with the CoM. This telephone conversation ended with Mr. Avondet 
advising me that he would check into the issue and get back with me on the status of the bond. 
9. On or about April12, 2013, I received an e-mail from attomey John M. Avondet, 
advising me that his client contact with regard to the bond issue, Riel< McAfee, was out of the 
office until next week and, therefore, be did not "have an update on jJle bond issue yet." 
10. A true and correct copy ofMt·. Avondet's Aprill2, 2013, e-mail is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 4. 
11. On that same date, I responded to Mr. Avondet thanking him for his e-mail and 
informing him. that I would not "hassle [him] too much while [he] worked on an answer" 
concerning the bond so long as he could "just assure me that [he] will follow through on this 
issue.'' 
1 2. Mr. Avondet wrote me back on that same date stating that he would follow-tiP on 
the bond issue. 
5975: Afl'idavit of Counsel in Support ofMotiorn far Personal Service on Out or State D0fCndant Page 2 
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13. A true and correct copy of these additional April 12, 2013, e-mail exchanges is 
attached hereto as Exhibit 5. 
14. On or about April26, 2013, Mr. Avondet e-mailed me stati.ng the following: "I 
owe you a response to your inquiry Let me at least say that it is being worked on. We'!"e exploring 
the option of depositing the required amount into a restricted account that would be FBO Quail 
Ridge and PMC, with restrictions being the funds can only be released upon proper court order or 
something to that effect. We're working on that portion. So, it's in progress." 
15. A true and correct copy of Mr. Avondet's April26, 2013, e·mail is attached hereto 
as Exhibit 6. 
!6. More than a month has pnssed since this last communication from Defendants' 
counsel and a bond still has not been posted nor has a cash deposit been lodged with the Clerk of 
the Court. 
17. On or about June 10,2013, I telephone attorney JohnAvondet and left him a voice 
mail message advising hint that if his clients had not obtained a bond or made a cash deposit with 
the Clerk of Court by Thursday, Jtme 13, 2013, then Plaintif'fwouldfile a motion to compel on this 
issue and seek attorney's fees associated within bringing such motion. 
18. I followed-up that telephone message with a lette1· to the same effect, which letter 
was faxed to Mr. Avondet on that same date. 
19. A tn1e and correct copy of my June 10,2013, letter along with the accompanying 
fax continuation sheet is attached hereto as Exhibit 7. 
DATED this rt'1oday of June, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Personal Service on Out llfState Defendant :Page 3 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this /Z:Jt...-day of hme, 2 13. 
l) 7. "'rtJ...l/'-' leJ .. ufo.._ 
Notary Public thr Tdaho 
Residing at: 'Fbto·i-e ds . 1 D 
My Commission Expires: h .. ";;-I] 
P. 05/16 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, Kent L. Hawkins, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a tnle, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was this I b 'fl.. day of J~me, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated 
below: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, ID 8320! 
(Chambers Copy) 
[_]U.S. Mail 
[_] Hand Delivery 
[_] gvemight Mail 
L!d11acsimile 
[_]U.S. Mail 
LJ Hand Delivery 
[j Overnight Delivery 
[_.j""relefax 547-2147 
5975: Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Motion for Personal SerVice on Out of State Defendant Page 5 
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IN THE DISTIUCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIALDISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1N AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d!bla 











QUAIL RlDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) 





CASE NO. CV-2012-5289-0C 
NUNUTEENTRYANDORDER 
P. 07/16 
This case came before this Court on March 4, 2013, tbr hearing on a Motion to Stay filed. 
by the Defendants. The Plaintiff filed an Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay, and 
alternatively, Request for Bond. 
Cmmsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendants wore pl·esent. The matter proceeded to 
hearing. After considering the parties' arguments and tlpon review of the file and the relevant 
law, this Court issued a ruling from the Bench. 
Tllis lawsuit arises from a dispute regarding the amount of rent owed by the Defendants 
under a Ground Lease Agreement eiecuted on January 27, 1983. The amount of past due rent 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- I 
CASE NO. CV-2012-5289-0C 
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was reso.lved by a declaratory judgment entered by the Honorable Mitcheli W. Brown in 
Bannock County Case No. CV-l0-2724. Pursuant to the Amfl!lded Declaratory Judgment 
entered in that case, Judge Brown determined that "Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay 
[Portrieuf Medical Center] $416,812.5 0 under the tenns of the parties' Ground Lease 
Agreement." (See Ex. 2, attached to Compl., Dec. 13, 2012.) Quail Ridge appealed. 
The Plailltiff fl.led the current action in order to recover tl1e amount stated to be due ln the 
.t· • 
.AI. .... -.. . ........ ..,., . .. - . 
Amended Declaratory Judgment. The Defendants thereafter moved for a stay in this case 
pending the outcome of its appeal, arguing a stay is necessary because "[t]he pre.sent action is 
entirely premised on the validity of Judge Brown's findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
B!Ulllock County Case No. CV-10-2724." (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Stay, Feb. 7, 2013, 
2.) The Plaintiff objected to the entry of a stay, but argtted in the alternative tllat this Court 
should require the Defendants to post a stlpersedeas bond as a. condition to granting any stay. 
The Plaintiff argued that "[r]equiring the Defendants to post such a bond in tllis case will ensure 
that PMC is able to quickly collect on its judgment once Judge Brown's rulings and declaratory 
judgment a.re upheld on appeal." (Pl.'s Reply to Defs.' Mot. to Stay, Feb. 25, 2013, 5.) 
Following oral arguments, this Court granted the Motion to Stay pursuant to Rule 62(b) 1 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, pending the posting of a bon.;! by tile Defendants in the 
amonnt of$416,812.50, tile amount Judge Brown declared to be due. Following the posting of 
1 Rnle 62. Stay of proceedings. 
' 
(b) Stay on Motion for New Trial or for Judgment. In its discretion and on such conditions for the security of the 
ad~erse. pru:ty as are proper, the cour.t may stay the execution of or any proceedings to enforce a judg,ment pending 
!Qe disposition of a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion 
for relief from a judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of & motion for judgment in accordance with a 
motion for a directed verdict made pur~uant to Rule 50, or of a motion for amendment to tho findings or for 
addi(ional fmdings made pursuant to Rule 52(b). 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 2 
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an appropriate bond, this matter will be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal filed in 
Brumock Cmmty Case No. CV-10-2724. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~ day of March, 2013. 
Copies to: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
Michael D. Gaffney 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER- 3 
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~C:.~ 




.~ ~., ... ..., ••• ..., vv·o-. ill IIL.H.i\lLL lX JU.:.J\1\.LLL 
DAVE R. GALLAF1lNT 
KENT L. liA WK!NS* 
Bl!ENDON C. 1'AYLOR 
KENT A. HIGGJNS* 
JARED A. STEADMAN 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK 
TYLER H. NEILL 
*Al-SO ADMl'l"rED IN TJ7'AH 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS ANU ATTORNEYS AT L4W 
J.09 N. ARTNUR • o•" FLOOR 
P.O. BOX991 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204·0991 
March 12,2013 
Sent Via Facsimile: 208-529-9732 
Michael. D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
RE: PMC v Quail Ridge Meclical!nvf!stors. et al 
Bannock County Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C 
Dear Mr. Gaffney: 
P. 10/16 
A.L. MERRILL (1886-1961) 
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972) 
W.F. MERRILL (1.919·2005) 
TELEPH0Nl!J:208·282-2286 
FAX:208·232-2499 
Foruu:led in 1918 
We received the court's Minute Entry and Order today ordering Quail to post the bond in this matter. 
I realized that the court did not enclose a specific deadline on this. Please let me know when you 
expect to have the bond posted or a cheok deposited. It seems reasonable that this should be 
accomplished within 14 days of the court's ruling so it could be done by March 20. Please let me 
lcnow if that is going to be a problem. 
Sincerely, 







VIA FACSIMlLE: (208} 232-:!499 
March 20, 2013 
Kent L. Hawkins 
Merrill & Merrill 
P0Box991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
RE: PMC v. Quail Ridge Medical Investor& 
Delli' Kent: 
( -',. 
\, ;Q7:41:0Sa,m, 03-20-2013 
Miebael }}. Gaffney 
2105 Coronado Street • Idaho finlls, ID 83404 
Phone (208) 557~5203 • Fax (208) 529-9732 
Assistant (Jessica) (208)557-5223 
E:mail gaffhe...x@beardstclair.com =·-· 
Admitted in Idaho, Wyoming & Oregon 
un•e-• 
. Mul.ft-MIUQI<~~FaioU>t 
. '""'Top 'lltol "-in -D 
I am in receipt of your :March 12, 2013letter. With regard to the bond requirement in this 
matter, my client will most likely be posting a cash deposit with the clerk of.tbe collrt and we 
will keep you apprised of the status of the deposit. 
Additi ying with the Court's order requiriug the po~ting of a bond, we are not 
acknowl mt' s pre judgment order is con-ect. 
Attomty•ll.,.,.d in ldoho Colonulo O!ogoo W"hingl<lll W~amios Utah 
P. 11/16 
1 /1 
WlmJtnn v. B~rd ' 1ohnG. St. Clair Michael D. Chtmc::y Gn:::soJYC.Caldllr Dille: P. Thom9QR JArinO. Himtner Latl¢e:J_ SdnlliJct 
J.:lfl't'y D. Brunao11 Doll C. Dflrmn31' laNd W. AJicm Johfi M. Ava•ldct Micbul W. &own J11lie Stornpcr Canird. 
Lindsay M- Lo(gr.m. !U.rlow J, M~Namnrn. ODRJon S. l'Qalchcr Qlair J_ Grover 13- $CQU. ho: 
ofC'O!.In~ ~fCO!RIHI ai'CtiiJMIII DFCoonNII 
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John Avondet <javondet@beardstclair.com> 
Friday, Aprill2, 2013 2:11 PM 
William Hancock 
P. 12/16 
Subject: 20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge <To: Quai!Ridge_PMC> 
I will follow up. But please understand that my ability to be responsive to you Is dependent on others being responsive to me. 
Have a good weekend. 
JMA 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Tel. (208) 557-5208 
Fax(208)529-9732 
e-mail: javondet@beardstclair.com 
This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be privileged and confidential. 
If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e-mail and notify us immediately. 
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any 
attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not intended to be used, and cannot be used or 
relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for 
promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. 
From: William Hancock<bhancoc~@merrillandmerrill.com> 
Date: Friday, Apri112, 2013 2:11 PM 
To: John Avondet <javondet@beardstclair.com> 
Subject: RE: 20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge <To: QuaiiRidge_PMC> 
--- .••. _, _________ , ____________ _ 
Thank you John. If you can just assure me that you will follow through on this issue, I will try not to hassle you too much 
while you work on an answer. 
Thanks, 
/s/ 
R. Williarn Hancoclc, Jr. 
Merill & MerrlJI, Chtd. 
109 N. Arthur. 5111 Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
P: (208) 232-2286 
F: (208) 232-2499 92 of 447
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bhancock@merrillandmerrlll.com 
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From: John Avondet [mailto:javoadet@beardstclair.comJ 
Sent: Friday, April12, 2013 1:46 PM 
To: bbancock@merrillandmerrill.com 
Subject: 20130412 PMC v. Quail Ridge <To: QuaiiRidge_PMC> 
Bill: 
Rick McAfee is out of the office until next week. Sa unfortunately, I don't have an update on the bond issue yet. 1 will try and 
touch base with him early next week and get back to you. 
Thanks. 
JMA 
John M. Avondet 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Tel. (208) 557-5208 
Fax (208) 529-9732 
e·mail: javondet@beardstclair.com 
This e-mail is sent by a law firm and contains information that may be privileged and confidential. 
If you are not the intended recipient, please delete the e"mail and notify us immediately. 
IRS Rules of Practice require us to inform you that advice, if any, in this email (including any 
attachments) concerning federal tax matters is not intended to be used, and cannot be used or 
relied upon for the purpose of avoiding penalties under the Internal Revenue Code, nor for 
promoting, marketing or recommending any transaction or matter addressed herein. 
EXHJBI'J1 
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John Avondet <j<~vondet@beardstcfair.com> 
Friday, April 26, 2013 4:00 PM 
William Hancock 
20130426 Bond Inquiry 
I owe you a response to your inquiry about the status of the bond. Let me at least say that it is being worked on. We're 
exploring the option of depositing the required amount Into a restricted account that would be FBO Quaill{idge and PMC, 
with the restriction being the funds can only be released upon proper court order or something to that effBct. We're working 
on that portion. So, it's in progress . 
•......................................... , .... ,, .. ,,.,,,,.,,.,,,,,,,,,, .... _, __ ,,. _____ ,.,,,,,,,,,,, ___ .............. ,,,.,, ... .,,,,..,,,,,,,,,,,.,,,,.,,,,,,,,,,, .. , .................................... , .. ,.,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,......................... ............................................... . .... ,,.,, ...... ,. ............................. . 
John M. Avondet I Attorney 
2105 Coronado St 1 Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
DIRECT (208) 557-52.06 I MAIN (208) 523-5171 
~: 
Tl1is e-mail is sen I; by a law firm and contains infomMtion t11at may bE> privil<~9ed and conf"iclential. lf you arn not the 
int~nded recipient, please clelete t.:M e-mail and notif\r us immecliat·ely . 
................... ,.,., ............. ,., ........................... ,. .......................................................................................................................................................... , .. ,.,,., .... ,,,, .................................................................. ,,.......................... .. ................... ,.,,. 
'~-
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~Ph! VIa Faeim%l (l9B) S29-Q73l 
JohnAvi>TJilct 
11...-.1 St. Clair 
210> COIOnodo S!nocl 
!doho F.Uo, J'l) 834\\4 
Ro: l'MCIQ••il Rl<l&•- 2m3 Rent A<\iU8tmont 





I lim writing Ulisl<Mer in follow up liJ t11o vol-.il Jb4t 1 loft tbr rou Clllflior todny. Without 
l1i\vins; co mob lfD. in·dcpth mcitation tJ'f our r®ent ~unl~:~nt:i,Qna. sufflCb it to say that our 
finn hao lriod to work with you fur'""""" mo~tb• now I<> hnvo your •li"111 com)!ly wltk tho 
Comt'o Ol'dorifl !ha ooove referonct<l m~tlor by 40positins tbo neeooo!U)I fuodo il:i oocurily for 
tbo stay .,.,.,od by U~t Court. Evon !housh ~our client wos rlminded of its obli~tion 1<1 oarnply 
with !hi• Court'• Ofdar over I:W~ montlm ago, tD tbo dato oftb!s lotiO!' no dopoSit hqs boon modo 
with tho Collrt'" ~d by Iq41!o Nafu:. W•lllo boyobd tho point ofwonons to 4isouss this 
matttr furl:bet, 
Iii lh,.nd,lt io re~~Uy quitooltnp!o. Yollr oli""t W.. to comply with llio Cnt~~t'• Ordar. Your 
client h~• not done so, ond w• will filo a Motion to Compel 04 tld• ~o ... byth;s 'fhul'•duy, Juno 
13, 20!3, You oan lot your ollent know thot wa orono! fn!.,..tod in ~ymoro cl""er ld•" for 
bo!f·hoa®iloomplianoo with tho Collrt'; Order. Rlllhor, wo wont olrict oomplillllco wiUllbo 
Colllt'• Ordc;r. lfl!lloh bBB not o01n""od byTh1lmllly, JIU!Oil, 20!3, we w\11 promptly fil• our 
Modon. to Compo!. Your ollont ohou!d koow th~t wo will sook •!tomoy fc., I'd 4!ed to thio 
MQfion 1<> Compel. Wo bcliOliO !!J•I wo""' .. ~~l:d tolh<Bo a!l<lmoy foos .... .,.. Wll havo lrl•d 
in &ood lllirl> !!lr two mont!"' i!OW to ooop..-.rivoly wor~ with :vour client to bovo it comply with 
the Court's Or4or. 
Slnooroly, 
MlliUULL lit. Ml>IUULL, CHTO. 
+S~m~ Witb.DIIE l(tnJI1~RI 
ta avoid dlfil\y 
R. Will!om HllllllOcl: 
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KENT L. HAWKINS• 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR 
!Oi:NT A. IiiGGINS'" 
J.AllJijD A. S'l'liADMAN 
R. WILJ,IAM HANCOCK 
TYLER H. NEILL 
,-"'··. 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS AND A'l'TO!l.NEYS AT LAW 
109 N. AR'rHlJR- 5'1'H fLOOR 
P.O. BOX991 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991 
June 10, 2013 
Sent Via Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
John Avondet 
Beard St. Clair 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
Re: PMC/Quail Ridge- 2013 Rent Adjustment 




R.D. MERRILL (lB9H972) 
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005) 
TELEPHONE:208·232·2286 
fA.lC:208·232·2499 
Found•d ill 1913 
I am writing this letter in follow up to the voicemail that I left for you earlier today. Without 
having to make an in-depth recitation of our recent communications, suffice it to say that our 
finn has tried to work with you for several months now to have your client comply with the 
Court's Orderin the above referenced matter by depositing the necessary funds as security for 
the stay entered by the Court. Even though your client was reminded of its obligation to comply 
with this Court's Order over two months ago, to the date of this letter no deposit has been made 
with the Court as required by Judge Naftz. We are beyond the point of wanting to discuss this 
matter further. · 
In the end, it is really quite simple. Your client has to comply with the Court's Order. Your 
client has not done so, and we will file a Motion to Compel on this issue by this Thursday, hme 
13,2013. You can let your client know that we are not interested in anymore clever ideas for 
half-hearted compliance with tlle Court's Order. Rather, we want strict cornpliallCe with the 
Court's Order. If such has not occurred by ThlU'sday, June 13, 2013, we will promptly file our 
Motion to Compel. Your client should know that we will seek attorney fees related to this 
Motion to Compel. We believe that we are entitled to these attorney fees because we have tried 
in good faith for two months now to cooperative'ly work with your client to have it comply with 
the Court's Order. 
If you have questions on any of this, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
*Sent without signature 
to avoid delay 




;1~-i..ll .. ' ' ?14 
~.D. Ol!l'llley, fSB No. 3559 
John M. Awndt~~, ISB No. 7431.1 
Bellld St. CJ~ ~y PA 
2!05 Coronl!do Stre« 
Idaho Fa&, IdaOO 83404·1411:5 
Teliepmllll: (20S) S23·S11! 
Fllil!limile:: (208) $2~•9732 
Email: ~Jllffuey@~tclllir-
jnvo~.tl)ta 
Al.lmley fllr ~hi! Defol!dan11> 
Pwa~eilo Hospillll, LLC dbil fortin 
Media~~ Cimlw, LLC, 
Pllllntiif, 
vs. 
Q~mil l!.idge Medical mwsrom, LLC, and 
FOO'I!lll' L.l'alstcm, 
Otse No.: CV·l2.Sli!J.OC 
~ms· Memwol!dmn m~mioo 
!)) Modem ro Coropd 
'f1le de:foodalllll {wlleclively Quail ~) through cot~~~sel of reoord, Belm:l St. C!~  
l'A, respectmlly sllllmlt !he mil~~-~~~ Oppooltloo ro th11 Motion m Coropelllll!d 
by !he plamliff, l'lleatel!n Hospihll, LLC dba l'!l~Med!ail Cel!mr, LLC (l'MC), 
bond u ll!lnrollled m tlw Mmute f!mry llfll:l Ord~~r enlenld cm Me::lt 6,. 2013. QUill! ~ 
!WI~ tbal: this will be ll!km Qlll'e !!fin !he nexl.few days. and Ideally ·~!he~ 
siilll!duled thr July 8, 2<113. Thure is !Ill tiutell~m  thr peMg the band llfll:l Quail 




KeCeJvea J:< AJ\. II LU~JL'1'115L ;-f',.:liax 
( ,_,, 
Rldi~~~llu, 111 all tinws, ~~~~lit~ willllll.e C®rt's order evtn if i,lllu lm:11 a r~· munlhs 
sm llle hemng 00. Q~~all R.idil(l's reqlli:SI b: asl!iy. 
Qnall ru~ oijoots ro !he rei:J:llesl for alklrney fees lmlllCiallod wilh filmgllle m.olloo ~ 
~L ~ JIQ 1m:!! :00 ~lle to I'MC dw to:> llle ullltd i>ise, l!s rights llsw ill M way 
lle!m abrosawd hi!Ca-llle illsw. lo s1wrt, thi!Ce ill oCt •~ fur i~ ~ m Gf JllliWOOitl or 
IIWmd of llllllmey f- !llld I'MC ei~es 110 !!iUioority fer ils rll!J.IICSI m ~ OOil(lrd. 
http://localhost:3080/pub/up.cgi?cmd=uinBoxEntry&Rec=rOOOO 18cb&print= 1 
Page 3 of4 
7/1/2013 
98 of 447
CERTIFICATE OF MAIUNG 
I certifY lama l~d a!mmey ln !he !Jlale ol'ldia.lw aad ooJ~ !,2iiiJ,I !l(l!VW alrw 
aud. eo~~Uctoopy of 1M DBF.l!NDANTS.' MEMO!ti\N.OUM IN Ol'l'~ITION TO MonON TO 
COMPI!L on !he !b!klwi~ by 1M~ of delivery de~d below: 
Bll!moilk Cmmty Q.)mtl!IJD:'i 
6'241l.CM!Ilr 
Pocatellll, m 83201 
l"u: {208} Zlii-7(!12 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a ) 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, ) 
) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
vs. ) MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, ) 





The Plaintiffs Motion to Compel came before this Court for hearing on the 8th day of July, 
2013, with attorney R. William Hancock, Jr., appearing for the Plaintiff and attorney John Avondet 
appearing for the Defendants. Upon considering the Plaintiffs motion and Defendants' objection 
thereto, together with oral arguments made at the time of the hearing, and with the Court otherwise 
being fully informed in the premises of this case; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted; 
2. By 5:00p.m. on July 22, 2013, the Defendants are required to either post a bond in the 
amount of$416,812.50 or to deposit with the Clerk of Court funds in the amount of 
$416,812.50; 
3. If Defendants fail to timely post the bond or deposit the funds as outlined in Paragraph 2 
5975: Minute Entry & Order Page I 
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immediately above, the stay previously entered by this Court will b~ al,!tomaiiQally lifted at 
that time; and, 
4. Defendants shall pay to Plaintiff all of its costs and attorney's fees associated with bringing 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel. Plaintiff shall Sl!bmit to th~ (;ourt and serve on opposing 
counsd an affidavit outlining its costs and attorney's fees associated with its Motion to 
Compel. 
DATED this li_ day of July, 2013. 
Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
CLER.T{'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned Clerk of Court, does hereby certifY that a true, full and correct copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry & Order was this Jl day of July, 2013, served upon the following in the 
manner indicated below: 
John A vondet 
BEARD ST. CLAIRGAFFNEYPA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
R. William Hancock 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
P. 0. Box991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
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Dave R. Gal1afent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 







COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical Center, LLC 
("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
56( a), and hereby moves this Court for an Order granting summary judgment in favor of the 
Plaintiff as a matter of law. The grounds for this motion are set forth more particularly in a 
supporting brief and the supporting affidavits, which have been filed contemporaneously herewith 
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56( c). Plaintiff requests oral argument on this motion. 
DATED this S-tlday of September, 2013. 
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MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By~~~~----------------­
j'R. William Hancock, Jr. 




CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this lf:>ifb day of 
September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIRGAFFNEYPA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Honorable Robert E. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(Chambers Copy) 
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[J Fax: (208) 529-9732 
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[J Hand Delivery 
[J Overnight Delivery 
[J Fax: (208) 236-7290 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
1 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 






Pursuant to LR.C.P. 56( c), the Plaintiff submits the following Brief in supports of its 
motion for summary judgment: 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
This case arises from Quail Ridge Medical Investor's ("Quail Ridge") failure to pay 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC") adjusted rents for the 2010 
rent adjustment period. 
Specifically, on or about October 16, 2012, after a two day court trial, the Honorable 
Mitchell W. Brown issued his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision 
and Order in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C ("Memorandum Decision"). 1 The 
1 See generally, Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law and Memorandnm Decision and Order, dated October 16, 2012 
(Bannock Connty Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C; Mitchell W. Brown, District Jndge) ("Memorandum Decision"), 
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primary issue before Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C was the 
interpretation of a January 27, 1983 Ground Lease Agreement ("Ground Lease")2 to which PMC 
and Quail Ridge are successor lessor and lessee respectively. 3 
Among the issues that Judge Brown was asked to consider in his interpretation of the 
Ground Lease and subsequent documents was whether PMC was entitled to adjust rents for the 
2010 Rent Adjustment Period outlined in the Ground Lease and, if so, what that adjusted rental 
rate should be. As to these specific issues, Judge Brown concluded in relevant part: 
PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in 
the amount of $148,500.00 annually. Therefore, for the three (3) year period 
applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combined annual rent for these three 
years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 2013, assuming that Quail Ridge remains 
current on its annual rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 toward the annual rent for 
this three (3) year period. As such it is entitled to a credit in this amount against 
the $445,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being obligated to PMC in the 
total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period of February 1, 2010 through 
January 31,2013.4 
On or about November 26, 2012, Judge Brown entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment 
in that case consistent with his findings. This Amended Declaratory Judgment states that "Quail 
Ridge is obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' [January 27, 
1983] Ground Lease Agreement." 5 The Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by Judge 
Brown in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C is a determination of the amount of 
adjusted rent that Quail should have paid during the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period. 
Upon receipt of this Amended Declaratory Judgment, Quail Ridge had the following 
contractual responsibility under Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease: 
* * * * 
attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith. 
3 Id. at p. 12, ~~ 5-7. 
4 Id. at p. 36, ~ 45. 
5 See Amended Declaratory Judgment, dated November 26, 2012 (Bannock County Case No. CV-20 I 0-0002724-0C; 
Mitchell W. Brown, District Judge) ("Amended Declaratory Judgment"), attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel 
filed simultaneous herewith. 
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If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment 
date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period 
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the 
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 6 
* * * * 
Quail Ridge has not paid to PMC the $416,812.50 determined by Judge Brown to be due and 
owing for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period.7 By failing to promptly pay these outstanding 
adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period after a determination of such rents was made 
by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge is in breach of its obligations under the Ground Lease. 
PMC, as the successor in interest to IHC for this hospital property, is the successor 
guarantee, beneficiary, of a certain Guaranty in Payment and Performance ("Personal Guaranty") 
executed by Forrest Preston ("Preston"), an individual, on or about June 1, 2011.8 As guarantor, 
Preston personally guarantees payment and performance of any and all of Quail's obligations 
under the Ground Lease. 9 Even though on November 27, 2012, PMC made written demand on 
Quail Ridge and Preston for payment of the $416,812.50 in outstanding adjusted rents for the 2010 
Rent Adjustment Period, 10 Preston has not personally paid to PMC these outstanding adjusted 
rents. 11 
In its November 27, 2012 demand letter to Quail Ridge and Preston, PMC notified both 
parties that if the outstanding balance of$416,812.50 was not paid within ten (10) days of the date 
of the letter, then PMC would proceed with this breach of contract action. 12 Despite such written 
demand and notice, neither Quail Ridge nor Preston has paid to PMC the adjusted rents for the 
6 See Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27, 1983 ("Ground Lease"), at p. 3, Section 1.3(b ), attached as Exhibit 
4 to Affidavit of Counsel. 
7 See Affidavit of Don Wadle. 
8 See Guarantee in Payment and Peiformance, dated June I, 20 II ("Personal Guaranty"), attached as Exhibit 3 to 
Affidavit of Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, '1!37, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel. 
9 See Personal Guaranty, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavitof Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, '1!37, 
attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel. 
IO See Letter dated November 27, 2012, attached as ExhibitS to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith. 
II See Affidavit of Don Wadle. 
12 Id. 
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2010 rent adjustment period. 13 
A comparison of the Defendants' Answer in this present action and Judge Brown's 
Memorandum Decision reveals that the Defendants are raising the same affirmative defenses in 
this action as has already been raised and adjudicated by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case 
No. CV-201 0-0002724-0C. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under Idaho law, summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw."14 Whether a fact is material depends on the substantive law of the 
case. 15 
Although the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
rests with the moving party, once that burden has been met, the bmden shifts to the nonmoving 
party to come forward with sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of fact. 16 Under Idaho 
law, the nonmoving party may not simply rest upon the mere allegations or denials in the 
pleadings. 17 Instead, the nonmoving party must come forvv·ard with specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue of fact to be resolved at trial. 18 
If there is an absence of evidence on a dispositive issue for which the nonmoving party 
bears the burden of proof, then the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by ... 
affidavits, or by the deposition, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate 
13 See Affidavit of Don Wadle. 
14 IRCP 56( c). Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000). 
15 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). 
16 Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. #2, 128 Idaho 714, 719,918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). 
17 IRCP 56( e); Baxter, 135 Idaho at 170, 16 P.3d at 267; Meridian Joint School Dist. #2, 128 Idaho at 719, 918 P.2d at 
588. 
18 Id. 
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specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."19 Summary judgment is mandated 
against the nonmoving party who thereafter fails to present sufficient evidence to establish a 
genuine issue offact for tria!.20 
Finally, a nonmoving party's case must be anchored in something more solid than mere 
speculation or conjecture. 21 A mere scintilla of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue 
of material fact.22 There is no issue for trial unless there is evidence favoring the nonmoving 
party which is sufficient for a jury to return a verdict in favor of that party. If the evidence is 
"merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."23 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment in favor of PMC is appropriate in this case because there are no 
genuine issues of material fact that: (1) by failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent for the 2010 
Rent Adjustment Period determined by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case No. 
CV-201 0-0002724-0C, Quail has breached its obligations under the Ground Lease; (2) By failing 
to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the Ground Lease, Preston is in breach of his 
obligations under the Personal Guaranty; and, (3) Defendants are collaterally estopped from 
raising their affirmative defenses in the present action because such defenses were already raised 
by Quail Ridge in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C and have been decided by 
Judge Brown after a full evidentiary hearing on the issues. 
I. By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent for the 2010 Rent 
Adjustment Period determined by Judge Brown in Bannock County 
Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C, Quail has breached its obligations 
under the Ground Lease. 
Despite Quail Ridge's attempts to murky the waters, this breach of contract case is really 
quite simple and straight forward. It is governed by the following language found in Section 
19 Celotex Com. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,324-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548,91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotations and 
citation omitted). 
20 Id. at 322, 324-25. 
21 Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., Ill Idaho 851,853,727 P.2d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 1986). 
22 !d. 
23 Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50 (citations omitted). 
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1.3(b) of the Ground Lease: 
* * * * 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment 
date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period 
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the 
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 24 
* * * * 
There is no doubt or confusion in this case that Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory 
Judgment entered on November 26, 2012, was a determination of the adjusted rents for the 2010 
Rent Adjustment Period. Indeed, after finding in his Memorandum Decision that PMC was 
entitled to a rent adjustment in 2010 and that the amount of the adjusted rents still owing for that 
rent adjustment period was $416,812.50, Judge Brown entered an Amended Declaratory Judgment 
wherein he declared that "Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the 
terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement."25 
Under Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease, once the determination of adjusted rents was 
made for the 2010 Rent Adjust Period, Quail Ridge was then obligated to "promptly after the 
determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment." In this case, Judge 
Brown declared that the difference was $416,812.50 and, therefore, Quail Ridge was required to 
promptly pay that amount to PMC. 
More than 9 months has now passed since Judge Brown declared the adjusted rental 
amount for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period and Quail Ridge has still not paid the outstanding 
adjusted rents due and owing to PMC. ·By failing to promptly pay this amount, Quail Ridge has 
breached its Ground Lease with PMC. This Court should find that Quail Ridge is in breach of the 
Ground Lease and thereafter enter a summary judgment against Quail Ridge and in favor ofPMC 
in the amount of $416,812.50, plus PMC's costs and attorney's fees associated with brining this 
breach of contract action. 
To the extent that it is anticipated that Quail Ridge will argue that it did not pay the 
24 See Ground Lease, at p. 3, Section 1.3(b ), attached as Exhibit 4 to Affidavit of Counsel. It is worth noting that 
Judge Brown found in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C that this specific paragraph in Section 1.3(b) 
of the Ground Lease contained clear and unambiguous language as to the parties' respective rights and obligations 
under the Ground Lease. 
25 See Amended Declaratory Judgment, attached as Exhibit 2 to Affidavit of Counsel filed simultaneous herewith. 
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$416,812.50 to PMC because it is appealing Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment, this Court 
should first recognize that the tenant's agreement with a declared adjusted rent amount is not a 
condition precedent under Section 1.3 (b) before the tenant is obligated to pay the adjusted amount. 
Further, this Court should take judicial notice of the fact that it temporarily stayed this present 
action at Quail Ridge's request on the condition that Quail Ridge pay the $416,812.50 declared by 
Judge Brown as currently due and owing into the Court during the pendency of the stay. Not only 
did Quail Ridge fail to deposit the necessary funds as ordered by the Court, but then Quail again 
refused and failed to deposit the necessary funds or submit the necessary bond even after the Court 
gave it additional time to do so. Under these circumstances, this Court should have little 
sympathy in this case with Quail Ridge's failure to abide by the clear and unambiguous terms of 
the Ground Lease even in light of Quail Ridge timely appealing Judge Brown's decision. Quail 
Ridge was given an opportunity to secure these funds and stay this action during the pendency of 
the appeal and it elected to not take the necessary steps to do so. As such, it should now be subject 
to a judgment against it for its failure to pay the outstanding adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent 
Adjustment period. 
II. By failing to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the 
Ground Lease, Preston is in breach of his obligations under the 
Personal Guaranty. 
Once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment 
Period as it was required to do under the Ground Lease, Preston became personally liable for the 
outstanding rents in the amount $416,812.50. Under the clear and unambiguous terms of the 
Personal Guaranty executed by Preston, he personally guaranteed payment and performance of 
any and all of Quail Ridge's obligations under the Ground Lease, including but not limited to 
Quail Ridge's obligation to pay rent.26 Once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the adjusted 
rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period after the determination of those rents was made by 
Judge Brown, Preston became personally responsible to pay such outstanding adjusted rents. It is 
undisputed in this case that Preston has not paid the outstanding adjusted rents for the 201 0 Rent 
Adjustment Period even though demand was made upon him to do so. Because he has not 
26 See Personal Guaranty, attached as Exhibit 3 to Affidavit of Counsel; see also Memorandum Decision, at p. 19, ~ 
3 7, attached as Exhibit I to Affidavit of Counsel. 
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personally paid the $416,812.50 in outstanding adjusted rents now due and owing to PMC, Preston 
is in breach of his personal guaranty and summary judgment against him personally is appropriate 
in this case. 
As discussed in this previous section of this Brief, Preston was given an opportunity to 
either deposit the necessary funds with the court or post a bond to stay this present action. Even 
when the Court gave Preston, as a defendant to this action, additional time to either deposit the 
necessary funds or post an appropriate bond and stay the action, Preston elected not to do so. In 
light of this case history, the Court should find no issue with enforcing the clear and unambiguous 
terms of the Ground Lease against Quail Ridge and the Personal Guaranty against Preston even if 
such Defendants disagree with Judge Brown's interpretation of the Ground Lease and Declaratory 
Judgment. There is no clause in either of these agreements which state that either party has to 
agree with a declaration of adjusted rents before they become liable to pay such rents. Rather, the 
Ground Lease is clear that once such declaration is made, Quail Ridge, a8 tenant, was obligated to 
promptly pay the amount of outstanding rents for the adjusted Period to PMC, as landlord, 
Similarly, the Personal Guaranty is clear that if Quail Ridge fails to fulfill its obligations under the 
Ground Lease, PMC, as landlord, is allowed to look to Preston to personally fulfill Quail Ridge's 
obligations. Both defendants have failed to fulfil their contractual obligations to PMC in this 
instance and, therefore, a grant of summary judgment against both defendants is appropriate at this 
time. 
III. Defendants are collaterally estopped from raising their affirmative 
defenses in the present action because such defenses were already 
raised by Quail Ridge in Bannock County Case No. 
CV-2010-0002724-0C and have been decided by Judge Brown after a 
full evidentiary hearing on the issues. 
Under Idaho law, the doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion, sometimes 
referred to as true res judicata, and issue preclusion, sometimes. referred to as collateral estoppel.27 
While claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
claims "relating to the same action ... which might have been made,"28 issue preclusion protects 
27 Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803.805 (2002). 
28 Id. 
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litigants from litigating an identical issue with the same party or the party's privv. 29 Separate tests 
are used to determine whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies. 30 
In this case, the doctrine of claim preclusion, a.k.a. collateral estoppel, applies to bar the 
affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants in this action. A comparison of the Defendants' 
Answer in this present action and Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision reveals that the 
Defendants are raising the same affirmative defenses in this present action as has already been 
raised by Quail Ridge in the prior action and adjudicated by Judge Brown. Under Idaho's well 
established law, the Defendants are collaterally estopped from raising those same affirmative 
defenses in this subsequent action. 
Whether collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in a prior action 
between the same party or a the party's privy is a question of law for the court. 31 Idaho courts 
have found that five questions must be answered in the affirmative before the collateral estoppel 
doctrine can be applied: (I) did the party against whom the earlier decision is asserted have a full 
and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in the earlier case?; (2) was the issue decided in the prior 
litigation identical with the one presented in the action in question?; (3) was the issue actually 
decided in the prior litigation?; (4)was there a final judgment on the merits; and (5) was the party 
against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?32 
All five requirements for collateral estoppel are satisfied in this case. First, a review of 
Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision demonstrates that Quail Ridge and, therefore, its principal, 
Forest Preston, were given a full and fair opportunity to litigate their affirmative defenses in 
Barmock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. Indeed, the Memorandum Decision reveals 
that Defendants were provided an opportunity to present any evidence in support of their 
affirmative defenses at trial. 
29 Rodriguez v. Dep't ofCorr., 136 Idaho 90, 92,29 P.3d 401,403 (2003). 
30 D.A.R. Inc. v. Sheffer, 134 Idaho 141, 144, 997 P.2d 602, 605 (2000). 
31 Richardson v. Four Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Three Dollars, U.S. Currency, 120 Idaho 220, 222, 814 P.2d 952, 
954 (Ct. App. 1991), citations omitted. 
32 Id., 120 Idaho at 223, 814 P.2d at 955 (citing Accord Anderson v. City ofpocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183-84, 731 
P.2d 171,178-79 (1987)). 
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Second, a comparison between Defendant's Answer in the present case and Judge Brown's 
Memorandum Decision in the prior case clearly reveals that the issues decided in Bannock County 
Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C are identical with the ones presented in the present action. Both 
cases revolve around the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement that governs the rights and 
responsibilities of the parties. The Defendants' allegations of modification, waiver, lack of a 
meeting of the minds, lack of real party in interest, failure to join necessary and indispensable 
parties, laches, and unenforceability in the present action are the exact same issues that were raised 
and adjudicated by Judge Brown in Bannock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. Also, 
there can be no doubt that consideration and adjudication of these defenses was necessary for 
Judge Brown to issue his final declaratory judgment in that prior case. As such, under the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel, Judge Brown's final decision is conclusive on these issues and 
Defendants are precluded from relitigating these same identical issues in the present action. 
Third, a review of Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision reveals that these defenses were 
actually decided in Bannock County Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. Because these 
affirmative defenses have been previously heard, considered, and decided by Judge Brown, they 
cannot be relitigated in the present action. 
Fourth, it is undisputed that there was a final judgment on the merits in Bannock County 
Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C. This Court has not only been provided a copy of Judge 
Brown's Memorandum Decision, but it has also been presented with Judge Brown's Amended 
Declaratory Judgment in that action, which judgment is consistent with his Memorandum 
Decision. Indeed, it is this Memorandum Decision that gives right to the present breach of 
contract claim against these defendants. 
Finally, it is undisputed that Quail Ridge was a party to the prior action. Although Preston 
was not a named party to the prior action, it is undisputed that Preston is the primary principal of 
Quail Ridge. Indeed, when Preston was deposed during the discovery phase of Bannock County 
Case. No. CV-2010-0002724-0C, Preston testified that he is a ninety-nine percent (99%) owner 
of Quail Ridge. 33 Because Preston was the principal owner of Quail Ridge during the litigation of 
Bannock County Case. No. CV-201 0-0002724-0C,1 there can be no doubt for purposes of the 
33 See Forest L. Preston Deposition Transcript, at 4:20-23, attached as Exhibit 6 to Affidavit of Counsel filed 
simultaneous herewith. 
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present analysis that Preston was in privity with Quail Ridge during the litigation and trial of the 
prior action. Because Preston was and still is in privity with Quail Ridge at all times material 
hereto, this Court should find that Preston is barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel from 
raising affirmative defenses in the present action that were already resolved against his company, 
Quail Ridge, in Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-00002724-0C. Such a finding in this case 
would certainly support the policy behind this doctrine which is to "relieve parties of the cost and 
vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial recourses, and, by preventing inconsistent 
decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication. "34 
CONCLUSION 
Because the undisputed evidence in this case establishes that both Defendants are in breach 
of their respective agreements governing their relationship with the Plaintiff, PMC, this Court 
should enter summary judgment in favor of PMC. Similarly, because the evidence before the 
Court demonstrates that the affirmative defenses raised by the Defendants in the present action are 
the same defenses raised by the Defendants and conclusively decided by Judge Brown in Bannock 
County Case No. CV-2010-00002724-0C, this Court should find that, as a matter of law, these 
defenses are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Because there are no issues of law or 
fact remaining in this case, this Court should grant summary judgment in favor of PM C. 
~::.*' DATED this _..;_day of September, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
34 See Richardson, 120 Idaho at 222, 814 P.2d at 954 (citing Vnited States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. !54, 158, 104 S.Ct. 
568, 571, 78 L.Ed.2d 379 (1984)). 
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Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
1 09 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 





) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) AFFIDAVIT OF COUNSEL IN 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an 
individual, 
) SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 






STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
CountyofBannock ) 
I, R. William Hancock, Jr., being first duly sworn on this oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff in the above-captioned matter and make 
the statements herein of my own personal knowledge and belief. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Memorandum Decision and Order, CV-2010-2724-0C, dated October 
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16, 2012. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of the Amended Declaratory 
Judgment, CV-201 0-2724-0C, dated November 26, 2012. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of the Guarantee in Payment 
and Performance, dated June I, 2011. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of the 1983 Ground Lease 
Agreement, dated January 27, 1983. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of Plaintiffs demand letter 
to Quail Ridge and Preston, dated November 27, 2012. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of the cover page, and page 4 
of Forest L. Preston's deposition transcript. 
Further your affiant saith naught. 
1h 
DATED this 5- day of September, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
R. William Hancock 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this~ day of September, 2013. 
;Po( }0§(/L{;c l ~ 
Otary Public for Idaho 
Residing at: 'PD«t fdlpt ID 
(SEPJL) DEBORAH LAFANA 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
STATE OF IDAHO 
My Commission Expires: 12.-'5-1] 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, R. William Hancock, the undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was this k day of September, 2013, served upon the following in the marrner 
indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
(Chambers Copy) 
~U.S. Mail 
[_] Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Mail 
[_] Facsimile 
[29 U.S. Mail 
[_] Hand Delivery 
[_] Overnight Delivery 
[_] Telefax 547-2147 
(}w~ ~~~-. 
. William Hancock ----------
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) F1NDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) OF LAW AND MEMORANDUM 






This action came before the Court for a two (2) day court trial commencing on May 14 
and continuing through May 15, 2012. The Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC (PMC) was represented at trial by C01111sel, Kent L. Hawkins and R. 
William Hancock. Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century 
Park Associates, LLC (Century Park) were represented by Michael D. Gaffuey and 1obn M. 
Avondet. At the conclusion of trial, the Court set forth a post-trial briefing schedule. The parties 
agreed tO share the cost associated with the preparation of a transcript of the trial in advance of post-
trial briefing. See Minute Entty and Order entered on May 17, 2012. The Court entered an order 
regarding remitting payment to the Caurt Rep<?Iter and prepaw.tion of the transcript of the trial. See 
Order entered on June 5, 2012. The parties were instructed to submit post-trial arguments along 
with their proposed findings of fact and conclusiOJl$ of Jaw. There were four ( 4) depositions which 
were submitted to the Court for its review as part of the trial record. Pursuant to stipulation of the 
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process contemplated by the Lease Agreement. Memonmdwn in Support of Plaintiff's Motion 
for Sununary Judgment, p. 3. PMC also requested that the Court enter summary judgment in its 
favor and declare that Quail Ridge owed PMC back rent for the yeai'S 2007 through 2011 in the 
amoWlt of $735,187.50 and rent in the swn of $148,500.00 for 2012. ld. at p. 5. PMC argued 
that this result was justified under the clear and \lr\ambiguous language of the parties' Lease 
Agreement. Quail Ridge also filed a counter-motion for summary judgment, Quail Ridge 
argued that the Court should deny PMC's motion for summary judgment and grant summary 
judgment on its behalf. Quail Ridge argued that in 200 l, "the ability to adjust rent was removed 
from the patties' agreement." Defendants' Motion for SUlllllllllJf Judgment, p. I. The Court 
denied both parties' motions for summary judgment finding that the patties' Lease Agreement 
contained ambiguities that would require extrinsic evidence conce.r:tUng the parties' intent, 
specifically as it related to Article I, section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
Numerous pre-trial motions were filed in anticipation of trial. Two (2) of these are 
procedurally significant. The f1rst was PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint and the second was 
FMC's Motion to Enforce Jlll'y Waiver Clause m 2001 Landlord Consent !Uld Estoppel 
Certificate. PMC's Motion to Amend Complaint was granted without objection by Quail Ridge. 
See Defendants' Notice of Non-Opposition to Plaintifrs Motion to Amend Complaint. The 
Colln likewise granted PMC's Motion to Enfurce the Jury Waiver Clause in 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate! 
PMC's Amended Complaint sought damages that were not requested in the original 
Complaint, based upon an updated appraisal. The' Amended Complaint also asserted a claim for 
'Quail Ridg,:. in its Initial NISWer, demanded a jury ttial u ""'uirad by Rule 38 of lbc: Idaho Rules of Civil Prooodllte. It ~so 
made a jury demand In ;,. AMWerto the Amo;ndl;<l Complaint PMC's MotiOn to Enlim:c Juey: Waiver was gnntod by 1lle Coun 
on grounds different than argtiM by PMC, ~was noncthsleos gn,n1od and the Court 'll'dcred' diat the trial would proce<d to the 
Court rarlu~r than the jury. The b:sstS fotlhiS dt:~OQ-was s~c-'fotat· in dctailliUilf's!# m:oJd· em May -t 201~ 
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2. De\)ositiou Testimony- Guy P. Kroesche.4 
PMC submitted the deposition of Guy P. Kroesche (Kroesche) as part of its case 
on rebuttal. PMC submitted the following with regard to Kroesche's testimony: (I) 
During Quail Ridge's eross-examillation of Kroesche the following question was asked: 
Okay. But you would agree that that language could have been easily inserted in 
the 2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates as it had been in the 1996 certificate, right. 
Depo. Kroesche, p. 34, LL.ll-14. The propounded question does require a yes or no response. 
Further, Kroesche's response is non-rcspollSive. Instead, he eKplaillS that typically estoppel 
certificates are not identical from transaction to transaction. However. Kroesche fails to respond 
to the specific question, that being that certain language could have easily been inserted in the 
2001 and 2002 estoppel certificates just as it bad been in the !996 certificate. Quail Ridge 
moved to strike this response as non-responsive. ld. at p. 3S, LL. 10-11. PMC argues Kroesche 
was entitled to explain his reasons for not being able to answer ''yes" or "no." The Court will 
SUSTAIN Quail Ridge's objection and find that Krriesche's answer was non-responsive and will 
strike the same. 5 
PMC also addresses an objection made by Quail Ridge during PMC's re-direct 
examination as being beyond the scope of Quail Ridge's cross-eKamination. This exchange 
centered on the following questions: 
First of all, there was a question about whether if there had been a modification 
to the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement, wQU]d it have been included in the estoppel 
certificate. Can you ariswer that? 
<~pMC withdn:w any of' the abJections to que$~ions asked by Quail Ridge duTing Kroeschc._s deposition. PMC's Objections to 
Deposilion TtStimony. p. 3. Therefore, the Court wiJI address anty 1:110~ issues raised by PMC ln PMC's Obj~OM to 
Depositillll 'l'..mmony, 
'Tlic Com has CllllsOd through lh>tpol'lion ofKrncoohe's response whiCh bas liccn sulakcnily tba ~ Su Ol'iSina! ~· 
dcpnsltion ar p. 34, LL. 15•25. p. 3S. LL.1..6. "!llo-. quCSiion ilo ~ on p. 37 ofKroescho's 4eposi1iml when he ill, asked 
")roU·could hilve, whoa you prepan:d the '01 CS!Oppel cetlilieate llllll !h.: '1)2 ~ c:ertif....., or ~-you ~~~MeWing 
them. inoerted lansoasollkc tha1 fbund In !he 199/i ~o! C!:!fltlcue reJa!Oil 10 tilt renuulJ~ provi$ion, ~· The 
response was "lYles, I could have put many di:ff'e=t words in !his ~~ ... fno!udl\lg I ~d have wrilfon.thar 
[refertlng 10 lhe language fi'om tho 1996 estoppelcmifico.tc] in as well.'" Thi• response will be ADMITTED over lit• objeotions 
of eounsel as stlltl!ld in !h~ depos:ldon. 
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PMC next argues that Quail Ridge's objection to the following question, on leading 
grounds, should be overruled because the question is not lcadi!lg: 
[a]t any time did you ever promise or make a representation to a Quail Ridge 
representative, or representatives from the Pocatello Medical Investors that you 
would waive or limit the rights under the 1983 contract to limit or increase the 
rent provision - the amount of rent under that agreement? 
Goodwin Depo. p. 18, 11.15-21. The Court will OVERULE this objection and allow the 
EIIISwer to stand. 7 The Court concludes that this questio11 is not leading because it does not 
suggest the answer. 
Quail Ridge reasserts all of the objections made during the course of Goodwin's 
deposition. The only objectiol1 asserted by Quail Ridge that has not been addressed above is its 
objection, on the ground oflack offoundation. to the following question: 
What I want to know is if during the period from 1983 to 2003 you were aware of 
this adjustment provision in the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. 
Goodwin Depo., p. 15, LL.l8-2I. The Court will OVERRULE this objection. The question 
asked if Goodwin was aware of the adjustment piovision found in the Lease Agreement. He 
answers that he "was not specifically aware of this arrangement." The Court will allow this 
answer. Obviously Goodwin lacks foundation to answer any further questions abo11t the so 
called "adjustment provision" of the Lease Agreement based upon his admission, but he certainly 
can testify to what he testified !11 response to this question. 
1 Goodwin•s answer to this q,~stion w.s ~o) sir.'" However~ Goodwin tb.~:n adds "this l,lllSOlicitcd rC~paose "ln fact. in paragraph .5 
oftbat docun\..., ti>ola.<~. ""-oflhol Pllf8&lllllh 84YS. '8,""t has been paid throut:h and includ~ Februey 28. 1996. Under 
s..,don 1.3(b) of the 1 ..... dto ri:nl slulll bud)usr#d on llu,iQXi l'e]ltlll!il!Stm.mtdal<; M- 1, 1999-199$. ·~ Thi&RSponso is 
non·rcspanslveand-cwm bdTIUCKEN by lheCoUJL PMC's queR!!ilt was ~ li1 scope to whed!er (;Qodwill ever Diode lillY 
promi~.s or r<pmt:lllliiiOIIS to Sterling or Quail Ridge. The question <Hilod fur a yes or no ICSP""""· GoodWin'~ "Do. sh" 
tdlpOIUC will boallowo4; tholnlan"" is non·mponsive and will be !llrUOk. The Court l>as oro""'d through tho stric:k<:n ponlon af 
lhc testimony In the original deposition ofGoodwjn_ 
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ld. at p. 6, LL.l6-18. Again, Quail Ridge objects on the basis that the question assumes 
facts not in evidence, lack of foundation of the witness to answer, and speculation. 
The Court will OVERRUU: both objections. The answers are really oJ no evidentiary 
value. Amon responds generally that he is sure that he would have seen the Lease Agreement 
and the reason he believes this is that he was the CEO of PMC from 1981 through 1984. Anton 
Depo., p. 5, LL.l0-11. This is sufficient foundation to take the matter out of the realm of 
speculation. Further, the Lease Agreement is in evidence. The balance of Anton's deposition 
establishes that he has little or no recollection, surrounding the Lease Agreement or the facts or 
circumstances leading to its creation. 
Quail Ridge next objects to the following question and answer: 
Q. Da you know what involvement he [Gerald OlsonJ had, if any, in the drafting 
of this Agreement? 
A. I do not, but he may have c!rafted the Agreement. 
/d. at p. 7, LL.6-8. Quail Ridge objects to this response as being non-tespcnsive. The Coun will 
OVERRULE as it relates to Anton's response that he docs not know what involvement Olson 
may have had in drafting the Lease Agreement. The balance of the answer and the objection 
based upon non-responsiveness will be SUSTAINED. The balance of this response is 
speculative and apparently beyond Anton's PerSOnal knowledge and/or recollection. Therefore, 
it will be STRICKEN.8 
Next, Quail Ridge objects 10 the following exchange on the basis of vagueness, lack of 
foundation, and assumes facts not in evidence: · ' 
Q. Do you have any recollection of that language in this Agreement at all :trom 
1983? 
'"I'he Court ha.~ crossed lbrough lh.:: portion of ttl is response \hat has been stricken 1n the original depOSition on file with the 
Coutt. 
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that the call of the question, seelcing Anton's understanding as the CEO of what specific 
language meant, is suggestive of an answer. It is therefore, overruled on leading grounds. The 
Court has previously found that adequate foundation has been laid, establishing Anton's status as 
CEO at the time the Lease Agreement was entered and created, to allow him to testify regarding 
his recollection of this Lease Agreement and the circumstances surrounding its creation. 
Therefore, the objection is overruled on the foundation objection. Finally, the Court overrules on 
the speculation basis. Although Anton is being asked to recall matters that occurred nearly thirty 
(30) years ago, that will go to weight. To the extent he remembers the circumstances 
surrounding the creation of the Lease Agreement, his testimony will stand. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
To the extent that any· of the Court's Findings of Fact are deemed to be Conclusions of 
Law, they are inco!Jlorated in the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
( l) PMC is a Delaware Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in the state 
of!daho. PMC's principal place ofbusiness is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Idaho. Amended 
Complaint, p. 1, ~1, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. I, ~1. 
(2) Quail Ridge is a Tennessee Limited Liability Company authorized to do business in 
the state of Idaho. Quail Ridge's principal place of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland 
Tennessee. Amended Complaint, p. 2, 1[2, Answer to Amended Complaint, p. l, ~1. 
(3) Quail Ridge operates an assisted living center located in Pocatello, Idaho. The 
assisted living center is located on a 4.25 acre piece of real property which is currently owned by 
PMC. 
(4) Tne building from which the assisted living center is run and operated is owned by 
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(5) PMC and Quail Ridge are successors in interest to a certain Ground Lease 
Agreement (Lease Agreement) entered into on January 27, 1983. 
(6) The Lease Agreement was origirial!y entered into between IHC and Sterling whereby 
IHC leased 4.25 acres of real property, as Lessor, to Sterling, as Lessee. 
(7) PMC is the successor in interest to lHC and Bannock County as it relates to the Lease 
Agreement and occupies the role as lessor. Quail Ridge is the successor in interest to Sterling 
and occupies the role of lessee. 
(8) The Lease Agreement is for a thirty (30) year term of years conunencing on February 
1, 1983 and concluding on January 31, 2013. However, the Lease Agreement provides for one 
(1) ten (I 0) year option to extend the term of the lease. This option is to be exercised, if at all, by 
"giving Lessor written notice ... not later than 120 days prior to the expiration date of the 
Tenn."9 (Lease Agreement, p. 2, § 1.2) 
(9) The Lease Agreement also provides that rent shall be paid on an annual basis as 
follows: 
An initial annual rental [sic] shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(1 5%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the fust three (3) years 
from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the 
rate of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($1 5,000 .00) per acre.10 
(Lease Agreement, pp. 2·3, §1.3(a)). 
(10) The total acreage of leased land was 4.25 acres. Therefore, the annual rent for the 
first three (3) years of the Lease Agreement was $9,562.50. 
'Tht: opt.ion ~ppe!!,t:$ to be personal to Str:rling. However~ this does nuL appear 1.0 be an Issue between the pcmics. despite the faP:t 
that then: wilS no tvidortc:a t!t trial c:onccrning: the pt.-rsonal nat~ of the optton and Ute option having been exercise-a. the parties 
seem to ~e rhat the: Oplion bas be.!n exerolsed, that it is a.ssi,gnablc to Quail Rid~ and tl'itll the LB:L,~ Agra.!m~t. is anti will be 
In place throug.'1 Januwy 31, 20;!3. '!'his ....,. of ofl'airs soems to be futthor conlim1ed by 1he lAndlord Consent and Es<oppel 
Certifiome entered in 2001 wh""' the ~attiess!a!e that lhe !:.ease Agreement has bc<m extend~d 1hrouah and including J<tlluoty 31, 
2023. Therefore. rhe!C Issues will ncn be addressed or eonsidered .J))"lbe Court. 
1"rhc Comm•noemont Dare of the Lease Agn:cmont is dctlncd llli tho 1" doy ~fl'•bruary, !983, or on or before thirty (30) d•r• 
after a building; pmnil is issued whichever is later. Sec LCZISC Ag,rc:cmcnt. p.2. § 1.2. No evid~rtce hi!! beef\ la\tl"Oduced rt&al'dlng 
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(15) No evidence was introduced that the parties ever submitted this matter to arbitration 
as mandated in the Lease Agreement. Further, the parties freely admit that there has not been 
any attempt to arbitrate.11 
(16) The Lease Agreement next provides that in arriving at the adjusted rent every three 
(3) years, the parties shollld consider the following: 
The rent as adjusted shall be eqlllll to fifteen percent (15%) percent [sic] of the 
fair market value of the leased ll'!nd, exclusive of the improvements on the 
premise. Determination of fair market value shall be based 011 the highest and 
beSt use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date without taking the 
leasehold into account The determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied to 
a fair market value ofFifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre 
and shall also take into accowtt my determinations of market value made under 
this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent 
adjustment date. 
(Lease Agreement, p. 3, §J.3(b)). 
(17) The evidence at trial established that the parties have never followed the provisions 
contained in the Lease Agreement to effectuate an adjusunent in the rent. 
(18) Finally, the Lease Agreement provides that "if the determination of adjusted rent is 
made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate 
applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined." (Lease Agreement, p. 3, 
§1.3(b)). 
(19) Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's designated representative at trial, testified that 
Quail Ridge has paid rent, annually, in the origi~ and unadjusted amount of $9,562.50 and is 
currant on its annual obligation. 
11Whe:n the Coun inquired of the partie! concemlnt this maner lhey both advised tl1e COth't Utat lhey were waiving this 
requirement of the Lease Agreement. "fhe Court telied upon whul. lh~ Court doh:rmined 10 ~a mandalory arbltradoll provl:!lon 
when ;, gnnted PMG's motion "'!Ue.!ling 1!1111 Q..UIIIidi• bo d<uiod 1m jury dCIII8Ild, 
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(24) Finally, the I 996 Estoppel Certificate provides !hat !he "Landlords consent to the 
Sublease as set forth herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord of Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or (b) excuse Tenant's 
perfonnance of any term or condition ofthe Lea.lle (Agreement)." (1996 Estoppel Certificate, 
(25) No evidence was introduced that IHC attempted to proceed with the three (3) year 
annual rent adjustment in 1 998 as referenced by the 1996 Esmppel Certificate. 14 
(26) Between 1996 and 200 I the relationship between the parties and Lea.lle Agreement 
remained static. IHC was the Lessor, Sterling was the Lessee, and PM! was the Sub-tenant or 
Sub-Lessee. In 2001, the relationships changed. 
(27) Sometime between 1996 and 2001, Sterling determined that it wanted to sell the 
building located on the leasehold and Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their 
personal guarantees associated with the financing of the building located on the leasehold. 
Likewise, PMI wanted to purchase this building. 
(28) Richard Faulkner testified that for a nwnber of reasons, not particularly germane to 
this litigation, in on;ler to facilitate the 1ranssction between Sterling and PMI wherein PM! would .. 
purchase the building located on the leasehC?ld, a new entity WllS created. This entity was Quail 
Ridge Medical Investors (Quail Ridge). Quail Ridge then purchased the building located on the 
leasehold from Sterling and PMI continued on as a subtenant of Quail Ridge. 
(Z9) Richard Faulkner testified that !he t:tan$action was complex and involved a number 
of parties (IHC, Sterling, Qwul Ridge, PMI, and the Public Employee Retirement System of 
'"'The only evidence introduced at trial regarding a. dcmlllld by IHC or any of it! SUQ'ccs.sors in intcrcsr: was in Oaober of 2009 
whm PMC mado a d.:mand fbr a. rent Adjumn~n" whiwh led to the prcKnt controv~ and lldau.~Jon. 
FINDINGS OF FACf, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ME MORAND VIII DECISION AND ORDER • 16 
128 of 447
(' 
OCT-17·2012 02:05PM FROM-Bannock 6th Olit.Crt 208·ZB8·701Z T·42i P.OIT/037 F·380 
Under the Lease (Agreement], the Tenant is obligated to pay rent at the rate of 
NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 
FIFTY CENTS ($9,562.50) per annwn. Rent has been paid through and 
including FEBRUARY 28, 2001. 
(2001 Estoppel Certificate, ~5). This provision contains two (2) dramatic alterations from the 
19915 Estoppel Certificate. First the 1996 Estoppel Certificate states that Sterling (the Tenant) "Is 
obligated to pay rent currently at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." The term "cUITently" has 
been deleted from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate and reads Sterling (the Tenant) "is obligated to 
pay rent at the rate of ... $9,562.50 per annum." Further, while the 1996 Estoppel Ceni.ficate 
provides that ''under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease (Agreement], the rent shall be adjusted on the 
next rent adjustment date"; this language is glaringly absent from the 2001 Estoppel Certificate. 
(35) Richard Faulkner discusses, from his perspective and that of Ql!llil Ridge, why the 
language of 2001 Estoppel Certificate differs from the 1996 Estoppel Certificate. At trial, the 
following dialogue occurred: 
Q. If you'lllook at exhibit 228 [2001 Estoppel Certificate] again, going back to 
paragraph five, it says that "under the lease tenant is obligated to pay rent at the 
cUitent rate of $9,562.50 per annum. The rent has been paid through and 
including Februaty 281\ 2001." 
Now, the language talking about rent adjustment that appears in the '96 estoppel 
certificate is not in this certificate here? 
A. That's can:ect. I did not include it in the first draft. 
Q. And why was that left out? 
A. Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for 
the five years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent acljustment 
m~chanism had never been raised. A,nd then I spoke with the folks from Sterling 
Development Group and understood tliat in the entire 13 years preceding our 
involvement no one had ever raised the section of the rent adjUstment in Order to 
increase or change the rent. So I wanted to confirm in the cow-se of dealing that 
that had been waived. 
Faulkner Tria! Testimony, p.I6S,LL.22·25, p.l66, LL.l-17. 
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(40) In 2009, shortly after PMC acquired and became successor in interest to the Lease 
Agreement, as part of its larger purchase of the hospital operated and known as Pormeuf Medical 
Center, Don Wadle was asked to review the Lease Agreement. He was informed that a previous 
adjustment had not taken place and asked to detennine the appropriateness of making an 
adjustment to the annual rent 
( 41) Don Wadle determined that an adjustment to the annual rent would be appropriate 
and that !here was a process in the Lease Agreement to obtain an adj11Stment. 
( 42) In 2009, PMC began lhe process of having the: 4.25 acre leasehold appfllised and 
following the appraisal PMC made Quail Ridge aware of its intent to increase the annual rent in 
accordance with the Lease Agreement. 
(43) At trial Brad Janoi.ISh, a principal with Integra Realty Resources in Boise, Idaho 
·. 
testified regarding the market value of the 4.25 acres of property which is the subject of the 
Lease Agreement. 
(44) Mr. Janoush was admitted to testify at trial as an expert real estate appraiser and 
consultant. 
(45) Mr. Janoush opined. after discussi.Ilg his methodology, that the 4.25 acres of 
property that are the subject of the leasehold had a value of $1,080,000 on January 27, 2007. He 
further testified that on Januai-y 27,2010, the value of this 4.25 acre leasehold had declined in 
value from the January 27, 2007 date to $990,000.17 
(46) Christian Joseph Anton (Anton) testified, by way of deposilion introduced at trial, 
that he "assumed" that the $15,000 per acre figure utilized by the parties as the "filir market 
11PMC has argued l!lat the appllcoblc modff!Clll1on date Is Janu..y 2.3. The Court is not sure where this dOie comes from. The 
copy of tho: Lease Agreeme:Pt ;tdmitted. into evidence at trial reflectS a signature: date of 1anuaey 27, 1983. How~cr. lh=.: Lease 
Ag=mo:ntlu•:lr provid<s thlll the applicable date for lbe rent .qjusuncnt i• Fcbrulll)' I. See Coun's Findillp of Fact Nwnbor 9 
Md foolnoL<llQ, 
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affirmative or negative in fonn and effect, and such declarations shall have~ 
force and effect of a :final judgment or decree. 
(2) Idaho Code §10·1202 provides as follows: 
Any person interested under a deed, will, writteu contract or other writings 
constituting a contract or any oral contract, or whose rights, statUS or other legal 
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have detennincd any· question of construction or validity arising under the 
instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of 
rights, statos or other legal relations thereunder. · 
[Bold Emphasis Added by the Court] 
(3) Finally, Idaho Code § 10-1203 provides as follows: 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof. 
(4) Porsuant to the foregoing, the Coun has authority and jurisdiction to declare the rights 
ofPMC and Quail Ridge as the successors in interest to the Lease Agreement. 
(5) In 1983, lliC and Sterling entered into a legally binding and valid Lease Agreement 
whereby Sterling leased 4.25 acres of property from IHC. 
(6) PMC and Quail Ridge are the successors in interest to this Lease Agreement PMC is 
the Lessor and Quail Ridge is the Lessee. 
(J) In Bakker v. Thunder Spring-Wareham, LLC, 141 Idaho 185, 190, 108 P.3d 332, 337 
(2005), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed contract interpretation, in doing so it stated as follows: 
When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, its interpretation and 
legal effect are questions of!aw. An unambiguous contract will be given its plain 
meaning. The purpose of interpreting a COI!tract is to determine the intent of the 
contracting parties at the time the contract was entered. In determining the intent 
of the parties, this Court must view the contract as a whole. Jf a contract is found 
ambiguous, its interpretation is a queStion of fact. Whether a contract is 
ambi~ous is a question of law. A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably subject 
to conflicting interpretations. 
(8) This Court, upon review of the Lease Agreement concludes that section 1.3(b} of the 
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footnote l 0 to the Court's Findings of Fact. Therefore, the Lease Agreement called for 
adjustments to the =ual rent on the following dates: 
February I, !986 
February I, 1989 
Febt'uaty 1 , 1992 
February!, 1995 
February 1, 1998 
February 1, 2001 
February l, 2004 
February 1, 2007 
February 1, 2010 
It also calls for adjustments to the amlual rem on the following prospective dates: 
February 1, 2013 
FebrUary;, 2016 
February 1, 2019 
February I, 2022 
( 13) No adjustment to the annual rent under The Lease Agreement was effectuated pursuant 
to the terms of the Lease Asreement between 1986 and 2010. Further, no party to the Lease 
Agreement even attempted to adjust the annual rent wttil September and October of 2009 when 
PMC attempted to invoke section L3(b) of the Lease Agreement to effectuate a modification in the 
annual mt! amotlllt. 
(14) The Court concludes that the second paragraph of section 1.3(b) is clear and 
' 
unambiguous. It provides the procedure whereby the tent adjUStment process is implemented. It 
allows for the parties to negotiate and ·submit by way of ''written agreement'' their agreement 
concerning the "fair market value" of the 4.25 ~re leasehold for the upcoming three (3) year 
adjusnnent period. This period in which the parties are to negotiate and arrive at an agreed upon 
''fu.ir ~IU~tket value" of the 4.2S acre leuehold is to oecur withln ninety (90) days of rent adjustment 
· date. If tlw plttrles are successful in this en~vor, their agreed upcm value is "a conc:lusive 
determination ... of fair market value for the period to which the aqjustment applies." If the parties 
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v. Rocky Mountain Rogues, Inc., 148 Idaho 503, 513, 224 P.3d 1092, 1102 (2009). "The 
determination of a parties' intent with respect to a contract p{ovision 'is to be determined by 
looking at the contract as a whole, the language used in the document, the circumstmccs under 
which it was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any construction 
placed upon it by the contraming parties as shown by their conduct or dealings."' Beus v. Beus, 
!51 Idaho 235,238,254 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2011). 
( 18) The Collrt concludes that "fair market value" is a term of art in the legal and real estate 
fields. Black's Law Dictionary <iefines fair market value as "the price that a seller is willing to 
accept and a buyer is willing to pay on the open llllll'ket and in an arm's-length transaction." Black's 
Law Dictionary, Seventh Editio11. In Logan v. Grand Junetion ksociates, Ill Idaho 670, 671, 726 
P .2d 782 783 (Ct.App.l986), the Idaho Court of Appeals consid~ a case where the trial court 
applied a nearly identical definition of fair market value (the legal defirutio11 of fair market value is 
what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller). Although the Idaho Court of Appc:als did not 
rule on the correctness of this definition, neither did it indicate that this was not the correct 
definition. Rather, it reversed the trial judge on the basis that the methodology it applied in arriving 
at fair market value was in error. Brad Janoush, ,PMC's real estate appraiser expert, testified thllt 
fair market value is an antiquated temt that was <ltellted and used back in the 1980's. He testified 
that the term now used is "market value." He defined market value as "the property's most 
probable sales price." He :tilrth.er testified !hat although the term "fair mlllket value" "is hardly ever 
used currently, [it] ... may be thought of as being synonymous with IIIIIIket value." 
( 19) The Court concludes thar these two (2) definitions of market value and fair market 
value are consistent and appear to be manageable definitions for the rent adjustment provision of the 
Lease Agreement if standing alone. However, they are not left standing alone. 
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County, and forgotten in its entirety except at times when ownership changed hands. It appears that 
there was no colll'Se ofdealing between me and Sterling as well as their successors dealing directly 
with the three (3) year adjustment provision. Christison's testimony seems to intimate tbat IHC 
never sought a rent adjustmentbecause it determined that the value of me leasehold acreage had not 
increased in value. Therefore, iiii adjustment process would have resulted in no change in the 
annual rent or a decrease. However, good management practices and compliance with the Lease 
Aareement would have rt:quired that they advise Sterling that they did nor believe the value of the 
leasehold justified an increase in rent rather iliiiii just ignoring or forgetting about the rent 
adjustment provision. 
(23) As stated in BellS v. BellS, supra, unde.r Idaho law the parties' intent is to be determined 
by the express language of the document and reviewing the document as a whole. This is an issue 
of law. If there are ambiguities, then it becomes a question of fact concerning the intent of the 
parties. In ascertaining that intent, the fact finder may conside.r extrinsic evidence touching upon the 
parties' intent. In this case, the Court is the finder of fact. In discerning the intent of the parties, by 
way of extrinsic or parol evidence, the Court can consider the circumstances under which the 
Lease Agreement was made, the objective and purpose of the particular provision, and any 
construction placed upon it by the contracting parties as shown by their conduct or dealings. 
Beusv. Beus, 151 Idaho235,238,254P.3d 1231, 1234(20ll)(Beus). 
(24) As stated and discussecl above, there is almost no credible or relevant evi<:lence on 
these issues. The Court, in researching this issue, can find. no controlling case law in Idaho that 
discusses how the Court should procee<i when the record is entirely lacking extrinsic evidence of 
prior course of dealings mtdlor !he parties' original intent. 
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is that there were no cou:rse of dealing for the following reasons: (1) Sterling, and later Quail 
Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a manner of speaking if Sterling or Quail 
Ridge "rocked the boat" they had no !bing to gain and only increased rent to lose if they initiated 
a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) IHC and Bannock County, through poor 
management arullor ha¥ing forgotten about the rent adjustment provisions, never sought a rent 
adj ustment.10 
(28) Therefore: (1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen 
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to establish a 
course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to the language 
related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions of the Lease 
Agreement. 21 
(29) The Court will apply the current m;u:ket value to the 4.25 acres of property which 
make up the leasehold. The Court accepts Janoush's opinion with respect to the current market 
value of the 4.25 acres, exclusive of improvements, as of February l, 2007 as being $1,080,000. 
The Court further accepts Janoush's opinion with xespect to the C\ll!ent market value of the 4.25 
acres, exclusive ofimprovements, as of February!, 2010 as being $990,000. 
(30) In 2009, when PMC attempted 10 invoke section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement for 
purposes of modifying the annual rent, PMC had become the successor in interest to the original 
"Again tho Court re<ogni,.. !hat Christison !I:Sriflcd !hat he n.-vlcwcd all of IHC's oxooutor l"'lltroc!S on61hor <luring his tl"""c 
no incn:allic: in rcmt was sought because he believed that the value in:tb~ property was 1'10t tho:re to support a rtnt increase. Wh.Ue 
Ill is may bellll ao:outat~>lillltc of arraits d•nng Chrillison's tenure at IIIC. I ~891brou;h.ZOOO; as ianousb'stestimony ostablisbod. 
in recent YCU'S\ this ane8t cwu or l-lS, ha,q became a hot-bed o_f commercial d~clopmcn\ in Poc5ltello, Idaho. For thcst" r~ns. 
the Coon concludes '!:hQI: there is no course of dealing with rcspc;t to IHC and Bamtock County in their capaciey as lessots due 
solely to mismartt\gement and the fact that the provisions of the Lcec: Agreement wet'$ forgotten on two (2) occasio11s in 1083 
a:ftor the Lease Agr=m~nt was created lind in 1996 after JHC agreed to f'MI becoming a $\J.brenant. 
;nCcrtainly 1h~ fatlQI'S may play a. role in future rent adjustments under tb-c- Leese Agteement, but there Is no evidoenc~ In the 
ro:ord to allow them to pla.)l a role in the acUustmcnt proce!! this Court is being o.sked. to consider a..q pan: of the d~laratory 
judgm.:nt proceedinQ. Por eM.amptc. itdlc parties were. by written agn:·cm.;nt., abl.: to a~ 1o rent adjusnnertt that was based an 
a value lcsslhan 15% or market v:llue as that term was defined by Jmoush or Blat:k's Law Dictioruzry, thfLt would certainly ben 
rclcvtt.nl COUr:'iC': f,)( dealirtg IWid~ncC going. forward. 
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(1961). As with all modifications, tbe terms of a contract cannot be altered by 
one party without the other party's approval. ld. at 296, 362 P 2d at 386. 
Additionally, the minds ohhe parties must meet as to the proposed modification. 
Jd. "The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of conduct in 
accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one 
part)' ill accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other." !d. 
Whether an alleged modification is proven "is one for the trier of the facts to 
decide." Res. Eng'g, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,938,500 P.2d 836,839 (1972). 
This Court, as the finder of fact, determines that the evidence at trial does not support a finding by 
this Court of a modification to the terms of the Lease Agreement. Both the 1996 Esroppel 
Certificate and the 200 I Estoppel Certificate recite as follows: 
The Lease [Agreement] is in full force and effect, is valid and enforceable in 
accordance with its terms and has not been terminated. The Lease constitutes the 
only agreement of any kind or nature between the Landlord a11d the Ten.an.t relating 
in any way to the Demised Premises. 
1996 Lei!S~ Agreeme11t, '112 and 2001 Lease Agreement, 1\2. Both the 1996 Estoppel Certificate and 
the 2001 Estoppel Certificate also provided as follows: 
Landlord's CO!lSent to the Sublease as set forth herein shall not ccmstitute or be 
construed as (a) a waiver or modification by Landlord of Tenants duties or 
obligations under the Lease [Agreement], or excuse Tena11ts performa11ce of any 
term or condition of the Lease [Agreement], or (b) a waiver or modification by 
Landlord to any rights, under the Lease [Agreement], i11cludillg without 
limitation, Landlords right pursuant to Section 12.1 of the Lease Agreement. 
1996 Estoppel Certificate, ~1 0, am:! 2001 Estoppel Certificate, 'lJl 0. 
(35) The only svidence in the record ~garding the modificatio11 of the Lease Agreement is 
the subjective inte11t of Faulkner. Faulkner, testified as the individual drafting the 2001 Estoppel 
Certificate that he purposefully left out certain language that existed in the 1996 Estoppel Certificate 
because he "wanted to confirm in the course of dealing that that had been waived." The Court 
would suggest that removing language thet was present in an earlier doc~~ment and not discussing 
the same or making the other party aware of its deletion does not establish "murual assem." In fact, 
some might question the prop&:ty of mch conduct. The Court finds that this unilateral act of 
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(38) The Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed the doctrine of waiver in Knipe Land 
Co. v. Roberrsen, !51 Idaho 449,457-58,259 P.3d 595, 603-04 (2011). In doing so, it stated as 
follows: 
"A waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage, and the party asserting the waiver must show that he acted in 
reasonable reliance upon it and that he thereby has altered hi$ position to his 
deuiment." Fullerton v. Griswold, 142 Idaho 820, 824, 136 P.3d 291, 295 (2006) 
(internal quotation omitted). "Waiver is foremost a question of inlent," Seaport 
Citizens Bankv. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct.App.I987): 
A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established. 
Margaret H. Wayne Tnm v, Lip.sky, 123 Idaho 253, 256, 846 P.2d 904, 907 
(1993). "Waiver will not be inferred except ftom a clear and unequivocal act 
manifesting an intent to waive, or from conduct amounting to estOppel." ld. 
(39) As the Court previously ruled with respect to Quail Ridge's claim of conlillct 
modification, the Court, as the finder of filet, finds no facts to support the claim that lHC or 
Bannock County voluntarily and intentionally waived a known right. Rather, what the Court has 
found is that lHC and Bannock County, through poor management and oversight, neglected 
and! or forgot about the rent adjustment provision of the: Lease Agreement. Such conduct does 
not establish the requisite intent to voluntarily Waive the rent adjustment provision of the Lease 
Agreement. 
( 40) Finally, Quail Ridge a.sserrs that the Collt! should apply the equltable d9ctrine of 
laches to the rent adjustment provisions and not allow PMC to modizy the rent either 
retroactively or prospectively. The CoUrt will' IIICcept Quail.Ridge's laches defense in part and 
finds it to be inapplicable in part. 
(41) In Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352, 359, 48 PJd 1241, 1248 
(2002), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed the defense of laches. In addressing this affirmative 
defense, the Supreme Court noted that the party asserting the defense bears the burden of proving 
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Agreement until October of 2009. This Wall two (2) years and over seven (7) months into the 
current rent adjustment period. This was not reasonable, nor was it compliant with the express 
provisions of the Lease Agreement, nor was it reasonable to expect Quail Ridge to have its 
llllllual rent adjusted two (2) years and seven (7) plus months into the current period. 
( 44) However, the Court does not find the same impediments to a prospective rent 
adjustme,nt. ht October of2009, PMC notified Quail Ridge that it was seeking tO adjust the rent 
in accordance with section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. The Court concludes that this was 
consistent with the intent of obtaining a written agreement within the ninety (90) window set by 
section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. These attempts were unsuccessful, and in June of 2010 
litigation was initiated. The Court does not believe the doctrine of laches applies to PMC's 
attempts to effectuate a rent adjustment for the 291 0 rent adjustment period as well as future rent 
adjustment periods. The Court concludes that although both parties failed to comply with the 
mandatory arbitration provision of the Lease Agreement, that PMC has complied with the 
provisions of the Lease Agreement sufficient to justifY an adjustment to the annual rent. 
( 45) Therefore, the Court concludes !4at PMC is entitled to an adjustment in the rent for 
the years 2010, 2011, and 2012 in the amount of $148,5'00.00 annually. Therefore, for the three 
(3) year period applicable to the 2010 rent adjustment, the combirted annual rent for these three (3) 
years is $445,500.00 by January 31, 2013, li$I!Uilling that Quail Ridge remains current on its annual 
rent, it will have paid $28,687.50 towards the arurual rent for this three (3) year period . .As such it is 
entitled to a credit in this amount against the $44S,500.00. This credit results in Quail Ridge being 
obligated to PMC in the total amount of $416,812.50 for rent for the period ofFebrua!y 1, 2010 
through January 31, 2013. 
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The undersigned certifies that on the X' day of OctOber, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Findings ofFaet, Conclusions ofi..aw and Memorandum Decision and 
Order to be served upon the following persons in the following manner. 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawlcins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-099! 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
21 05 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
X Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
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POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC, dba ) 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, ) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, ) 







. ' .. · .. 
Following a two (2) day bench trial conducted before the Court commencing on May 14, 
2012 and concluding on May 15, 2012 and the Court having rendered its Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Memorandum Decision and Order the Court hereby enters this 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 10-1201 through 10-1203. This 
Declaratory Judgment declares the parties' respective rights and obligations with respect those 
issues. This Declaratory Judgment deals specifically with the rent adjustment provisions of the 
parties' Ground Lease Agreement (Section 1.3(b) and generally with sections 1.1, 1.2 and 1.3(a) of 
the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. 
The Court hereby ORDERS ADJUDGES AND DECREES as follows: 
(I) Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf Medical Centers (PM C) is entitled to an 
adjustment in the annual rent owed by Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail 
Ridge) under the parties Ground Lease Agreement from $9,562.50 annually to 
$148,500.00 annually. 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT- 1 
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(2) This rent adjustment is for the three (3) period commencing on February 1, 2010 and 
concluding on January 31,2013. Therefore the total rent due PMC from Quail Ridge is 
the amount of$445,500.00 for this three (3) year period. 
(3) Quail Ridge has already paid PMC $9,562.00 armual rent on or about February I 
each year during that three year period for a total amount paid of $28,687.50. 
(4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to promptly pay 
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. 
(5) The rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease Agreement, dated January 27, 
1983, of which PMC is the successor Lessor and Quail Ridge is the successor Lessee 
remains in full force and effect. The next rent adjustment, which is scheduled to take 
effect February 1, 2013, shall proceed consistent with section 1.3(b) of the Ground 
Lease Agreement. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 26th day ofNovember, 2012. 
DECLARATORYJUDGMENT-2 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
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The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day of November, 2012, she caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order on Form of Judgment to be served upon the following persons 
in the following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2499 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
2105 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 529-9732 









GUARANTEE OF PAYMENT AND PERFORMANCE 
By the· exeeufioii hereaf, and as a condition precedent to, and as inducement for, the 
execution and delivery by me Health Services, Jnc., a Utah nonprofit corporation ("JHCHS"), of 
that certain Landlord Consent and Estoppel, dated as of June 1, 2001, and the foregoing 
Amendment, FORREST L. PRESTON, individually, wtconditionally guarantees the payment and 
performance of any and all obligations of Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, a Tennessee 
limited liability company ("Quail Ridge'') and/or Pocatello Medical Investors Limited 
Partnership, a Tennessee limited partnership ("PMI"), under the "Ground Lease" and the 
"Sublease" (each as defined in the foregoing Amendment). To the fullest extent possible, the 
undersigned expressly waives notice of the acceptance of this Guarantee, notice of demand for 
payment, notice of nonpayment, notice of other default, notice of suit, and all other notices to 
which the wtdersigned might otherwise be entitled in connection with this Guarantee. Further, 
the undersigned waives any responsibility or duty lliCHS may have to the undersigned to 
proceed against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or to pursue any other legal remedy available. Upon any 
default, lliCHS may, at its option, proceed directly, and at once, without notice, against the 
undersigned without proceeding against Quail Ridge and/or PMI or any other person. In 
addition, the undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for 
all costs and expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this 
Guarantee. 
DATED as ofthe 1stdayofJwte, 2001/ A 
~rO~RRE~S~~~L~.P~~~T~~~~------
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GROUND LEASE AGREEME~T 
Thisj1ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this -27 
day of lKJ.-?t--tU~, 1983, by and between lNTERNOUNTAIN HEALTH 
CARE, ftc,, a ~h non-profit corporation, authoriz.ed to do 
business in the State of Idaho. under the name of Pocatello 
Regional Medical Center (hereinafter called "Lessor"). and 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington partnership authoriz.ed to 
do l:>usiness in the State of Idaho, (hereinafter called "Lessee"), 
!)_~£!_!_A~S 
1-IHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within the 
City of Pocatello, Bannock County, Idaho: and 
WHEREAS, Lessor wishes to lease to Lessee approximately 4 
acres, more or less, of ·said property for construction of a 
1• Psychiatric: Hospital building (the "hospital") and to impose 
certain restrictions on the use of sucn parcel of real property 
and Lessee wishes to lease said parcel of real property for such 
purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions; and 
WHEREAS, Lessor and Lessee wish to enter into a ""ritten 
ground lease agree·ment setting forth the terms, conditions and · 
restrictions under which said parcel of real property is to be 
leased; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual 
covenants, conditions and promises contained 'herein, Lessor and 
Lessee agree as follo""s: 
ARTICLE 1 
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL 
1.1 Real Prooerty Leased. Lessor hereby leases to Lessee 
and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described 
G.ROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1 HORtN'S l(l!o:. WYt.:N'l,lt llr.Ct,..tS.O,.•t S10t.""-tf" 
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i,n E.x.hibit "A" attached hereto and hereby ~:~ade a part hereof, in-
cluding all easements, right-of-way interests associated there-
with whether granted or by prescription, and any and all other 
interests or rights appurtenant to the property and in adjoining 
and adjacent land, highways, roads, 
public or private, which are 
installation, maintenance, operation 
streets and lanes! whether 
reasonably required for 
and service of electricity, 
gas, s·ewer, ·telephone, water and other utility lines and for 
and from driveways and approaches to 
and bene·fi t of the above described 
improvemetlts to 
··leased fand"). 
be erected thereon 
abutting ways for the use 
real property, incl~ding 
(hereinafter· called the 
situated in the County of Bannocks State of 
Idaho. 
l. 2 ~- The ter~:~ of this Lease shall be for a period of 
thirty (30) years (hereinafter referred as the "Term"), 
commencing on the ·1st cay of 1983, or on or 
before thirty (30) 
whi-chever i-s ia ter, 
days 
(the 
after permit i·s 
~·commencement Date~~), with -one 
issued, / 
(l) ten \ 
·(10) vear option to extend such term to be exercised as pr-ovided 
in A.:rticle 14, Paragraph 14.1, hereof. Such option :to ext·end the 
term is per•onal to Lessee and may not be.assigned or convefed in 
any manner whatsoever to anothe:r party. Lessee shall be entitled 
to possession of the lea.sed land on the Commencement Date. 
1.3 Rent and Pavment Thereof. 
(a) Rental. Lessee shall pay the following ann·ual 
rental amount: 
An initial annual r.ental shall be calculated 
on the basis of fifteen percent (l5t) of the 
value of the leased land. For purposes of 
the first three ( 3) years from the Cor.wence= 
ment Date of this Lease, the leased land 
sha1·1 be valued at the rate of Fifteen 
C:R.OU!:l"D LEASE AGREEMENT - 2 
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Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) ·per 
acre. 
(b) Adjustments Based on Property 
rental as set forth above shall be 
Value. The annual 
adjusted every three 
(3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, 
referred to below as the rent adjust~ent date. 
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days 
before the applicable rent adjustment date shall be a 
conclusive determination between the parties of the fair 
market value for the period to which the adjustment applies. 
If the parties have not so agreed by the applicable rent 
adjustment date, the determination shall be made as in the 
paragraph on Arbitration in Ar.ticle 13. 
The rent as adjusted shall be· equal to fifteen percent 
(15%) percent of the !:air market value of the leased land, 
exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determina-
tion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and 
best use of the land·on the applicable rent adjustment date 
'-'ithout ta'ldng the leasenold into account. The det errnina-
tion shall take into account the parties' agreement that the 
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied 
to a fair market value of Fifteen Tnousand and No/100 
Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into 
account any determinations of market value made under this 
1 ease for t_he purpose of aojustments for perioos preceding 
tne applicable rent adjustment date. 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the 
applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to 
pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period 
until the adjusted rate is oetermined. The party indebted 
shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference 
for the period affected by the adjustment. 
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{cJ Definition of Lease Year. l\ ;l.e;:.se year is either a 
calendar year or a fiscal year, as selected 'by Lessee. 
1.4 ~ation of Pa:rtne..-shio..· Nothing- .in this Lease shall 
'be construed to render_ the Lessor in any '-1ay or for a,ny purpose a 
partner, joint venturer, or associate in any relationship with 
Lessee other than that of landlord and tenant, nor shall this 
Lease be construed to autho-riz.e either to act as agent for the 
other, except as expressly provided to the contrary in this 
Lease. 
1.5 !'lllc:e of :Rental. P~mera.s. .All payments of Rental 
required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this" lease shall 
be made in lawful .money of the United· States which at time of 
such payment shall be legal tender for the payment of public and 
private~debts, free from all claims, demands, deductions, 
a.b;;.tement;s, se-t-off-s, .prior notices or c:ounterc:laims of any l<ind 
or character against Lessor and shall be payable at the follo..,ing 
address or at such other place or places· as may· be from time to 
time desi9_nated by Lessor by written' notice given to ·Lessee: 
Pocatello Re9ional Hedic:al Center 
777 i:iospital Way 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
1.6 fee Mortoaoes. Lessor may grant mortgages, Deeds of 
T+ust or O-ther s.ecurity i·nterests in the leased land by 
subordination agreement, provided, however, that 
Deed-s of Trust o.r security interests. shall· be 
such mortgages, 
subject to this 
lease and further provided that LesSee de~iver a copy of any such 
proposed rnortga.ge., Deed of Trust or other security interest and 
related note to Le,ssor :i'a>r prior examination and approval; 
provided, however, th<~t such examination and approval shall be 
accomplished by Lessor in a diligent ~anner. 
(~ 
' 
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USE OF LEASED LAND AND TITLE TO IMPROVEMENTS 
2.1 Use of Leased Land. Lessee shall use the leased land 
solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining ~nd operating 
the hospital for psychiatric care and substance abuse treatment; 
provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land for any 
lawful purpose. Lessee shall commence construction of the 
hospital within forty-fiv·e (45) days after the commencement date 
of· this Lease and the issuance of' a building permit. lf Lessee 
is delayed in commencing construction or receivins the permit by 
any cause or causJOs beyond Lessee's control, such causes 
including but not necessarily being lir.lited to Acts of God, 
strikes, war, insurrections, and the li)te, said forty-five (45) 
day period to commence construction shall be extended for a 
period e~uivalent to the time lest by reason of any such cause or 
causes; provided, however, that no extensions shall be g::anted 
for any such delay which commences more than ten {10) days before 
Lessee notifies Lessor of .. such delay and the :reasons therefor. 
Once construction is begun, Lessee shall, with reasonable 
diligence, prosecute to completion all construction of improve-
ments • additions, or alterations and shall have substantially 
completed construction of the hospital within "&?t( (_/ ___ ) years 
after date of this lease. "Substantial completion" shall mean 
that the hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as 
evidenced by a Coo.rtificate of Occupancy or other like document 
issued by an appropriate governmental authority. If Lessee is 
delayed in substantial completion of the hospital by any cause or 
causes beyond Lessee's control. such causes including but not 
necessarily being limited to 1\.cts of God, strikes, '-'ar, 
insurrections, and the like, said cate for sub~tantial completion 
of the hospital shall be extended for a period e~uivalent to the 
time lost by reason of any such cause or causes; provided, 
however, that no e>:tensions will be o;:;:anted for any such delay 
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which commences more than ten '(-lO) t:·ay·s ·befo·re 't:e:'ssee 
Lessor of such delay and. the reasons thereforv All work 




performed in a good ind workmanlike manner, shall substantially 
comply with plans and specifications submitted to Lessor as 
required by this lease, and shall comply with all govenlmental. 
p&rmits, laws, ordinances a.nd regulat.ions. Less-ee shall not 
bring, cause to be brought., or permit t.o be brought or kept on 
the leased land anything which will in any way conflict with any 
law, ordinance, rule, or regulation,_ or commit or suffer to be 
COT.ll'!litted any waste upon the leased land 1 Or use or a'! low the 
.leased land or hospital to be used for any immoral .or' unlawful 
P,u.r-pose. 
2.2 Architectural Compatibility, lt is understno<! and 
agr.eed that the hospital will be architecturally compatible witn 
the ~1ed Center hospital. ln order to insure that: this be 
accomplished, Lessee shall submit its site plan, .. elev-ations, and 
architectural plans and specifications for the hci'spital to the ( 
Boa.rd of Directors of the tied Ceni;.er hospital for approval before 
commencing construction. The approval of the Board of-Directors 
shall not be unreasonably withheld and response snall be· given 
w-ithin forty-five (45) days following the submission of Le!<see's 
plan;s and specifications. 
2. 3 · · Requ'ired Parking. Lessee agrees that in oesigning the 
site plans and' t'he plans and specifications for constn.iction of 
the hospit'al, it will include sufficient off-_street parl;ing 
spaces to ·accommodate the minimum required by, local codes. 
2.4 Title tb Builcincs. Title to the h'ospital and 
a}:>purtenan.ces thereto and all at.'h!::!r improve-ments and fixtures 
located on the leased lane or con'structec or placed on the le»sed 
laoO ·oy Lessee or its tenants shail be and renain in Lessee 
during the Term. Lessee shall 'have the right to ma);e 
alterations, changes and repairs as provided herein. No interest 
in any builcings, per::;anent improvements, or fixtures shall pass 
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to Lessor until the expiration of the Term or the prior 
( termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the 
right to terminate this lease pursuant. to hrticle 10 hereof. 
Lessee coven<.nts and agrees that upon expiration of_ the Term it 
will yield up and deliver the leased land vith any such 
buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the leased 
land at such time free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of 
any kind, and upon such expiration title therein shall be in 
Lessor. In the event of earlier termination of this lease, 
Lessee covenants and agrees that it ,,,.ill yield up and deliver the 
leased land '-'ith any suc:b buildings, permanent improvements, and 
fixtures upon the leased land at suer: time free and clear of all 
liens and indebtedness of any kind. Provided, however, that such 
obligation to deliver the leased land and improvements free and 
clear of all liens and indebtedness shall not apply to the 
original lien of first encumbrance represented by the mortgage or 
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Article 6 
hereof given to secure the- financing for the construction of t!-:e 
original buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the 
leased land. Upon suc:b earlier termination, title in the 
buildings, permanent ir..provements and fixtures upon the leased 
land shall be in Lessor. 
2.5 Deed at Termination. Upon termination of this lease, 
Lessee shall·, subject to the foregoing, execute a deed 
satisfactory in £-orm and content to Lessor confirming Lessor's 
title to any buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures 
therein, upon the leased land at the time of termination. 
2.6 hdditional Real Propertv. At such time as Lessee shall 
require add.it.ional real property for the expansion of the 
hospital, Lessee shall so notify _Lessor and Lessor shall in good 
faith consider the leasing of acditional real property to Lessee 
for such purpose. 
'--
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requests being made, Lessor shall grant to public entities or 
other public service· corporations·, for the ·-purpose of serving 
only the property, rights of way or easements on .or over the 
property for poles or conduits or both, for telephone, 
electricity, wat.er, sanitary or storm sewers or both, and for 
other utilities and municipal or special district services. 
The cost. of utilities, their installation and maintenance, 
are to be assumed, fully paid and satisfied by Lessee. 
ARTICLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
3.1 General Maintenance. Throughou:t the Term, Lessee 
shall, at Lessee's ·sole_ cost and expense, maintain the premises 
and all improvements in good condition and repair, ordinary wear 
.and .tear .excepted, and in' accordance with all applicable 






municipal, and other gover·nmental agencies 





departments, bureaus, and officials: (2) the ins1,1rance 
underwriting board· or insurance companies insuring all or any 
part of the premises or improvements or both; and {3) Lessor, as 
shall be in effect froni time to time·. Lessee shall r.~anage and 
operate the hospital ·and the surrounding grounds in a competent 
and professio·nal "n~anner. Lessee s·ha.ll maintain the sidewalks and 
roadways giving access to the hospital free and clear of ice and 
snow~ 
E:t.cept as provided below; Lessee she.ll oromotlv ana . - -
diligently repair, restore and replace as requirecl to maintain or 
comply as above, or to remedy ail damage to or C~st.ruction of all 
or any part of the improvements resulting "-'holly or in part from 
causes required by this lease to be covered b~· fire or el<tended 
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exceed seventy-five per_cent (75\) of the replacement value of all 
of the improvements. If the cost does exceed that percent, 
Lessee may nevertheless repair, restore and replace as above or 
may by notice elect instead to raze the improvements damaged or 
destroyed. Within thirty (30) days after such notice, Lessor may 
by notice elect 
Lessee snall not 
to repair, 
raze until 
restore and replace 





Lessor's notice of election. Lessor sha 11 not be required to 
furnish any services ·or facilities 
al~erations of any kind in or on the 
or to make any repairs or 
premises. Lessor 1 S election 
to perform any obligation of Lessee under this provision on 
Lessee's failure or refusal to do so sball not constitute a 
waiver o~ ~ny _right or remedy for LessJ'e • s. default, and Lessee 
shall promptly reimburse, defend, and indemnify Lessor a9ainst 
all liability, loss, cost, and expense arising from it. 
In determining whether Lessee has acted promptly as 
required under the foregoing paragraph, one of the criteria to be 
considered· is the availability of any applicable insurance 
proceeds. 
Nothing in this provision defining the duty of 
maintenance shall be construed as limiting any righ~ given 
elsewhere in this lease to alter, modify, demolish, remove, or 
replace any improvement, or as limiting provisions relating to 
condemnation or to damage or destruc~ion during the final year or 
years of tbe Term-. No deprivation, 
use resulting from any event or 
paragrapb shall entitle Lessee to 
impairment, or limitation on 
wor'lo: contemplated by this 
any offset, aba ter:>ent, or 
reduction in rent nor to any termination or ex~ension of the 
Term. 
3.2 Relief for Substantial Less of Area. lf any dar..age to 
or destruction of tbe premises or the improvements is such that 
75\ of the floor area is rendered unusable for purposes stated in 
the Lease, Lessee may, at Lessee's election, delay the "'Or'l<. 
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cont.ainec'f in this paragraph shall be construed to negate or 
moCify eny provision -of this "lease relating to dai.i.age Ot"" 
destruction during the final year ( s) of the term. 
3.3 ~ajor and Minor Distinquished. Lessor's approval is 
:net required fo.r Less~e•s_:minor repairs, alterations., or 
additions. ..Minor'1 means a construction cost not. exceeding Five 
Thousand ana No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00.), none of which is derived 
:from funds advanced on the security o£ an encu"'brance on the 
leasehold or the property. hConstruction cost• includes all 
costs that .,auld constitute the basis of a valid claim or c.labns 
under the mechanics' lien laws in effect at the time the work is 
c·ommenced for an_y demolition and a!jy r!'moval of e:<dsting 
improvements_or parts of i~pr~Jements as well as for preparation, 
construction and- completion of all new improvements or 
improvements. The dol~ar amount. stated above shall be 
parts of 
ad just.ed 
by the percentaae chanae in the index k~o~~ as the United States "" ... ,-. - . 
De·part•nent of Cornme~:ce Composite Cotost.-uction Cost lnde:x ~s 
published 
Department 
in the Survey of Current Business by the U.S. 
of Commerce, or successor index. If the index is 
discontinued and thezce is no successor index, 'the refe::ence 
figure shall be determined bY the senior officer in the closest. 
office of the U.S. Department of Commerce or successor department 
or ageney .. ,,M.a jcr ~ re.pairs,. alt-e-rations, or additions ~re t'ho~e 
not cefined as mi-nor a.bove. Fozc major rep01irs, alterations, o:r-
additions, Lessee shal·l receive Lessor·s approvals of the plans 
as set forth .above in Paragraph 2. 2. 
3 .. 4 Go.ver.nmental. i\ut~orities. Lessee shall pro~ptly comply 
with all applicab1e laws, ref;!ulaticns, orainances, requirements 
ana orders of governmental authorities, in-clueing, but ru»t 
limited to, the ~e:};.ing, at. its sole ex?ense,. of any insta~ __ l.a t.Lon, 
alteration, roodification,. change or repair, structu:ral or 
ot.her.,..,ise; .firovided, ho~ever, LeSsee 'has the right to contest by· 
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appropriate judicial or administrative proceedings, withoct cos~ 
o.- expense to Lesser, the validity or application of any l "'"', 
ordinance, order, rule, regulations or requirement (hereinafter 
called "Lav") that Lessee repair, maintain, alter or. replace the 
improvements in vhole or in part, and Lessee shall not be in 
default for failing to do such 
following final o:'leterrnination of 
work until a reasonable time 
Lessee's contest. lf Lessor 
gives notice of request, Lessee sh<>ll first. furnish Lessor a 
bond, satisfactory to Lessox- i"n for~, amocnt and insurer, 
guaranteeing compliance by Lessee with the contested law, and 
indemnifying Lessor against all liability that Lessor.rnay sustain 
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law. 
Lessor may, but is not required to,, cont<>st any such Law 
independently o:f Lessee. Lessor may, and on Lessee's notice of 
request shall. join in Lessee's 
3.5 Damage or Destruction 
the event of substantial damage 
contest. 
During Final Years of 'l'errn. In 
or destruction to the nospital or 
any part thereof durin9 the last five (5 l years of the Term, 
Lessor shall have the right, exercisable during the ninety ( 90) 
days following the date of such damage or destruction, to 
terminate this lease·. Lessor shall exercise such right. by 
delivering to Lessee "'ritten notice o:f the date of such 
termination, which date shall not be earlier than thirty (30) 
days following the date of Lessor's not.ice of termination. Upon 
exercise of such ...right, Lessor snall be entitled to recover the 
full proceeds of any policy of insurance coverin9 any such damage 
or destruction except such proceeds as may be attributable to 
Lessee's loss of personal property and/or to interruption of 
Lessee's business. 
If Lessor does not 
Lessee shall be responsible 
replacement of the hospital or 
oestroyed as the case may be. 





tenninat.e this lease, 
repair, rebuilding or 
thereof so damaged or 
repairs, rebuilding or 
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.. 
to the condition -it 
~n itrmediately prior tO the event giving rise to the vo~k~ 
3 .. 6 Last Year of Term~ ~1\ .. nyt'.hing her~in to the contrary 
notwithstanding, Lessee shall not have the right during the last 
3'6S days 9f the 'l'el:l11 to alter, remove or demolish, in wl-;ole or in 
part, any buildings, st.rut:tures or other improvements :which exist 
upon the leased land 365 days pn .. or to the end of the Term, 
except with the writ ten consent of Lessor. This provision s1'.all 
not impair. tbe right o·f Lessee t.o" remove any moveable items of 





4.1 ~ht to Grant Lien ·on Leasehold Estate. 
Lessee shall not be in d e·.f iHll t under the term11 
have the right ·to grant. a lien ,upon 
So long as 
.of. this lease', 
or a see.urity Lessee shall 
interest in its leasehold· estate under this lease; provided, 
ho.wevex:-, that not"Wi.thstanding any such instruo~nt granting such 
lien or security interest, Lessor is bound on.ly by those 
obligat~on;; and enjoys all rights end privile$!;!S vhich ""'"' set 
forth in this l.ease. Jmy mortgage or Deed of '!'rust "Or other 
security interest executed by Lessee pursuant to this auth<:l>rity 
i.s hereinafter Oesigna:ted and referred to as tf\e "ledse:'h.Old 
mortgage" and thenolder or owner of such lee!fehold morts:;age upon 
the leasehold est.ate of Lessee, including the benef:i,eiary .of a 
Deed of Truf\t, if such mortgage be in the for.m of a Deed of '!'r,u.st 
or . othe~ -~ecur-ed is hereinafter designated .as 
"leasehold mortgage.e". Any leasehold mortgage sha.l.l not be for a 
period 'llxce.edi·ng "e..he Term. Lessor agr~es, at any time an<;'! from 
time to time, upon receipt of not less than ten (10) days. pFie>r 
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold r.tortgagee, 
to e~ecute~ c.c:kncwledge and deliver to Lessee or to leasehold 









mortgagee a stl!ltement_ in "'riting, certifying. . ., .l.. such is the 
case, that this lease is then unmodified and unamended,_that it 
is not in default, and that it is in full force and effect. :lf 
there have been modifications and amendments to this· lease, said 
statement shall, if such is the case, certify t;ha t the same is 
not then in default· and· is in full force and effect as then 
shall l:>e modified and amended. Said modifications and amendments 
set forth in full in said statement. Said statement shall 
fur~;her state the dates to which the basic rental or other 
charges have been paid, and whether or not there is any existing 
default by Lessee with respect to any covenant, promise of 
agreement on the part of Lessee provided to be performed under 
this lea!"e( and also "'hether a notice of such default ha" been 
served by Lessor. If any such statement contains a claim of 
non-perfonr.ance, insofar as actually known by Lessor, shall be 
summari:z.ed in said statement. Lessee shall. make payment. "'hen due 
and before delinquency of all principal, interest and other 
charges for \-lhich Lessee may be or l:>ecome obligated under any 
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate. 
4.2 Foreclosure of Lien. Prior to com~encing any action to 
foreclose a leasehold mortgage. the lel!lsehol.d mor~;gagee, or any 
assigns of such mer toaoe, shall notify Lessor in writing of t.he 
default by Lessee "'it.h a statement. of the amount then due and 
offer to withhold any acceleration of mat.u:-ity of the promissory 
no~;e, payment of which is secured by the leasehold mortgage. In 
the event Lessor shall., within thirty (30) days o: the ~eceipt of 
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrea~s on 
said mortgage, then upon said payment. said mortgagee shall rein-
state the ~ortgage in all respects as if no default had occurred. 
Lessor may, at. its 
and t.he amounts of 
option. make such payr:~ents on said mort;age, 
such payments shall be consioered additional 
rental due Lessor :f rorr, Lessee under this lease. 
successive defaults by Lessee in makin9 paynents 
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leasehold rr.ortgage shall be subject t:C;- the foregoing previsions 
each time any -such default occurs. Lessee s;hall insure that all 
provisions contained--in this lease reguirirtg action by parties 
n·ot a party hereto shal-l be incorporated into docur:>e'nts to whi.ch 
such parties are a party and that executeD copies of such 
documents be delivered to Lesser within -ten (10) days of 
execution thereof. 
ARTICLE 5 
?ROTECTlON OF MORTGAGEE 
Lessee shall 9ive notice to Lessor of any leasehold morta<;~e 
which Lessee-grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall 
deliver along with said notice a copy of· the -rr.ortgage instrument. 
So long as any_ surr. remains owi:ng on any obligation sect: red by 
such a leasehold 'mortgage, Lessor' and Lessee agree: 
(a) That no rnodification or termination of this lease o.r 
surrender of the leased la~d may be made by tpe Lessor or Lessee 
without the prior written consent of the mortgagee; 
(b) That the Lessor will give· to the rnortg.osee al.l notice 
of oefault simultaneously with any notice given to the Lessee: 
(c) That the mortgagee will have thi::-tx (30) days a!ter 
notice of default delivered to it "·ithin which to cure Lessee's 
default; provided, 11-owever, that said ·period. in which default may' 
be corrected may be extended to ~o more than ninety {90) days in 
the event the mortgagee requires such a period as a condition for 
granting a loan to Lessee anC. if wH:.hin forty (40) days after 
notice of default the t:~prtgag ee notice to Lessor it 
intends to cure Lessee·s default within said extended period; 
(d} That the Lessor will accept performance by the 
mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee; 
{e) '!'hat the Lessor 'Will not terminate the lease for thos" 
defaults, the cure of wnich requites that the rnortgasee be in 
possession provided that the said mortgagee ( i) promptly 
( 
-· ~ ·-
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commences foreclosure and continues its action with due 
diligence, and (ii) continues payment of rent and all other 
charges required to be paid by Lessee which have accrued and 
-..hicn become due and payable during the period the foreclosure 
proceeding is pending; 
(f) That the Lessor shall not have the rignt to terminate 
this lease solely on account of any of the events enticipated by 
subdivision {d) of paragraph 1 of Article 10 without the written 
consent of the leasehold mortgagee, provided that such mortgagee 
promptly commences foreclosu•e if it has tne right to do so and 
thereafter continues its action "'ith due diligence; 
(g) That in the event tne Lessee's interest under this 
lease shall be sold, assigned or other~ise .transferred FUrsuant 
to thE! exE!rcise· of any rignt, power or rE!medy of any mortgagee or 
pursuant to judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
Article 10, and if no rent or othE!r charges snall then be duE! an 
payable under this lease, and if such mortgagee shall have 
arranged to the reasonable satisfaction of the Lessor for the 
curing of any default susceptible of being cured, Lessor within 
sixty (60) days after receiving a .,..ritten request therefor and 
upon receiving payment of its expenses, incl•Jding attonoeys' 
fees, incident thereto, -..ill execute and deliver such instrument 
or instruments as may be required to confirm such sale, 
assignment or other transfer of Lessee's interest under tne 
lease; or 
(h) That in the event a default under anj' leasehold 
mortgage shall have occured, the mortgagee may exercise any 
right, po"'er or remedy of the mortgagee under the mortgage \olhich 
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease. 
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The Lessor- shall, prcmpt:.y after the 
notice of request of Lessee, e~ecute and deliver a mortgage, Deed 
of Trust or other security instrument {herein call eo roortgase) 
sufficient to subordinate, tO the lien of a first encumOra-nee 
represented by the mortgage, Lessorf s fee title {which shall be 
·considered to include fee title in the leased premises or any 
part or parts of the l¢ased premises. includin; all rights and 
• appurtenances) to any mortgage lender who is prepared to make a 
mortgage loan to Lessee to be secured by a first mortgage or Deed 
of Trust covering said Lessor's fee interest in the demised 
premises (o~:- suc'h part thereof as may pe d!3signat.ed by !Jessee} . .,. . .. 
provided that l'iaid mo~:-tgage is on te~:-ins not more onerous tnan the 
following; 
Principal~ Not more t'han s~Jenty-five percent· (75·1!;) 
-
of the value of the property to be ( 
mo;t.tgaged as appraised.· by any 
institl:lt.i"or~al lender _propt:?s.~n_g --~o make 
the loan, -c.- as independently ·appraised 
Kat.uri t.y • 
if the lender be other .than a.n 
·institution. An insti.t.utional lender is 
a bank, insurance company. charitable 
institution, c·ollege or other institution 
of learning, retirement system, welfare 
f~ncl, o~ any other organization or 
institution 
foregoing. 
similar t.o any of the 
The principa~ mu.st be 
self-liquidating by periodic payments 
over the term of tbe mortgage; 
Not more than thirty {30) yet:.rs or 
alternatively not more than the period of 
the unex9ired term be!\o.'eeti the date of ( 
the mortgage and the end of the term, 
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whichever is the shorter. The "term" 
means the original term herein or 
exercise of the rene...,al options herein 
provided for. 
6. 2 ExPenses. All expenses in connection with the making 
of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and 
Lessor will execute any and all documents that :may be required 
with respect thereto. However, Lessor shall assume no personal 
liability for the underlying indebtedness, but the mortgage note 
or other evidence of indebtedness shall be executed s~lely by the 
Lessee. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall e~tend to 
any construction mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as 
any permanent mortgage loan, and any mortgages in substit\ltion or 
in replacement thereof, and as often as during the term such 
loans are applied for by the Lessee. 
6.3 Non-Mortgage by Lessor. Lessor agrees not to place any 
mortgage on the preroises' _or permit the same to be encumbered in 
\ any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee .. 
6.4 Limitation on Subordination. Lessor's agreement to 
subordinate any given portion of the fee title to a first 
mortgage is limited to one such mortgage on the given 
the fee title for the purpose of enabling Lessee 
portion of 
to obtain 
financing for the improvements as contemplated herein and located 
on the given portion of the leesed land: provided that, for this 
purpose, mortgages securing separate construction and take-out or 
permanent loans for the same work of improvement shall be 
considered to be one mortgage. Both the note ana the mortgage 
securing it shall expressly provide that there can be no 
extension of the due date, addition to the balance of the loan, 
alteration of any provision in the documer.ts, release of any 
obligor, or any refinancing of the unpaid principal balance 
"'ithout Lessor's prior "''ritten approval. Nothing in this para-
grap"h shall prohibit mortgagee from paying delinquent. taxes or 
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e.ss.essments or providi:>9 insurance coverage if Lessor fails to ( 
cure such detaults of Lessee. Le~;sor shall not be required t.o 
subordinate Lessor's fee title to the lien cf an encumbrance 
securing a construction or interim loan exc:ept. ·on Lessee's 
presentation of evidence, delivered as provided for giving 
notices, of a firm--and-enforceable commitment. for a taKe-out or 
permanent loan .. 
6. 5 Curing of Defaul t.s. Tne mortgage shall provide that 
the mortgage~ ox:- trustee may not. accelerate the due da~e of the 
balancoe· outstanding on any loa..n py reason of any default by 
Lessee without having first. given Lessor wri'tt.en notice of such 
default and without having permitted Lessor thirty (30) days in 
which to c:ure such default or, if more .'than. <:.r.irty (30}. ~ays is . ._.. . . 
necessary to cure such default, without 
adequate ·time · to cure sl.lch default., '!'he 
having given Lessor 
mortgage and related 
documents shall further provide t")lat. ·.the performancre of any and 
all o·bligatio·n·s .of Lessee thereunder shall be accepted if 
<. 
tendex:-ed by Lessor. Neither Lessor's right to cure any default 
nor any· exercise of such a right shell constitute an assumption 
of liability under the note or rnortgase. 
6. 6 :nde:tnnificat.ion. On request ·by Lessor, Lessee shall 
indemnify Lessor from any and all liability and expense caused 
Lessor as a result of any .action of Lessee in connection with t.he 
mortgage or Deed o~ Tru~t~ 
ARTICLE 7 
INSURANCE 
7.1 Liability and Property Damace. From the time when the 
Lessee comme~t:::es construction on· the demised .premises or anr par~ 
thereof, the Lessee will cause to l>e wri'tten a policy or _policies 
of insurance in the form and contents '"generally Y.no·~·n as pub,lic 
liability and/or owner • s, landlorcl and te·nant policies a no boiler 
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boilers and elevators i:>cluded in any imp::ovements located on the 
demised premises, inscring the Lessee against any and all claims 
and demands made by any person or ·persons whomsoever for ·injuries 
received in connection with t.he operation and mainte·nance of the 
premises, itr.provements, and buildings located on the demised 
premises or for any other risk insured against by such policies, 
each class of which policies shall have been written within 
limits of not less than Five Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or claimed by any one person 
for bodily injury, or othendse, plus One Hundred Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars {$100,000.00) damages to property, and for not 
less tr.an One Million and No/100 Dollars ($1,000,000.001 for 
damages ~n~~\rretl or claimed by more .than one person for ~dily 
injury, or ·otherwise, plus One Hundred Thousand and Na/100 
Dollars ($100' 000. 00) c'lanages to property. All such policies 
shall name the Lessee and the Lessor, as their respective 
interests may app.,ar, as the persons assured by such policies; 
; and the original or duplicate original of each of such policy or 
policies shall be delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly 
upon the writing of such policies, together with adequate 
evidence of the fact that the pre~iums are paid. 
7.2 Fire and Wind Damaoe Insurance. 
( 1) Lessee's 0Dlioation. The Lessee covenants and 
agrees with Lessor that. from and after the time when the 
lease comrnen~s, the Lessee will keep insured any and all 
buildings and improvements upon the said premises against 
all loss or damage by fire and ~.<indstorm, and what is 
generally termed in the insurance trade as "extended 
coverage", which said insurance "'ill be maintained in an 
amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party in 
interest from being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of 
the risk, which a~ount shall not b~ less than eighty percent 
( 80%) of t..he full insurable value, and all of such policies 
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of insurance shall include th-e··name of.the''Lessor as one of(. 
the parties insur~d thereby and shall fully protect both the 
Lessor ana the Lessee as their respective interest may 
appear. ln the event of destruction of the said buildings 
or improvements by fire, windstorm, or other casualty for 
which ins·urance shall be payable and as often as su.ch 
insurance money shall have been paid to the Lessor and the 
Lessee, said sums so paid shall be deposited in a joint 
account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a bank located in 
Bannock County, !daho, and shall be made available to the 
Lessee foi- the construction or repair, as the case may be, 
of any building or building.s damaged or destroyed by fire, 
windstorm, or other casualty for which insurance money shall . . 
be 'l?a:)iable arid shall be paid out by the Lessor and the 
.Lessee from said joint account from tit:1e to time on the 
estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of 
Iclaho having jurisdiction of such reconstr-uc.tion and repair, ( 
certifying t:.h.at t".iu:~ arilount. of such estimate is being applied 
to the payment of the reconst.ruction or repair and at, a 
reasonable cost therefor; provided, however, that :i.t first 
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the 
total amount of money necessary to provide for the 
reconstruction or repair of a.ny buii'€-ing or buildings 
destroyed or injured, as aforesaid, according to the plans 
aclopted the~for, has been provided by the Lessee for such 
purpose and its application for such purpose assured; and 
the Lessee covenants and agrees that in the event of the 
destruct'ion or damage of the buildings a·nd improvements or 
any part· thereof, and as often as any buildil')g or 
improvement on said prewises shell be Oestro:;ed or .dar:t~ged 
by f.ire, windstorm, or other casualty, the Lessee shall 
rebuild and repair the sarne in such manner that the building 
or it:tprovernen't so rebuilt and repaire<'l, and the personal 
G!l.O.\lND LE:AS:E; AGREEMENT - 20 H0~~ ..:S Tf I !'I> W\·o.;sl. f I ~C.t'!-O"'C &. ~10\!Mi!.(. . 
... 1JUII'""": t) ... I lAt\ 
1:1'(1 '"''~"1 •"t'LlF .lUI 
PO lllt"1•<>14 
••a .... (Ot..,.·tq \••'1.~•-0:tCr-"-
168 of 447
property upon the .demised premises prior to such damage or 
destruction, and shall have the same rebuilt and ready for 
occupancy "'i. thin fi £teen 115) months from the time •ihen the 
loss or destruction occurred. The fifteen (15) ·month pe::-iod 
for reconstruction shall be enlarged by delays caused 
without fault or neglect on the part. of the Lessee by act of 
God, str i k"'s, lockouts, or other conditions beyond the 
Lessee's control. 
(2) Delivery of Policies. The originals of all such 
policies shall be delivered to the Lessor by the Lessee 
along .,.ith the receipted bills evidencing the fact that the 
premiums therefore are paid; but nothing herein contained 
shall .be construec as prohibiting the l;essee from financing 
the premiums .,.here the terms of the policies are for three 
(3) years or more and in such event the receipts shall 
evidence it to be the fact that the installment pre~ium pay-
ment or payments are paid at or before their respective 
maturities~ Where, however, there is a mortgage on the 
premises created pursuant to the provisions contained in 
this lease and if, under the terms of such mortgage, it is 
obligatory upon the Lessee to cause the c.;riginals of. the 
policies to be delivered to the mortgagee, then the Lessee 
shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate certificates of such 
policies. The policies or duplicate certificates thereof, 
as the case may be, shall be delivered by the Lessee t.o the 
Lessor at least ten (10) days prior to the effective date of 
the policies. 
(3) Effect of Mortcaae Subordination. All of the pro-
visions herein contained relative to the disposition of pay-
ments from insurance companies are subject to the fact that 
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the 
provisions of this lease hereof elects, in accordance .,.·ith 
the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceecs of 
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the insurance 'be paid to the mortgagee on account of sueh 
-mort.saCJe, then such payment shall 'be made, but in .such 
event, it shall· stiJ.l be cb:..igatory upon· ·the·" Lessee to 
create the complete £uno in the manner set forth in this 
section t.o assur.e and .:or.oplete the payment for the work of 
reconstruction and r.e-pair .• 
{4j Damaoes: Inst.~rance Proceeds: Joint. Bank l\ccount. 
I"t is agreed that any excess. cf rnoney received from insur-
ance remaining in the joint bank account after the recon-
struction or repair of such building or buildings, if there 
be no default on t.he part of the Less'ee in t'he perfort'"~nce 
of the covenants herein, shall ·be paid to the Lessee, and in 
case ... of the Lessee: not·: enterittg. into the reconstruction or 
repair of the building er buildings withi:> a period •of six 
(fi) months from the date -of payment of the lo~s, after 
damage or destr1lction · occNa-sioned by fire, windstorm, or 
other cause for ~hich .. insurance --money shall be payable. and 
prosecuting the sam~ t.heiTeaft.er with !<uch dispatch as may be 
necessary to coit~.plet.e the sa~.e \.Tith:i.n fifteen (15) n:ont.'hs 
after the occurr-ence of 'such dam'age or aestruction 
occasioned as aforesaid, then the <?.:mount so collectetl, or 
the balance there,pf_ re-maining in the joint account, as the 
case may be, sha~l be paid to :the ·Lessor and it will be at 
the Lessor • s cpt.~_on ___ to terr.1ina te the lease a-nd retain stJch 
·amount as li.quida!:,ed. and agreed upon damages resulting from 
the· failure of the Lessee to promptly, ~ithin the time spec-
ifiedi complete such worK reconstruction and repair. The 
fift.-e_en ( ~5) month period herein provided for reconstruction 
shall be enlarged by delays caused wit.hout. fault. or neglect 
on the part of th.e Lessee by act ·of God, str~kes, lockout, 
or ot'her conditions (other than matters of finance.) beyond 
the control of Lessee. 
( 
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(5) Direct Repavment. 
in the event the insurance 
The foregoing notwithstanding, 
proceeds are the sum of Twenty 
Five Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00) or less, then 
such proceeds shall be paid directly to the Lessee Without 
the necessity of creating the 




use such funds 
as 
to 
~ake the replacements or repairs as required hereunder. 
7.3 Lessee's Covenant to Pay lnsurance Premiu."'s• The 
Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee will pay 
premil.lr.ls for a 11 of the insurance policies which the Lessee is 
obligated to carry under the terms of this lease, and will 
deliver to the Lessor evidence of such payments before the 
payment .:;f_any. such premiums become i.n.default, and the Lessee 
will cause renewa 1 s of expiring pal icies ·to be w:ri tten and the 
policies or copies thereof, as the lease may :require, to be 
delivered to Lessor at least ten {10} days before the expira~ion 
date of such expiring poli:ies. 
7.4 Indemnification. 
(a} Defense and Pavment of Claims. Lessee agrees to 
defenc, indemnify and hold Lessor harmless together with all 
of its servants, agents, or el:lployees, from and against all 
liability or loss for injuries to or deaths of persons or 
damages to property caused by Lessee's acts or omissions to 
act, use of. or occupancy of the leased land, or as the 
result of Lessee's operations on said leased land. Each 
party hereto shall give to the other parties prompt and 
timely notice of any claim or suit instituted coming to its 
kno..,ledge which in any way, directly or indirectly, 
contingently or other,.,ise, affects or might affect another 
party, and all parties shall have the ri<;!ht to participate 
in the defense of the .same to the extent of each parties' 
own interest. 
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(b) Mechanic's Liens. ln the event any mechanic's or ( 
·ether liens or orders f.or the payment of money shall be 
filed against land or any building 
improvements ~hereon by reason of or arising· aut of any 
labor, material furnished or alleged to have been furnished, 
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the leased land, or 
for or by reason of any change, alteration, or addition of 
the cost or e:Kpense 
thereto., or against 
shall, within thirty 
thereof, or any contract. relating 
the Lessor as owner thereof, Lessee 
00} days after it receivo::s notice or 
'knowledge thereof, ei t.her pay or bond the· sal1\e qr provide 
for t.he discharge thereof in ·s·uch manner as may be provided 
by law. -Lessee shall also defend· on -\::.ehalf of Les:so:r at -.. 
Lessee's sole e~pense, any action, suit or proceeding wnich 
may be brought thereon, or for the enforcer-lent of sucb 
lien~, o·r orders, and Lessee shall pay any damage and 
discharg~ any judgrne':'t entered tnerein and save harmless 
Lessor from any and all claims or ·dar.\ages resulting 
therefrom. Lessor reser~es the right, ho~ever, to defend or 
to direct the defense of any such suit or ptoceedings. 
Les<."e shall pay all expenses of !.uch ca:fense, inol·~cling 
attorney • s fees, and shall pay any ·dama~]e and dischaq;,e any 
judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless from any 
and all clairas ~r darnag·es resulting ·therefrol:l .. 
{c) Resistin\01 C;i,S+1"'!!· In tne event Lessee . shall 
desire to resist. any mechanic's or r..eterialmen • s l,i eps., or 
any 'other claim l!!gainst the hereinabove described premises 
on account. of building, rebuilding, repairing, :reconstruc-
tion or other>dse·.improvins the leased land, Lessee shall 
have the z:ight. t.o do so, provided Lessee shall first. place 
funas into escrow in an amoun~ sufficient to pay said clai~ 
or lien, with said escrow direc~ed to pay such claim or lien 
in the event of a result adverse to Lessee. 
I 
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7.5 Insurer Qualified. The insurer shall be qualified and 
authori:z:ed through the· Department of Insurance of the State of 
ldaho. 
AR'I'lCLE 8 
T~~ES, ASSESSMENTS, LIENS AND ENCUHBPANCES 
Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discharge all exist-
ing and future taxes and assessments which are or may become a 
lien upon or "'hich may be levied by the State, County or any 
other tax levying body upon the leased land or improver:~ents 
the;:-eon or property located on the leased land. Lessee shall 
also be responsible for all insurance premiums, and for all 
liabilities, .charges, fees, obligations, liens and encumbrances 
associated· with or relating to the existence and use of the 
leased land including, but not 
installments due or payable after 
lirr.ited to, all assessment 
the date of this lease. All 
pa~ents of taxes or assessments or both, except permitted 
installment payments, shall be prorated for the initial lease 
year and for the year in ~hich the lease terminates. Lessee ~ay, 
in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name, 
contest in_good faith by all appropriate proceedings, the amount, 
applicability or validity of any tax, assessment or fine 
pertainir.g to the leased land, or to any building, structure or 
improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Lessee does in 
good faith contest the applicability or validity of any tax, 
assessment or fine, Lessor '-'ill cooperate in such contest 
whenever possible with Lessee: provided that such contest "'ill 
not subject any part of the leased land to forfeiture or loss, 
except that, if at any time payment of the ~hole or any part of 
such ta:x, assessment or fine shall bec:one necessar:r in order to 
prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or 
cause the same to be paid in tit:~e to prevent such forfeiture or 
loss. 
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ARTICLE 9 
·CONDEMNATION 
9~ l P_rioritye In the event .of the taking or condemnation 
by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or 
purpose of the whole or materially all of the demised premises at 
any time during··the term and .after any outstanding first mortgage 
indebtedness ha·s ·been paid and satisfied, then the rights o£ 
Lessor and Lessee to share in the net proceeds o.f any awards for 
land, bu il.dings, impro•.ie:n\ents and da.';'ages u;ron. a11-y such taking, 
shall be as .follow., and in the following_ order of priority: 
. (a l Lessor, at all titnes, regardless of w'nen the taking 
occur>;, shall be entitled to receive, with interest thereon, 
that porticon of the aw-ard as shall represent compens'.ltion ··- .. ' .. 
for the value of. t·he demised premises, considered as vacant 
and unimproved· land, such value being hereinafter referred 
to as. the "land val.ue•. Lessor shall also be entitled to 
costs awarded in the cdtidemnation proceed,ing. -proportionately 
attribu.table .to such larid value. 
( 
(b} (1) During all the term herein demised, e>::cept the 
last five years of the term, Lessee shall .be -entitled to the 
entire balal'lce of the award, which balance is hereinaf-ter 
referred to as "award balance•. 
(2) If· the taking or condemnation as above set 
forth shall occur at any time during the last five years of 
the term, Lessee shall ·be entitled to receive out of the 
a"'ard, With intere··st ···thereon, the a'-"ard bslan.ce. diminished 
by twenty. percent ·po%) ·of such aw~rd bal.a.nce for eacn full 
year {a.n(l in proportion for a fraction of a year) that 
elapses from the firs·t day of said five year period to the 
date of the vesting of title in the condemnor; the remaining 
award balance and interest thereon, as well as the a1.>ard for 
la.nd value and intere.st thereon, shall belong to the Lessoro 
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(3) For the purpose of computins the last five 
years of the term within the meaning of- subparagraphs ( l) 
and (2) above,-.it--i-s agreed that said. "last five years" 
shall mean the last five years of the original ·term, or if, 
at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial 
payment thereof (if there be such partial payments) becomes 
payable, the parties shall have duly agreed to extend the 
term of this lease pursuant to the options to renew herein 
contained or by a written instrument executed in the manner 
required for recording, then said last five years s'hall be 
deemed to mean the last five (5) years of the term as so 
extended• 
, (_c) Lf the values of the respective interests of Lessor 
and Lessee shall be determined accor-ding to the provisions 
of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this Section in the pro-
ceeding purscant to which the demised premises shall have 
been taken or c::mdemned, the values so deter-mined shall be 
conclusive upon Les.sor and Lessee. lf such values shall not 
have been thus separately determined, such values shall be 
fixed by agr-eement between the Lessor and Lessee or- if they 
are unable to agree, then the controversy shall be re3olved 
by arbitration under the procedure to gove!'n in Arbitration 
as set forth in this lease hereof under Article 13. 
(d) In the event. of the taking J.n condemnation of less 
than the whoie of the demised premises but materially all of 
said premises as hereinbelow defined and the part of the 
premises t'hat remains includes a part of the improvement 
that IJas taken, then as to the untaken :.-er.~ainder of the 
improvement only, 
shall endeavor to 
but not any remaining lana, the pa::-ties 
agree on the then fair oa.r'ket value of 
such remainder of the improvement, and if they fail to agree 
then the controversy shall be resolved by arbitration. The 
value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of such 
' .... 
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remainder of the improvement or as determined in arbitre- c-
tion, but diminished in the same manner as provided for in 
·~(b)" above relative to an ''award balance~·, shall be paid by 
Lessor to Lessee, and until paid shall be a charge on the 
share of the a~o~ard for land val(Je to which Lessor shall be 
entitled in the condemnation proceeding. 
(e) If title to the whole or materially all· of the 
demised .premises shall be taken or condemned, this lease 
shan cease and terminate as to the provision so taken and 
shall terminate as to the entire parcel if in Lessee's 
judgment the taking :r:~aterially and substantially affects the 
use and value of the rePainder of the demised premises, 
ARTICLE: 10 
DEFhULT PROVlSIONS; REMEDIES; :>..TTORNEY' S FEES 
10.1 Default by Lessee.· Each of the following shall be 
deemed an event of defau.lt by Less•ee and ii. breach of this lease: (,. 
(a) Rent or Other Payments. If Lessee shall default 
in the payment of rent or ot.her payments hereunoer whe.n due 
according tO the terms of this lease and does not fully 
correct the same within thirty (30) days after Wt"i~.t.en 
notice thereof to Lessee. 
(b) Otf\er C9ve.nants or Conditions. If Lessee shall 
default in the performance ·Or observance of any other 
coven·Q.nt or co"ndition of this' lease or of any .note' 
mortgage, Deed of Trust, or ·other document relating to the 
financing of the hospital to be performed or observed by 
Lessee, whether or not Lessor is a party to any such 
documents, ana does not fully correct the same within 30 
days afte.r notice the;reof to the Lessee. 
(c) 
(d) 
Abandonment. Abandonment of the premises. 
Bankruotcy )"·ro:ceedings. ll: during the Term 












• . .. •. 
(i~ Ancointment of Receiver. Apply for 
or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee 
or its duly authoriz.ed attorney. to the 
appointment of a receiver, trustee or liquidator 
of the Lessee or of all or a substantial part of 
Lessee~s assets~ or 
{ii) Voluntary 
voluntary petition in 
writing its· inability 
become due; or 
Bankruptcy. File a 
bankruptcy or admit in 
"to pay its debts as they 
(iii) Assignment for Creditors. Ma"l<e a 
general assignment for the benefit of creditors; 
or 
{iv) Reoroanization or Arranoement. File 
a reorganization or arrangement witb creditors to 
take advantage of any insolvency law; or 
(vl Admit Insolvency. File an answer 
admitting tbe material allegations of a petition 
filed against. Lessee in any bankruptcy, 
reorganiz.ation or insolvency proceeding, or 
during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment 
or decree shall be entered by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, on the application cf a 
creditor, adjudicating Lessee bankrupt or 
insolv.&nt or approving a petition seeking a 
reorganization of Lessee or appointing a 
receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of 
all or a substantial part of its assets. 
10.2 Remedies. !n the event of any breach or default of 
this lease by Lessee, then Lessor, besides other ri9hts of 
re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of 
the hospital and use o! the property upon the premises for these 
purposes. 
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Should Lessor elect to re-e~ter as herein provided, or 
should Le'ssor taice possession pursuant to legal proceedings. or 
pursuant to any notice provided for by la'-", Lessor may either 
terminate t.his lease or Lessor may from time to t.'imer -without 
t~>nninating this lease, relet said premises or any part thereof 
for such term or te.-ms and at such rental or rentals and upon 
such ether terms and conditions as Lesser in Lesser's sole 
discretion m~y deem advisable, wit~ the right to make alterations 
and r:epairs to the premises. Rentals received by Lessor from 
such reletting sha~l be applied' first., to payment of any 
indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunder from Lessee; 
second, to the paj~.ent of rent due'and unpaid hereunder; third, 
to the payment· of ·any costs of such rel ett"ing; fourth, to the 
payment of the cost of any alterations and repairs t.o the 
premises made necessary by Lessee's breaeh of the provisions of 
this lease; and the residue, if any, shall be ·held by. Lessor and ( 
applied in payment of future rent as the_ same may become due and 
payable hereunder. Should s~ch rental rece·ived from such 
reletting be less than the rental agreed to 
Lessee hereunder, then Lessee shall pay 




Lessor. Such deficiency shall be calculated. an.S paid monthly. 
t<o such re-er,try or taking possession of the premis.es by Lessor 
shall. be construed as an election on Lessor's part to terminate 
this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to 
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be cecreed by a cou~t of 
competent jurisdiction.. Notwithstanding any such relettin'ii 
without termination. LeS$Or may at any time thereafter elect to 
terminate this lease for such previous breach. 
Sho~la Lessor at any ti~e terminate this lease fOr any 
breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor 
may recover from Lessee all eamages Lessor may incur by reason of 
such breach, including the costs of recovering the premises, ana 
including the worth at the ti,-,e of such termination of the 
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excess, if any, of the amount of :rent, additional :rent and 
charges equivalent to rent :reserved in this lease for the 
:remainder of the Term over the then reasonable :rental value of 
the premises for the remainder of the Term. The remedies herein 
given to Lessor shall be 
remedy by Lessor shall 
cumulative, and the exercise of any one 
not be to the exclusion of any other 
remedy. With previous written notice or demand, separate actions 
may be maintained by .Lessor against Lessee from time to time to 
recover any rent or damages which, at the commencem.,nt of any 
such action, has become due and payable to Lessor without waiting 
until the end of the Term of this lease. 
10.3 Attorney's Fees. In the event suit shall be brought 
.for an unlawfui detainer of the said premise.;, for the recovery 
of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, or because of 
the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or 
performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasonable 
attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall 
be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and 
shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to 
judgment. 
J'.CTICLE 11 
COVENANTS AND WARRANTIES 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this lease, lessee 
agrees to take posses,.,ion of the leased land in an "as is" 
condition, provided hO"-'ever, that Lessor covenants, represents 
and warrants as follows: 
11.1 Title. That Lessor has good and marketable title to 
the leased land and said title is free and unencumbered. 
Lessor's right, title and interest in and to the leased land, 
except for this lease and :for any lien or indebtedness incurred 
pursuant to Article 4, sha~l not be subordinated to any other 
clairo or interest of Less!"e or to any other claim or interest of 
.· 
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any mortgagee or other .creditor in connection with the financing ( 
of the improvements to be constructed on the leased premises. 
11.2 .. 1\iaht-·to Execute. That· Lessor has full right. and 
power ·to execute and pex:-.form tnis lease and to grain the estate 
leased herein and the rights, easemen·t.s, privileges,. 
appurtenances and heredi tarnents belonging or pertaining ther~to, 
·including. air-rights. 
11.3 Feaceful.Enjoyment. That Lessee, on ·p·aying the . .r;:;nt 
herein reserved and perforr.~ing the covenants 'and provisiol)s 
hereof on its part to be. performed, shall peacefully and qu"ietly 
have ·and enjOy the leasad __ ,~and, and ·all such existing or .future 
required rights, easements, 
:tu:redi ta.rn.e.nts- belonging or 




air-rights·, during tne Ter;n; provided, however, that Lessor does 
net wan:·ant t'hat governmental authority may not at some time 
during' the Terml without t.ne con.sent or permission of Lessor, 
·pass ordinances or perform a<ot.s which may ):le prejudicial to 
Les·see ·thl:"ci.;gh no £ault of Lesso:r; provided, however, that Lessor 
agrees ·t.o join "" .. it.h 'L~ssee in protest. or opposition to such 
ordinances·· or acts, the expenses of such opposition to be borne 
by Lessee .. 
. . .JI.ll:'l'l CLE 12 
ASSl.GNM.:E;N'l', SU$LE;I:TlNG AJ:lD SALE 
. -
·12 .. 1 A.ssionmen.:t,., sv..blett.ing a,nd ·Sal~~ Lessee may not 
assign or sublet this lease agreement "-'it.hout. the' prior written 
consent Lessor, whictn consent shall not. be unreasonably 
withheld; provided, however, that in t:he event LessD'r gives its 
consent. for tbe 
bourili. only by 
priv·ileges li.s 
assignment or sublettin.g .of this 
such obligations and enjoys 
are set :f;orth in this. leas·e. 
·such rights and · .. 
lt is el<presssly 
ag'reed t'hat Lessor may requ!.re, as a ctDndition of such consent, 
that tr.e officers of the Lessee corporation agree to be person-
( 
( 




ally liable for the performance of all 
of Lessee's assignee(s} or subtenant(s) 
obligations and covenants 
un~er this Lease. ln the 
event Lessee shall determine to sell all or any portion of the 
hospital, and/or any additions or expansions thereto or thereof, 
gran~ed firsc righ~ cf r~f~sai 
Lessor s;<all be :erni.:t:Xt<e:~[ to purchase tne hospital as the fair 
market value which, unless agreed upon by the parties, shall be 
determined by an M • .A.I. real estate appraiser appointed and paid 
by Lessor. If Lessee is not satisfied "ith the fair market value 
appraisal submitted by the appraiser selected by Lessor, Lessee 
roay, at its own expense and within twenty (20) days of tbe 
receipt of the appraisal, select an M.A. I. real estate appraiser 
who, together with the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose 
a third_ such appraiser whose fees sha,ll be sno.red e·;p.lally by 
Lessor and Lessee. lf Lessee fails to select a second appraiser 
within the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed shall be 
the sole appraiser and shall set the fair market value of the 
hospital. lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree 
as to the fair market value of the hospital, the three (3) 
"ppraisals shall be added together and their total divided by 
three (3). The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value 
of the hospital for the purpose of this purchase option. 
ARTICLE 13 
~~BITAATIO}l: AP?~!-qTH~ 
13.1 Arbitration. Either party may require the arbitration 
of any matter arising under or in connection '.lith this lease. 
Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice spec:i£yin9 
the matter to be arbitrated. If ac.tion is already pending· on any 
matter concernin9 w'hich the notice is given, the notice is 
ineffective unless given before the expiration of thirty (30) 
days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice. 
E:<.cept as provided. to the contrary in these provisions on 
arbitration, the arbitration shall be in conformity and subject 
CROOND LEASE .AGREEMENT - 33 t-IQit{HSTt•f-0_ V...,.NNt. tUCt.'SOW I. 110Ut.'l8{ 
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to applicable rules and procedures of the American Ar~itration 
Association. T'ne arbitrators shall be bound by this lease. 
Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the 
arbitration is required . or consented to, be deemed amended to 
l_imit the issues to those contemplated by the rules prescribed 
above. Each party shall pay half the cost of arbitration 
including arbitrator • s fees. .l>.t. torneys • fees shall be a'"'arded as 
separately provided in this lease. 
13.2 hJ;POir>t:nent. Appointment shall be made in the manner 
required for the appointment of arbitrators unless expressly 
provided to the c:o>;1trary in the applicable provisions of this 
leas e. 
·The!e shall be three {3) arbitrato:::s appointed as t:o;l.lows, 
(a) Within twenty (ZO) days after not.ice req,.iring 
arbitration, each party shall appoint one (l) arbitrator and 
give notice of the appointment to the other party. 
(b) The t'Wo {2) arbitrators shall c:hoose a. third 
arbitrator 'Nithin thirty (30) days after appoint:ro.ent of the 
second .. 
(c) lf either party fails to appoint an arbitrator, 
·or if the two (2) arbitrators fail to choc;se a third, the 
appointment shall be made by the then presiding judge of the 
Superior Court. for the county in which the premises are 
located, acting in his individual and nonofficia.l capacity 
on the ap_pli"ca tiOn of 
to the other party; 
either party and on ·(30) days' notice 
provided that ~i ther party may, by 
notice 9 i ven before, commencement of the arbitr'>tion hearing, 
consent to arbitration. by t'he arbitrator appoint~d by the 
other party. In that event, no further appointi:lents of 
arbitrator shall be oade and any other arbitrators 
previously appointed snall be dismissed. 
( 
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ARTlCLE: 14 
Ml SCELLAHEOUS PROV! S! ON S 
14.1 E~ercise. of Rene..,al Ot>tion. ___ Les~_e"!._ !"e:Y exercise its 
option to extend the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1.2, 
hereof, by giving Lessor written notice thereof net later than 
120 days prior to the expiration date 
exercised shall extend the lease on 
of the Term. A.ny option 
the same terms as are 
so 
in 
effect at the time of the exercise of such options, subject to 
adjustment and notification in accordance herewith. 
14.2 Inspection bv :.essor. Lessor may enter upon the 
leased land at any reasonable time for any purpose necessary, 
incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance 
of Lessee's obligat5.ons her-eunder, but subject to any provisions 
-. 0 M ' ' .. • 
with respect thereto other~ise contained herein. 
14.3 Necation of Partne~shi~. Nothing in this lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for- a~y purpose a 
partner, joint venturer, or associate in any relationship with 
:..essee other than that of landlord and tenant, nor shall this 
lease be construed to authorize either to act as agent for the 
other except as expressly provided to the 
14.4 Controllin~ Law. This 1 ease 
contrary in this lease. 
shall be deemed <;.n be 
made and shall be construed in accoroance with the laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
14.5 Surrender of Possession. Lessee agrees to yield and 
deliver to Leon:or possession of the demised lane at the 
termination of this lease or as other"ise provideo herein, in 
good condition and in accoroance with the ell:press obligations 
provided herein, except for reasonable wear and tear, and Lessee 
shall execute and deliver to Lessor a good and sufficient 
document of relinquishment, if and When requested. 
14.6 Succes!lors. This lease shall bind and inure to the 
benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors 
or assignees of Lessee '<~hether resulting frorn any mer'i!er, 
G~OUND L£~SE AGREEME~T - 35 
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con so 1 ida tion, 
otherwise. 
reorg~nilation, assignment, foreclosure or 
14.7 Headinqs. The article and paragraph headings 
contained herein are for convenience and reference' and are not 
itnended to define or limit the scope of any pr.ovision of this 
lease. 
14.8 Notices. All notices required to be given to Lessee 
under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to Lessee as 
follo'-'s: 
STERLING DEv~LOPMENT CO., a 
Washington partnership 
1906 Eroad..-ay 
·-.. .. Vancouver, Washington ·98563 
"it.h copy to: 
HORENSTEIN, WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUMBOS 
12.20 Main Street, s.uite 300 
p. 0. Box 694 
Vancouver, ~ashington 98556 
or at such other addresses as Lessee may designate in writing 
delivered to Lessor. 
as follows: · 
Similar notice shall be aOdressed to Lessor 
with <;!opy to; 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
Suite 2200, 3S South 




POCATELLO REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER 
177 flospi tal Way 
Pocatellot !daho 83201 
Attention: Chris hnton, Ad~~nistrator 
or at. such other address as 
delivered to Lessee. Notices 
Lessor may desi<;~nate in· writing 
shall be sent in a similar manner 
to any r.~ortgegee of Lessee at such address as may be designated 
in '-'rit.ingo 









l . ~.... ~· '• . . . 
~ . . - .. 
14.9 ~.lT\endment. of Lease. Lessor and Lessee shall cooperate 
/ and incLlde in this lease by suitable amendment from time to time 
any provision that may reasonably be requested by any proposed 
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing ~he Mortgagee 
protection provisions contained in this lease and ello..,ing such 
mortgagee reasonable meens to protect or preserve the lien of a 
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of 
this lease. Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver 
and to acknowledge if necessary for recording purposes, any 
agreement necessary to effect such a.>nendment; provided, ho,.,ever, 
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under 
this lease nor otherwise in any respect adversely affect the 
rights of the Lessor in this lease. 
l4.J.O ·~ecording. Lessor and Lessee agree to execute and 
ha·~e ackno,.,ledged, and Lessee agrees to deliver to Lessor, a 
rnemorandu:11 o£ this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" for the purpose of recol:ding such memorandum with the County 
Recorder of Bannock County. 
IN WITNESS !><"HEREOF, the parties have set their hands 
the day and year first above written. 
LESSOR: 
INTEF~OU~TA!N HEALTH CARE, INC., a 
Utah non-profit corporation 
authorized to do business in Idaho, 
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STERLING DEVELOP~IENT co~ 1 
Washington partnership 
Sy ___ ~~--H-.--L-.-~--C-E_L_O_S_l ________ ~-------
:ey -/ ?. JO!!N l\. Yl!DlTSKY 
.'\'l:!~ST: . 
w~- ·.· .. 
~/~W'L--_ 
7 ? . 
. ' .. -~. -· 
STATE OF ~ ) 
County of &M~ ss .. 
;;v- /l . 
On .this 2._Cday of ~1 l~r , 19.{3 , be:t;ore l:'le, the ( 
undersigned, a Notary PUJ?lli in~-- for said State, personally 
appeared odua .a th.,;t;:;;. ~=:!: -=---~-----=~,.----------
,/£ . "~~......,._.. . ..___._~ l. known to me to Oe tpt P~es:I:dent ana Secrgtary, re:spect:i"<e Yr of 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEJ\.L'I'H CARE:, INC. , a Utah non-pro 'fit corporation 
aut~v~ized to a~ business in idaho, d~a Pocatello Regional 
Medical Center, th~ corporation ·that executed the foregoing 
instrument, -and acknowledged .to rne that such corporation executed 
the same. 
IN WITNtSS WHtREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
\/ritter. .. 
38 
/NOTARY PUBLIC in and for the State 
of Idaho , residing at Pocatello 
( 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss .. 
County of Bannock ) 
On this .2!.Ehday of Januat"y 19~, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally 
a'ppeared M. L. CANGELOSI and JCH< P... YU0111iKY , k.nown to me to be the 
General Partners of STERLING DEVELOPHENT CO., a Washington 
par~nership, the partnership that executed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set rny hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written.---. 
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 39 
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Merrill & Merrill 
P.O. Box99l 
Pocml\o, Idaho 83204-{)991 
{208) 232-2ZB6 
Fax: (208) 232-249!1 
FAX COVER SHEET 
FAX NUMBER TRANSMITTED TO: 208·529-9732 
Number of pages in addition to this cover sheet: 2 
To: Michael D. Gafiney 
Of: BEARD ST. CLAIR 
From: Dave R. Gallafent/Gayla 
Client/Matter: PocateUo Hospital w Quail Ridge, et aJ 
Bannock Co1mty Case No. CV-JIJ..J7Z4·0C 
Date: November27,2012 
COMMENTS: Attached hereto please find my letter dated November 27, 2012 pursuaot to the 
above-referenced matter. Please con't.aet our office with any questions, thank: you. 
AT ('!08) 232-22.86. 
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Merrill & Merrill 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
FAX COVER SHEET 
FAX NUMBER TRANSMITTED TO: 208-529-9732 
Number of pages in addition to this cover sheet: 2 
To: Michael D. Gaffuey 
Of: BEARD ST. CLAIR 
From: Dave R. Gallafent/Gayla 
Client/Matter: Pocatello Hospital v. Quail Ridge, et al 
Bannock County Case No. CV-10-2724-0C 
Date: November 27, 2012 
COMMENTS: Attached hereto please find my letter dated November 27, 2012 pursuant to the 
above-referenced matter. Please contact our office with any questions, thank you. 
THIS MESSAGE IS INTENDED ONLY FOR THE USE OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ENTITY TO WHICH IT IS 
ADDRESSED AND MAY CONTAIN INFORMATION THAT IS PRIVILEGED, CONFIDENTIAL, AND EXEMPT FROM 
DISCLOSURE UNDER APPLICABLE LAW. IF THE READER OF THIS MESSAGE IS NOT THE INTENDED 
RECIPIENT OR THE EMPLOYEE OR AGENT RESPONSIBLE FOR DELIVERING THE MESSAGE TO THE INTENDED 
RECIPIENT, YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT ANY DISSEMINATION, DISTRIBUTION, OR COPYING OF THIS 
COMMUNICATION IS STRICTLY PROHIBITED. IF YOU HAVE RECEIVED THIS COMMUNICATION IN ERROR, 
PLEASE NOTIFY US IMMEDIATELY BY TELEPHONE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL MESSAGE TO US AT THE 
ABOVE ADDRESS VIA THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE. THANK YOU. 
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL PAGES, PLEASE TELEPHONE US IMMEDIATELY AT (208) 232-2286. 
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT 
KENT L. HAWKINS* 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR 
KENT A. IDGGINS* 
JARED A. STEADMAN 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK 
TYLER H. NEILL 
*ALSO ADMI'ITED IN UTAH 
Via Facsimile: 529-9732 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Bread St. Clair 
2105 Coronado St. 
Idaho Falls, ID 83402 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
109 N. ARTHUR- 5TH FLOOR 
P.O. BOX991 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991 
November 27, 2012 
A.L. MERRILL (1886-1961) 
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972) 
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005) 
TELEPHONE:208-232-2286 
FAX:208-232-2499 
Founded in 1913 
Re: Pocatello Hospital, LLC vs. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC 
(Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-0002724-0C) 
Dear Mike: 
We are in receipt of Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered yesterday in the 
above-referenced action, which judgment declares that your client "is obligated to promptly pay 
PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement." Accordingly, 
formal demand is hereby made on Quail Ridge and/or Forest Preston, individually, to "promptly" 
pay that amount to PMC. 
Although we acknowledge receipt of your Notice of Appeal, we do not believe that the filing of 
such appeal has any impact on PMC's right to immediate payment of the past due rent which has 
now been declared by the Court as currently due and owing. Quail Ridge is obligated to make 
prompt payment of this amount under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease Agreement and 
Forest Preston, individually, is liable for this past due rent amount pursuant to the 2001 
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him. 
As such, Quail Ridge and Forest Preston, individually, are hereby put on notice that if payment 
to PMC in the amount of$416,812.50 is not made within ten days, then PMC will consider Quail 
Ridge in breach of its rent obligations under the Ground Lease Agreement and Forest Preston in 
breach of his payment obligations under the Guarantee of Payment and Performance. If you do 
not consider yourself as legal counsel for Mr. Preston and are not authorized to accept this 
demand for payment on his behalf, please let us know as soon as possible so that we can make 
direct demand upon him. Quail Ridge and Mr. Preston should be aware that if full payment is 
not received within ten days, PMC will seek all legal remedies available to it under Idaho law, 
including but not limited to filing a legal action for collection of this outstanding rent. If such 
legal action becomes necessary, PMC will seek attorneys fees pursuant to Section 10.3 of the 
192 of 447
Michael D. Gaffuey 
November 27,2012 
Page2 
Ground Lease Agreement; pursuant to the terms of the Guarantee of Payment and Performance; 
and, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 to 12-121 and 12-123. Quail Ridge should take 
particular note that Section I 0.3 of the Ground Lease Agreement provides that "such attorney's 
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid 
whether or not such action is prosecuted to judgment." Forest Preston should take note that the 
Guarantee of Payment and Performance executed by him specifically provides that "the 
undersigned further agrees, without demand, immediately to reimburse and pay for all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' fees, incurred in the enforcement of this Guarantee." 
Additionally, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 28-22-104, interest is accruing on the amount due at 12% 
perarmum. 
For your information, PMC is in the process of appraising the Quail Ridge Property to determine 
the rental rate for the 2013 rent adjustment period. We will share the appraisal with you as soon 
as we receive it. 
In the meantime, if you have questions or if you wish to make additional arrangements for the 
payment of the remaining rent due for the 2010 rent adjustment period, or if you have any input 
regarding the market value ofthe property for the 2013 rent adjustment period, please do not 
hesitate to contact me or Kent Hawkins. 
Sincerely, 
M~RRILL & ME~LL, CHTD. 
(,, 4 / l·'j• /_." J./ 
;l • 1j ' VI .0f, , /\ VitJ__ ~ ·~ /il!tv~ 
r.Yave R. Gallafent f 
DRG/R WH/5975 
cc: Client (via e-mail) 
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1 FORREST L. PRESTON, 
2 called as a witness at the instance of the Plaintiff, 
3 having been first duly sworn, was examined and 
4 testified as follows: 
5 EXAMINATION 
6 BY MR. HAWKINS: 
7 Q My name is Kent Hawkins. I'm one of 
8 the three attorneys representing the Pocatello Medical 
9 Center in this case. If the witness would please state 












Forrest L. Preston. 
And what is your, what is your address 
Business address? 
Business would be fine. 
Okay. 3001 Keith, K-E-I-T-H, Street, 
17 Cleveland, Tennessee. 
18 Q All right. Tell me a little -- and 
19 let's just briefly-- a little bit about yourself 
20 starting with -- well, we're hearing it in a little 
21 different order. I understand there's two corporations 
22 in this suit. I'm going to -- if I refer to them as 
23 Quail Ridge and Century Park, is it clear to you of the 
24 two entities that I'm speaking of? 
25 A Yes. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
------------------------------------------------------
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. NO: CV-10-2724 OC 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





April 11, 2012 
DEPOSITION OF FORREST L. PRESTON 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
KENT L. HAWKINS, ESQ. 
Merrill & Merrill, Chartered 
109 North Arthur, 5th Floor 
P. 0. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
( 2 0 8 ) 2 32-2 2 8 6 
(Appearing via Skype) 
FOR THE DEFENDANTS: 
MICHAEL D. GAFFNEY, ESQ. 
Beard, St. Clair, Gaffney, P.A. 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 557-5203 
(Appearing via Skype) 
ALSO PRESENT: Richard D. Faulkner, Jr., Esq. 
Richard J. McAfee, Esq. 
Joanna Crooks 
Aaron Webb, Esq. 
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY (423) 267-600 
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1 Q And do you hold positions in both of 






What are -- what lS your position ln 
5 each, each of those companies? 
6 A Quail Ridge is the ownership entity of 
7 the actual building itself and operation. Century Park 
8 is a management company that I formed about six years 
9 ago with my youngest son, Bryan. 
10 Q So when you say that you formed 
11 Century Park, are you the sole owner of Century Park? 
12 A I share an ownership with my youngest 
13 son, Bryan, yes. 
14 Q I missed that. Who do you share 









My youngest son, Bryan. B-R-Y-A-N. 
Just the two of you? 
Yes. 
All right. Would the same be true of 
20 Quail? Who are the owners of Quail? 
21 A I have not reviewed that recently, but 
22 I believe that I am a 99 percent owner, and there is a 
23 one percent ownership of which --
24 By the way, our video went off here, 
25 so I don't know if that's meaning -- can you still hear 
WILSON REPORTING AGENCY (423) 267-6000 
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Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 17 45) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 














) _______________________ ) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss 
County of Bannock ) 
Don Wadle, being first duly sworn, deposes and states that: 
1. I am currently a vice-president of Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (PMC), the 
plaintiff herein, and I have personal knowledge of the facts stated below 
2. Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail"), has not paid to PMC the 
$416,812.50 in unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period. 
3. Forrest L. Preston has not paid to PMC the $416,812.50 in unpaid adjusted rents for 
the 2010 rent adjustment period. 










(SEAL STATE OF IDAHO 
NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at: ?o~.e.Llc, . I]) 
day of 
Commission expires:.~Uc,..:-_,;5~-~0+-------
5975: Affidavit of Don Wadle Page 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, R. William Hancock, the undersigned, on~ of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was this 5~ day of September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner 
indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A 
21 05 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Robert C. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
(Chambers Copy) 
5975: Affidavit of Don Wadle 
[:if U.S. Mail 
[J Hand Delivery 
[J Overnight Mail 
[J Facsimile 
[~U.S. Mail 
[J Hand Delivery 
[J Overnight Delivery 
[J Telefax 547-2147 
R Wilham Hancock 
Page 3 
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Michael D. Gaffuey, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
F arrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Defendants, by and through counsel of record and pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56, respectfully move 
this Court for summary judgment dismissing the above-entitled case. The basis for this motion is 
set forth in the memorandum and affidavit filed contemporaneously herewith. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on September 23, 2013, I 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT on the following by the method of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse ~ Q 
624 E. Center U.S. Mail ·. ·' Hand-delivered .· Facsimile 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
POBox 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
U.S. Mail ~('Hand-delivered Q Facsimile 





Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
JohnM.Avondet,ISBNo. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
F arrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge) through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney 
PA, respectfully submit the following Memorandum in Support of their Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
Introduction 
The plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC (PM C), has 
already sued Quail Ridge for breach of contract. PMC lost its case for breach of contract. In fact, 
PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss its claim for breach of contract when Barmock County Civil 
Case No. I 0-2724 was tried to Judge Brown. The doctrines of res judicata and collateral 
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estoppel forestall PMC's claims in this litigation. Quail Ridge is entitled to summary judgment 
dismissing the case. 
Legal Standard 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." IDAHO R. 
Crv. P. 56( c) (2011); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 
853-54 (1991). It is recognized that the court must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the 
non-moving party. G&M Farms, 119 Idaho at 517, 808 P.2d at 854 (1991); Sanders v. Kuna 
Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Safeco Title 
Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 (1992). 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of an issue of material fact. If the 
moving party fails to show this then summary judgment should be denied. Tingley v. Harrison, 
125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). The non-moving party is entitled to show a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the moving party's motion. Olsen v. 
J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 (1990), citing, Celotex v. Catrett, 
477U.S. 317(1986);seealsoBadellv. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101,102, 765P.2d 126,127 (1988). 
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 900, 876 
P.2d 595, 598 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,470, 716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986). "The 
fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not change the 
applicable standard of review[.]" Lewiston Indep. Sch. Dist. #I v. City of Lewiston, 264 P.3d 907, 
911 (Idaho 2011). 
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Statement of Facts 
1. PMC filed a Verified Complaint against Quail Ridge and Century Park on June 28, 2010. 
(Avondet Aff. Ex. A.) The case was assigned the Bannock County Civil Case number of 10-
2724.1 The Verified Complaint alleged facts and the legal claim that Quail Ridge and 
Century Park were successors-in-interest to a certain Ground Lease Agreement that had been 
entered into by Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. 
(Sterling) in 1983. (!d.) The Ground Lease Agreement pertained to real property located 
within the City of Pocatello. (!d.) The Verified Complaint attached a copy of the Ground 
Lease Agreement. 
2. PMC sought relief from both Quail Ridge and Century Park for breach of contract. 
Specifically, PMC alleged that Quail Ridge and Century Park had breached Section 1.3(a) & 
1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.) Section 1.3(a) of the Ground Lease Agreement 
provides: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent (15%) of the value 
of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years from the Commencement Date of 
this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($15,000.00) per acre. 
(Id.) 
3. Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement provides: 
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning on 
the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as the rent adjustment date .... The 
rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value ofthe leased 
land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determination of fair market value 
shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date 
without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall take into account the 
parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applies to a 
fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and Noll 00 Dollars ($15, 000.00) per acre and shall 
also take into account any determinations of market value made under this lease for the 
1 CV -10-2724 will hereafter be referred to as P MC l 
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purpose of aiijustments for periods preceding the applicable rent aiijustment date. (emphasis 
added) 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, lessee 
shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the adjusted rate 
is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference 
for the period affected by the adjustment. 
(!d.) 
4. In PMC I, PMC alleged that Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement by not 
paying adjusted rent pursuant to Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement for the 
adjustment periods of2007 and 2010. (Id.) 
5. Quail Ridge and Century Park filed an Answer and Jury Demand to the PMC /Verified 
Complaint on August 2, 2010. (!d. Ex. B.) Trial was subsequently scheduled by Judge 
Brown to commence in May 2012. 
6. PMC filed an Amended Complaint in the PMC I case on May 4, 2012, just days before trial. 
(Avondet Aff. Ex. C.) PMC added a count for Declaratory Relief; however, PMC continued 
to assert a claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Century Park for the 2007 
and 2010 adjustment periods. (!d.) 
7. Paragraphs 14 through 34 of the Amended Complaint articulate the grounds that PMC 
believed gave rise to a claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Century Park. 
(!d.) Those paragraphs generally identify the failure of Quail Ridge and Century Park to pay 
adjusted rent as set forth therein as the basis for the breach of contract claims. (!d.) 
8. Ultimately, Judge Brown held a court trial inPMC I on May 14-15,2012. (Avondet Aff. Ex. 
D.) After the close ofPMC's case-in-chief Quail Ridge and Century Park moved for a 
directed verdict on Count I of the Amended Complaint. (Id. Ex. D.) Count I was the breach 
of contract claims for both the 2007 and 2010 adjustment periods. (Avondet Aff. Ex. C.) 
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9. After hearing some argument in support of the directed verdict motion, counsel for PMC said 
the following the Judge Brown: 
MR. HAWKINS: I can probably stipulate on this and save a little time. I agree exactly with 
what Mr. Gaffuey is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the trial. We feel that the way 
we have alleged the complaint, and especially with the amendment for the declaratory 
judgment, which effectively becomes the adjustment process that we're alleging, then that 
adjustment process itself results in the payments of the fair market value on the property for 
the years 2007 to current. So we would withdraw the first count regarding a breach of 
contract and damages from a breach. 
(Avondet Aff. Ex. E; FMC !Trial Tran. Vol. II, 86:1-12, May 15, 2012.) 
10. During trial, Richard Faulkner, Quail Ridge's corporate representative, testified about a 
restructuring of the parties' arrangement in 2001. (Id, 153:8-11.) Sterling sought to sell the 
building. Forrest Preston, PMI and Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the building. (Id., 
153:12-21.) Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their guarantees of the Ground 
Lease and also wanted Sterling released from the fmancing on the building. (I d.) Sterling 
owed approximately $2.8 million on the building. (ld., 154:1-4.) 
11. The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into Sterling's shoes vis-a-vis the 
Ground Lease. (ld., 154:18-155:4.) The parties amended and restated the old sublease with 
Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and PMI remaining as subtenant. (Id., 155:9-16.) 
12. Among other various additions to the parties' relationship, Forrest Preston's personal 
guarantee was executed attendant to the 2001 restructuring. (Id., 165:19-21.) 
13. Judge Brown granted Quail Ridge and Century Park's motion for directed verdict on breach 
of contract for both 2007 and 2010. (Id. Ex. D.) Century Park moved to be dismissed 
entirely from the FMC Ilitigation. That motion was also granted. (Id.) 
14. On November 12,2012, the Judge Brown entered an Order on Form of Judgment. (Avondet 
Aff. Ex. F.) The order stated that during the first trial there had been "no evidence that Quail 
Ridge was in violation or had breached the terms of the Ground Lease Agreement." (Id.) 
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The Court concluded that there were "absolutely no facts in the record that would justify this 
Court entering a money judgment in favor of the Plaintiff." (!d.) 
15. Judge Brown ultimately denied PMC's request to adjust rent for the 2007 adjustment period. 
(Hancock Aff. Ex. 1, ~~ 40 & 41.) 
Argument 
1 Res judicata bars PMC's claim for breach of contract 
1.1 Res judicata bars PMC's claim against the Quail Ridge entity 
PMC I involved claims for breach of contract for 2007 and 2010. Those claims were fully 
adjudicated by Judge Brown and dismissed. (Avondet Aff. Ex. D.) Since PMC previously sued 
for breach of contract and lost it should not be allowed to come before this Court and relitigate 
the issue in an effort to reduce the 2010 adjustment period to a money judgment. 
Res judicata "includes two legal concepts-issue preclusion or collateral estoppel and claim 
preclusion." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (Idaho 2012). "Claim 
preclusion 'bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon 
claims relating to the same cause of action."' !d. In Berkshire Investments, LLC, the Court 
wrote: 
!d. 
Under this doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) the original action ended in 
final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the same parties as the original 
action, and (2) (sic) the present claim arises out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 125-27, 157 P.3d 613, 618-20 (2007) 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars relitigation of an issue when: 
(1) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity 
to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was 
identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was 
actually decided in the prior litigation; ( 4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the 
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prior litigations; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity 
with a party to the litigation. 
!d. Both doctrines apply to this case and, specifically, res judicata bars PMC's claim against 
Quail Ridge in this lawsuit. 
In this case, the parties are the same as those involved in P MC I PMC sued Quail Ridge in 
PMC !for breach of contract. (Avondet Aff. Ex. A.i Thus, the res judicata prerequisite of 
identical parties is present here. 
The claims asserted are identical. The factual allegations contained in the Amended 
Complaint alleged that there was an adjusted rent that Quail Ridge failed to pay for the 20 10 rent 
adjustment period. (Avondet Aff. Ex. C.) PMC asserted that claim through trial and had every 
opportunity to present evidence in support of the breach of contract. However, after PMC' s 
evidence closed, Quail Ridge sought to have the claim dismissed and PMC remarkably agreed 
that it had not presented any evidence of breach of contract for the 2010 adjustment period. 
Judge Brown dismissed the breach of contract claim for the 2010 adjustment period. (!d. Ex. D.) 
This case involves a claim for breach of contract for the 2010 adjustment period. (See Com pl. pp. 
1-5.) The alleged failure to pay adjusted rent for 2010 forms the basis for both lawsuits. Thus, 
the claims are the same. 
The present claim for breach of contract does involve the same transaction that was at issue 
in P MC I and is nothing more than relitigating issues that were previously decided. Res judicata 
relates to claims that were actually litigated and those that could have been raised in the earlier 
case. Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. The allegations in the two cases are the 
same. InPMC I, PMC sought to recover adjusted rent in the amount of$445,500.00. (Avondet 
Aff. Ex. C, ~ 34.) After offsets, PMC claimed that Quail Ridge owed "PMC a sum of not less 
2 Though PMC did not sue Preston in P MC I, the application of the doctrine will be discussed, 
infra. 
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than $416,812.50 for unpaid adjusted rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period" in PMC I. (Id.) 
PMC actually litigated that claim through trial, which resulted in the Claim being dismissed by 
Judge Brown after FMC's case-in-chief. 
Nothing required PMC to assert the breach of contract claim in the prior litigation. PMC 
could have limited its relief requested to a declaration of the parties' rights under the Ground 
Lease Agreement. In Harris v. Cassia County, 681 P.2d 988 (Idaho 1984), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held "that the right sought to be protected by declaratory judgment 'may invoke either 
remedial or preventive relief; it may relate to a right that has either been breached or is only yet 
in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or endangered; but, in either or any event, it 
must involve actual or existing facts."' Id. at 991-92 (citing State ex rel. Miller v. State Bd of 
Educ., 52 P.2d 141, 144 (Idaho 1935)). However, PMC pressed its breach of contract claim and 
that claim ultimately failed. 
Alternatively, PMC could have bifurcated the claims and had Judge Brown first declare the 
rights of the parties after a trial. He then could have had a separate proceeding to decide the 
breach of contract issue. PMC could have requested Court implement this type of procedure in 
P MC I and probably should have asked for a bifurcation in order to avoid having the breach of 
contract claim fully adjudicated by the Court in the prior litigation. A bifurcation would have 
allowed PMC to adjudicate the parties' respective contract rights and then pursue a breach of 
contract claim following the declaration. As it is, however, PMC sought to recover damages for 
the 201 0 adjustment period, Judge Brown held a trial on the issue, and PMC failed to present any 
evidence of breach and actually stipulated to Quail Ridge's motion following the presentation of 
FMC's evidence. (Avondet Aff. Ex. F.) Thus, there is a fmal adjudication of the breach of 
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contract claim and PMC is precluded from relitigating that claim against Quail Ridge. See, e.g., 
Silver Eagle Mining Co. v. State, 280 P.3d 679, 682-83 (Idaho 2012). 
Thus, the elements of res judicata are satisfied in this case. PMC has already litigated its 
breach of contract cause of action and PMC lost. It should not be allowed to come before this 
Court and assert a claim that a prior court ruled to lack evidence. 
1.2 Res judicata applies to PMC's claim against Forrest Preston 
Claim preclusion also applies to PMC's claim against Forrest Preston (Preston) on the 
guarantee. Because PMC originally sued Quail Ridge for breach of its obligation to pay rent 
under the Ground Lease Agreement PMC should also have sued Preston for breach of the 
guarantee. The guarantee claim was a claim that should have been brought in the prior litigation. 
It was not asserted at any point by PMC. Thus, claim preclusion applies not only to the parties 
of the original action but also to their privies. "To be a privy, 'a person not a party to the former 
action must deriveD his interest from one who was a party to it."' Berkshire Investments, LLC, 
278 P.3d at 951. 
Here, Preston signed the guarantee as a part of the 2001 restructuring of the parties 
agreements. (Avondet Aff. Ex. E.) Indeed, PMC's own claims against Preston assert that he is a 
privy because PMC seeks to enforce the rent obligation vis-it-vis the guarantee. (Compl. pp. 1-
5.) Thus, by suing Quail Ridge in PMC I for breach of contract PMC should have also sued 
Preston under the guarantee. P MC I did not involve a claim on the guarantee when it should 
have. Claim preclusion applies to claims brought or those claims that could have been brought 
in the prior litigation. Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P .3d at 951. Thus, res judicata bars 
PMC's present claim against Preston on the guarantee. 
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2 Issue preclusion applies to the guarantee 
Even if the Court finds that Preston was not a privy as defined in Berkshire Investments LLC, 
it should still dismiss PMC's claim under the guarantee on the basis of issue preclusion. The 
elements of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion are: 
1. The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; 
2. The issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present 
action; 
3. The issue sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; 
4. There was a final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation; and, 
5. The party against whom the issue is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the 
litigation. 
Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. Each element of collateral estoppel is met in this 
case. 
First, PMC could have, and should have, included its claim on the guarantee in the prior 
litigation. PMC had sued Quail Ridge for breach of the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010 
rent adjustment period. If Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement for that 
period then PMC should have invoked the guarantee and sought to recover by enforcing the 
guarantee against Preston. PMC chose not to do so. 
Second, the issue of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment 
period is the same in both cases. Both cases asserted that Quail Ridge breached the Ground 
Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by refusing to pay $416,812.50, after 
offsets. 
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Third, the issue of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement was decided in the prior litigation. 
Judge Brown dismissed PMC's claim for breach of the agreement. (Avondet Aff. Ex. D.) 
Fourth, a fmaljudgment was entered and the claim was dismissed. 
Finally, as discussed supra, Preston is in privity with Quail Ridge and PMC. Judge Brown 
found that PMC had not presented any evidence of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.) 
By dismissing the breach of contract claim the Court disposed of any basis that PMC would have 
had for invoking the guarantee against Preston. 
Conclusion 
As a result of the foregoing, the Defendants' Cross-Motion for Sununary Judgment should be 
granted. 
DATED: Septe ber 23,2013 
Micha I . 
John . vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on September 23, 2013, I 
served a true and correct copy of the DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the method of delivery 
designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
POBox 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
"f'"' 't-'· affii.ey 
John . 1<\.vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for Defendants 
U.S. Mail Facsimile 
""-/ D 
U.S. Mail ;Ji Hand-delivered , ,/ Facsimile 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7 495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair .com 
Attorney for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 




County of Bonneville ) 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support of 
Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
I, John M. Avondet, having been duly sworn on oath, depose and state: 
1. I am an attorney with the law firm, Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A, and counsel of record for 
Defendants in the above-entitled action. 
2. I am competent to testify and do so through personal knowledge. 




3. Attached as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Verified Complaint dated June 28, 
2010. 
4. Attached as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the Answer and Jury Demand dated 
August 2, 2010. 
5. Attached as Exhibit Cis a true and correct copy of the Amended Complaint dated May 4, 
2012. 
6. Attached as Exhibit Dis a true and correct copy of the Minute Entry and Order dated May 
15, 2012. 
7. Attached as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of excerpts of Volume 2 of 2 of a Bench 
Trial dated May 15, 2012. 
8. Attached as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of the Order on Form of Judgment dated 
November 12, 2012 . 
. A ondet 
d St. Clair Gaffuey P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
Subscribed and sworn to before me on this 23'd day of September, 2013. 
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I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofldaho and on September 23, 2013, I 
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DEFENDANTS' CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT on the following by the 
method of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
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Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
I 09 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
ISB # 1745, 7938 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 




~- Case NG~ 10- 2 72; 4 OC 
) 
) 
) VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
) 
) FEE CATEGORY Pr 
) FEES$ 0 ~ o J 
) 
) 
) _________________________ ) 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, 
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the 
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, complains 
and alleges as follows: 
I. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), 
is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 651 Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho 83201. EXHIBIT 
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2. Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
of business is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 
1983 ("Lease Agreement"). PMC's copy of this Lease Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 
" I " and is iocorporated herein by this reference. 
5. The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. ("lliC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original 
lessee. 
6. The Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello, 
Barmock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal description for the 
Leased Land is attached hereto as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
7. On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to 
Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited partnership 
authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith 
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 3 7312. 
8. On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their respective interests 
in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridge and Quail Ridge thereby became the 
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement 
9. On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest in the Lease 
Agreement to lliC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., thereby became the 
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. 
10. On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in 
the Lease Agreement to Barmock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby 
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became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its 
name to PortneufMedical Center. 
11. On or about February 1, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Center), 
assigned its interest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the successor lessor 
to the Lease Agreement. 
12. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or 
related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement. 
13. Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of 
"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land. 
14. When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27, 1983, IHC and 
Sterling, as original lessor and lessee respectively, agreed upon a basis for calculating the initial 
armual rental. Specifically, in Article 1, Section 1.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original 
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis for calculating the initial annual rental: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of fifteen percent 
(15%) of the value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) 
years from the Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be 
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) 
per acre. 
15. The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and 
unambiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased 
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 x 4.25 = $63,750; $63,750 x 15% = $9,562.50). 
16. The armual rental rate is subject to adjustment on a periodic basis pursuant to the 
Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.3(b ), which states in relevant part: 
. . . The annual rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) 
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to 
below as the rent adjustment date. 
17. The above language in Article 1 of the Lease Agreement concerning when each 
rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date 
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled for January 27, 1986 and the rent was, and is, subject 
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to adjustment every three years thereafter until the termination of this Lease Agreement. 
18. Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent adjustment date was 
January 27,2010. 
19. Although the Lease Agreement provides for period rent adjustment dates as 
outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive 
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the 
specified rent adjustment date. 
20. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part: 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent 
adjustment date, lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to 
the preceding period until the adjusted rate is determined. The party 
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the 
period affected by the adjustment. 
21. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC becoming a successor 
lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither lliC, lliC Health Services, Inc., nor BRMC exercised its 
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article I of 
the Lease Agreement. 
22. Sometime in the summer of2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the armual 
rental rate for the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article I of the 
Lease Agreement. 
23. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement provides the 
following clear and unambiguous formula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the 
Leased Land: 
Complaint 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of the fair 
market value of the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the 
premises. Determination of fair market value shall be based on the 
highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date 
without taking the leasehold into account . ... 




24. In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation 
("Bowman") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land on the prior three rent 
adjustment dates. 
25. On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC, 
which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007 
rent adjustment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively. 
26. On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention 
to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article I of this Lease Agreement. 
27. As evidence in support ofPMC's request for an adjustment of the annual rent rate 
pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time 
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 
prior three rent adjustment periods. 
28. Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual 
rental rate pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue 
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land. 
29. Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement 
30. Based upon Bowman's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $658,879.20 in annual rents for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,686.00 in annual rents during the 
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $630,193.20 
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjustment period. 
31. Although Bowman has not yet determined the fair market value of the Leased 
Land for the 2010 rent adjustment period, to the best ofPMC's knowledge and belief, the current 
fair market value of the Leased Land is not less than the fair market value of the Leased Land for 
the 2007 rent adjustment period. Therefore, in January of 2010, Defendants should have paid 
annual rent in an amount of not less than $219,626.40. Instead, Defendants paid $9,562.00 in 
annual rent. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $210,064.60 for unpaid 
current adjusted annual rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period. 
Complaint 




32. Furthermore, the adjusted ilnnual rental rate for the remaining years of the 2010 
rent adjustment period should not be in an amount less than $219,626.40 per year. 
33. To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 
12-120(3) and 12-123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Ru1es of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and 
against the Defendants as follows: 
i. That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plaintiff for the 2007 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $630,193.20; 
ii. That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $210,064.40; 
iii. That Defendants be ordered to pay an annual rental rate for the remaining years of 
the 20 I 0 rent adjustment period in an amount not less than $219,626.40 per year. 
iv. That Defendants be ordered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associated 
with bringing this action; and 
v. For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances of this case. 
DATED this2~fJune, 2010. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By~ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC 
Complaint 
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DAVE R. GALLAFENT 
KENT L. HAWKINS' 
THOMAS J. LYONS 
BRENDON C. TAYLOR 
KENT A. HIGGINS* 
IAN C. JOHNSON 
JARED A. STEADMAN 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK 
*ALSO ADMITI'ED IN UTAH 
Winston Beard 
Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
MERRILL & MERRILL 
CHARTERED 
COUNSELORS AND ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
109 N. ARTHUR • 5'" FLOOR 
P.O. BOX991 
POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204-0991 
June 28, 2010 
Re: PMC I Quail Ridge & Century Park 
Dear Winston: 
A.L. MERRILL (1886·1961) 
R.D. MERRILL (1893-1972) 
W.F. MERRILL (1919-2005) 
TELEPHONE:208-232-2286 
FAX:208-232-2499 
Founded in 1913 
It is our understanding from you that your clients have authorized you to accept 
service of our Complaint in the above-referenced matter. As such, please find 
enclosed conformed copies of our Complaint and Summons along with an Acceptance 
of Service for you to complete. We ask that you please execute this Acceptance of 
Service and return to us in the self-addressed stamped envelope as soon as possible. 
Thank you in advance for your assistance. 
Sincerely, 
~ERRILL, CHTD. 
Dave R. Gallafent 
DRG/rwh/5975 
cc: Norm Stephens 
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,-~dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Idaho State Bar #1745,7938 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL,LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, 
LLC, 
Defendants. 













NOTICE: YOU HAVE BEEN SUED BY THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF(S). 
THE COURT MAY ENTER JUDGMENT AGAINST YOU WITHOUT FURTHER NOTICE 
UNLESS YOU RESPOND WITHIN 20 DAYS. READ THE INFORMATION BELOW. 
TO: QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that in order to defend this lawsuit, an appropriate 
written response must be filed with the above-designated court within 20 days after service of 
this Summons on you. If you fail to so respond the court may enter a judgment against you as 
demanded by the Plaintiff(s) in the Complaint. 
A copy of the Complaint is served with this Summons. If you wish to seek the advice 
of or representation by an attorney in this matter, you should do so promptly so that your written 
response, if any, may be filed in time and other legal rights protected. 
An appropriate written response requires compliance with Rule IO(a)(l) and other 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and shall also include: 
I. The title and number of this case. 
2. If your response is an Answer to the Complaint, it must contain admissions or 
denials of the separate allegations of the Complaint and other defenses you may claim. 
3. Your signature, mailing address and telephone number, or the signature, 
mailing address and telephone number of your attorney. 
Summons 
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'f'" 4. Proof of mailing or delivery of a copy of your response to Plaintiffs attorney, 
.i as designated above. 
To detennine whether you must pay a filing fee with your response, contact the Clerk 
of the above-named court. 
DATED this~ day of June, 2010. 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
By ___ ~~~~~?J.l~~ .... ,----
DeputyCle~ 
Summons 





.. ..... ,.~~, 












GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT 
•.•• f.'l-' . 
T~bKe of Conf.~nts ,, __ .. 
:. ' 
l •.. J)t:SCIU-PTlON; TERM· AND. R~NTAJ..:-~.'---::-,.------..-----o;;.- 1 
Ri!!!-l.Prop.erty Leasea-.:..:..:. ________ _; _____________ -:--::- ; 
' ~:~;:;;~-;~;:~;:;;~~~;::::::::=::=~~::_.:::~==~=== .. ' ~>' ' 
Neg·a'ti'6n of Partnership----.---":'..,.·'"'7"'--"'--:.;o.,.c...;.----~""' . ·4 . 
Plac.e o£ Rental · l!'aymei:lts;;:.----t"--'-"'"--.-.:.,...:.~-.:.~·.,.._ ___ ._. '' 4 
Fee Mortg·a'!·es--•-''"""'~·.;. ____ :;: __ ;;:. ___________________ .;..- 4 
.. .. ',.;·,·· .. · 
ARTICLE 2.. .. __ ..,:_ S 
2.1 "-·:rls.. --""- 5 
::2 • t · ~- ~l="~hitect.ural eompa:tibi'1.1_1:y------.,.,-----,.,--------- · 6 
2 • 3 Required .... Parking-""-"";...:-'-'--------------------------- .. ~ ·· 
2:. 4 Title to Buildings----.:._--.--;-;.,-.--"'-.-:-... ,.,._.,.,., ..... "'_______ · ·s 
2 • 5 Dee!;) a.t Ter·mination-'.;,;._.,;·;.:..;.:: ... __ . .:.:~"''-r.--:-..:.,...;_.,..,. ... .,..,..,.,._.;._ 7 
t. 6 · Ad!;litional Rea.l Property--.:: _____ ..., __ .,,.-.,.::----""' ..... __ 7_; · · .7 
2·. 7 .. G,:-ant .. o.f .ces:e of Utili t'ies and, .:E:!!,sements.-<--':,..-..----..:. · B 
ARTICLE 
3 .. 1 
'3·. 2 







3 • CQNSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS- ANI:l.· MA:t.m.'~NANCE----'..:--: . S .. 
. Gener-al Mait:lt~~inc·~,+~~:..:.~ . .;,;.~~-.;:~-:~i7~:-~L·.:..·-.::-.~·----.~ .• :----- -a 
Fielief for Substantial Loss of Area--------------- 9 . 
'Major and Minor Distingu-i.~hed.rr--,,;..,.~:--""'-"''""'""·"'"------ 1 o 
Gov.l'\.ri3JTiental · ill.uthori:ti e!'•------,..- - ... -,.,:-~ ,----;..,...,.;.. __ o;;. 1 0 
D.a111.age , or Destruction During ·· ·, . · · Final ... Year .. s· of .. ·Termo..o;,;..;....;_;;, _________________________ ll 
Last Year of Term--. .,.----:--_;,.._ -----,_-,_ ... ..:~":">frt-.----... --·'' f2 . ·, '',. 
~; . 
. :.,.,_, ... 
4 • L.E:ASEHOLD L!ENS~-.;..-.-.:;""'.,.:::----·,.,..--,.,.---"'""'-..,...,.-.. ..,---- l '2 
···Right .to Grant Lien on Leas;~hc?iq :t;~tat.e,.-,:---..,.,.~--::.. · 12 
Fore.c::losure of Lien•-------:':-----:-,..--:-"~"'-~.,.,..,..--,.. ... ---·13 
ARTIC'LE 5. 
~: · .. ,; {""• . . 








6':.· . Sl,l.,S.O.RDINATIO!\----"----.:.-------------..,-----,-·-··----" 16' 
Subordination---------~--------..,.----,..----.- .. ------.:. 16 
Expenses--·---;..---~----------..:_.:. ___ ..,...,.~---~~------- 17 
N?n-Mortgage by Less-or---------------------------- 17 
Limitation on Subordination---------------------- 17 
Curing of Defaults-------------------------------- 18 
lndemnification------------------------------------18 
Hrn.:t ... ·s Tt ·~ ""' ~,.,,. ru:c\.'5~1. S19l·"": "'. ,,., ... , .. ~ .. , ..• 
.. .: ... •••!tot"ro\o.1 • ""'" -
~'' "-""••• ... -.......... ,,_ .... ~-· .. ·' 228 of 447
•, ' '• . ·. ~ ' ., . 
( 
.•.. . .. ~ 
,. -. 
GROUND LEA.S~ AGREEMENT 
This ~ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this ~ 
. day of lkvn.-1~, 1983, by and bet...,een lNTER.I-IOUNTAIN ijEALTH 
CARE, Po".. a~h non-profit cor,I>oration, authorized to do 
business in the St.ate of' Idaho. under the name of :Pocatello 
Regional Medical Center.· ('heri:d.nafter called "Les10.or"), and 
STtR.LING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington partnership auth.oriz.e,d to 
. do b:t.~siness in t.he State of Idaho, (hereinafter ~allec3 "Lesse.e •). 
R~C.!,TALS 
'1-IHEREAs,. Lessor owns certairi real property located ...,i thin the 
City of Pocatello, Bannock Count·y, Idaho: and 
·.., WHEREI>.S, .Lessor wishes. to· le'ase to Les11ee approximately 4 
-:.J '( 
acres,, more or. less;· ·of ·said property for con!;tructj,cm of a 
Psyehiatric · FJospi tal building · (the · "hospital") .ard to impo!>e 
c~r,tain restrictions on the. use of such parcel of real property 
.and·:. Lec&see wishes to l1!ase sai'd ·parcel of real propertY for such 
PUFpGSe,.' subject to· Lessor. s restrictions: 






into a. written 
c;:ondi tions ·· and ground. lease . agreement setting f·orth 
restrictions under whic;:h said parcel of· 'Teal property is to be 
leased: 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in . c;:onsideration of the mutual 
c;:ovenants, c;:onditions ·and promises contained herein, Lessor and 
Lessee agree ··as follows·: 
ARTICLE 1 
DESCRIPTION, TERM ~D RENTAL 
1.1. Real Prooerty Leased. 'Lessor hereby leases to Lessee 
and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property desc;:ribed 
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1 HdRI N'SltiN, wYHNt,l laCL'SO~& SlOl~'" 
A.UC'1~'1'1 4.UAw 
1Z".:O~•..,NJ1 • \UIU .. . ,.o,...,~•·' 
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... , Tho,~~ana a~~..c.~~£.,!.22.-~C:~-~~Es ... < H~i900. 00) ·per - . ' . 
.. acre .•. 
(b) Adjustments @asep .on. Property Val·u·e. The annual 
net rental. as. set for·th above shall be a'cijusted every three 
· ( 3.) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, 
·. 
ref.erred to b.~ low as . the r.ent a~just~:~ent date. 
The pa,rties' writ~E!n ag):eement. within· ninety ( 90) days 
before the applicable rent c adjustment date shall be· a 
conclusive determination between the parties of the fair 
.~:~ar'ket value .f.or the period. t'Q ,,which· the a':dju·stment applies • 
,. . '·~ • . '2< • . 
H . the parties have not s.o . agreed by· the applicable :tAent 
adju!'tment date.. the det.ef'mination sha.ll be' made as in· the 
paragr;\ph, O!l 1\.rbi tration in' ~ticle .13. 
-The rent, as ad::just~d shall •be· equal to fifteen percent 
(1.5%) p,E!;rcent. of tf!e fair ma~'ket value of the lea$ed 'land, 
. ex,c;lusiye of. the improvements on ·the· 'premi:ses. Oet~rinina­
tion of fair market. value shaoll be based on· the highest arid . . . . . ·. :- . 
be.st. ,use of .. tl}e land. on, 1;.he. app)..icable rent adjustment date 
without taxing the leaseh()lci ;Jl:\:1(. ac;po.unt. 
·;; . . . The determina-
tion shall take into account t1te' palt'tie•s • agree~:~ent that the 
initial minimum rent is .the aboiie-st.ated percentage applied 
to a fai:z;- .11\arket . value o~. Fifteen· ·Thou·s·ang, .and No/100 
Oo.llar.s ($15,000.00) per acre and sha;ll also t'<!<'ke'int.o 
.' . "I 
account any determina1;.i.ons· .of ,market ·value made under· t'his 
leas.~ for the pu.rpose. of adj1,1stments for periOds preceding 
the applicable rent adj,u.stment d·ate. 
. If the det.erm,ination o·f adjusted rent ·is !:lade a·fter the 
applicable rent adjustment.· date, lessee shall continue to 
pay rent at the rate. applicable to the preceding period 
until· the adjusted. rat~ is determined. ·The party indebted 
shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference 
for the period affected by the adjustment. 
-. --·-
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ARTICLE 2 
• . ' •·f··· • :'>1~-"ii . ;'l'"""'"";. 
OF ·:J.£A:St:!f LMD. AND. TITLE TO 
• /;!". -~~ ...... , ·•·· .l =--~ .. 
IMPROV!;ME!lTS. 
.2.1 Use of Lea~ed.Land~ Lessee shall,. use :the leased land 
solel-y fo+ toe purpose of cohsttuetin·~, maintaining a.nd opcer~rting 
the hp~pital. f.or psychiatric· eare ·and. substance ... abuse· tre·atment; 
provide~ that Lessee may at any time use the. leased land~ for ·imy 
lawful .purpose. Lessee shall commence . constructiqn of· the 
· ... ,.-
hOspital within forty-fiv-e '(45) days ·after ,t.'he commencement d\H.e 
of. this Lease and the·. issuance. of~ a buildins .. .Permit.. ~f Lessii!e 
is delayed .in commencing corn\truction or rec~iving t:.,qe :·permit by 
a.ny . c;.ause. or causes ~eyond""Les~:~e' s ... cont,rol, S•UC'l) cau·ses 
inc11i~ing. but not necessarilY' ''bei.h9 lirni ted to Acts of .. Gt;d., 
s'trikes, war, insurrections, and the li}te,. !Said 
day . peri 'ad to commence c6n!i·truc·tion. ·shall . l:;l,e 
forty-five (4S) 
extend!i!d· f•or .a 
J?eriod equivalent to the'tiine lost by reason of. any such cau·se·or 
cause~: provided., however, that rio extensions s)1all pe gra·nted 
. . . ' ·····"•i;· . :· ' .. · . . 
for a.ll:Y .su~;:h dela}' which comnences mo're than t~n (.1.0) days before 
~. 9 . ·. '· .. 
L~ssee notifi~~:.s Lessor of'' such delay. and. tl;e reasons .. the·refoi"'' 
. .· ,• . 
Oric;e constru .. c·tion is· begun;'" Lessee shall, . with. reason.able 
diligent;:~, . presecute to completion all co~st;ucticm of io.mprove-
men:ts, additions, or alterations and shall. have S\lbsta·,ntie:lly· 
comple~ed construction of the hos:pital 'within. '(tlr.( .( .} . 1 year's: 
after <late of this lease. "Substantial compl~ti,on" .$hall. mean 
• •. .. ; .. . . . .· :-·... .. . :. ;<:·· .' 
that the, hospital is ready for o·c-cu:pancy a!la tis.e as,~' .hospital. as 
evidence9, by a Ce.rti.:ficate of b'ccupimcy. OI;' other li:K~., ·<;ipc;:ume·nt 
issued by an <;~ppropriate governmental ·authority. If .. L¢ssee is 
delaye<l i.n .subst<antial comp'1e'tion · ~f the ho~;r,'i t'?l by. an;r C!!Use or 
,·· 
causes .. be:yon.CI · Lessee • s control, such · causes inc~uding but:· not 
" . .·' 
neces.sarily bein9 limited to Acts of God, strike.s, '.war, 
i,l'lsurrections, a·nd the like·;: said date fo:- substant~al completion 
of the hospita.l shall 
tirne lost by. reason 
be extelidi!.d f'or a period eq\l~ valent to the 
of any· ·subn cause or 
however, that no exten·sions will be s:::ante<l 
cause~: 
for any 
pperv id ed.·, 
such de1ay ·-
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 5 
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to Lessor until the ... t.he T,erm· ,or·· the· prior 
'(_,-._: termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the 
right to terminate t,his lease pursuant to krticle 10 hereof. 
Lessee covenants and agrees that upon expiration .of. the Term it 
will yield up and deliver the leased land ""ith any such 
buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the leas.ed 
( 
. ·-
land at such time free and clear .. of all liens and encumbrances of 
any kind, and upon such expiration title therein shall be in 
Lessor. In the event of earlier t.errnination··. o:f · thi·s lease, 
Lessee covenants and agrees that it ""ill yield up and deliver the 
leased land 1dth any such buildings, permanent improvements, and 
fixtures upon the leased ,land at .such time. free and clear of all 
liens and. irideb~edness of any kind. Proyided, how.ever, that such 
,._ 
obligation to 
cl.ear of all 
deliver the leaseO. land. ;;.nd imp;ro.vernents. free 
liens and indebtedness shall not apply to 
and 
the 
or'i:gihal lie.n of first encumbrance repr-esented by the mort-gage· o'r 
De'ed of Trust or other security ;interest referred to in Article 6 
hereof g·iven to secure the' financing .for thE! construction of the 
orf'ginal builcHngs, permanent improve~:~ents, and fixtures upon the 
leased land. Upon ·such earlier terminati•;m, tit-le in ·the 
bu':i.idings, permanent improvements and fixtures upon. tne leased 
l'and shall be in Lessor. 
2 ~ 5 Deed at Termination .. Upon terrnin<;ltion of this lease, 
the forego-i:ng, e,xecute a Ciee·a. L~ssee shall~ subject to 
satisfactory in £orrn and 
title tO any bUildings 1 
c.ontent to Lessor. confirming Lessor's 
permanent improvements, . and fixtures 
therein, upon the leased land at the time of termination. 
2.6 Additional Real Propertv. At such time as Lessee shall 
require additional real property for the e~pansion of the 
hospital, Lessee shall so notify Lessor and Lessor shall in good 
faith consider the. leasing of additional real property to Lessee 
for such purpose. 
.. -• 
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exceed seventy-five percent 
of· 'the improvements. If. 
('15\J. of th'e tE!!Hacemertt-'v~lue· ot'au .. 
the cost does exceed that percent, 
.. ' 
Lessee may nevertheless repair, res-tore and repiace as above or 
may by notice elect inst,ead to raze the improvements damaged or 
destroyed. Within thirty (30) days aftei'. such notice, Lessor may 
by notice elect to repai.r. restore· and repla;d:e as above, an(! 
Lessee shall not raze until the ·-expiration of the time for: 
Lessor''s notice of election. I..essor shall · not be required to 
furnish any serv,ices -or facilities or to make any re})airs or 
alterations of any kind .,in ,or on the premises'·.- Lessor's election 
•• ·' • •! 
to perform - any obli~ation of Les-11ee under this p-~ovision on 
. ' . . . 
Lesse-e's faiiure or refusal. to co so •shall riot. · d:msti tut;.~ - a 
.•:<. ···, 
waiver of- any _right or remedy. for Less~e' s. Cle-f'ai.Jlt, and Lessee. 
~hall' prom~tly reimbu_rse, defend, and indemnify Lessor agi!in5t 
al-l- liability, ·loss, cost, an(! expense arising ·from it. 
·,>, . . • 
In determining whet;.her . Le.ssee has act~d promptly _a~ 
required under the foregoing_ par-agraph, one of _the ·criteria to b~,-
·· .. 
cons-idered is the a:vaila'l;>ility of any applicable insurance_ 
pro.ceeds. 
Nothing in this provision defining the dut;.y of 
maintenance. shall be construed_ as. limiting any right given 
elsewhere· in thi~- lea_se to alter_,.· modify·,· deinoiish, remove, or_ 
replace 'any improvement, or ,as limiti·ng provisions relating to - . . . 
cond emna'tion 
yeats-- of the 
or to damag_e or dest-ru_ction during the final year or 
TeriTI". No deprivation,. 
from any use resulting· 
paragraph shall entitle 
event 
Lessee to 
impairmj!nt; or limitation-on 
,-
wo.rk• · aoritemplat.ed by this 
any -.-of-fset, aba:ter:tent, or 
reduction in rent nor to aJ:Jy te.:t:~T!ination or -·ext·e·ri's{O-ri of the 
Term.-
3. 2 Relief .for Substantia.l_ .Less of Area. If any dar..age to 
or destruction of 'the pre111i,ses or -the improvements is such that 
7 S%- of the floor area is rendered . unusable for our·ooses stated in . . ' . .. ... 
the Lease, :Lessee may, at Lesst;~e's election •. delay the "'ork 
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appropriate judici;!.l or admin.i,strat3,ve proeered'itigs: 'i.if1;hout cost 
(-··. or expense to Lessor, the validl. ty or application of any law, 
ordinanc~. order, rule, regulations or re~uire~~nt (he~einafter 
called "Law") that Lessee repair,. maintain• ·alter or.· replace the 
improv·ements in whole or in pa):'t, and Lessee- shall not be in 
default fOr failing to do SUCh wor.k until a re·asonable time 
( 
following· final determination of L.essee' s contest. 
g~ves notice of request, Le.s~.ee s't!all fir.st ·furnish 
bond,, satisfact·ory to Lessor . in form, amo.unt a·nd 
If Lessor 
Lessor a ... · 
insurer_, 
guaranteeing complh.'nce b::( Lessee .with the Ci:ontest'ed . law, and. 
indemnifying LE!~sor' agains·t' ~ll liability that Lessor. may SUS~<~.in 
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law. 
Lessor may, but is not required to.. contest any such Law 
independently of Lessee. Lessor may·, a.nd on Lessee's notice of 
request shall, join in Lesse~' s c;ontest, .. 
3.5 bal:!age 6r Destruction Durirl$ Final. Years of Term: In 
the event of· subst:cimtial' 'damag~ .. or dest,ruction to 'the hospital or 
an-y· part thereof' auring the l<).st five (5·) years of 'the Term, 
Lessor ·shall ha'Ve the right, exe_):'cisable during the ninety ( 90) 
da;Ys following tlie date ·of S!J.9h damage or d'estruction, to 
terminate· this lease·. Lessor s_hall exerci:se such ·t-i.ght by 
deliveri-ng· to LEis.see written notice of the ·date o£ such 
termination,· which date shall not be e<).rlier than 'thirty' (30) 
days fcidlowing the' dat; of Lessor's notice of tertnination; · 'tip~n­
exercise ·of su·ch ..right,· Lessor shall be entitled tro tec'ove·:r· the 
ful:). proc;eeds of . any pol icy of insurance covering any suCh damage 
or destruction ex·cept such 
Lessee's loss'· of personal 
proceeds .as may b-e 




If Lessor does not elect . to te:rminate this lease, 
Les.l;e·e shall ·be responsible fo.r the repair, rebui'lding or 
repl.acernent of the hospital or any part thereof so damaged or 
destroyed as t'he case may be. All such repairs,. tebuilding or 
---
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mortgagee a statement. in writing, certifying, if such is the 
case, that this lease is then unmodified and unamended, _thi!lt it 
is not in default, and that. it is in full force and effect. I.f 
there have been modifications and aJnendments to this· lease, said 
statement shall, if such. is the ·case, certify that the same is 
not then in default· and· is in full. force and effect as then 
iiiodified and amended. Said modifications and ar:~endments shall be 
set forth in full in said statement. Said statement shall 
further state the dates to which .. the basic rental or other 
• charges have been paid, and· ~het'her or not there is any existing 
default by Lessee wi ti<. respect to a.ny covenant., promise of 
agreement on the part of Lessee provided to· be performed under 
this lea~P.! and also "''nether a notice of such default·· h-a~ been 
sei:'ved by Lessor. I.f any such statement· contains a claim of 
non-performance,· insofar as actually kno"m 'by Lessor, shall be 
summarized in said statetnent. 
ana before delinquency of ... 
Lessee shall ~ake pal~ent when due. 
all principal, interest and other 
cha.rges for which Lessee may be or become obligated under any 
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate. 
4.2 Foreclosure of L.ien. P:-ior to com:nencirig any action to 
foreclose a leasehold mortgage, the leasehold mortgagee, or any 
assigns of such mortgage, shall notify Less·or in wd,ting of the 
default by Lessee w:i,th .a. statement· of the al'ilount then due and 
offer to withhold any acceleration of maturity of the promissory 
note, payment of which. is secured by the leasehold r:~ortgage. ln 
the event Lessor shall, within thirty (30) d~ys of the receipt of 
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on 
said mortgage, then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-
state the mortgage in all respects as if no default had occurred. 
Lessor may, at its option, ·make such payr:~ents on said mort;age, 
and the amounts of such payments shall be considered additional 
rental due Lessor from Lessee under this lease. ·s u=>s equ ent. and 
successive defaults by Lessee in making payl':\ents required by any 
·-
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commences foreclosure arid cont·inues its action with due 
diligence, and ( ii) continues,. payment of rent and all other 
charges required to be paid by Lessee which have accrued <~nd 
which become due and payable .during the period the. foreclosure 
proceeding is pending; 
., •' 
(f) That the Lessor .shall not have ·the right to terminate 
. : . . 
this lease solely on account of, .any of• the· events ant.ici.pat.ed by 
subdivi'sion (d) of p~ragraph 1 of Article 10 without the wri1;ten 
consent df the lea~ehold mortgagee, provitded that such mort,gagee 
promptl'y eominences forec:losure if it )\as the right to' do so and 
.· ,,. : 
thereafter continues its action with due diligence:' 
(g) · 'that in the event . the Lessee's · intere.st this 
lease sh~l~. be_ sold, assignE!!C). or othervise· .transferred FUr.suan~ . ' 
to the exerci'se of any right, power or remedy of· any mbrtgagee or. 
pursuant to· judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragraph 1 of 
Article 10, and if no rent or other· charges shall t'hei"i' ~e due an 
• "1. ' ' • • 
pa;Y'iible · under· this lease, and i:f such mortgagee shall have 
.~ 
arran<ged to· 'the· reasonable satisfac.tion of the Lessor for the 
curf·ng of any d~f~ult susceptible· ,q_f being cured, Lessor within 
si,Xty ( 60) days after recei vipg a .wri ttei:l request therefor and 
upon receiving payme~t of. its expenses, incl•Jding atto!'neys' 
fees, incident ·thereto, will exec)-lte and "deliver such instrument 
or instruments as may be requir·ed. to . confirm such sale, 
a·s·sii:gnment or other trans.fer of Lessee's interest under the 
lease; or' 
(h) That in the event a default under any leasehold 
mortgage shall·· ·have occured, the mortgagee 
right', power or remedy of the morts;agee under 
may exercise any 
the mortgage which 
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease. 
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6. 2 txpenses ~ 
of said mortgage or 
···~ 
~· . . ·~ ·'· 
whichever is the shorter. The "term" 
means the original term herein or 
exerc-ise of the 'renewal options herein 
provided for.· 
All expenses in connection with the making 
De.ed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and 
Less·or will execute any and all documents that may be ·required . 
with respect thereto. . However, Les·s·or shall assume no personal 
liability for the underlying indebte'dness; but the mortgage note 
• or other evidence of .indebtedness shall be executed solely by t'l:le 
Lessee. 'The foregoing provisions of· this Article shall, extend to 
,. ' 
any construction mortgage .loan applied for by Lessee, as well as 
any perman:nt mortgage, loa~,. and any mortgages in substitution or 
in replacimient thereof, a.nd as often as during the term .such 
loans are applied for by the Less•ee. 
6.3 Non-Mortgage ,by Les.sor~ Lessor agrees not to place any 
mortgage On the prelt);ses I pr permit the same to be encumbered. in 
any marmer, without .the: prior wr.itten c6n·sent of the Le.ssee • 
. .. 6:4 Limitation on Subordination. 'Leiser's agre.ement to 
subordinate any given portion of the fee title to a first 
.. , ·~ ' 
mortgage is limited to one such mortgage 'on 'the given ,pcrtion of 
the fee title for t(1e purpose of ·ena·bling Lessee to obtain 
financing for the impro.vements as con'tetriplated herein and located· 
on. the given portion of the leased land; provided that, for this 
purpose, mortgages securing 
permanent loans for the 
separate construction and take-out 
same work of improvement shall 
or 
be 
considered to be one mortgage. Both the note and the mortgage 
securing it shall expressly provide that there can _'be no 
extension of the due de~te, addit·ion to the balance of the loan, 
alteration of any provision in the docur.~ents, release of any 
obligor, or any refinancing ·of the unpaid principal balance 
without Lessor's prior "'ri.tteo 
graph shall prohibit mortg,agee 
approval. Nothing in this para-
from paying delinquent taxes or 
: ::,... ·-
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boilers ana elevat.ors. inel·ude'd'' 'iri any' impiovements loc:ated on the 
(. demised premises, insuring the Lessee against any and all claims 
and demands made 'by any person or -persons whomsoever for. ·injuries 
received in c~nnection with the operation and mainte·nance of the 
premises, improvements, and 'buildings located on the demised 
premises or for any Other risk insured against by SUCh policies 1 
each class of which policie·s shall have been ,..ri tt.en· within 
limits of n6t less than Five Hundreid Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or cla~mea. by any one person 
• for bodily injury,. or other-..•ise, plus One Hunarea. Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($100,000.00) aam:ages to property, and for not 
l•ess than One ~illion and 'No/160 bollars ($1,000,00.0.00) for 
cilamages 
injury, 
~ncurred or claim.ed by . more .than one per9on for 
or ·Otherwise, plus Orie Hund'red Thousand and 
::iodily 
No/100 
Dollars ( UOO, 000.00) dar:~ages · to property. All such policies 
sha11 name the Lessee and the Lessor, as their, respective 
interests may appear, as .!-he persons assured by such ·policies; 
( and the original or 9uplicate orisinal of each of. such .policy or 
polf:cies shall 'be delivered by t'he Lessee to the Lessor promptly 
upon·· the writing of s.uch policies, 




7.2 Fire and Wind Darnaoe Insuran6e. 
( l) Lessee's Oblioation. The Lessee covenants· and 
agrees with Lessor that from and after the .time when the 
lease commen~s, the Lessee will keep insured any. and all 
'buildings 
all loss 
and improvements upon tne said premises against 
or damage 'by fire and ~o.•indstorm, and ~o.•hat is 
generally termed in the· insurance trade as "extended 
coverage", which said in.surance ""ill be maintained in an 
amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party. in 
interest from 'being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of 
the risk, which amount shall not be less than eighty percent 
(80%) of the full insura·ble value. and all of such policies 
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( property upon the .demised premises- prior to such damage or 
destruction, and shall have t.he same rebuilt and ready for 
occupancy within fifteen. (15) months from the time when the 
-loss or destruction occ;ur.red. The fifteen· (15) ·month. period 
for reconstruction shall be enlarge·d ·by del,ays caused 
without fault or neglect on the .part of the Lessee by act of-
God, strikes, loc:ko!lts 1 or other '':con·di tions beyond the 
!:esse~·, s c6ntrol • '.···. 
(2) Delivery of folicies~ The original~ of al.l such 
policies shall be ~elivered to the !,;essor by the Lessee 
along with the· receipte¢1 bills · evidencirlg the fact th;~t the 
premiums therefore are . paid: ·but ·nothing 'herein contained 
shall.be ·construed <~s. prohibiting the Les;;ee from finC~.ncing 
the premiums where t'he teJCms of. the policies are for .three 
(3) yeai:s or more and in suc'h event . the receipts ... shall 
•evidence it to be the fact t,hat the installment-premium pay-. . . . . . ~ 
riient or payments are paid at dr before 
' ~.. . 
maturities. Where, however, ·there is a 
their respec.tive 
mortgage on the 
premise·~ created pursuant 1:>0 the provisions contained in 
t'his lease and if, unde.r the terms of such mortgage, it is 
CilHigatory upon the Le;s.see to cause the oi:igi~als of the 
policie·s to be delivered to the liiortgagee, then the Le,_ssee 
shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate eertific(lte~· of. such 
. '' 
policies. The policies or duplicate certificates thereof' 
as the case may be, shall be delivered l:iy. the Lesse~ to the 
Lessor at ·:least ten (10) :days prior to the. effective date of 
the policies. 
(3) Effect of Mortcaae ~ubordini!d:ion. All of the pro-
visions herein contained relative-to the disposition of pay-
ments from insuranc_e companies are subject to the f_act t,hat 
if any mortgagees ·holding a mortgage created pursuant. to. the 
provisions of this lease hereof elects, in accordance ,.i th 
the terms of such mortgage, to require that the proceeds of 
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(5) Dire.ct Repayment.. The foregoing notwiths.tanding, 
in the event the. insurance. proceeds are the sum of T"'enty 
Five Thousl!,~d and No/100 Dollars ( $25, 000.00) or . l.e.ss, then 
such proceeds shall be paid directly· to the Lessee without 
the necessity of creating the joint bank account as 
hereinabove set. forth, and Lessee shall use such funds to 
make the rel?lacements or repairs as required hereunder. 
7.3 Lesse~' s Covenant t.o Pay Insurance Premiu'rns ~ The 
Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee W:ill pay 
• p:t~miums for all of the insurance policies which the Lessee is 
obligated to carry under the ··terms of this lease, and will 
·aetiver to the Lessor evidence of · such payments before the 
payment of any. ;such premiums become .in; default., and the Lessee 
. ._, •·.. •. 
will cause renewals of .expirin.g policies to be written imd the 
policies or copies thereof, as the lease may require, to be 
de'live.red to Lessor at least ten (10) days before the expiration 
ai!lte o'f' such e~piring policies. 
'7.4 Indemnification. 
(a) Defense a_nd Pavrnent of Claims. 
ci'elend, indemni~y and hold Lessor harmless 
Lessee a.grees to 
together with all 
of itsservants, .c;s,ents, or employees, f'rom and against all 
liabilit~ or lo.ss . for injuries. to o·r de~ths of per.sons or 
damages to p~o~erty caus.ed by Lessee's acts .;r omi~sions to . ' . . 
act, use of, or occupancy of the leased land, or as the 
result of Liiss~e' s operations on said lea·sed land. Each 
part~ hereto shal;l._ give to the other parties promJ?t and 
tiinely notice of any claim or suit instituted coming to its 
knowledge which in any "'ay, directly or indirectly, 
contingentlY.. or ot(lerwise, affects or might affect another 
party, and .. all parties shall have the r'ight to participate 
' . . • t 
in the defense of the ._same to· ·the extent of each partl.es 
own interest. 
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7.5 Insurer Qualified. The insurer shall be qualified and 




·TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, LIE:~S. 1.\ND ENCUMBRANCES 
Lessee shall be· responsible to pay. and discha-rge all exist-
ing and future taxes and assessments which are or may become a 
li.en upon or which may be levied by the State, County or any 
other tax levyi·ng body upon the l.eased .. land ·or improvements 
thereon· or property located on the leased lend. Lessee shall 
elso. be . respo·nsible for ·'all insuranc;e premiums, and for all 
1 iabili ties, .cl'liu:·ges, · fees, . obligatj,o.ns, liens ·and encumbrances 
associat-ed•. WitH or relating to the exi,stence &rid USe Of the 
lei1,sed land i•ncluding, but not limite.Q· to, all assessment 
installments due ·or payable after the date of this lease.· All 
payments · of taxes or 
insta:),lment :··payments, 
. . 
assessments or both, except permitted 
sha 11 be prorat; eedd-....cf~GG'L'r~tt::fll'l-ee----cl<:tc".nn±~·-:teas e·· 
year and for the year in which the lease terminates. Lessee may, 
in. its own. name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name, 
con.test .in :good faith by all appropr~ate proceed-ings,· the amount, 
applical;>ility or validity of an;:r tax, ass.essment· or fine 
pertaining to the leased land, or to any building, structure or ,. 
improvement upon tne leased land, and in the event Lessee does in 
good f_aith contdt the applicability sr validity of any tax, 
·assessment or fine; Lessor will coppeJ;Oate in such contest 
wheneyer possible with Lessee; provided that such contest 'Will 
not subject any par·t of t))e leased land to f.orfeiture or loss, 
except that, if at any time payment of the whole or any part of 
such tax, ass~ssment or fine shall becol:le neces·sary ·in order to 
prevent any such forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or 
cause the· same to be paid in time to prevent such forfeiture or 
loss. 
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(.3) FQr .. the purpose of computing the last five 
years of the term within the me·aning of subparagraph_s ( 1) 
and (2) above, -.it .. i-s agreed that said" "last five years" 
shall mean the last .five years of the original ·term, or if, 
at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial 
payment thereof (if there be such partial payments) becomes 
payable, the parties. shall. have duly agreed 'to extend the 
term of this lfi!ase pursuant to the options to ·renew herein 
contained or by a ... written instrument executed in the manner 
required for r~cording, then said ·last five years shall be 
·deemed to mean the. last. :five (5} · ye·ars ·of the term as so 
extended. 
,·· (_c). I..f th!;! values of the respective interests of Lessor 
and Lessee shall be determined. ac~ording to the provisions 
of subdivisions (a) and:z (b) of this s'ection in the pro-
ceeding· :purs4ant · to . which .. tbe demised I:'remises shall have 
been taken or condemned, the· ·valJJes ·so determine·d shall be 
·' .. 
con·clusive upon Lessor a..n.d Le"S.see.· If s.uch values shall not 
have been thus separately. de-termined' such vaiues shall be 
f.i.';ed by agreement pe;tween the Lessor and Lessee or if they 
are unable to agree, 
by arbitration under 
as set forth in this 
then the controversy. shall be resolved 
. '::}-:. ::. . 
the procedure to govern iri' Arbitration 
lea.s,e hereof ·under .. Artic::le l.3. 
'(d) In the event.of the ta'lcii:l'g in cO'n'demnation of less 
than the whoie of tbe de111ised premises but materially all of . . . 
said premises as hereinbe.low defined anc the part of the 
premises that remains includes . a part of the improvement 
tba:t was taken, then as to the l.intaken rer.iainder of the 
improvement only, but not any remaining land, the parties 
shail endeavor to agree op. the t'hen ·fair r:iarket value of 
such remainder of the improvement, and .if the-y fail to agree .,. . 
then the controversy shall be resoly·e·a by arbitration. The 
value so agreed upon as the then fair market value of such 
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(i) Appointment of Receiver. Apply for 
or consent in writing, signed on behalf of Lessee 
or its duly authorized attorney, to the 
appointment of a receiver, trustee or liquidator 
of the Lessee or of all or a s.ubstantial part of 
L~ssee's assets: or 
(ii) Voluntary Bankr\Jptcy. File . a 
voluntary .petition in bankruptcy or admit i·n 
writing its· inability "to pay its debts as they 
becoll)e due; or 
(iii) Assignment for Creditors. Make a 
general assig!lll\ent for· the benefit of creditors: 
or . 
(iv} Reorganization or Arrangement. File. 
a reorga\"lization or arrangement with creditors to 
take advantage .. of any insolvency law: or 
(v} Admit Insolvency. File an answer 
admitting the material allegations of a petition 
filed against_ Lessee in any bankruptcy, 
reorganization or insolvency proceeding, or 
during. the Term of this lease, an order, judgment 
or d.ecree shall ·be entered by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, on the application of a 
creditor, adjti~icating Lessee bankrupt or 
in~olv-ent or approving a 




receiver, trustee or liquidator of Lessee, or of 
all.or a substantial part of its assets. 
Remedies. In the event of 
lease by Lessee, then Lessor, 




re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of 
the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these 
purposes. 
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(" excess, if any, of the amount of rent, additional, rent and 
charges equiva.l!!nt to rent reserved in tnis lease for the 
( 
' 
remainder of the Term over the then r-easonable rental va.l.IJe . of 
the premise~, .for the remainder of the Term. The remedies he;:ein 
given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the. exercise of. anY.:-:one 
remedy by Lessor shall not ·be to the exclusion of a,.ny, ot;her 
remedy. With previous written notice or demand,· separate actions 
may be maintained by Lessor ag'ain.st Lessee from time to ti'l'e, to ,,.,,_._ . .,, . 
recover any rent or damages which, at the · commencement of. any 
such action, ha.,s be.come •due and payable'· to Lessor without wai t:i,ng 
until the end of t:he .Te.rm of .this· lease·. . , .. · - . . 
10.3 ·Attorney's. Fees. Iii· the event suit shall. 'l::!e . bro\lght 
.for an unlawfu1 detainer of the said ptemise.:>, for the. recovery 
of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, o:~;: ,,because. ·of 
thl brea~h o£ ~ny o,.ther covenant. herein con't~ineci to b~ 'kept· ·or 
pe.rfo~~ed, the prevailing party shall be paid a ·reasonable 
at.torney' s fef!l by the other party 1 ana such attorney'$ .f·ee shall 
be d't{emed to nave a<:cl;'ued, at the conilhencement o:t; such a.cticm <~.nd 
shhi .· be paid whether or not such action is prosec;;utea . to 
:\udgment. 
ACTICLE 11 
COVENAN.TS MII:! WARRANTIES 
Except as otherwise expressly prov·ided 'in this lease .• lessee 
agrees to ta'ke posses:sion of the 'lei!'sed land in . an "as .is~. 
ccindi tion, prov·ided ho"'·ev er, that 'Lessor covenants, represents 
and wai~ants as follows: 
li.i TitJ..e. That L£i'Ssor has good 'and marketable titl,e to 
the leased l~nd and said. title is free and unencu~jtbet:,ed· 
Lessor's right, . title. and interest in arid to the leasl1!d land, 
except for tnis lease and for any· lien or indebtedness incurre,d 
pursuant to Arti.cl.e 4, ... shall not· be subordinated to any ot.her 
clai~:~ or interest of Less~e or to any other claim or interest of 
: -
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants 
of Lessee's assignee(s) or subtenant(s) under this Lease. In the 
event Lessee shall deteJ;"mine to sell all or ·any portion of the 
hospital, and/or any additi.ons or expansions thereto or thereof, 
. .. . . · . granted first right of refusal. 
L_essor shall be le!ttUJOxE!IA/ to purchase · t:he· hospital as the fair 
market value which, unle,ss agreed upon by the parties, shall be 
determlned by an M.A. I. real. estate appraiser appointed and paid 
by Lessor. If Lessee is not satisfied with the fair market value 
appraisal submitted by the appraiser selected. by Lessor, Lessee 
and within twenty (20) days of the. may, at its own expense 
receipt of the appraisal, s~le.ct an M.A. I. real estate appraiser 
who, together with. the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose 
a third_ s~ch appraiser whose fees sha·ll be shared e·.:rually by 
Lessor and· Lessee. If Lessee fails to select' a second appraiser 
within· the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed. shall be 
the sol'e appraiser and shall set the fair market value of the 
hospital. If Lessee does timely e~ct, and a majority cannot agree 
as to the fair market value of the hospital, the three (3) 
appraisals· shall be added together and their total divided by 
three {3). The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value 
of the h·ospital for the purpose o:t; this purchas2 option. 
,kRTICLE.l3 
ARE!ITRAT.ION: APPOINTMENT 
13.1 Arbitration. Either party may require the arbitration 
of any matter arisin9 under or. in. connec.tion with this lease· 
Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifying 
the matter to be ar~itrated. If action is alrea~y pending·on any 
matter concerning which the notice is given, the notice is 
ine.ffective unless given before the expiration of thirty. (,30) 
days after service of process on the person g'i ving the notice. 
Except as provided. to the contrary in these provisions on 
arbitration, the arbitration shall be in conformity and subject 
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ARTICLE 14 
MISCELWU,EOUS PROVISIONS 
14.1 Exercise. of. Renewal O?tion. __ .Less.elt !:!'a.Y exercise it_s __ -. 
option to eli:tend· the Term granted under Article I, paragraph 1. 2, 
h~reo£, by giving Lessor written notice thereof not la·ter than 
12() days prior to the expiration date of the Term. Any option so 
exercised shall extend the lease on. the same terms as are in 
effect at the time of the exercise '?f such. options, subject. to 
adjustment ana notification ·in ac~ordance l:!erewith • 
. 14.2 Inspection by Lessor. .Lessor may enter upon the 
leased land at any reasonable tim~ for any purpose necessary, 
incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance 
of Lessee's obligations hereunder, but subject. to. any previsions . .... . . . . . .. . 
~ith respect thereto otherwise contained herein. 
14.3 Negation of Partnership. Nothing in this lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a 
partner, joint venturer., or associate in ·any relationship with 
Lessee other than that of landlord and tenant, nor shall this 
lease be construed to authorize either to act as agent for the 
other except as expressly provided to the 
14.4 Control line Law. This 1 ease 
contrary in this lease. 
shall be deemed· '::O· ·be 
made and shall be construed in accordance with. the laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
14.5 Surrender of Possession. Lessee agrees to :y:ield and 
deliver to Les-sor possession of the demised land ·at the 
termination of this lease or as otherwise provided herein, in 
good condition and in accordance with the express obligations 
provided herein, except for reasonable wear and tear, and Lessee 
shall execute and deliver to Lessor a good and sufficient 
document of relinquishment, if and when requested. 
14.6 Successors. This lease shall bind and inure to the 
benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor and any successors 
or assigne.es of Lessee ""hether resulting from any merger, 
.. 
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14.9 l\m~nqrol!nt of L.ease .•... Les-sor and Lessee shall cooperate 
and include in this lea:se by suitable amendment from time to time 
any provision th"at may reasonably. be x'equested by any proposed 
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing ~he Mortgagee 
protection provisions contained in. this lease and allowing such 
mortgagee reasonable tn,l!ans. t9 protect or preserve the lien of a 
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of 
this lease. Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver 
.and to acknowledg.e if necessary for recording purposes, any 
agreement necessary to effect such amendment: provided, howevEit;· · 
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent tinder 
this lease nor otherwise in any respE!.(;it adversely affect the 
rights of the Lessor in this lease. 
14.10 'Recording. Lessor and Lessee agree to execute and 
have acknowledged, and Lessee agrees to d·eliver to Lessor, a 
memorandum of this lease in the form attached hereto as Exhibit 
"B" for·.the purpose of recording such memor<jndurn with the County 
Recorder of Bannock .county.-
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the P.art,ies have s·et t!J.eir hands 
the day and year first. above written ... 
GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 37 
LESSOR: 
INTERJ,IOUN'l'AIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a 
Utah non-pr_ofi t cQ:;:poration 
auth~ri:t.ed to do business in Id.;aho, 
dba Pocatello Regional Medical 
Center 
By_5;=7L~~__!~..a..>::YUV?::=.:..OJI:--n.::-• ...:.-..J· ~~:«~-:::;:-· :;;::-r_-· 
By __ ~--------------------------
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
: ss. 
County of Bannock ) 
On this 27thday of January 19_!!, before me, the 
undersigned, a Notary 
appeared M. L. CANCELOSI 
General Partners of 
Public in and for said State, personally 
and .xHI R. YIIDI'ISKY , kno\ol!l to me to be the 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a '1\'ashington 
par~nership, the partnership that executed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed 
the same • 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written .. · 
.... ·-·~. 
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NOTARY PUBLIC ~n and for the State 
of Idaho residing at Pocatello 
HORf NSl ( 1". "',.,._...,.l. flKi::.L"SO!'\' StOt•to• 







r··• \ -' 
A parcel of land in the State ofJdaho, CoUnty ofBarmock, located in the NE Y. of Sec. 25 T. 65., 
R. 34 E., B.M., more particularly described as follows: 
Beginning at the NE Y. of Sec. 25. Thence South 0 degrees Ol' 58" East along the·East·Jine of 
Sec. 25, 1461.67feet, thence West 509.89 to the True Point of Beginning. Said point on the 
Westerly right-of-way of the hospital. 
Thence, Sou"th 0 degrees OJ '50" along Westerly right-of-way 160.64 feet to.the Point of curvature 
of a 488.37 foot radius cUTYe having a central angle of33 degrees 43'35" 
Thence, Southeasterly along srud curve to the left 287.47 feet 
Thence, South 88 degrees 42'58" West 488.91 feet 
Thence, North 442.14 feet 
Thence East 406.35 feet to the True Point ofBeginning. 
Contains 4 .25. acres · 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
Attorney for Defendants 
DISTRICT COURT SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
BANNOCK COUNTY IDAHO 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTERS, LLC, Case No.: CV-10-2724 OC 
Plaintiff, 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC and CENTURY PARK 
ASSOCIATES, LLC, 
Defendants. 
ANSWER AND WRY DEMAND 
The defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Century Park Associates, 
LLC (Quail Ridge, collectively), through counsel of record, Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA, 
respectfully answer the plaintiffs' complaint as follows: 
1. Admit paragraph 1, 2, 3, 6 and 7. 
2. The answering defendants have insufficient information to admit or dert~------• 
paragraphs 4 and 5. It is admitted that PMC has attached a Lease Agreement to 
the Verified Complaint; however, the answering defendant cannot authenticate or 
otherwise admit the specifics of the Lease Agreement. The answering defendant 
does admit that a Lease Agreement was entered into a lease dated January 27, 
Answer and Jury Demand Page 1 
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1983 between Intermountain Healthcare, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development 
Co. 
3. Deny paragraphs 8 through 33, inclusive. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
I. The plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
2. The plaintiff's claims are barred by its unclean hands. 
3. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata. 
4. The plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of estoppel. 
5. The plaintiff's claims are barred from recovery by the doctrine of laches. 
6. The plaintiff has failed to mitigate its alleged damages, if any. 
7. The plaintiffs claims, some or all of them, are barred by the applicable statute of 
limitations 
8. The plaintiffs claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. 
9. The plaintiffs claims are barred on the basis that they lack a legal basis. 
10. The plaintiffs claims are barred because they are not based in fact. 
II. The plaintiff has failed to join necessary or indispensible parties. 
12. The defendants are excused from performance by virtue of breach of the lease 
agreement on the part of the plaintiff. 
13. The plaintiff has waived, through its conduct or course of dealing, any retroactive 
or prospective claims for rent adjustments. 
14. The plaintiff is not the real party in interest. 
15. The plaintiff has failed to give required contractual or statutory notices to the 
defendants for alleged rents due. 
Answer and Jury Demand Page 2 
252 of 447
16. The plaintiff has failed to perform a condition precedent to enforcement or 
imposition of any rental adjustment, including, but not limited to, compliance with 
section 1.3(b ). 
17. Any determination offair market value must exclude consideration of 
improvements and the lease. Improvements include roads, utilities, buildings and 
improvements to surrounding lands that affect the value of the land in question. 
18. Any determination of fair market value must include consideration that the initial 
value was an agreed $15,000 per acre, and all determinations of value were made, 
accepted, agreed to, or relied upon by the parties at each adjustment date since the 
inception of the lease. Thus, adjustments, if any, are limited to changes in value during 
the period since last acceptance or acquiescence of fair value by the parties. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, the defendants pray for the following relief from this Court: 
1. Dismissal of the plaintiffs Complaint in its entirety; 
2. Awarding the defendants their full, reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12-120 and 12-121 and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure; 
3. Granting such other relief as the court deems just and proper. 
JURY DEMAND 
claimants demand a jury as to all triable issues. 
Answer and Jury Demand Page 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certifY I am a licensed attorney in the state of Idaho and on August 2, 20 I 0, I 
served a true and correct copy of the ANSWER AND JURY DEMAND on the following 
by the method of delivery designated below: 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
Fax: 232-2499 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E Center, Rm 220 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: 236-7012 
0 · U.S. Mail 
Answer and Jury Demand Page 4 
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· rJHr-uq-;:uJ<: rliJ uq:qo l'rl M.rH~!LL & MERNJLL 
Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- Sth Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 8320+099! 
(208) 232·2286 
(208) 232·2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FAX NO. ?r1~ 232 2499 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDrClAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 





) Case No. CV-10·2724 
) 
) 






) ______________________ ) 
P. 02/10 
. ' ' . 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, 
LLC, by and through its attorneys, Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, and for its action against the 
Defendants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Century Park Associates, LLC, cc:mplfl,in$ 
and alleges as follows: 
1. Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC (''PMC"), 
is a Delaware limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of!dalio, whose 
principal place of business in the State of Idaho is 6St Memorial Drive, Pocatello, Bannock 
County, Idaho 83201. EXHIBIT 
Amended Complaint Page 1. 
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2. Defendant, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC ("Quail Ridge"),·is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
3. Defendant, Century Park Associates, LLC ("Century Park"), is a Tennessee 
limited liability company authorized to do business in the State of Idaho, whose principal place · 
ofbusiness is 3570 Keith Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
4. This lawsuit arises from a certain Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27,. 
1983 ("Lease Agreement"), PMC's copy of this Lease Asreement is attached to Plaintiff's 
original Complaint as Exhibit "l" and is incorporated herein by this reference. 
5. The Lease Agreement was originally entered into between Intermountain Health 
Care, Inc. ("IHC"), as original lessor, and Sterling Development Co. ("Sterling"), as original 
lessee. 
6. TI1e Lease Agreement concerns real property located within the City of Pocatello, 
Bannock County, Idaho ("Leased Land"). A true and correct copy of the legal descriptipn for the 
Leased Land is attached to Plaintiff's Original Complain.t as Exhibit "2" and is incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
7. On or about January 1, 1996, Sterling subleased its interest in the Leased Land to 
Pocatello Medical· lnvestors Limited Partnership ("PMI"), a Tennessee limited p~ership · 
authorized to do business in the State ofldaho, whose principal place of business is 3570 Keith 
Street NW, Cleveland, Tennessee 37312. 
8. On or about January 3, 2001, Sterling and PMI assigned their resp.ective.interests 
in the Leased Land and Lease Agreement to Quail Ridl,le and Quail Ridge thereby became the 
successor lessee to the Lease Agreement 
9. On or about September 23, 2002, IHC assigned its interest .in the Lease 
Agreement to JHC Health Services, Inc. and IHC Health Services, Inc., the1·eby be~arne the 
successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. 
l 0. On or about October 1, 2002, IHC Health Services, Inc., assigned its interest in 
the Lease Agreement to Bmmock Regional Medical Center ("BRMC") and BRMC thereby 
became the successor lessor to the Lease Agreement. Shortly thereafter, BRMC changed its 
Amended Complaint 
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11. On or about February I, 2009, BRMC (then known as PortneufMedical Cen'ter), 
assigned its iuterest in the Lease Agreement to PMC, whereby PMC became the Successor le~sor 
to the Lease Agreement. 
12. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, Century Park is an affiliate of, or 
related to, Quail Ridge and may claim a Lessee's interest in the Lease Agreement. 
13. Quail Ridge or Century Park or both operate a senior living facility by the name of 
"Quail Ridge" which facility is situated on the Lease Land. 
COUNT I 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
14. PMC real!eges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through 13 above 
as if they had been set forth fully herein. 
15. When this Lease Agreement was first entered into on January 27,1983, !HC and 
Sterling, as origina11essor and lessee respectively, agreed ~tpon a buis for calculating the initial 
annual rental. Specifically, in Article I, Section !.3(a) of the Lease Agreement, the original 
lessor and lessee agreed as follows as the basis f'or calculatirig the initial annual rental: 
0 0 I 0 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis qf fifteen 'percent 
(15%) ofthe value ofthe leased land. For purposes of the .first three (3} 
years from the Commencement Date cifthis Lease, the leased land sha./1 be 
valued at the rate of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) 
par acre, 
16. The Leased Land is 4.25 acres and, therefore, based upon the above clear and 
wuunbiguous language, the original lessor and lessee set the initial annual rental for this Leased 
Land as $9,562.50 ($15,000 X 4.25 "'$63,750; $63,750 x 15%"' $9,562.50). 
17, The annual rental rate is subject to acijustment on a periodic buis pursuant to the 
Lease Agreement, Article 1, Section l.3(b), which states in relevant part: 
. . . The annual rental as set forth aboveshall be a4fusted every ihree (3) 
years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to 
below as the rent adjustmlilnt date. 
• I'' 
. 18. The above language in Article I of the Lease Agreement concerning when each 
Amended Complaint Pagel 
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rent adjustment date is to occur is clear and unambiguous. Thus, the first rent adjustment date 
under this Lease Agreement was scheduled fur January 27, 1986 and the r~nt was, and is, subject 
to adjustment every three years thereafter until the tem1ination of this Lease Agreement. 
19. Pursuant to the foregoing schedule, the most recent rent. adjustme~t !late was 
January 27,2010. 
20. Although the Lease Agreement provides fqr period rent adjustment dates as 
outlined above, this Lease Agreement also clearly and unambiguously allows for retroactive 
adjustment of the annual rental rate when such adjustment did not occur on or before the 
' ' ' 
specified rent adjustment date. 
21. Specifically, Article 1, Section 1.3(b) states in relevant part: 
. ' .. 
If the determination of ar,jjusted rent iS made qfter the applicable rent 
ar,jjustrnent date, lessee shall contl»ue to pajf rent at the rate applicable to 
the preceding period until the a4fusted rate is det~rmined. The party 
indebted shall, promptly after the determination, pay any dtfferencefor the 
period qffected by the adjustment. 
22. To the best of PMC's knowledge and belief, prior to PMC 'becoming a successor 
lessor to the Lease Agreement, neither IHC, IHC Health Service$, Inc., nor BRMC ~ereised its 
right as lessor under this Lease Agreement t'O adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to 'Article 1 of 
the Lease Agreement. 
23. Sometime in the summer of 2009, PMC became aware of the fact that the annual 
rental rate fur the Leased Land had not been previously adjusted as outlined in Article I of the 
Lease Agreement. 
24. Specifically, Article I, Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement proVides the 
following clear and unambiguous fonnula for calculating the adjusted annual rental rate for the 
Leased Land: 
t t •• 
The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (15%) of 'the fair 
market value of the lea$ed land, exclusive of the imprrJVements on the 
premises. Determination of fatr market valuii! shall be based on the · 
highii!st and best use of the land on the applicable rent adjustment date 
without taking the leasehold into aacount . ... 
Amended Ce~mplalnt • Pajle 4 
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25. In September of 2009, PMC retained Bowman Appraisal and Valuation 
("Bowman") to detennine the fair market value of the Leased Land ori the priot three ~nt 
adjustment dates, 
26, On or about October 5, 2009, Bowman provided its appraisal report to PMC, 
which states that the fair market values of the leased land for each of the 2001, 2004, and 2007 
rent a(ljus1ment dates was $1,297,371, $1,371,507, and $1,464,176, respectively. · 
27. On or about October 26, 2009, PMC notified the Defendants ofPMC's intention 
to adjust the annual rental rate pursuant to Article 1 of this Lease Agreement. 
28. As evidence in support ofPMC's request for.an adjustment of the annual rent rate 
pursuant to Aliicle 1 of the Lease Agreement, PMC provided the Defendants at that same time . 
with a copy of Bowman's appraisal report stating the fair market value of the LeaSed Land for. the 
prior three rent adjustment periods. 
29. Although PMC gave Defendants proper notice of its intent to adjust the annual 
rental rate pursuant to Article I of the Lease Agreement, Defendants have refused, and continue 
to refuse, to pay an adjusted annual rent for the Leased Land. 
30. Defendants are in breach of the Lease Agreement . . 
31. After tllis litigation had commenced, PMC retained Integra Realty Resourc!'ls 
("Integra") to determine the fair market value of the Leased Land for the Januatj 23, 2007 rent 
adjustment period and the January 23, 201 o rent adjustment period. 
32. On or about December 15, 2010, Integra provided its appraisal report, which 
states that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2007 rent adjustment period 
ls $1,080,000.00 and that the fair market value of the leased land for the January 23, 2010 rent 
a(ljustment period Is $990,000.00, 
33. Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2007 rent adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $486,000.00 in annual ~nts for the 2007 rent 
acljustiDent period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the 
2007 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not ~ess than $457,312.50 . . 
for unpaid adjusted annual rents for the 2007 rent adjU$tment period. The 2007 rent acljustment 
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period includes the years 2007, 2008, and 2009. 
34. Based upon Integra's valuation of the Leased Land for the 2010 rent' adjustment 
period, Defendants should have paid a total of $445,500.00 in annual rents for the im 0 rent 
adjustment period. Instead, Defendants paid a total of $28,687.50 in annual rents during the 
2010 rent adjustment period. As such, Defendants owe PMC a sum of not less than $416,812.50 
for unpaid adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The 201 o rent adjristment period 
includes the years 2010, 2011, and 2012. 
COUNT II 
IN THE AL TER.NATIVE, DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
35. PMC realleges and incorporates the allegations in Paragraph 1 through .34 above 
as if they had been set forth fully herein. 
36. Defendants deny that ~Y are obligated to pay additional rent for the 2007 and 
2010 rent adjustment periods; claiming that Plaintiff failed to apply the following language from 
Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement when Plaintiff calculated its proposed rent adjustments: 
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial· 
minimum rent ts the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value qf 
Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00_per acre and shall also take 
tnto acapunt any determlnatton.r of market value made under this lease for the 
purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. . . .
3 7. The court has found that the above-identified la.nguage in Section 1.3(b) of the 
Lease Agreement does create an ambiguity in the fonnula to aqjust the rent and, therefore, a 
dispute has arose between the parties over the interpretation and construction of the rent 
adjustment language contained in Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement. 
38. Section J.3(b) of the Lease Agreement pro~des that if a dispute arises between 
the parties as to the detennination of fair market value of the Leased Land ~or the period to which 
any rent adjustment applies, then "the detennination shall be made as in the paragraph on 
Arbitration in Article 13.'' 
39. Although multiple attempts have been made, the parties to this action have been 
unable to reach an agreement for determining llle fair market value of the Leas~ Land for llle 
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2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
40. lnstead of arbitrating this controversy over the determination of fair market value 
under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, the parties have instead proceeded. with this civil 
action in the District Court for Bannock County, Jdaho. . ' . 
41. An interpretation of the rent adjustment language in Section L3(b) of th.e Lease 
Agreement is necessary to deciding the relative rights and obligations of the parties to this action 
under this 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. 
42. Until a detennJ:nation of fair market value under Section· 1.3(b) . of the Lease 
Agreement is made, it is impossible for the parties to caiQulate an. adjusted rental rate for the 
2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods. 
43. Pursuant to Id!1ho Code Title 10, Chapter 12, this Court is authorized and has 
power to enter a declaratory judgment on the construction of this written contract. 
44. An actual controversy exists between the parties to this action over the 
interpretation oftbe rent adjustment IMguage in Section U(b) of the Lease Agreement. · 
45. Entry of a declaratory judgment by the Court on how fair market :..alue is to be 
determined under Section l.J(b) of Lease Agreement is consistent with the original contracthig 
parties' agreement that such disputes over a determination of fair market value would be 
arbitrated. 
46. Once this Court has adjudged and declared how fair market :value is to be 
determined under Section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement, this Court should further enter a 
judgment declaring the fair market value of the Leased Land for the 2007 and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods and the appropriate adjuSted rent for each such period based upon the Court's 
fair market value determinations. 
47. Finally, the last paragraph of Section l.3(b) of the Lease Agreement requires the 
Defendants to "promptly after the determination [of adjusted rent], pay any difference fur the 
. ' 
period affected by the aqjustment." 
48. PMC has not been paid an appropriate adjusted rent for the 2007' and 2010 rent 
adjustment periods and, as such, the Defendants are obligated under Section J.3(b) of the 1983 
Ground Lease Agreement to promptly pay PMC any difference between the actual rent owed and 
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the actual rental paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods after this Court h!ls 
determined the at\iusted rent for these periods. 
ATTORNEYS FEES 
49. To bring this suit, Plaintiff has retained the services of Merrill & Merrill, 
Chartered, and is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to idaho Code §§ 
12-120(3) and 12·123, and Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. 
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays that judgment be entered in Plaintiff's favor and . ' 
against the Defendants as follows: 
i. That Defendants be ordered to pay back rents to the Plabltiff for the 2007. rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $457,312.50; 
ii. That Defendants be ordered to pay unpaid current annual rent for th~ 20 lO rent 
adjustment period in a sum of not less than $416,812,50; 
iii. In the alternative, that the Court enter a decl~atory judgment on the fair market 
value of the leased for the 2007 and 2010 rent adjustment periods; 
iv. That after the fair market value of the leased land for the 2007 Md 2010 rent 
~ustment periods has been determined by the court, that the Court atljust the rent for each suclt 
period and enter an order directing Defendants to promptly pay any difference in the actual rent 
owed and the actual rent paid for the 2007 and 2010 rent atljustment periods. 
v. That Defendants be ol:'dered to pay Plaintiff's attorneys' fees and costs associ11ted 
with bringing this action; and 
vi. For such other and further relief this Court deems just and equitable \lnder the 
circumstances of this~~~·_ · 
DATED this _!f. day of May, 2012. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
By , . ~~~'*~ ~ ~ 
R:WUiil11llii(; k, TrO 
Attorneys for Plaintiff, PMC . , 
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CERTIFICATJl; OF SERVICE 
1,·~~~~, undersigned, one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, in the 
above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that a true, full and correct oopy of the foregoing 
document was this l..f~ay of May, 2012, served upon the following in the mann.er indicated 
below: 
Michael 0. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Judge Mitchell Brown 
P.O. Box 4165 




U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
) 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC ) 
) Case No: CV-2010-0002724-0C 
PLAINTIFF, ) 
vs ) 
) MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC ) 
CENTURY PARK ASSOCIATES, LLC ) 
) 
DEFENDANT ) ___________________________ ) 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 14th day of May, 2012 for Court 
Trial. Plaintiff appeared by and through counsel, Kent L. Hawkins, and R. William Hancock. 
Defendants appeared by and through counsel, Michael D. Gaffney and John M. Avondet. 
Rodney M. Felshaw was the Court Reporter. 
At the outset, counsel for the Plaintiff placed a stipulation on the record as to severd! of 
Plaintiff's exhibits. Pursuant to the stipulation, Plaintiff's Exhibits #101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 
I 08, and 115 were admitted by the Court. Exhibit #I 07 is withdrawn at this time. 
Plaintiff's counsel, Kent L. Hawkins gave an opening statement, followed by Defendants' 
counsel, Michael D. Gaffney. 
Plaintiff called Don Wadle who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hawkins 
conducted direct examination of the witness. Mr. Gaffney cross examined the witness. 
Plaintiff called Brad Janoesh who was administered an oath and testified. Mr. Hancock 
D 
EXHIBIT conducted direct examination. The Court took its morning recess at 10:50 a.m. Upon 
I 
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reconvening at 11:10 am., Mr. Gaffney conducted cross examination of the witness. Brief re-
direct examination was conducted and the witness was excused. Plaintiff advised that it had no 
further witnesses for today and the Court adjourned at 11:40 a.m. for the day. 
Trial reconvened at 9:00a.m. on Tuesday, May 15,2012. At the outset, counsel for the 
Plaintiff informed the Court they were resting their case. Mr. Gaffney then made a number of 
oral motions to the Court. A Motion for Directed Verdict as to the breach of contract claim of 
the Complaint was made and stipulated to by Plaintiff's counsel. The Court GRANTED the 
Motion for Directed Verdict as it related to Count I of the Complaint. Mr. Gaffuey moved to 
dismiss Defendant Century Park Associates, LLC from this litigation. Again, Plaintiff stipulated 
to this motion and the Court GRANTED the Motion to Dismiss Century Park Associates, LLC 
from this litigation. 
The Court heard further argument from counsel as to Defendants Motion to Strike the 
Testimony of Mr. Janoesh and Motion for Directed Verdict as to the declaratory relief claim of 
the Amended Complaint paragraphs 46, 4 7, and 48. Additionally, Mr. Gaffney made an oral 
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 
The Court recessed to give counsel time to confer with clients before offering additional 
argument to the Court. 
Upon reconvening, the Court ruled on the pending Motions as follows: Defendant's 
Motion to Strike Testimony of Mr. Janoesh is DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Directed 
Verdict as to paragraphs 46, 47, and 48 of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. Defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss Count II of the Amended Complaint is DENIED. The Court stated on the 
record the basis for denying each of these motions. . 
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Defendant's counsel then called its first witness, Earl Christison whose deposition was 
published and accepted by the Court. Mr. Gaffney then called Richard Faulkner, who was 
administered an oath and testified. Direct examination was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. 
Defendant's Exhibits #256, #257, and #211 were offered and admitted without objection. Exhibit 
#228 (pages 1-8) were offered, objected to and admitted over objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #218 
through #224 were offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Exhibit #227 was also 
offered, objected to and not admitted by the Court. Plaintiff Exhibit #242 was offered, objected 
to and admitted over objection. The Court took an afternoon recess at I :05 p.m. 
Court reconvened at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff counsel had no cross examination of Mr. 
Faulkner and the witness was excused. Defendant's counsel then called Brent Thompson who 
was administered an oath and testified. At the outset, Plaintiff's counsel renewed their Motion in 
Limine as to this Mr. Thompson's testimony and the Court again DENIED the motion. Direct 
exam was conducted by Mr. A vondet. No cross examination was conducted and the witness was 
excused. Defendants then rested their case. 
The Court took a brief recess waiting on the arrival of Plaintiffs rebuttal witness. The 
Court reconvened with Plaintiff rebuttal witness Tracy Farnsworth who was administered an oath 
and testified. Direct examination of the witness was handled by Mr. Hawkins. Cross examination 
was conducted by Mr. Gaffney. The witness was excused and evidence was closed. 
The Court and counsel then discussed preparation of the trial transcript in this matter and 
submission of proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Counsel would like the 
transcript prepared prior to the submission and agreed the costs associated with the preparation 
of the transcript shall be shared by the parties. Upon receipt of the transcript, the Plaintiff shall 
have 14 days to submit proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court with a 
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separate document containing closing arguments. Defendant will then have 14 days to submit 
the same. Counsel for Plaintiff shall then have 7 days for any reply argument (but no additional 
findings of fact or conclusions of law) they may wish to submit. At that time the matter will be 
taken under advisement by the Court. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: May 15,2012. 
MITCHELL W. BROWN 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on the(1 day of May, 2012, she caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Minute Entry and Order to be served upon the following persons in the 
following manner: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
DEFENDANT ATTORNEY: 
Michael D. Gaffuey 
21 05 Coronado State 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER-4 
0 Faxed 
0 Hand Delivered 
• Mailed 
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1 finder. He doesn't get you art} cioser to how to 
2 incorporate those additional criteria that are in the 
3 lease. I mesn, he didn't even talk about it. Basically 
4 what they want In do, Your Honor, is say he did an 
5 appraisal and throw out that million dollar nwnber 
6 because they needed In get a number out there. I guess 
7 that would be my response. I do think it's an 
8 admissibility issue rather than a weight issue. I mellll, 
9 if you took like a Daubert analysis, which I know the 
10 state courts don't do in Idaho, but in essence he hasn't 
II followed the proper methodology. 
12 Since I've moved to strike his testimony, 
!3 I'd also like to move for a directed verdict first on 
14 count one of the amended complaint, which is breach of 
15 contract. There is no evidence in the record, by virtue 
16 of testimony, oral testimony, or depositions, that even 
17 suggests that a demand was made upon my clients for a 
18 rent adjustment. How can we be in breach of this 
19 agreement if they never put on evidence yesterday that 
20 they were requesting and demanding a rent adjustment? 
21 What we've got here is back in -- we know 
, 22 that in 2007 they did not do anything. In 2010 they 
1 23 decided that they wanted to seek a rent adjustment, but 
24 Mr. Wadle did not testify at all about that. They 
25 haven't put any documents in --
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I evidence that was introduced yesterday was deficient in 
2 establishing that there had been a breach of contract 
3 associated with this matter. Tn fact, Mr. Wadle's 
4 testimony to that effect was that he had no information 
5 concerning whether or not there had ever been -- whether 
' 6 or not the hospital had ever invoked the nrhitration 
7 provision of the Grouad Lease Agreement So I think 
8 that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on 
9 count one of the complaint is in proper form and order. 
10 And I note that the plaintiffs have indicated here that 
II they have not attempted to establish breach of contract 
12 based upon the amendment to the complaint and are 
13 withdrawing that claim. 
14 So at this point in time the eourt will 
15 enter a direeted verdict as relates to count one of the 
16 breach of contraet, or count one of the complaint filed 
17 in this matter, and will dismiss count one pursuant to a 
18 directed verdict motion in this matter. 
19 With that, then, Mr. Gaffney, that motion 
20 being granted, do you have any additional motions? 
21 MR. GAFFNEY: Yes, Your Honor. fd also like to 
22 move for a directed verdict on paragraphs 46, 4 7, and 
23 48, which are in part of the declaratory relief claim. 
24 Paragraph 46 says that unce this court has adjudged and 
25 declared how the fair market value is to be determined 
87 
( 
MR. IiA .v'KINS: I can probably stipulate on this 
2 and save a little time. I agree exactly with what Mr. 
3 Gaffney is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the 
4 trial. We feel that the way we have alleged the 
5 complaint, and especially with the amendment for the 
6 declaratory judgment, end then as a result of a 
7. declaratory judgment, which effectively becomes the 
8 adjustment process that we're alleging, then that 
9 adjustment process itself results in the payment of the 
I 0 fair market value on the property for the years 2007 to 
II current. So we would withdraw the first count regarding 
12 a breach of contract and damages from a breach. 
13 THE COURT: All right. 
14 MR. GAFFNEY: I'll shut up on that issue. 
15 THE COURT: I agree with both counsel for the 
16 hospital and counsel for Quail Ridge in this matter. l 
17 did not hear any evidence yesterday that in my mind 
18 would have supported a breach of contract claim 
19 associated with this matter. It appears as though the 
20 plaintiffs have withdrawn that here today ll!ld have opted 
21 not to attempt to establish any breach of contract by 
22 way of their case in chief in this matter. At this 
23 point in time they appear to be seeking only declaratory 
24 relief with respect to that matter. 
25 I would agree with Mr. Gaffney that the 
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I under seetion 1.3(b) of the lease agreement, this court 
2 should further enter a judgment declaring the fair 
3 market value of the leased land for the 2007 and 20 I 0 
4 rent adjustment periods in the appropriate adjusted rent 
5 for each such period based upon the court's fair market 
6 value determinations. Then the next two paragraphs talk 
7 about basically that same issue. 
8 It seems toJile that in essence what they're 
9 asking for is exactly the same relief they were asking 
10 for under the eontract theory. In other words, for you 
II to determine that there is a deficiency from 2007 going 
12 forward. Ifs ju>i kind of another way to try and get 
13 damages. I don't think that that is appropriate for a 
14 dec action claim. I think at most what the court could 
15 do, if the court found that there had to be an 
16 adjustment, the court would have In order the parties 
17 into arbitration per the agreement, because that is the 
18 way that that is supposed to be determined. In fact, I 
19 would suggest that these parties are -- the plaintiffs 
20 are in breach because rather than coming to us and 
21 seeking an adjustment and allowing os to dispute that 
22 adjustment and then going through the arbitration 
23 process, they short circuited it and carne into court. 
24 THE COURT: Well, I'll be honest, that has been a 





















I lhe fonn of testimony and-
2 THE COURT: And leading. Sustained. 
3 Q. (BY ti.R. OO'!NEY) lbl, fran 1996 to 2001, did 
4 Pocatello rfliical lllV"cStors stay as a subtenant to the 
5 building? 
6 A. They did. They operated the building as a 
7 subtenant. 
8 Q. Now, in 2001 did that·· did ovmership of 
9 lhe building change? 
l 0 A. It did, yes. The whole transaction was 
!1 restructured in 200 I. 
12 Q. Okay. I wantto walk you lhrough lhat 
13 restructure. First of all, what was the reason that lhe 
14 transaetion was restructured in 2001? 
!5 A. Sterling Development Group wanted to sell 
16 the building. Mr. Preston wanted to purchase the 
17 building. And by the building I mean lhe bricks and 
!8 sticks, not the land. In addition, the Sterling 
19 Development Group principals wanted to be released from 
20 their individual guarantees. And lhey wanted to be 
21 released from the financing on the facility. 
22 Q. Okay. So Sterling owed mooey on lhe 
23 building at that point? 
I 24 A. That's correct. Sterling had a loan with 
, 25 PERSI, the Public Employees Retirement System of Idaho. 
I 
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I the operator licensee of the facility. What happened in 
2 2001 was that Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, 
3 stepped into the position - stepped into the shoes of 
4 the Sterling Development Group. 
5 Q. All right. 
6 A. So we just aroended and restated the sublease 
7 agreement and Pocatello Medieal stayed in as the 
8 subtenant. 
9 Q. What was the arrangement between Pocatello 
10 Medical Investors and Quail Ridge since Pocatello 
II Medical Investors stayed us the subtenant? 
12 A. We had a sublease agreement. 
13 Q. Was this a second sublease? 
14 A. Well, we either had a substitute sublease 
!5 or, my recollection is, that we aroended and restated tbe 
16 old sublease. 
17 Q. All right. The next question is during the 
18 2001 restructure did you deal with any attorneys 
19 representing tbe hospital? 
20 A. I did, yes. 
21 Q. And was there any specific attorney that you 
22 dealt with? 
23 A. Yes. Guy Kroesche, although I may be 
24 mispronouncing the last naroe. 
25 Q. And he's with Stole Rives dovm in Salt Lake 
155 
I Q. Di!1Jhrecall,atthetimein2001 when this 
2 transaction occurred, what the aroount owing oa that note 
3 was? 
· 4 A. I helieve it was approximately 2.8 million. 
5 Q. All right. 
6 A. Although I'm sure its in the documents here 
7 somewhere, 
8 Q. I'm sure it is, but it's not necessarily-
9 A. It was a lot of money. 
I 0 Q. An estimate is good enough. So if I 
Jl understand, why did Pocatello Medical Investors not just 
12 purchase the building directly from Sterling? 
13 A. Because PERSI, tbelender PERSI, had a 
14 policy of not making loans to operators of care 
15 facilities. So we had to create a new entity, Quail 
16 Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, to assume the loan. 
17 Q. All right. And at that point I assume that 
18 Pocatello Medical Investors basically dropped out of the 
19 picture once that transaction was completed? 
20 A. I'm sorry, but did you say Pocatello 
21 Medieal? 
1 
22 Q. Did I say somelhing else? 
23 A. I might have misheard you. Pocatello 
24 Medieal never dropped out. Pocatello Medical stayed in 
25 as lhe subtenant, stayed in that·· by subtenant I mean 
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I City? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. Was he in essence the·· I gness I'll use 
4 the counterpart lawyer assisting with this transaetion 
5 on behalf of the hospital? 
6 A. He was. He was representing •• 
7 MR. HA WK!NS: Objection. Leading. 
8 THE COURT: Sustained. 
9 Q. (BY MR. GILIIIN!:f) What was his role with regard 
10 to the hospital? 
!I A. He represented as couosel for the hospital. 
12 Q. Allright. Wasthereanexcbaogeof 
13 documents during that- first of all, how long did this 
14 transaction take to cumplete? 
15 A. Gosh. I think the documentation took 
16 virtually a whole year back and forth. 
17 Q. Back and forth between whom? 
18 A. !twas a four-way back and forth between our 
19 group and Sterling Developmen~ involving PERSI and its 
20 couosel, and the landlord and its counsel. The landlord 
21 being the hospital, of course. 
22 Q. Would you take a look at exhibits 218, 
23 219-- 2181hrough 224, please. Have you had a chance 
24 to look through those? 





















1 guarantee of the ground lease'! 
2 A. It was, yes. 
3 Q. All right Why was that? 
4 A. The original Sterling Development Group, the 
5 original tenan~ the principals of lhat entity had 
6 guaranteed the ground lease and lhe landlord wanted a 
7 personal guarantor to stand behind the entity, Quail 
8 Ridge Medical Investors, llC, which at lhat time was a 
9 newly formed entity. 
I 0 Q. Now, when Pocatello Medical Investors became 
11 a subtenant in 2006 to the ground lease, did the 
12 hospital request any personal guarantees from Quail 
13 Ridge at that point? 
14 A. No. Mr. Preston did not have to personally 
15 guarantee the sublease in 1996. 
16 Q. So as part of the restructuring lhere was 
: 17 this additional requirement that was stipulated by the 
J 18 hospital? 
19 A. Yes. The hospital required numerous changes 
20 and numerous amendments here, including that Mr. Preston 
21 personally guarantee lhe ground lease. 
22 Q. If you'll look at exhibit 228 again, going 
23 back to paragraph five, it says that "under the lease 
24 tenant is obligated to pay rent at the current rate of 
25 $9,562.50 per aonum. The rent has been paid through and 
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1 don't believe it was objected to concerning why he did 
2 not include that in the first draft. I'm going to 
3 sustain the objection as to did lie view that as a 
4 significant modification to the ground lease. That 
5 would be sustained. 
6 MR GAFFNEY: I understand the second part. I 
7 did not uuderstand the first part. 
8 THE COURT: The first part was he previously 
, 9 stated why he did not include it in the first draft that 
I 0 he prepared. There was no objection to that That I'll 
II let stand and allow lhat 
12 Q. (BY t•IR. GAF!NEY) In QJail Rid]e's willingness 
13 to provide a [:<lrs:lr~ guarantee of the groJnd lease, 
14 what was the s1gni£1car~ of that ~t related to 
15 provision five of the estorf€1 certificate? 
16 MR HAWKINS: Objection. Legal conclusion. 
17 MR GAFFNEY: Ifs not a legal conclusion, it's 
I 18 why lhey agreed to a personal guarantee, Y oor Honor. 
.,, 19 MR HA WKlNS: Also an objection that this 
20 document has been declared unambiguous and now we're 
21 looking into outside circumstances in order to interpret 
22 it. 
23 MR GAFFNEY: We're not interpreting lhe 
1
24 document. I want to know what the relationship is 
25 between the two documents. 
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1 including Febiluuy 28th, 2001." 
2 Now, the language talking about rent 
3 adjustment that appeara in the '96 estoppel certificate 
4 is not in this certificate here1 
5 A. That's correct I did not include it in the 
6 frrst draft. 
7 Q. And why was that left out? 
1
8 A. Beenuse I had looked at what the parties had 
. 9 been doing since 1996, and for the five years that our 
; I 0 group had been involved in the facility the rent 
II adjustment mechanism had never be<ln raised. And then I 
12 spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and 
13 understood that in the entire 13 yeara preceding our 
14 involvement no one had ever raised the section of the 
15 reot adjustment in order to increase or change the rent 
16 So I wanted to confirm in the coarse of dealinglhat 
17 lhat had been waived. 
18 Q. Did you, on behalf of Quail Ridge, view that 
19 as a sigoificant modification to the grouud lease? 
20 MR. HA WK!NS: Objection. Conclusion. 
21 Particularly in light of the court's previous ruling 
22 that lhis particular document is unambiganus and that 
23 parol evidence about the document is not going to be 
24 admitted. 
25 THECOURT: l'mgoingtoallowtheanswer. I 
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I THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection 
2 and allow the question. 
3 THE WITNESS: We wanted to uail do\'m once and for 
4 all what the rent was. This document made numerous 
5 provisions and amendments to lhe ground lease. As part 
6 of that negotiating process we wanted to put to bed once 
7 and for all what the •• confirming what the course of 
8 conduct had been, but put to bed once and for all what 
9 the rent would be under the ground lease. 
10 MR. HA WKfNS: Your Honor, I move to strike the 
11 response. It wasn't responsive to the questioo that was 
, 12 asked and it did exactly what was previously barred by 
13 the court as giving an opinion as to the intent and 
14 purpose of the 200 I estoppel certificate, which is an 
15 unambiguous document and we don't need the attorney to 
1 
16 come in and tell us what was dooe in that document or 
1 17 why it was done. 
18 MR. GAFFNEY: Yoor Honor, only the party asking 
19 the question can move to strike as nonresponsive. The 
20 other party has to live with the answer. 
21 MR. HAWKINS: Then I'm renewing the objection to 
22 the question, having heard the answer. 
23 THE COURT: Just a minute. Only the party 
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This action came before the Court for a two (2) day ~urt trial coiiUilenclng on May 14, 
2012 and continuing tbrol.lgh May 15, 2012. On October 17, 2012, the Court issued its Findings 
oU'aot and Cono.lusions of Law. On October 22, 2012, the Cc>urt issued its Order Correcting 
Conolusions of Law. Pu:r&uant to the Court's Findings of Flll.lt and ConclUsions of Law, the 
Court Orde)'ed that 'th& Pl.atirti:ff p.re.Jtare a Declaratory Judgment consistent with the Court's 
Conclusions ofLa.w. 
Consiatent with the COl.l.rt' s order, Plaintiff subndtted a proposed Judgment. The 
p;coposed Judgment was In a different .fotm than antioip11ted by the Court. Plahl.tiff' s propo$ed 
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$416,812.50 and a dec!SJ:ation that the rent adjustment. provision relative to the parties' Clround 
Lease Agreement remains in full force and offeot and is subject to adjustment in 2013.1 
Due to concerns that the Court had regSJ:ding whether · a money judgment was 
appropriate, the Collrl ~chedul.ed a oonferenoe oall witll counsel fo~ both parties. The Court 
expressed its concerns and advised 1he patties that they should submit briefing in support of their 
respective positions on the natw:e and form. of judgment the Court should enter in this matter. 
Conmtent'with the Court's request, the parties :filed simultaneous briefs on this issue. The Court 
has considered the submissions and now enters its Order. 
DISCUSSION 
Plai.ntl£f"s Initial. Complaint was couched in terms ofa complaint for breach of contract. 
During the course of pre-trial motion practice, the Court advised that it was not certain relief 
could be granted to the' Plaintiff on a breach of contnwt theory and opiruld :tlu¢ perhaps "the relief 
Plaintiff' was seeking wa.s a declaration of the parties' rights p'LitSUII1lt to I. C. §§10-1201 through 
10-1203. 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff moved to amend its complaint to assert a claim for 
decla:tatory relief. The motion was granted, without objection from Quail Ridge. Thetefore, this 
matter proceeded to trial on two (2) sepatate clain:ul: (1) Bree.oh of Confl:aot. and (2) I>eclaratory 
Relief. At tbe conclusion of Plllirrtift' s casc-4n-obief, Quail Ridge moved for a directed verdict 
on Plaintiff's breach of oontract .claim, Plaintift' did not oppose Quail Ridge's motion and the 
Court granted the same. 
llowever, had Plaintiff opposed Quaill.Udge Motion for Directed Verdict on Plaintiffs 
Bteaoh ·of Colltract Claim, the Court. would have be@l CO!lStrained to grant the motion because 
1l'I.Oli>U!I' oWed. tb• dale tbr ~CI)t lO b&Ianumy 27, 2013. l!owov.,., 'lbo Court's Plndlng! of Fact and Cooolua!on of Law 
e.smbl!sh lhftl1llecflt:ctlvo date furthc rcatadjustmentdal&ls l'llbruary 1, 2013 not1atl\lall' Z7, 201!, 
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there was no evidence in the trial record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was m breach of 
contract. Rather, Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the orig!Dal ar;nount of $9,562.5 0. See 
Court's Findings ofFact No. 18 anti 19, Findings ofFact, Co:o.clusiona ofLaw 11\l.d Memonmdum 
Decision apd Order, p.14,1f118-19. 
As such, thore was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or had breached the 
terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court would also have concluded, had the 
Court been asked to make findings of :filet and conclusions of laW on this issue, that Quail Ridge 
had not violated the Ground Less~> A~t in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment 
provisions. 
Fortheso reasons, the Court concludes that thero are absolutely no facts in the record that 
would jlistlfy this Court entering a money judgxnmt in Jkllot of the Plaintiff. AU the Court's 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law lllld McmorandUtn Decision cltll properly be utilized fur is 
to declare the parties' l'!lspec1ive ri.ghts in relation to the Ground Lease Agreement. There has 
bee.n no breach established to the Court as of the time of1rial in this matter. 
The parties' Ground Lease ~t provides that ''the paxty indebted shall, ptOmptly 
after the determination, pay any c:liffermce for the period affected by the acljustment." Ground 
Lease Agreexnent, p.3, §1.3(b). Now that the deten:ni.nation has· been made il$ contemplated 
llll.der the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requin:s ''prompt" payment of 
the balance due under the Ground Lease Ag:rc=nent? Although theo Ground Lease Agreemen:t 
~oes not define the term prompt fo:r purposes of the parties' agreement, .a fllilure to pay this 
amount in a reasonable time certamly would give rise to an action for breach of contract. 
'h tho\l[d be noted illal the partie$' OroUild Leaso Agrocu!flllt conteii\PIIIW. llllt ~on bolDg mod• by lfblttalion. 
However, both p~ .. clearly 8)ld ""Prot!1y waived tbfl requirement, lnstold opting to ~~ in this forum. 
OIIIJEII. ON Ji'ORM OF JUDGMENT-! 
'•' 
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Tb.~e, because there has been no breach and the breach of contract claim was 
disini~sed at. trW, the Court will decline Pla:inti.ff"s request for entry of a. money judgment. 
'• '• ,.•: .,•.• 'I 
· certaihl.y if''prompt" payment is not nw!c consistent with tbis Court's determination, Plaintiff is 
entitled to avail itse>lf of the courts in ordet to seck redress for this breach. However, this Court 
will limit its judgment to one of declaring the respective rights and obliptions \ll;ldet the Ground 
Lease Agreement. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 12th day ofNovembeJ:, 2012. 
ORDER ON FORM Ol' JUIIGM!.N'I' -4 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAlLtNG/SER.VICE 
P. 006/006 
P. uu~ 
The undersigned certifies that on the 12th day o:fNovember, 20 l.2, slw caused a true and 
correct oopy of the foregoing Order on Fonn of Judgment to be served upon the following: :Persons 
in the :fOllowing tnaMer: 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEY: 
Kent L. Hawkins 
P.O.Box991 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204-0991 
{208) 232-2499 
DEFENDANT ATIOR.NEY: 
Michael D. Gafflley 
21 OS Coronado State 
· Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
(208) 529-9732 
OliDltl! Olll fOliM 011 Jll))GIItENT • S 
DALE HATCH. Clerk 
YvnrJ& ~irM 
By: Deputy Clerk 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
· Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffney@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
In the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition 
to Motion for Summary Judgment 
The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge), through counsel of record Beard St. Clair 
Gaffney P A, respectfully submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, 
LLC (PMC). This memorandum in opposition to PMC's motion for summary judgment is 
supported by Quail Ridge's cross-motion and memorandum for summary judgment; the second 
affidavit of John M. Avondet, counsel for Quail Ridge; and other pleadings and affidavits in the 
record. 
Ill 
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INTRODUCTION 
This action is the second lawsuit between the parties. PMC previously sued Quail Ridge 
for breach of contract in Bannock County Civil Case No. 10-2724. At the trial for that matter, 
and upon the conclusion ofPMC's case-in-chief, Quail Ridge moved for directed verdict. The 
Court in P MC I granted the motion. In fact, PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss its breach of 
contract claim against Quail Ridge pursuant to Quail Ridge's directed verdict motion. 
PMC now argues it is entitled to summary judgment in this action for its breach of 
contract claims against Quail Ridge and Forrest Preston. In so arguing, however, PMC ignores 
the limitations of res judicata and collateral estoppel, both of which preclude it from obtaiuing 
sununary judgment over Quail Ridge as a matter oflaw, pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56( c). Because PMC has not met its burden in showing that it is entitled to judgment 
as a matter oflaw, one of the requirements for obtaiuing sununary judgment under Rule 56( c), 
the Court should deny PMC's motion for sununary judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." IDAHO R. 
CJV. P. 56( c) (2013); G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 516-17, 808 P.2d 851, 
853-54 (1991 ). It is recognized that when assessing the motion for summary judgment, the court 
must draw all facts and inferences in favor of the non-moving party. G&M Farms, 119 Idaho at 
517, 808 P.2d at 854; Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 
(Ct. App. 1994); Haessley v. Saftco Title Ins. Co. of Idaho, 121 Idaho 463, 825 P.2d 1119 (1992). 
The moving party bears the burden of establishing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment- Page 2 
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fact. If the moving party fails to make this showing, then summary judgment is inappropriate. 
Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994). The non-moving party is 
entitled to show a genuine issue of material fact regarding the elements challenged by the 
moving party's motion. Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 720, 791 P.2d 1285, 1299 
(1990) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986)); see also Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho lOi, 
102, 765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). 
If reasonable people could reach different conclusions or inferences from the evidence, 
the motion for summary judgment should be denied. Thompson v. Pike, 125 Idaho 897, 900, 876 
P.2d 595, 598 (1994); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,470,716 P.2d 1238, 1242 (1986). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Quail Ridge references and incorporates its Statement of Facts contained in its cross-
motion for summary judgment as if set forth fully herein. (See generally Defs.' Mem. Re: Cross-
Mot. Summ. J. at 3-6.)1 
ARGUMENT 
Summary judgment is only appropriate in situations where the moving party meets its 
burden in showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is 
entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. IDAHO R. Crv. P. 56( c) (20 13). Quail Ridge does not 
concede PMC's argument that there are no genuine issues of material fact to bar PMC from its 
requested summary judgment. But because PMC has already brought these claims against Quail 
Ridge in P MC I, the general principle of res judicata, including "true" res judicata, or claim 
preclusion, and collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars PMC from a summary judgment as a 
matter of law under Ru1e 56( c). See Pincockv. Pocatello Gold and Copper Mining Co., 100 
1 Submitted on September 23, 2013. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment- Page 3 
280 of 447
Idaho 325, 328, 597 P.2d 211, 214 (1979) ("It is well settled in Idaho that a trial judge should not 
grant a motion for sunnnary judgment if the evidence, construed in the light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion ... presents a genuine issue of material fact or shows that the 
respondent ... is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. If either condition is satisfied, 
summary judgment [is] improper.") (internal citations omitted). 
I. Res judicata precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment as a matter of 
law. 
"True" res judicata, or claim preclusion, '"treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full 
measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same 'claim' or cause of 
action."' Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,256,668 P.2d 130, 132 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting 
Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530, 535 (5th Cir. 1978)). Res 
judicata "bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or upon claims 
'relating to the same cause of action ... which might have been made."' Kootenai Elec. Coop., 
Inc. v. The Lamar Corp., 148 Idaho 116, 120,219 PJd 440,444 (2009) (quoting Ticor Title v. 
Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007)). Res judicata exists to preserve the 
integrity of judicial dispute resolution, protect the courts against the burdens of repetitious 
litigation, and provide refuge from the harassment of repetitious claims. Aldape, 105 Idaho at 
247,668 P.2d at 133. 
Res judicata bars a party from asserting a claim in a subsequent action when three 
requirements are met: "(1) same parties, (2) same claim, and (3) final judgment." Kootenai Elec. 
Coop., 148 Idaho at 120, 219 P.3d at 444 (quoting Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 PJd at 617). 
All three requirements for res judicata are satisfied in this case. 
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First, the parties from PMC I are the same parties to this litigation. In PMC I, PMC sued 
Quail Ridge for breaching the Ground Lease Agreement. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. C.i In this 
litigation, PMC is again suing Quail Ridge for breach of contract under the Ground Lease 
Agreement. This satisfies the first requirement for res judicata. 
Second, and as set forth in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-motion for 
sunnnary judgment, the present claim for breach of contract is the same breach of contract claim 
litigated in P MC I. In determining what constitutes a claim for purposes of res judicata analysis, 
the Idaho Court of Appeals turned to the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24: 
When a valid and fmal judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiffs 
claim ... the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies 
against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction ... out of 
which the transaction arose. 
*** 
What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" ... [is] to be determined 
pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are 
related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial 
unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or 
business understanding or usage. 
Aldape, 105 Idaho at 258-59, 668 P.2d at 134-35 (quoting REsTATEMENT(SECOND) OF 
JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982)) (omissions in original). See also Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 
Idaho 146, 149, 804 P.2d 319, 322 (1990) (Idaho Supreme Court citing with approval Aldape's 
analysis of Restatement (2nd) of Judgments§ 24). 
In analyzing what constituted a separate claim under res judicata standards, the Aldape 
court looked further to the Restatement: 
Having been defeated on the merits in one action, a plaintiff sometimes attempts 
another action seeking the same or approximately the same relief but adducing a 
different substantive law premise or ground. This does not constitute the 
2 Submitted September 23, 2013. 
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Sunnnary Judgment- Page 5 
282 of 447
presentation of a new claim when the new premise or ground is related to the 
same transaction or series of transactions, and accordingly the second action 
should be held barred. 
Aldape, 105 Idaho at 259, 668 P.2d at 135 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 25 
cmt. d (1982)). 
Under this pragmatic framework, PMC's present breach of contract claim against Quail 
Ridge stems from the same transaction- the parties' Ground Lease Agreement - and is therefore 
not a new claim, but instead the same claim, rehashed, from P MC I. Because the same claim 
from P MC I is at issue in this litigation, the second requirement of res judicata is satisfied. 
Finally, there is no dispute that a final judgment was issued in PMC I or whether Judge 
Brown granted directed verdict to Quail Ridge. (pee Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. I 0 ("[I]t is 
nndisputed that there was a final judgment on the merits in [PMC 1].").) The final judgment 
rendered in P MC I satisfies the third and last requirement for res judicata. 
In PMC I, Judge Brown granted directed verdict to Quail Ridge on PMC's breach of 
contract claim. Now, in this case, PMC has "decided to seek more favorable relief in a different 
court. In essence, it sought to split its cause of action so as to obtain a further bite at the apple." 
Kootenai Elec. Coop., 148 Idaho at 122, 219 P.3d at 446. Res judicata exists to avoid such a 
result. Id Because this action shares the same parties and claim as those in P MC I, and because 
Judge Brown entered a directed verdict and fmal judgment. in P MC I, res judicata bars PMC 
from a judgment as a matter oflaw under Rule 56( c). PMC has failed to meet its burden in 
showing that summary judgment would be appropriate, and the Court should deny summary 
judgment. 
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ll. Collateral estoppel precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment as a 
matter oflaw. 
Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, "bars the relitigation of issues actually 
adjudicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the same parties." Aldape 
v. Akins, 10 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 (Ct. App. 1983) (quoting Kaspar Wire Works, Inc. 
v. Leco Eng'g & Mach., Inc., 575 F.2d 530,535-36 (5th Cir. 1978)). "Collateral estoppel serves 
the purposes of protecting litigants from the burden of relitigating an identical issue with the 
same party or his privy, of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation, or 
preventing inconsistent decisions, and of encouraging reliance on adjudications." Anderson v. 
Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 183, 731 P.2d 171, 178 (1986)(internal citations omitted). 
For collateral estoppel to bar a subsequent claim, five requirements must be satisfied: (1) 
the party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the earlier case is identical to the 
issue in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was decided in the earlier action; 
(4) there was final judgment on the merits in the earlier case; and (5) the party against whom the 
issue is asserted in the present case was a party or in privity with a party to the litigation. 
Kootenai Elec. Coop., 148 Idaho at 120,219 P.3d at 444 (citing Ticor Title, 144 Idaho at 124, 
157 P.3d at 618 ). As outlined previously in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-
motion for summary judgment, all five requirements for collateral estoppel have been satisfied. 
First, PMC had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its breach of contract claim against 
Quail Ridge. At trial, PMC presented its case-in-chief on its breach of contract claim against 
Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d A:ff. Ex. D.) After PMC concluded its argument regarding its breach 
of contract claim against Quail Ridge, PMC voluntarily agreed to dismiss the claim. (Id Ex. E; 
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FMC /Trial Tran. Vol. II, 86:1-12, May 15, 2012.) PMC was not deprived of its opportunity to 
fully and fairly litigate its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge. 
Second, the issue to be decided in this action- PMC's breach of contract claim against 
Quail Ridge - is identical to the issue decided in P MC I. See supra. Both cases asserted that 
Quail Ridge breached the Ground Lease Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by 
refusing to pay $416,812.50 after offsets. 
Third, the issue of Quail Ridge's alleged breach of the Ground Lease Agreement was 
decided in the earlier litigation, with Judge Brown dismissing PMC's breach of contract claim 
against Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. D.) 
Fourth, Judge Brown entered a final judgment in the earlier case. See supra. 
Finally, Quail Ridge, the party against whom PMC's present breach of contract claim is 
asserted, was a party to the earlier litigation. See supra. 
Because all five requirements for collateral estoppel have been satisfied in this action, 
collateral estoppel bars PMC from pursuing its present breach of contract action against Quail 
Ridge. PMC is not entitled to a summary judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56( c), and the 
Court should deny PMC' s motion for summary judgment. 
III. Res judicata precludes PMC from an entry of summary judgment against 
Forrest Preston as a matter oflaw. 
As argued in Quail Ridge's memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary 
judgment, res judicata bars PMC from pursuing its breach of contract claim against Forrest 
Preston, owner and principal of Quail Ridge. (Avondet 2d Ex. C.) Once again, PMC's present 
action shares the same parties and the same claim asP MC I. 
As addressed by Quail Ridge in its memorandum in support of its cross-motion for 
summary judgment, Preston is a privy of Quail Ridge. (Defs.' Mem. Re: Defs' Mot. Summ J. 9.) 
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This point is undisputed, as in its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, PMC 
notes that "[a]lthough Preston was not a named party to the prior action, it is undisputed that 
Preston is the primary principal of Quail Ridge." ((Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 10 
(emphasis added).) Because Preston is privy of Quail Ridge, the parties of PMC I are the same 
parties to this present litigation. 
PMC' s breach claim against Preston is also the same claim at issue in P MC I. Claim 
preclusion applies to claims brought, as well as those that could have been brought, in the prior 
litigation. Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012). As noted by the 
Aldape court, "the transactional concept of a claim is broad, and ... the bar of claim preclusion is 
similarly broad." Aldape, 105 Idaho 254,259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 cmt. a (1982)). PMC has no excuse for its failure to bring a breach 
claim against Preston in P MC I. It is now estopped from doing so because of res judicata. 
Because PMC is not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law under Rule 56( c) regarding its 
breach claim against Preston, PMC has failed to meet its burden to show it is entitled to summary 
judgment under Ru1e 56( c). This Court shou1d deny PMC's motion for summary judgment. 
IV. Alternatively, the Court should fmd that there are triable issues of material fact 
precluding summary judgment. 
In the event that the Court does not agree that PMC's claims are barred by res judicata 
and/or collateral estoppel, the Court should still deny the motion for summary judgment. PMC's 
claims are fundamentally based upon Judge Brown properly construing the Ground Lease 
Agreement's terms, conditions, and language. If Judge Brown erred in his application of the law 
to the facts of P MC I, the basis for this second lawsuit will be extinguished. Quail Ridge has 
appealed Judge Brown's findings and the Amended Declaratory Judgment that he entered on 
November 26,2012. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. A.) 
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Therefore, there are two grounds for denying the summary judgment motion in addition 
to those articulated supra. First, there are triable issues whether Quail Ridge has failed to have 
"promptly paid" the amounts Judge Brown found were owed under the Ground Lease Agreement. 
The second basis is that the issue is not ripe and there is a risk of reaching inconsistent results in 
two interrelated lawsuits. 
a. Triable issues exist whether there has been a breach. 
Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment stated that Quail Ridge was to "promptly 
pay" the amount identified in the Amended Declaratory Judgment. Judge Brown did not 
articulate a specific time period when payment was to occur. Quail Ridge does dispute whether it 
has failed to promptly pay the amounts Judge Brown held were owed under the Ground Lease 
Agreement. Quail Ridge submits that the determination of whether Quail Ridge has breached the 
contract is an issue offact. 
PMC pins its argument on the fact that it made a demand for payment following Judge 
Brown's issuance of the Amended Declaratory Judgment and that Quail Ridge did not meet the 
terms of the PMC demand letter. (Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. at 5-7.) PMC's argument, 
however, is flawed because the demand letter did not comport with the terms of the Amended 
Declaratory Judgment. The Amended Declaratory Judgment provides, in relevant part: 
(4) Therefore, based upon the rent adjustment, Quail Ridge is obligated to 
promptly pay PMC $416,812.50 under the terms of the parties' Ground Lease 
Agreement. 
(Hancock Aff. Ex. 2.) The phrase "promptly pay" is ambiguous. Though the promptly pay 
language is found in the Amended Declaratory Judgment, the document purports to set forth 
contractual obligations. Thus, if the duties of the parties are ambiguous, the general rules of 
contract construction should apply. 
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Juries are arbiters of contractual ambiguities. Potlach Education Ass 'n v. Potlach School 
Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633,226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (2010). Judge Brown did not state a 
specific time period for performance of the payment obligation. He ambiguously described the 
obligation as one to "promptly pay" the $416,812.50. He did not parse the terms any further. 
Whether Quail Ridge has not promptly paid PMC is a question of fact. 
The term "promptly pay" is subject to differing interpretations and is based upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "promptly" as follows: 
Adverbial form of the word "prompt," which means ready and quick to act as occasion 
demands. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co. v. MissouriPac. Ry. Co., 103 Kan. 1, 175 P. 97, 103. 
The meaning of the word depends largely on the facts in each case. Irvin v. Koehler, 
C.C.A.B.Y., 230 F. 795, 796; Stovall & Strickland v. McBrayer, 20 Ga.App. 93, 92 S.E. 543. 
BLACK'SLAWDICTIONARY 1379 (4TH ED. 1968). In Rierson v. State, 614 P.2d 1020, 1023 
(Mont. 1980), the Montana Supreme Court stated that the meaning of"promptly" was "ready and 
quick to act, depending on the circumstances." Id The Court has sufficient evidence before it 
that generates triable issues of material fact whether Quail Ridge has acted consistent with Judge 
Brown's findings. 
There is no dispute that the amount identified by Judge Brown has not been paid by Quail 
Ridge. The fact that there has not been payment, however, does not mean that when Quail Ridge 
does tender payment that the payment will not have been promptly made at that point in time. 
This case is unique because the rights of the parties were declared by a Court oflaw and those 
findings have been appealed to a court of appellate review. Thus, the rights of the parties remain 
in flux and could be altered in the future by the Idaho Supreme Court. There is no agreed upon 
statement of what is owed under the Ground Lease Agreement because of the appeal in Barmock 
County Civil Case No. 2010-2724. Whether Quail Ridge has acted promptly vis-a-vis the 
Ground Lease Agreement is subject to the appeal's outcome and carmot be determined now. 
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In the P MC I appeal, Quail Ridge has asserted that the judge made errors of law and fact 
in reaching his conclusions in P MC I and in calculating the rent owed for the 2010 adjustment 
period. (Gaffney Aff. Ex. A; see also Avondet 1st Aff. Ex. A, submitted on February 6, 2013.) If 
Quail Ridge prevails before the Idaho Supreme Court, then the Amended Declaratory Judgment 
will be vacated and there would be no obligation to pay PMC the adjusted rent amount set by 
Judge Brown. If the Supreme Court affirms Judge Brown, then the obligations of the parties for 
the 2010 adjustment period will likely be settled. It is only after the appeal has been adjudicated 
that the jury or the Court could even decide whether Quail Ridge has promptly made payment. 
At this point, however, a jury could reasonably decide that Quail Ridge has acted properly and 
that a payment made following the appeal would constitute a prompt payment under the 
Amended Declaratory Judgment. 
PMC suggests that its I 0-day demand establishes what would constitute prompt payment 
as a matter of law. However, whether payment has been promptly made is a determination based 
upon the totality of the facts and circumstances of each case. See Rierson, 614 P .2d at I 023. The 
correct outcome in this case is intrinsically tied to the outcome of the appeal in P MC I. The 
Court cannot decide as a matter of law that Quail Ridge's refusal to pay pursuant to PMC' s 
demand qualified as a failure to promptly pay the amount outlined in the Amended Declaratory 
Judgment. It is a disputed issue that a jury could find that Quail Ridge properly waited until after 
the appeal to pay any obligation. 
b. The issue is not ripe and there is a risk of reaching inconsistent results in two 
interrelated lawsuits. 
The interdependent nature of the two cases was the reason why Quail Ridge asked for a 
stay in March 2013. The propriety of this lawsuit depends on the outcome of the appeal in P MC 
I. Judge Brown found in P MC I that there was no basis for awarding PMC a money judgment 
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that could be executed upon by PMC. (Avondet 2d Aff. Ex. D.) Because there was no money 
judgment to execute upon in P MC I, there was no requirement for an Idaho Appellate Rule 16 
supersedeas bond. 
Quail Ridge's prior motion was also improperly construed as a motion for stay for a new 
trial or for judgment under Rule 62(b ). Quail Ridge did not seek a stay on any motion for a new 
trial or a stay of an effort to enforce a judgment. The judgment received by PMC in FMC /was 
not a money judgment that could be enforced. (/d.) It merely declared rights. Thus, there was no 
legal justification for requiring the posting of a bond or securing PMC against its eventual 
collection efforts. This proceeding is not "any proceeding to enforce a judgment" because PMC 
only asserts (a) breach of contract and (b) enforcement against a guarantee. (See Compl. 'If~ 14-
24.) Rule 62(b) is limited to staying proceedings only when a motion for a new trial or to alter or 
amend a judgment has been made pursuant to Rule 59 in the underlying proceedings. See IDAHO 
R. C1v. P. 62(b) (2013). The grounds for staying execution of a money judgment are simply not 
met in this case. The entire premise of Quail Ridge's prior motion for a stay was because the 
validity of any outcome in this case is inherently based on the outcome of the appeal in P MC 1 
No security should ever have been required in connection with a stay in this case. 
Quail Ridge submits that the Court should defer this matter until such time as the appeal 
has been decided. There is a risk of inconsistent results in the two cases. Staying the matter, 
without the requirement of a bond, will not prejudice PMC because (a) it does not have a 
judgment that it can enforce anyway at this point and (b) the outcome of the appeal will, for all 
intents and purposes, determine the outcome of this case. 
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V. Quail Ridge is not collaterally estopped from asserting its affirmative defenses 
against PMC. 
In its brief in support of its motion for summary judgment, PMC argues that Quail Ridge 
is collaterally estopped from raising its affirmative defenses against PMC in the present action. 
(See generally Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 8-11.) Specifically, PMC argues that because 
Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses relate to the parties' Ground Lease Agreement, which was at 
issue in P MC I, Quail Ridge cannot raise them in this action. See id This argument is completely 
incongruous with PMC's position as plaintiff in this second lawsuit. As PMC notes in its brief in 
support of summary judgment, "[b ]oth cases revolve around the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement 
that governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties." !d. at 10. PMC is essentially arguing 
that while it should be granted summary judgment on its current breach of contract claims 
against Quail Ridge, which are based on Quail Ridge's alleged breach of the Ground Lease 
Agreement, Quail Ridge carmot assert affirmative defenses it raised against PMC's first breach 
of contract claim in P MC I. PMC cannot have it both ways. 
Further, PMC makes a blanket argument that Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses to this 
action have already been adjudicated by Judge Brown in PMC I. (Pl. Mem. Re: Pl. Mot. Summ. J. 
9.) However, this is not an accurate representation. Quail Ridge did not raise all of its affirmative 
defenses to this present claim against PMC in PMC 1. Later in its collateral estoppel argument, 
PMC only lists a select number of Quail Ridge's affirmative defenses to this claim as having 
been addressed inPMC I Id at 10. Arguing that Quail Ridge is collaterally estopped from 
asserting all of its affirmative defenses in this present action is therefore an incorrect 
overstatement at odds with PMC's litigation posture in this action. The Court should therefore 
disregard PMC' s argument that Quail Ridge is collaterally estopped from asserting its 
affirmative defenses in this claim. 




The motion for summary judgment should be denied. Alternatively, the Court should 
stay this matter until the Idaho Supreme Court has determined the appeal in P MC I. 
DATED: October 7, 2013 
Mic el . Ga fney 
Jo M Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
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A. Nnture of the Case. 
The plaintitf/respondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a .Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC 
(PMC), filed a Vel'ified Complaint alleging breach of a Ground Lease Agreement against two 
defendants: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge) and Century Park Associates, 
LLC (Century Park). PMC subsequently sought, and received, leave to amend its Complaint and 
added a claim for declaratory relief. The defendants tiled an Answer and Jury Demand. The 
case was tried to the Court on May 14-15,2012, in Bannock County District Court. The Court 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17, 2012, and entered an 
Amended Declaratory Judgment on November 26, 2012. This appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
PMC tiled a Verified Complaint against Quail Ridge and Century Park on February 28, 
2010. (R Vol. I, pp. 1-51.) The Verified Complaint alleged that Quail Ridge and Century Park 
were successors-in-interest to a certain Ground Lease Agreement that had been entered into by 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Sterling Development Co. (Sterling) in 1983. (I d.) 
The Ground Lease Agreement pertained to real property located within the City of Pocatello. 
(Id.) The Verified Complaint alleged that both Quail Ridge and Century Park had breached the 
Ground Lease Agreement and had failed to pay an adjusted amount of rent. (ld., pp.l-51.) Quail 
Ridge and Century Park filed an Answer and Jury Demand onAugust2, 2010. (!d., pp. 54-57.) 
All parties filed dispositive motions. The district court heard argument on the motions on 
August 5, 2011. (Id., p. 60.) The district court took the motions under advisement. (/d.) The 





















district court orally announced its decision regnrding the dispositive motions on January 7, 2012. 
(/d., p. 62.) The Court denied the motions. (ld.) 
PMC asked lbr and received leave to amend its complaint. PMC tiled an Amended 
Complaint on May 4, 2012. (ld., pp. 96-1 04.) Quail Ridge and Century Park answered the 
Amended Complaint on May 7, 2012, a week before trial. (!d., pp.lOS-09.) 
The case was tried without a jury on May 14-15, 2012. (!d., pp. 128-29.) During trial, 
Quail Ridge and Century Park moved for directed verdict on Count I of the Amended Complaint. 
(ld., p. 129.) Count I alleged breach of contract against the defendants. (/d. pp. 96-104.) PMC 
stipulated to dismiss its breach of contract claim and the district court granted the defendants' 
motion. (!d., p. 129.) Century Park moved for a dismissal of the remaining declaratory relief 
claim and PMC also stipulated to the motion. (!d.) 
Tile parties submitted post-trial briefing to the district court. (!d., pp. 135-63.) The 
district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 17, 2012. (!d., pp. 
166-203.) The district court found that PMC was not entitled to adjusted rent for 2007-09 but 
also found an entitlement to adjusted rent for 2010-12. (Id., p. 201.) The district court entered a 
Declaratory Judgment on November 13, 2012, and an Amended Declaratory Judgment on 
November 26,2012. (R VoL II, pp. 214-18.) Quail Ridge timely appealed. (Jd., pp. 219-226.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
PMC is a Delaware LLC licensed and authorized to do business within the state of Idaho. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 96-104.) Quail Ridge, the sole defendant/appellant, is a Tennessee LLC licensed 
and authorized to do business within the state ofldaho. (Jd., pp. 105-09.) 


















Quail Ridge is an assisted living facility located in .Pocatello, Idaho. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 
139:7-13, May 15, 2012.) The assisted living center facility is located on approximately 4.25 
acres in Pocatello, Idaho. (lei., 139:14-18.) Quail Ridge owns the facility. (!d.) PMC owns the 
4.25 acres oft'eal property. (Jd., 139:21-140:1; Trial Tr. Vol. I, 36:1-3, May 14, 2012.) 
In .January 1983, IHC and Sterling entered in a Ground Lease Agreement (Ground Lease) 
pertaining to the 4.25 acres ofproperty involved in this case. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 140:2-22; Pl. Ex. 
10 I.) The Ground Lease governs, in part, the current parties' relationship. There is no dispute 
whether PMC is the successor-in-interest to the lessor's (IHC) interest in the Ground Lease. 
Quail Ridge similarly acknowledges that it is the successor-in-interest to the lessee's (Sterling) 
interest. Section 1.3( a) of the Ground Lease establishes the initial value for determining rent. 
The section provides: 
An initial annual rental shall be calculated on the basis of :fifteen percent (15%) ofthe 
value of the leased land. For purposes of the first three (3) years from the 
Commencement Date of this Lease, the leased land shall be valued at the rate of Fifteen 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre. 
(Pl. Ex. 10 1.) Section 1.3(b) discusses adjustment of the rent value and provides, in part: 
The annual net rental as set forth above shall be adjusted every three (3) years beginning 
on the Commencement Date of this Lease, referred to below as the rent adjustment date .. 
. . The rent as adjusted shall be equal to fifteen percent (1 5%) of the fair market value of 
the leased land, exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determination of fair · 
market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable rent 
adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. The determination shall take 
into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applies to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($15, 000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market 
value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the 
applicable rent aqjustment date. (emphasis added) 
(Jd.) The last paragraph of Section 1.3(b) states: 





















If the determination of adjusted rent is made atler the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the 
adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after tl1e determination, 
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 
(!d.) Under the Ground Lease, Quail Ridge paid PMC rent in the amount of $9,562.50 per 
annum. (Trial Tr. Vol. U, 141:14-15, De f. Exs. 256, 257 .) No one ever adjusted the rent amount 
during the intervening years and once Quail Ridge became subject to the Ground Lease it paid 
the rent every year in the amount of$9,562.50. (Trial Tr. Vol. n, 144:17-24; 150:5-15, 20-24.) 
Earl Christison, former Pocatello Regional Medical Center (PRMC) 1 CEO/administrator 
from 1989-2000, reviewed all PRMC contracts including the Ground Lease during his tenure. (R 
Vol, II, pp. 308-1 0.) Christison testified during his deposition that PRMC would have gone 
through each contract and "either renegotiated them or re-evaluated how they existed" on a local 
and corporate level. (ld.) Christison testified that the hospital would have tried to "squeeze 
every nickel and dime out of what [the hospital] could have got from them at the time[.]" (I d.) 
The land values from 1989-2000 would not have supported an adjusted rent and so PRMC did 
not adjust the rent. (Jd., pp. 308-10.) Don Wadle, vice-president of clinical support for PMC, 
confirmed that rent had not been adjusted since 2002 when PMC took over the IHC facility. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, 38:14-39:10.) 
In 1996, an entity named Pocatello Medical Investors Limited Partnership (PMI) began 
operating tile facility knoW!l as Quail Ridge. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 145:9-18.) PMI subleased the 
building from Sterling, the original tenant. (ld., 145:9-18.) PMI transitioned the facility from a 
1 PRMC was the name of the IHC facility in Pocatello. 





















psychiatric hospital into an assi&ied living tacility. (Jd., 147:20-25.) 
In 1996, l'MC's predecessor, IHC, signed a Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate 
(the 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate) certizying to PMI that the rent was 
$9,562.50 per annum and that the rent would be adjusted at the next adjustment period. (Def. 
Ex. 21 I, ~!5.) Counsel represented IHC during the 1996 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 152:2-11.) 
Neither PMI nor Quail Ridge's records evidence a request by the landlord to adjust the rent. (!d., 
150:25-151 :23.) PMI continued to sublease from Sterling from 1996-2001. (Id, 153:3-7.) 
In 2001, the parties substantially restructured their relationship. (!d., 153:8-11.) Sterling 
sought to sell the building. Forrest Preston, PMI and Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the 
building. (Jd., 153:12-21.) Sterling's principals wanted to be released from their guarantees of 
the Ground Lease and also wanted Sterling released from the financing on the building. (Id.) 
Sterling owed approximately $2.8 million on the building. (Id., 154:1-4.) 
The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into Sterling's shoes vis-a-vis the 
Ground Lease. (Id., 154:18-155:4.) The parties amended and restated the old sublease with 
Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and PMI remaining as subtenant. (!d., 155:9-16.) 
IHC retained Guy Kroesche, an attorney with Stoel Rives in Salt Lake City, Utah, to 
represent it during the restructuring of the parties' arrangement. (I d., 156:9-11.) 
Kroesche negotiated terms of the 2001 restructure with Richard Faulkner, in-house 
counsel for PMI/Quail Ridge. Kroesche made changes to the documents of the restructure and 
many of his changes were "crafted towards rewriting the existing agreements." (R Vol. II, p. 
291.) Kroesche received all of the documents involved in the restructure and commented on 





















many of them. {Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:8-17; Def. Ex. 228). The documents included a new 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate (the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certilicnte). (/d., 164:13-23; Def. Ex. 228.) Kroesche specifically edited the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate to add provisions that required a guarantee of the payments 
under the Ground Lease. (See id.) This addition constituted a new term to the parties' 
arrangement. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:22-23.) Forrest Preston's personal guarantee also constituted 
another new tenn for the 2001 restructuring, in addition to other changes and amendments in the 
deal. (Id., 165:19-21.) 
The 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is different than its 1996 
counterpart. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate never makes reference to the 
ability to adjust rent at the next adjustment date under the Ground Lease. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.) 
Instead, the language about rent being adjusted at the next adjustment date is conspicuously 
absent in the 2001 iteration. Faulkner, who acted as Quail Ridge's corporate representative 
during trial, testified about why the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate differed 
from its 1996 counterpart. Faulkner said: 
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the five 
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had 
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and 
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised 
the section of the rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to 
confirm in the course of dealing that it had been waived. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17.) Per Faulkner's testimony, in 2001, Quail Ridge "wanted to put to 
bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston agreeing to personally 
guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This served to confirm what the 





















course of dealing had been for all that many years before this." (!d., 170:8-16.) Neither IHC nor 
IHC's attorney ever asked Faulkner to change the 200 I Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certiticate's language in paragraph 5. (Id., 170:21-24.) 
After 2001, Quail Ridge paid off several million dollars in debt associated with the loan 
related to the Quail Ridge .tacility. (ld., 171 :20-172:4.) Quail Ridge made the decision to pay off 
debt because it relied on knowing that the Ground Lease rent had been set at a fixed amount and 
was no longer subject to the rent adjustment provision of the Ground Lease. (!d., 172: 11-20.) 
Quail Ridge also decided to invest more than $1 million in building renovations due to its 
understanding that the rent had been fixed at a set amount (ld., 174:2-7.) As Faulkner testified, 
no one had invoked paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease at any time during its existence. (I d., 
178:8-19.) One of the critical roles the 2001 restructure played was to "nail down what the rent 
under the ground lease was going to be going forward." (Id., 182:14-19.) 
In 2002, PMC became the successor in interest to IHC's interests in the Ground Lease. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, 39:6-9.) It did not immediately seek to adjust the rent. (Id., 36:7-37:20.) In 
2008, PMC began researching the Ground Lease and claimed that it had made a mistake in 
managing the Ground Lease and that it had failed to adjust the rent as set forth in paragraph 
1.3(b). (Id.) The lawsuit is the first time that any party sought to adjust the rent. 





















II.JSSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred by not finding modification. 
B. Whether the district court erred by failing to find waiver. 
C. Whether the district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim. 
D. Whether the district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease' language. 
E. Whether the district court erred by not finding a course of dealing. 
F. Whether the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Brad J anoush. 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Stand11rd of Review 
When reviewing a district court's decision after a trial without a jury, the Court's review 
of the decision: 
[I]s limited to ascertaining whether the evidence supports the findings offact, and 
whether the findings offact support the conclusions oflaw. A district court's findings of 
fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor of the judgment entered, 
in view of the district court's role as trier of fact. It is the province of the district judge 
acting as trier of fact to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses. We will not substitute our view of the facts for the view of 
the district court. Instead, where findings of fact are based on substantial evidence, even 
if the evidence is conflicting, those findings will not be overturned on appeal. We 
exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions oflaw, however, to determine 
whether the court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions 
are sustained by the facts found. Fox v. Mountain W. Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 706-07, 
52 P.3d 848, 851-52 (2002) (quoting Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Wash Fed. Sav., 
135 Idaho 518, 521, 20 P.3d 702, 705 (2001)). 
Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731, 735 (Idaho 2012). Substantial evidence is that which a 
reasonable trier of fact would accept and rely upon it in determining fmdings of fact. Duspiva v. 
Fillmore, 293 P.3d 651, 655 (Idaho 2013). 





















B. The district court erred by not finding a modification. 
The district court erred when it ruled that the parties had not modi!ied paragraph 1.3(b) of 
the Ground Lease in 2001. Quail Ridge raised this issue in a pretrial motion in limine, which the 
district court denied on May 4, 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 123-25; Hr'g Tr. 15:20-19:22, May, 4, 
2012.) Quail Ridge also argued post-trial that the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel 
Certificate modified the GrOLmd Lease, constituted a waiver, and barred PMC from adjusting the 
rent (R Vol. I, pp. 153-63.) The district court misapplied the law governing estoppel 
certificates and reached an incorrect result. The Court should reverse the district court's findings 
and rule that the parties modified the terms of 1.3(b ). 
Contracts may be moditied by mutual consent of the parties. Watkins Co., LLC v. 
Storms, 272 P.3d 503, 508 (Idaho 2012) (citing Ore-Ida Potato Prods., Inc. v. Larsen, 83 Idaho 
290,293,362 P.2d 384,385 (1961)). The fact of agreement may be implied from a course of 
conduct in accordance with its existence and assent may be implied from the acts of one party in 
accordance with the terms of a change proposed by the other. Watkins Co., LLC v. Storms, 272 
P.3d at 508. Consent to a modification may be implied from a course of conduct consistent with 
the asserted modification. Res. Eng'g. Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935, 938, 500 P.2d 836, 839 
(1972). Where an agreement involves repeated occasions for performance by either party with 
knowledge of the nature of the performance and the opportunity to object to it by the other, any 
course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without objection is given great weight in the 
interpretation of the agreement. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 202(4). 





















The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate establishes a modification of the 
Ground Lease. "An 'estoppel certificate' is a common device used in real estate transactions. It 
consists of a 'signed statement by a party (such as a tenant or mortgagee) certifYing for another's 
benetit that certain !acts are correct, as that a Lease exists, that there are no defaults, and that rent 
is paid to a certain date."' Lakeview Mgm/., Inc. v. Care Realty, LLC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28171, *54 (March 30, 2009). "A party's delivery ofthis statement estops that party from later 
claiming a different set of facts." /d.; .vee also K's Merch. Mart, Inc. v. Northgate Ltd P 'ship, 
835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel certificate should not be 
allowed to raise claims of which it knew or should have known at the time the certificate was 
executed.'' K's Merch. Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel certificate binds the 
signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the contrary at a later 
time." Plaza Freeway Ltd. P 'ship v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 616, 626, 96 Cal. 
Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). In Plaza Freeway Limited Partnership, the Court found that "the 
estoppel certificate served to set forth the key terms of the lease agreement, as understood by the 
tenant at the time of the plaintiffs purchase ofthe property." !d. at 628, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d at 873. 
No party disputes that the Ground Lease originally provided a mechanism for adjusting 
rent. (Pl. Ex. 101.) Also, no one is arguing that rent was adjusted at any time from 1983-2009. 
(R Vol. I, p. 179.) The lawsuit is the first attempt to adjust the rent in approximately twenty-
seven years. Two transactions, in 1996 and 2001, demonstrate that a modification occurred and 
that the ability to adjust rent was removed from the parties' arrangement by mutual assent. The 
district court failed to accurately apply the law to the facts and erred as a consequence. 
















In 1996, PM! became Sterling's subtenant and operated a facility known as Quail Ridge. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. 11,145:9-147:5, May 15, 2012.) PMI and Sterling entered into a sublease 
agreement attendant to that transaction. (Jd. 147:4-5.) One of the documents executed as a part 
of the 1996 transaction was a Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate signed by Everett 
Goodwin, Chief Financial Officer for IHC. (Det: Ex. 211.) Paragraph 5 of the 1996 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate states; 
Under the Lease, the Tenant is obligated to pay rent currently at the rate ofNINE 
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY TWO DOLLARS AND 50/XX CENTS 
($9 ,562.50) per annum. Rent has been paid through and including February 28, 1996. 
Under Section 1.3(b) of the Lease, the rent shall be adjusted on the next rent adjustment 
date, March 1, 1998. 
(Jd.) Paragraph 5 ofthe 1996 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate contains two items that 
are of note: (1) it clearly states the annual rent to be paid under the Ground Lease, atftrrning that 
the rent had not been adjusted in the years since 1983 and (2) it provides that rent shall be 
adjusted in March 1998. (Jd.) Because the rent remained static in 1996, the parties agreed that 
the fair market value was $15,000.00/acre. According to the language of paragraph 1.3(b ), this 
agreement should have been taken into account when deciding subsequent rent adjustments. (Pl. 
Ex. 101.) The district court did not take the transaction into account in its findings. 
Additionally, the 2001 transaction contains different terms than the 1996 transaction 
because it constitued a significant restructuring of the parties and the agreements. (Trial Tr. Vol. 
I, 153:8-11.) Sterling sold the building to Forrest Preston. (!d., 153:12-21.) Quail Ridge 
assumed the Ground Lease. (Jd., 155:9-16.) The parties amended the sublease between Sterling 
and PMl. Quail Ridge could become the sublessor with PMI remaining as the sublessee. (ld., 





















155:9-16.) Sterling took itself completely out ofthe picture in 2001 creating a new agreement 
between the parties. 
IHC, PMC's predecessor, remained a vital party to the transaction. IHC continued to 
own the real property where the Quail Ridge building is located. Attorney Guy Kroesche 
represented II-IC during the 2001 transaction. (!d., 156:9-11.) Kroesche received copies of every 
document associated with the 2001 transaction. (R Vol. II, p. 291.) Kroesche and Faulkner 
negotiated over the substance of the transactional documents, including the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certilicate. (/d.) 
Many of the changes suggested by Kroesche were "crafted towards rewriting the existing 
agreements." (R Vol. II, p. 291.) As counsel for IHC, Kroesche received all of the restructure 
documents and commented on many of them. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:8-17; Def. Ex. 228). 
Importantly, Kroesche edited the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and added, for 
instance, terms that required a payment guarantee of the Ground Lease. (See id., 164: 13-23; Def. 
Ex. 228.) There is no dispute whether Kroesche recommended changes to the estoppel 
certificate and that many of his suggestions were incorporated into the final version. Kroesche's 
involvement in the 2001 restructure demonstrates that the terms of the 2001 Landlord Consent 
and Estoppel Certificate were negotiated at arms-length. 
New terms were added to the parties' relationship in 2001. For instance, Forrest Preston 
was to sign a personal guarantee as a part of the 2001 transaction. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 164:22-23.) 
The personal guarantee constituted a new, additional term for the 2001 transaction. (ld., 165:19-
21.) The parties made other changes. Thus, the 2001 transaction created a new arrangement 




















mnong all of the remaining parties. 
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is substantively di:tlerent than its 
1996 counterpart. In the 2001 version, paragraph 5 omits the statement that rent would be 
adjusted tm the next rent adjustment date. (Def. Ex. 228, '1f5.) Faulkner, Quail Ridge's corporate 
representative during trial, explained the change during his testimony at trial. He testified: 
Because I had looked at what the parties had been doing since 1996, and for the tive 
years that our group had been involved in the facility the rent adjustment mechanism had 
never been raised. And then I spoke with the folks from Sterling Development Group and 
understood that in the entire 13 years preceding our involvement no one had ever raised 
the section of the rent adjustment in order to increase or change the rent. So I wanted to 
confirm in the course of dealing that it had been waived. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17 .) Faulkner testified that Quail Ridge: 
[W]anted to put to bed once and for all what the rent was going to be. So in Mr. Preston 
agreeing to personally guarantee the lease, he wanted to know what the rent was. This 
served to confirm what the course of dealing had been for all that many years before this. 
(!d., 170:8-16.) IHC never objected to the substantive change in paragraph 5. (!d., 170:21-24.) 
Kroesche reviewed the substance of the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate and 
Everett Goodwin signed the document on IHC's behalf. (Def. Ex. 228.) 
The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate modifies paragraph 1.3(b) of the 
Ground Lease. The 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent or 
acquiescence to the elimination ofthe rent adjustment provision found in 1.3(b ). The district 
court's finding that "the only evidence in the record regarding the modification of the Lease 
Agreement is the subjective intent of Faulkner'' stands in stark relief next to the substance of the 
2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate which is an express, written modification of the 
parties'lease arrangement and the fact that additional terms were added to the parties' 





















arrangement. (R Vol. l, p. 197, emphasis added.) The additional requirement of a personal 
guarantee of Preston demostrates that this signiticant mod iii cation of the lease was supported by 
additional consideration. The district court's finding ignores the totality of the admitted 
evidence, which leads to only one reasonable conclusion: that the parties' expressly tixed the rent 
amount at the historical per annum amount and, in consideration thereof, the CEO of Quail 
Ridge personally guaranteed the lease payments lor the duration of the lease. 
Idaho law allows course of conduct or written agreements to constitute a modification of 
a preexisting contract. Watkins Co., LLC, 272 P.3d at 508. The 2001 Landlord Consent and 
Estoppel Certificate evidences mutual assent to a new written agreement. The certificate 
contains terms that are substantively different from the Ground Lease. The document plainly 
provides for fixed rent starting in 2001. (Def. Ex. 228.) All of the parties signed the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court, therefore, erred when it concluded 
that the only evidence supporting modification was Faulkner's subjective intent because the 
document itself was evidence of the modification. 
Quail Ridge recognizes that the following language also appears in the 2001 Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate: 
Landlord's consent to the assignment and assumption and/or to the sublease as set forth 
herein shall not constitute or be construed as (a) an acknowledgement or consent to any 
other assignment, assumption and/or sublease, (b) a waiver or modification by Landlord 
of the Tenant's duties or obligations under the Lease, or excuse Tenant's performance of 
any terms or condition of the Lease, and/or (c) a waiver or modification by Landlord of 
any of its rights under the Lease, including without limitation Landlord's rights pursuant 
to Section 12.1 of the Lease. 
(Def. Ex. 228.) This language is not dispositive of the modification issue. Instead of finding this 





















language dispositive, the district coutt should have looked at how the parties behaved following 
the 2001 transaction to determine the parties' intent. Wcllkins Co., LLC, 272 P.3d at 508. During 
the years immediately !allowing the 2001 transaction, IHC acted in a manner consistent with 
modification. It never sought lo adjust rent. PMC, when it assumed IHC's position in 2002, 
never sought to adjust the rent until2009. The district com'! failed to analyze the subsequent 
conduct of the parties in light of the 200 l Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate's terms. 
Faulkner testified that the change to paragraph 5 was intended to accomplish a 
modification of the original Ground Lease. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, 166:7-17; 170:8-16.) PMC failed 
to refute Faulkner's testimony. Had PMC done so, the district court would have cited and relied 
on that testimony. It did not. (R Vol. I, p. 197, 1f35.) Faulkner's intent to modify the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate is not the type of "subjective intent" discussed in 
Beus v. Be us, 254 P.3d 1231 (Idaho 2011 ), the case relied upon by the district court. This case is 
distinct because the document fully disclosed the intent to K.roesche and IHC. Faulkner left out 
the adjustment language from paragraph 5, submitted it to Kroesche for additional changes and 
received none. The parties ultimately agreed to the terms as set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 228 
and negotiated at arms-length. 
The district court improperly criticized and dismissed Faulkner's testimony in paragraph 
35 of its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The district colll't wrote that "removing 
language that was present in an earlier document and not discussing the same or making the 
other party aware of its deletion does not establish 'mutual assent."' (R Vol. I, p. 197 .) 
However, the district colll't cites no evidence for its conclusion that Quail Ridge had somehow 













hoodwinked !HC. The district court never refers to Kroesche's deposition testimony that would 
substantiate such a conclusion. The district court similarly does not cite any IHC or PMC ofl1cer 
testimony nbout the issue. The district court ignores what it had in front of it: the 200 I Landlord 
Consent and Estoppel Certificate, Faulkner's testimony, and the parties' conduct following the 
2001 transaction. 
Thus, the evidence does not support the district court's findings and conclusions. The 
district court misapplied the law governing modification. It als failed to properly apply the law 
that requires district courts to have "substantial evidence" to support findings and conclusions in 
order for them to be upheld on appeal. Clayson v. Zebe, 280 P.3d 731,735 (Idaho 2012). The 
district court, in this case, ignored the guidance of Clayson and erred when it failed to to rule that 
the Ground Lease had been modified and the rent adjustment provision changd. In essence, the 
district court exercised its powers solely to restore PMC to "rights that they have, for a 
consideration, deliberately, or even negligently, waived." Travers v. Stevens, 145 So. 851, 855 
(Fla. 1933). The district court should be reversed and the matter remanded. 
C. The district court erred by failing to find waiver. 
The evidence also established that PMC waived its right to adjust rent. PMC never 
invoked the rent adjustment provision prior to the filing the lawsuit. IHC had never exercised 
the rent adjustment clause. PMC did not invoke the clause in the wake of it stepping in for IHC. 
The failure to act and adjust the rent constitutes a course of conduct that the district court should 
have relied upon to fmd waiver. 
"A clear intention to waive must be shown before waiver shall be established." Knipe 





















Land Co. v. Robertson, 259 P.3d 595,604 (Idaho 2011). "Waiver will not be inferred except 
from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or fi·om .conduct amounting to 
estoppel." Id. at 604. For waiver to be found tl1e court must lind whether the facts alleged to 
constitute waiver are tn1e. The court must also decide whether, if true, these facts suffice as a 
matter of law to show waiver. !d. Waiver may be evidenced by conduct, word, or acquiescence. 
Ewrton v. Blair, 576 P.2d 585, 587 (Idaho 1978). 
The Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that the failure to act could waive certain legal 
rights. In the criminal context, for example, the failure to request appropriate jury instructions 
would waive the associated defenses a criminal defendant may otherwise have been able to 
assert. State v. Peregrina, 2010 Ida. LEXIS 21 *7 (March 24, 20 I 0). In yet another example, in 
appellate practice, if a party fails to support a position with argument and authority in the 
opening brief then it waives those issues. Ball v. City ofBlaclifoot, 273 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Idaho 
March 23, 2012). In Maclay v. Idaho Real Estate Commission, 2012 Ida. LEXIS 35 (Idaho 
January 26, 2012), the Court declined to hear arguments that were not supported by argument or 
authority in the opening brief. ld. at *24-25 (citing Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 
P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006)); see also State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490,500, 198 P.3d 128, 138 (Ct. 
App. 2008). The logic of these holdings appears to be that a party's failure to act constitutes a 
course of conduct demonstrating waiver. 
The situation is no different for parties waiving contractual rights. If a party possesses a 
particular right under a contract and fails to assert that right, then the failure to assert the right is 
a course of conduct. As noted, supra, the evidence supporting waiver is undisputed, No party 





















ever tried to adjust the rent before 2001 or in the years immediately lbllowing the 2001 
transaction. PMC conducted itself in a manner consistent with waiving the right to adjust rent 
under the Ground Leuse. Quail Ridge relied on PMC's failure to act and paid down debt on the 
Quail Ridge building because it believed that the rent had been changed from an adjustable 
umount to a tixed amount. (ld., 171:20~172:4, 11-20; 174:2-7.) Quail Ridge detrimentally relied 
on PMC's conduct vis-a-vis the rent adjustment provision. Detrimental reliance may establish 
waiver. Clearwater Minerals Corp. v. Presnell, 729 P.2d 420, 425 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986). In its 
discussion of waiver, the district court never considers Quail Ridge's reliance on the failure to 
adjust the rent by PMC or its predecessor, IHC. (R Vol. I, pp. 198-99.) Again, the district court 
ignored the evidence that it had before it in order to fashion a remedy and result that it desired 
rather than one supported by the evidence. 
PMC acquiesced to the rent being tixed at $9,562.50 per annum. It never sought to adjust 
the rent before the 2001 transaction and it never sought to adjust the rent in the years 
immediately following 2001. The course of conduct between the parties evidences waiver and 
the district court erred by failing to tind a waiver in this case. 
D. The district court erred by not applying estoppel to bar PMC's claim. 
The district court erred by not finding that PMC was estopped from claiming that it was 
owed rent other than the amount set forth in the 2001 Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. 
The representations made by PMC in the estoppel certificate should have been binding on PMC 
and the district court erred by allowing PMC to assert claims that contradicted the plain language 
ofthe estoppel certificate. 





















The fundamental role of estoppel certificates is to make binding representations for a 
party in order for other parties to make informed, reasonable decisions. K's Merch. Mart, Inc. v. 
Northgate Lttl P ilhip, 835 N.E.2d 965, 971 (Ill. 2005). "A party who executes an estoppel 
certificate should not be allowed to raise claims of which it knew or should have known at the 
time the certificate was executed." K's Merch. Mart, Inc., 835 N.E.2d at 972. "An estoppel 
certificate binds the signatory to the statements made and estops that party from claiming to the 
contrary at a later time." Plaza Freeway Ltd. P :rhip v. First Mountain Bank, 81 Cal. App. 4th 
616, 626, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 865, 872 (2000). 
Here, IHC represented that the rent due under the Ground Lease Agreement was 
$9,562.50 per annum. (Def. Ex. 228, ~ 5.) Quail Ridge, Sterling, PERSI, PM!, and IHC all 
signed the document. (I d.) The representation contained in paragraph 5 does not contemplate a 
future adjustment to the rent. (!d.) The 1996 estoppel certificate contains fundamentally 
different language than the 200 I version insofar as it expressly contemplates adjusting the rent 
during the subsequent adjustment period. (!d.; see also Def. Ex. 211.) The district court erred by 
allowing PMC to seek a declaration of its rights related to adjusted rent when PMC made 
specific representations about the rent owed under the Ground Lease Agreement in the 2001 
Landlord Consent and Estoppel Certificate. The district court should have bound PMC to its 
representations and dismissed the claim for adjusted rent. The district court erred by failing to 
apply the law governing estoppel certificates and the district court should be reversed. 





















E. The district court erred by disregarding the Ground Lease's language. 
Quail Ridge asserts that the issues of modification, waiver, and estoppel are dispositive 
and should result in PMC's claim being dismissed. However, if the Court disagrees, Quail Ridge 
submits that the district court erred when it interpreted the Ground Lease's terms. The district 
court's tindings that Quail Ridge owed PMC adjusted rent for 2010-12 in the total amount of 
$445,000.00 is based on an improper reading of the Ground Lease. The district court 
misunderstood, or entirely missed, the point of the Ground Lease language and failed to correctly 
interpret the contract consistent with the evidence and the law. 
The issue tried to the district court, at its core, was one of contract interpretation. Idaho's 
case law controlling contract interpretation cases is not complex. The law provides that courts 
should begin with the document language when analyzing or interpreting a contract. Potlach 
Educ. Ass 'n v. Potlach Sch. Dist. No. 285, 148 Idaho 630, 633, 226 P.3d 1277, 1280 (201 0), 
Courts should "seek to give effect to the intention of the parties." Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. v. 
Clear Springs Foods, Inc., 141 Idaho 117, 120, 106 P.3d 443, 446 (2005). "To determine the 
intent of the parties, the contract must be viewed as a whole and in its entirety." Id. 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. In the 
absence of ambiguity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and proper 
sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the instrument. 
Interpreting an unambiguous contract and determining whether there has been a violation 
of that contract is an issue oflaw subject to free review. A contract term is ambiguous 
when there are two different reasonable interpretations or the language is nonsensical. 
Whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law, but interpreting an ambiguous term 
is an issue of fact. 
Knipe Land Co. v. Robertson, 151 Idaho 449, 454-55, 259 P.3d 595, 600-01 (2011). 























A fundamental rule of contract interpretation is that the court should not rewrite the 
parties' contract. The Court has held that courts lack "the roving power to rewrite contracts." 
City ofMeridian v. Petra, Inc., 2013 I d. LEXIS 98, *17 (April I, 2013) (citing Shawver v. 
fluck/eheny Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 354,362,93 P.3d 685,693 (2004)). In McCallum v. 
Campbell-Simpson Motor Co., 82 Idaho 160, 349 P .2d 986 ( 1960), the Court wrote: 
We must construe the contract according to the plain language used by the parties. While 
a court may interp.ret agreements voluntarily entered into, a court cannot modify an 
agreement to as to create a new and different one, nor is the court at libertY to revise an 
agreement where its interpretation is involved. Courts cannot make for the parties better 
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make, and by a process of 
interpretation relieve one of the parties from the terms which he voluntarily consented to; 
nor can courts interpret an agreement to mean something the contract does not itself 
contain. 
!d. at 166, 349 P.2d at 990. The Idaho Supreme Court has consistently applied this ruie. In the 
context of arbitration, the Court has held that "arbitrators are, of course, not free to disregard the 
terms of the contracts they are reviewing-their powers derive from the parties' agreement." 
Storey Constr. Inc. v. Hanks, 148 Idaho 401,409,224 P.3d468, 476 (2009).2 
Here, the district court focused on paragraph 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease. Paragraph 
1.3(b) contained the terms related to rent adjustment. PMC initially sued Quail Ridge for breach 
of contract and argued that PMC was entitled to an increased rent based on that paragraph. (R 
Vol. I, p. 1-51.) The district court dismissed the breach of contract claim after PMC rested its 
case. (/d., p. 129.) Once the breach of contract claim had been dismissed PMC only had a claim 
2 The context of arbitration is especially appropriate since the district court essentially acted as the arbitrator of the 
dispute as required by Section 13 of the Ground Lease Agreement. 




















for declaratory relict: (ld., pp. 101-04.) Section 1.3(b) of the Ground Lease Agreement 
provides: 
Adjustment Based on Property Value. The annual net rental as set forth above shall be 
adjusted every three (3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, 
referred to below as the rent adjustment date. 
The parties' written agreement within ninety (90) days betbre the applicable rent 
adjustment date shall a conclusive determination between the parties of the fair market 
value lbr the period to which the adjustment applies. If the parties have not so agreed by 
the applicable rent adjustment date, the determination shall be made as in the paragraph 
on Arbitration in Article 13. 
The rent adjusted shall be equal to frfteen percent (15%) percent (sic) of the fair market 
value of the leased lm1d, eKclusive of improvements on the premises. Determination of 
fair market value shall be based on the highest and best use of the land on the applicable 
rent adjustment date without taking the leasehold into account. TI1e determination shall 
take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum rent is the above-stated 
percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations of market value 
made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding the applicable 
rent adjustment date. 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the applicable rent adjustment date, 
lessee shall continue to pay rent at the rate applicable to the preceding period until the 
adjusted rent is determined. The party indebted shall, promptly after the determination, 
pay any difference for the period affected by the adjustment. 
(Pl. EK. 101.) The Court found that the s01ne of this language ambiguous. (R Vol.I, pp. 62-63; 
Hr'g Tr. 4:1-13:18, March 26, 2012.) Specifically, the Court found the following portion of 
Section 1.3(b) ambiguous: 
The determination shall take into account the parties' agreement that the initial minimum 
rent is the above-stated percentage applied to a fair market value of Fifteen Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also take into account any determinations 
of market value made under this lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods 
preceding the applicable rent adjustment date. 


















(Hr'g Tr. 8:14-9:13, March 26, 2012). A finding that the language was ambiguous, however, 
does not mean that it is not helpful to understanding the contract or that the district court should 
just ignore the language when interpreting the contract document. 
The district court concluded that it should disregard or ignore certain language in the 
Ground Lease Agreement. That decision was wrong. Specifically, the district court wrote: 
(26) The Court will give no weight to the language contained in the Lease Agreement 
that when adjusting the rent 'the determination shall take into account the parties' 
agreement that the initial minimum rent is above-the stated percentage applied to a fair 
market value ofFHleen Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre.' The 
reason the Court will give no weight to this language is that there has been no credible 
evidence which this Court accepts concerning whether this. $15,000.00 per acre figure 
was the result of a market analysis conducted by the parties in 1983, or whether it was a 
figure higher or lower than market value as discussed in the Court's Conclusion of Law 
number21. 
(27) Likewise, the Court concludes that there is no course of dealings between the parties 
to assist the Court in determining what construction the parties placed upon this provision 
of the Lease Agreement by observing and construing their conduct or dealings. The crux 
of the matter is that there was no course of dealing for the following reasons (1) Sterling, 
and later Quail Ridge, had no incentive to seek a rent adjustment (in a maaner of 
speaking if Sterling or Quail Ridge 'rocked the boat' they had nothing to gain and only 
increased rent to lose if they initiated a rent adjustment under the Lease Agreement); (2) 
IHC and Bannock County, through poor management and/or having forgotten about the 
rent adjustment provision, never sought a rent adjustment. [footnote omitted] 
(2 8) Therefore: ( 1) because there is no evidence to establish how the original fifteen 
thousand dollar per acre figure was reached; and (2) because there is no evidence to 
establish a course of dealing to establish what construction the parties intended to give to 
the language related to subsequent adjustments, the Court will disregard these provisions 
of the [Grouod Lease]. 
(R Vol. I, p. 195.) The act of ignoring, giving no weight to contract terms, or disregarding the 
contract language, necessarily creates a new contract with new terms. The creation of a new 
contract is not the goal of contract interpretation. See Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 





















Idaho 354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004). The district court should have interpreted the contract 
language without fashioning a new agreement. I d. 
The district court reasoned that since no parole evidence was admitted during trial about 
the terms it found ambiguous that it could not interpret the contract as written. That rationale is 
inherently tlawed and entirely misses the point. The issue in the case was not "how" the parties 
initially reached the $15,000.00 Ugure. The process for deciding the original value given to the 
real property does not matter when adjusting the rent. The tact that IHC and Sterling originally 
agreed on the $15,000.00/acre value is relevant; how they reached that figure ultimately does not 
matter. The Ground Lease clearly contemplated subsequent adjustments in rent "taking into 
account" the original, agreed upon figure. The $15,000.00/acre figure, by the document's own 
terms, has to be factored into subsequent adjustments of the rent in some manner. (Pl. Ex. 101.) 
The district court did not take those facts into account and therefore misapplied the law to the 
document. The district court's improper application of Jaw and fact resulted in its incorrect 
findings because contract intent is to be derived based on the contract language as a whole. J.R. 
Simplot v. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,614, 167 P.3d 748, 751 (2006); Gem-Valley Ranches v. Small, 
90 Idaho 354, 372, 411 P.2d 943, 954 (1966). 
The existence or absence of extrinsic evidence does not justify willfully disregarding 
contract language. Instead, the district court should have factored in the "taking into account" 
language rather than just ignoring it or giving it no weight. The district court rewrote the parties' 
agreement when it should not have done so. Shawver v. Huckleberry Estates, LLC, 140 Idaho 
354, 362, 93 P.3d 685, 693 (2004). 





















Taking into account the original $1 5,000.00/acre agreement and the fact that there were 
no subsequent adjustments to the rent results in a vastly different adjustment to the rent than the 
one created ex nihilo by the district cmni. Any adjustment to rent based on the actual language 
of 1.3(b) would be based on the incremental change in land values for the adjustment periods at 
issue in this case. Applying the incremental change, regardless of whether it is an increase or 
decrease in land value, takes into account the prior agreements as to value and rent. 
The district court only awarded adjusted rent for 2010. The two experts in the case both 
testified that land values decreasedfrom2007 to 2010. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 62:11-65:2; Vol. II, 
202:2-7.) Janoush testified that the decrease in land values from 2007 to 2010 was -8.33%. (/d. 
Vol. I, 64:11-18.) The adjustment of rent, if the any, should have factored in the incremental, 
relative change in land values of -8.33% as applied to the $15,000.00/acre value. This would 
have reduced the rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC. 
The justitication for this interpretation is firmly based in the Ground Lease's language. 
The Ground Lease mandates that the prior value be taken into consideration. (Pl. Ex. 1 01.) The 
Ground Lease does not, significantly, require an objective market value for the property. (/d) 
Such an "objective" market value for the real property fails to take into account the Ground 
Lease's language. For over thirty years, the parties and their predecessors stipulated, acquiesced, 
or otherwise agreed that the land value for prior adjustment periods was $15,000.00/acre. The 
parties did this through various economic upswings and downturns. That course of conduct 
should have been taken into account by the district court when adjusting the rent. It chose not to 
do so but by making that choice it reached a result not even remotely based on the actual 























language of the contract. Such a finding by the district court should be reversed by this Court 
and remanded for a proper interpretation of the Ground Lease. 
F. The district court erred by not finding a course of dealing. 
The district court expressly tbund the absence of a course of conduct that would have 
been relevant to the determination of any adjusted rent. However, the district court's conclusion 
could only be reached by (a) ignoring or minimizing certain pieces of evidence and (b) by 
ignoring certain terms in the Ground Lease. 
Parties' course of dealing is relevant to determining intent when interpreting contract 
terms. J.R. Simp/otv. Bosen, 144 Idaho 611,614, 167P.3d 748,751 (2006). The district court 
had before it evidence in the form of deposition testimony establishing IHC's mentality about 
how the terms of 1.3(b) were to be carried out. From 1989 to 2000, there was a conscious 
decision by IHC to not adjust the rent. (R Vol. II, pp. 309-10, Christison Dep. 10:1-11 :3; 12:24-
13:4.) The conscious decision to leave the rent at $9,562.50 was a course of conduct by 1HC that 
should have bound PMC. At the very least IHC's conscious, deliberate choice to leave the rent 
where it was at in 1983 should have been "taken into account" when deciding any rent 
adjustments. The district court did not factor in IHC and Sterling's course of dealings and 
instead elected to ignore it because PMC, when it stepped into IHC's shoes, failed to adjust rent 
or otherwise pay attention to the Ground Lease. However, just because PMC negligently 
managed its contracts does not mean that the prior, voluntary choices by IHC to not adjust rent 
fails to be relevant when adjusting rent under the Ground Lease. Paragraph 1.3(b) requires that 
the prior adjustments of rent be "taken into account" and the district court admittedly did not take 





















into account IHC's conscious choices in this regard. (R. Vol. I, p. 195; footnote 20.) 
The failure to take into account the past actions by IHC and PMC was an error by the 
district court. Its linding that there was no course of dealing in this case is not supported by 
substantial evidence; indeed, there is no evidence supporting the district court's conclusions. 
G. The district court erred by admitting Brad Janoush's testimony. 
1. Standard I?(Review 
District court decisions related to the admission of expert testimony are reviewed for an 
abuse of discretion. Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho 561, 97 P.3d 428, 431 (2004). "In reviewing 
whether or not a district court abused its discretion this Court determines: (I) whether the trial 
court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the 
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason." Kirkv. Ford Motor Co., 116 P.3d 27,30-31 (Idaho 2005). 
2. Argument 
The district court relied on the testimony ofPMC's expert witness, Brad Janoush 
(Janoush) for reaching its conclusion about the amount of rent owed by Quail Ridge to PMC for 
the 2010 rent adjustment period. Quail Ridge moved to strike Janoush's testimony from the 
record and the district court denied that motion. (R Vol. I, p. 129.) The district court abused its 
discretion because it did not act within the outer boundaries of its discretion and within the 
applicable legal standard. The district court also failed to reach its decision by an exercise of 
reason. 



















The admissibility of expert testimony is committed to the discretion of the trial court. 
Weeks v. E. idaho Health Servs., 153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (Idaho 2011). The test for admissibility is 
Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Jd. Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 states: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to 
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qua!Hied as an expert 
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of 
an opinion or otherwise. 
IDAHO R. Evro. 702 (2012). Rule 703 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence is as follows: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in terming 
opinions or inference upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in 
evidence in order tor the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts or data that are 
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of the opinion 
or inference unless the court determines that their probative value in assisting the jury to 
evaluate the expert's opinion Sttbstantially outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
IDAHO R. Evm. 703. "Expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated by the 
facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its verdict and, therefore, is 
inadmissible as evidence." Weeks, 153 P.3d at 1184. When analyzing the admissibility of an 
expert's proposed testimony, the focus of the court's inquiry must be on the "principles and 
methodology" used and not the conclusions generated. I d. 
Here, the district court admitted Janoush's testimony despite Janoush's suspect 
methodology and his failure to consider the terms of the Ground Lease. Quail Ridge objected to 
Janoush's opinions as to value during trial. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, 52:18-22; 60:12-20; 61:7-16.) 
Janoush testified that he had never reviewed the terms of the Ground Lease prior to performing 
his appraisal. (Trial Tr. Vol.I, 63:10-15.) The Ground Lease sets forth how the parties should 
















subsequently decide the value ofthe property. (Pl. Ex. I 01.) It requires the parties to "take into 
account" the original value of $15,000.00 and subsequent determinations of market value. By 
acknowledging he did not review the Ground Lease or its terms, Janoush could not have "taken 
into account" either of those factors when coming up with his values that would be relevant to 
the adjustments of rent. Janoush did not employ a proper methodology to the case. His opinion 
that the land values were $990,000 for the 4.25 acre parcel was not tied to the Ground Lease at 
all. Janoush's opinions Jacked foundation and were not relevant. 
Admission of Janoush's opinions clearly impacted the outcome in this matter. The 
district court relied on Janoush's opinions when deciding the adjusted rent. (R Vol. I, pp. 191-
92.) However, Janoush applied a flawed methodology and lacked the requisite foundation to 
testify about how the rent should be adjusted in this case. 
In reliance on Janoush's testimony, the district court incorrectly calculated the adjusted 
rent based on the current land values. The district court ignored the Ground Lease requirements 
to take into account (a) prior agreements regarding adjustments and (b) the initial value being set 
at $15,000.00/acre. The district coutt's ignored the contractual language and should be reversed. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
As a result of the foregoing, the district court should be reversed and remanded. 
Michel . G ey 
John :vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA 
Attorneys for the Defendant/ Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 




) Case No. CV-2012·5289 
) 
) 
~. U2/U I 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
LLC, and FORREST L. PRESTON, an 
individual, 
) PLAINTIFF'S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF 







Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(c ), the Plaintiff subnnts the following as its Reply in Support of its 
Motion for SUlllmary Judgment: 
ARGUMENT 
With respect to Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston's (collectively 
"Quail Ridge") Arguments I, II, and III, respectively, in its Opposition to PMC's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintift~ Pocatello Hospital, LLC cfb/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC 
("PMC), notes that these arguments are identical to the arguments made by Quail Ridge :in its 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. PMC has already thoroughly addressed these arg~unents 
within its Opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and, therefore, PMC 
simply adopts and reiterates its brief in opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion tbr Summary 
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Judgment as if it bad been fully set forth herein. PMC is content to rely upon those earlier 
arguments for support of the fact d111t it is entitled to bring its present breach of contract action 
against Defendants. 
To the extent, however, that Quail Ridge has raised several new arguments in its 
Opposition to PMC's Motion for Summary, PMC will address the same. Specifically, Quail 
Ridge argues: (1) The phrase "promptly pay" is ambiguous; and (2) The issue of"promptly pay" 
is not ripe for acljudication; and (3) Quail Ridge is not collaterally estopped from bringing all of its 
affirmative defenses. 
I. The contract term "promptly pay" is not ambiguous. 
As an initial matter, tl1is Court should recognize that the requirement to "promptly pay" is a 
tenn of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of PMC and 
Quail Ridge. Indeed, in his Order on Form of Judgment, 1 Judge Brown succinctly fotu1d that: 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that 'the party indebted shall, 
pron1ptly after the detennination, pay any difference tbr the period affecfed by the 
adjustment.' Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the determination 
has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground 
Lease Agreement required "prompt" payment of the balance due under the G!·ound 
Lease Agreement. 
See Order on Form of Judgment (Avondet Aff., Ex. F, p. 3). Thus, while Judge Brown's 
Amended Declaratory Jndgment states that Quail Ridge was to "promptly pay" tile an1ount 
identified in the Amended Declaratory Jqdgment, this Court should recognize that all that Judge 
Brown was really doing by the language was simply giving respect the contractual tenJJ that 
required such prompt payment. PMC's Motion for Summary Judgment is based upon the breach 
of this clear and unambiguous contractual term and not upon a violation of Judge Brown's 
Amended Declaratory Judgment. 
Because Quail Ridge has cited with approval to the Idaho Supreme Court's decision i.n 
Pot/ach Educ. Ass'n ,,, Porlach School Dist. No. 285, 148 ldal1o 630,226 P.3d 1277 (2010), PMC 
will use tl'lllt opinion to outline the legal parameters of the issues currently before the Court. In 
Potlach, t11e Idaho Supreme Court summari.zed the process of contract interpretation in ldaho as 
1 Attached as Exhibit F to Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support ofDefendant's Cross·Motion forSurnmary 
Judgment. 
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follows: 
When interpreting a contract, this Court begins with the document's language. 'In 
the absence of ambig~1ity, the document must be construed in its plain, ordinary and 
proper sense, according to the meaning derived from the plain wording of the 
instn\ment.' Interpreting 8l1 unambig1.1ous contract and determining whether there 
has been a violation of that contract is an issue of law subject to free review. A 
contract term is ambiguous when there are two different reasonable interpretations 
or the language is nonsensical. Wl1ether a colltract is ambiguous is a question of 
law, but interpreting an ambiguous term is an issue of fact. 
Potlach, 148 Idaho at 633, 226 P.3d at 1280 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
P. 04/07 
The issue of whether the "promptly pay" tenn of the 1983 Ground. Lease Agreement is 
ambiguous is a question of law for this Court. In this case, Quail Ridge argues that this term is 
ambiguous, but gives no basis therefore. Certainly Quail Ridge has not argued that the language 
at issue is "nonsensical." To the extent fuat Quail Ridge may be trying to rely upon Potlach to 
argue that this phrase is ambiguous because it subject to "two different reasonable interpretations," 
this argument fails. A complete review of the majority opinion in Potlach demonstrates that the 
mere fact that parties to a contract may disagree as to the meaning of a contract term does not, in 
itself, make a term ambiguous. Indeed, the parties to the "Master Agreement" at issue in Porlach 
had different interpretations of what was meant by the phrase "professional leave" as used within 
that docwnent. Despite these reasonable differences in interpretation of the phrase "professional 
leave," the majority of the Idaho Supreme Court in Potlach fowld no difficulty with interpreting 
the contract, including the phrase "professional leave," and determining that the School District 
bad not violated the contract, as a matter of Jaw. 
That this Court should interpret this contract term as a matter of Jaw is even stronger in this 
case than in Potlach. Here, PMC is in agreement with Quail Ridge that the words in the phrase 
"promptly pay" should be construed in their plain and ordinary meaning. Further, Quail Ridge 
concedes in this case that "there is no dispute that the amount identified by Judge Brown has not 
been paid by Quail Ridge." Finally, PMC does not dispute that Quail Ridge is dispt1ting Judge 
Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment. Thus, there are no genuine issues o:fmatedal fact in 
this case. 
Because there are no genuu1e issues of material fact in this case, this Court is entitled to 
enter summary j~1dgment by giving the phrase "promptly pay" its plain and ordinary meaning and 
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thereafter detennining, as a matter of law, whether Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay tmder the 
tmdisputed facts of this case. Quail Ridge acknowledges within its opposition that promptly 
means ... ready and quick to act as occasion demands,"2 In this case, the Court should find that 
once a determination of adjusted rents had been made for the 20 lO rent adjustment period, the 
1983 Ground Lease Agreement demanded that Quail Ridge be ready and quick to act and make 
payment in the amount declared by Jttdge Brown to then be currently due and owing. 
II. This Issue is Now Ripe for Delermination 
It seems disingenuous, at best, for Quail Ridge to complain at this point that this matter 
should be stayed pending a n1Jing by the Court in P MC 1. This Court should recall that it gave 
Defendants two separate opportunities to stay this action by depositing the necessary ftmds into the 
Court and Quail Ridge failed to comply with the Court's order on both occasions, Indeed, it was 
only after Quail Ridge failed to deposit the necessary fttnds the second time, that this matter was 
allowed to proceed and PMC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Further, Quail Ridge misses the mark in arguing that the Court misinterpreted rl1e rules in 
ordering a bond as a requirement for this stay. Qua,il Ridge argues that no bond was necessary 
because this was not tile stay of a money judgment under I.R.C.P. 62(b). In so arguing, Quail 
Ridge fails to recognize the rule under which PMC requested a bond in the ftrst place, PMC did 
not request a bond pursuant to I.R.C.P. 62(b), but rather requested a bond pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
62(d) and I.A.R. 13(b)(l4)-(15). These rules provided this Colll't with broad discretion to require 
that a supersedaes bond be posted during the pendency ofthe appeal in PMC /. Even though such 
bond was required by tile Court, the Defendants ignored the Court's orders to post such bond on 
two occasion and now seek the Court to give it a third opportunity to stay this action pending 
appeal, Under th.e circumstances of the case, this Court should decline the offer and find tbat the 
issue before it his ripe for detennination. 
liJ. Defendants Are B1lrred from Bringing Their Affirmative Defenses 
Quail Ridge's arguments in this regard seem most curious. Quail Ridge doesn't seem to 
dispute that Defendants should be ban·ed from relitigating the affinnative defenses already raised 
and decided by Judge Brown, but rather seems to simply argue that Defendants have raised 
2 See Defendant's Memorand11m in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, at p. U (citing BLACK'S LAW 
DIC'tlONARY1379 {4TH Ed. 1968). 
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affinnative defenses in this action which were not raised in P MC !. Quail Ridge does not identify 
for the Court, however, those affinnative defenses which it claims to be new and valid in the 
instant case, PMC contends that Quail Ridge did not identify any such affhmative defenses 
because there is no factual basis in support of any alleged defenses and that the defenses which 
have been previously tried are the only otherwise valid affirmative defe11ses they may have had 
available. 
Regardless, PMC invites this Court to review Judge Brown's Memorandum Decision and 
Order in comparison to Quail Ridge's Answer in this case, PMC feels confident that when the 
Court does so, the Court wilJ find that the affinnative defenses raised by Quail Ridge in the present 
action are akin to the afflm1ative defenses raised by Quail Ridge in P MC I. PMC further feels 
co.nfident that the Com1 will flnd that these defenses were tried before Judge Brown in an 
evidentiary trial and that Judge Brown has made a ruling upon each of the same, which ruling is 
now binding upon these Defendants. 
For each of these reasons as well as the reasons outlined in PMC's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Brief in Support of its Opposition to Quail Ridge's Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment, PMC respectfully requests this Court to enter summary judgment in this matter against 
these Defendants and enter a judgment in favor of PMC in the amount that Judge Brown has 
determined as cuttently due and owing for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period, 
DATED this l,fhday of October, 2013. 
S97St Reply in Support nfPiuinnlrs Motion for Suonmu,.,.. Judgmcur 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
Byi~~~~~~~~------­
R. William Hancock 
Attorneys tbr the Plaintiff 
Page 5 
336 of 447
-QCT-15-2013 TUE 04:43PM ~~~RILL & MERRILL 
" .. t, ;/ 
FAX N0.<'\98 232 2499 
\ / 
P. 07/07 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVTCE 
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
certify that a true, full and cmrect copy of the foregoing document was this IS~ day of 
September, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
21 OS Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Honorable Robert E. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 I 
(Chambers Copy) 
S97S: Reply in Support afl'loiotifl's Malion ror S11mm•r~ Judgment 
U U.S. Mail 
LJ Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Mail 
~ Fax: (208) 529-9732 
LJU.S.MaU 
U Hand Delivery 
U Ovemi.ght Delivery 
,fSJ Fax: (208) 236· 7290 ----
Page6 
337 of 447
Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3791) 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur - 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
















IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that summary judgment is granted in favor of the Plaintiff as 
follows: 
1. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, unpaid current annual 
rent for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period in a sum of$416,812.50; 
2. Defendants are hereby ordered to pay interest on this amount from and after the 
date of the Amended Declaratory Judgment, November 26, 2012, at an annual rate of 12% until the 
date of entry of this Judgment. As of October 22, 2013, the total amount of interest owed is 
$45,221.30. Interest will continue to accrue in the amount of $13 7.03 per day thereafter until the 
date that this Judgment is entered. 
3. Interest shall accrue on the entire judgment amount from the date of judgment forward 
at the post-judgment legal rate, which is currently 5.250% per annum. 
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Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 




) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR COSTS 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 










COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a! PortneufMedical Center, LLC 
("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to I.R.C.P. 
54( d), I. C. 12-121, and hereby moves this Court for an order granting PMC's requests for costs and 
attorney's fees as outlined in its Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees filed 
contemporaneous herewith. With regard to PMC's request for attorney fees, PMC is specifically 
entitled to an award of attorney fees against the Defendant Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, as 
matter of contractual right under Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. This motion 
is based upon the Court's granting PMC its Motion for Summary Judgment, the judgment entered 
thereafter by this Court, and upon PMC' s Memorandum of Costs filed contemporaneous herewith. 
Oral argument is not requested. 
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DATED this !2_ day ofNovernber, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
~JG--
R. William Hancock, Jr. 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
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) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
) PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF 








Pursuant to IRCP 54( d), the Court's granting of Summary Judgment in favor ofPMC and 
the judgment entered by the Court thereafter, Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC ("PMC"), claims the following costs as the prevailing party to this action: 
I. COSTS AS A MATTER OF RIGHT UNDER IRCP 54(d)(l)(C). The 
following are non-discretionary costs actually paid by PMC in bringing this action: 
Filing Fee $ 96.00 
II. DISCRETIONARY COSTS SOUGHT UNDER IRCP 54(d)(l)(D). The 
following are discretionary costs which were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred in bringing the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and 
in defending the Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, which, in the 
5975: Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Page I 
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interests of justice, should be assessed against the Defendants. 
Westlaw Research $ 1,135.18 
TOTAL COSTS REQUESTED PURSUANT TO IRCP 54( d) $ 1,231.18 
ATTORNEY FEES FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
Pursuant to IC 12-121 and pursuant to paragraph 10.3 ofthe 1983 Ground Lease 
Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of the parties to this action, PMC claims the 
following attorney fees as the prevailing party to this action: 
TOTAL ATTORNEY FEES $ 15,797.00 
TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES $ 17,028.18 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Bannock ) 
R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, JR., being first duly sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am one of the attorneys representing the Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a 
PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC"), and as such I have knowledge of the amounts of the costs 
and the circumstances to their being incurred. 
2. I have reviewed the foregoing Memorandum of Costs and Attorneys Fees. The 
costs and attorney fees incurred therein are true and correct, were actually paid, and were 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in the prosecution of this action. To the best of my 
knowledge and belief, the costs and attorney fees shown herein are in compliance with the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct redacted copy of the Merrill & 
Merrill, Chtd. billing statement outlining the above-identified costs and attorney fees. The time 
entries shown on this billing statement are the time entries that were related to this action. All 
other time entries have been redacted, however, because they relate to other actions or matters that 
5975: Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees Page2 
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are not relevant to this action. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of the 1983 Ground Lease 
Agreement that governs the rights and responsibilities of these parties. 
5. Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement states: 
In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful detainer of the said 
premises, for the recovery of any rent due under the provisions of 
this lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant herein 
contained to be kept or performed, the prevailing party shall be paid 
a reasonable attorneys fee by the other party, and such attorney's 
fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such 
action and shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to 
judgment. 
6. Judgment was entered against the Defendants in this matter because of a 
failure to pay rents due and owing under the Ground Lease Agreement. 
_0~)/{)---
R. William Hancock, Jr. 
' it/._ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this (JJ day of November, 2013. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this 1.9-tb day ofNovember, 
2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney · 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Honorable Robert E. Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatelfo, Idaho 83201 
(Chambers Copy) 
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Trans H Tcodert'- ~ 
Client Date Atty P Task C~.... }' 
Client ID 13.59t5o LHP Hospital Group. l;;c. 
13.59750 12/04/2012 14 A 
13.59750 12/10/2012 4 A 
13.59750 12/11/2012 1 A 21 
13.59750 12/11/2012 4A 1 
13.59750 12/12/2012 1 A 21 
13.59750 12/12/2012 4A 1 
13.59750 12/13/2012 1 A 21 
13.59750 12/13/2012 14 A 1 
13.59750 12/13/2012 4A 
13.59750 12/13/2012 1 A 56 
13.59750 01/07/2013 14 A 




























72.50 Finalize complaint; Attention to Appeal certification from 
District Court; Conference with Attomey Gallafent on 
Cross-Appeal. 
90.00 Review and edit Complaint, meet with Dave Gallafent, 
review clerk's certificate of appeal. 
90.00 Quail Ridge- Draft Complaint 
216.00 Edit Complaint on collection of rent, meet with Dave 
Gallafent. 
360.00 Quail Ridge- Draft Complaint 
198.00 Edit Complaint. 
90.00 Quail Ridge- Draft complaint; appraisal analysis 
58.00 Edit and revise Complaint for breach of contract claim; 
Conference with Attorney Gallafent 
234.00 Edit Complaint and Summons, meet with Bm ar.d Dave, 
correspondence to Make Gaffney 
96.00 Bannock County Clerk- filing fee. 
43.50 Attention to Acceptance of Service; File Acceptance of 
Service with Court and cancel personal service 
43.50 Attention to Acceptance of Service and calendar 















Wednesday 1110612013 3:07pm 
346 of 447
f-~"\ 
Trans H Tcode/< _,"! 
Clie~1t Date Atty :_ Task Code 
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Amount 
34.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on default strategy, research on 
"notice of appearances". 
87.00 Research rules regarding Default Judgment and 
analyze whether notice required in this case; 
Conference with Attorney Hawkins on Notice issue 
17.00 Review Answer from Quail Ridge. 
42.50 Case preparation 
232.00 Conference with Attorney Gallafent on Summary 
Judgment in 2012 case and 2013 Rent Adjustment; 
Gather documents to begin next step in 2013 rent 
adjustment 
175.50 Research res iudicata. 
348.00 Legal research from Motion for Summary Judgement 
Conference with Attorney Neill on legal issues; Follow 
up legal research on collateral estoppel 
240.00 Discuss research with Bill Hancock; research collateral 
estoppel case law; draft legal argument for brief. 
899.00 Draft Motion for Summary Judgment 
24.00 Research collateral estoppel case law. 
85.00 Quail Ridge~ Conference with Bill re: Quail Ridge 
Motion 
34.00 Review Motion to Stay Proceedings. 
493.00 Work on Motion for Summary Judgement Review and 
analyze Quail's Motion to Stay; Conference with 
Attorney Gallafent and Neill regarding rules on bond; 
Posting on stay of action. 
144.00 Research stays of proceeding and bond requirements. 
42.50 Quail Ridge - Review Quail Ridge Motion for stay relief 
217.50 Draft Reply to motion to Stay; Conference with Attorney 
Gallafent 
153.00 Prepare "Agreed Response to Court's Request for 
Scheduling lnfonnation", review Motion for Stay & 
research cases on stay of one suit based on appeal of 
another suit. 
51.00 Edit Agreed Response to court's request for 
information. 
42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation on 2nd suit 
34.00 Amended Agreed Response to Order for Submission of 
Information to court, correspondence. 
116.00 Revise and Redraft Reply to Motion to stay 
212.50 Quail Ridge- Case preparation; e-mail Joe 
221.00 Pleadings & hearing notice {motion & affidavit for stay), 
memo in support of motion to stay, research on stay 
rule, also research amount of bond required. 
319.00 Revise and edit Reply Memorandum; Conference with 
Attorney Hawkins; Draft additional arguments for 
opposition to Motion to Stay and change from "reply'' to 
"opposition;" Conference with Attorney Gallafent; 
Revise and edit opposition 
85.00 Quail Ridge- Edit brief 
238.00 Edit stay memo, meet with Bill Hancock. 
464.00 Draft additional arguments in objection; Gather 
documentation and draft affidavits; Revise and edit 
objection; Conference with Attorney Hawkins; 
Conference with Attorney Gallafent; Revise Defendant's 
Answer to check admission of non-payment; Forward 
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13.59750 02/22/2013 14 A 1 
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42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation 
34.00 Affidavits and memo on motion to stay. 
101.50 Conference with Attorney Gallafent regarding issues 
with Reply; Draft changed to reply 
442.00 Meet with Bill, edit & finalize memo on Motion to Stay 
and to post a bond during appeal. 
174.00 Review and finalize objection; Conference with Attorney 
Hawkins 
17.00 Correspondence from Court on clerk's record. 
620.40 Westlaw research in February, 2013 (Bill Hancock). 
312.07 Westlaw research in February, 2013 (Tyler ~eill). 
221.00 Review Quail's reply brief, and prepare tor hearing on 
motion for stay. 
136.00 Prepare for hearing on Monday on Motion to Stay. 
629.00 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Stay. 
87.00 Review and analyze Quail Ridge's Reply Brief; 
Research Judge Brown's Minute Entry and Order for 
breach of contract issue; Conference with Attorney 
Hawkins 
391.00 Correspondence from Gaffney on posting cash with 
court instead of a bond, research on cash bond with 
court, continue review of record & transcripts, meet with 
dave Gallafent on bond & report to clients. 
85.00 Quail Ridge - Case analysis 
493.00 Edit correspondence to Gaffney, review strategy for 
raising rent and effect of stay order, follow up on 
cash/bond on stay order, call to administrative judge on 
bond procedure, finish transcript & record review, call to 
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Client 10 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc. 
13.59750 06/10/2013 14 A 
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72.50 Follow up with Attorney Avondet on Bond and notify of 
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580.06 · oratn~~10ifCu1.tO··com·pel; o·raft Affid"avft'in suP-POrt at 
Motion 
51.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on Motion to Compel and on 
Quail's bond with court. 
203.00 Conference with Attorney Gallafent and Hawkins 
regarding Motion to compel; Draft Responses to 
Attorney Avondet on Bond issue; Strategize for remedy 
request at hearing 
217.50 Prepare for hearing on Motion to Compel; Participate in 
~earing on Motion to Compel 
153.00 Meet with Bill Hancock on motion to compel and 
arbitration, finish review of appellant's reply brief, e-mail 
from court, eMmail to Mike Gaffney, e-mail to client. 
101.50 Telephone conference with Attorney Avondet; 
Conference with Attorney Gallafent regarding recent 
developments; Update Attorney Hawkins 
127.50 Summary Judgment brief preparation 
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Client Date Atty ~ Task Code 
Client JD 13.59750 LHP Hospital Group, Inc. 
13.59750 08130121i13 1 A 21 
13.59750 0813012013 14 A 1 
13.59750 09102/2013 1 A 21 
13.59750 09102/2013 14 A 1 
13.59750 09/03/2013 14 A 1 
13.59750 09/04/2013 14 A 
13.59750 09/0512013 1 A 21 
13.59750 09/05/2013 14 A 1 
13.59750 10107/2013 14 p 
13.59750 1010712013 15 p 
13.59750 10108/2013 14 p 
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696.00 Work on Motion for Summary Judgment- supporting 
brief 
85.00 Edit Summary Judgment Brief 
362.50 Finish drafting motion for summary judgment 
116.00 Revise Motion for Summary Judgment memo of 
Authorities; Additional legal research 
232.00 Ed1t and revise ivlodon for Summary Judgment; Draft 
additional legal arguments for Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
42.50 Quail Ridge - Case preparation; e-mail 
43.50 Finalize and file Motion for Summary Judgment and 
supporting documents 
188.50 Work on opposition to Quail's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
108.00 Review memo in opposition to motion for summary 
judgment; research. 
522.00 Legal research for opposition brief; Research 
transcripts for opposition brief; Conference with 
Attorney Hawkins; Revise and edit opposition brief and 























103.47 Westlaw research in October, 2013 (Bill Hancock). 
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GROUND LEASE AGREEMENT 
This ~ound Lease Agreement is made and entered into this ~ 
day of lJrWJU.U~. 1983, by and between lNTERI'lOUNTAlN HEALTH 
CARE, ftc"., a ~h non-profit corporation, authorized to do 
business in the State of Idaho . under the name of Pocatello 
Regional Medical Center (hereinafter called "Lessor"), and 
STERLlNG DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington partnership authorized to 
do business in the State of Idaho, (hereinafter called "Lessee"), 
.B.g_£.!.!~L§.. 
HHEREAS, Lessor owns certain real property located within l:he 
City of Pocatello, Bannock County, ldaho: and 
WHEREAS, Lessor wishes to lease to Lessee approximately 4 
acres, more or less, of ·said property for construction of a 
l Psychiatric Hospital building (the "hospital") and to impose 
certain restrictions on the use of such parcel of real property 
and Lessee wishes to lease said parcel of real property for such 
purpose, subject to Lessor's restrictions: 
WHEREAS, Lessor and Lessee wish to 
ground lease ag:ree·ment setting forth the 
and 
enter into a written 
terms, conditions and' 
restrictions und~_r which said parcel of real property is to be 
leased; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual 
covenants, conditions and promises contained herein, Lessor and 
Lessee agree as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
DESCRIPTION, TERM AND RENTAL 
1.1 Real Prooerty Leesed. Lessor hereby leases to Lessee 
and Lessee hereby leases from Lessor the real property described 
G.ROUND LEASE AGREEMENT - 1 HOR t NS ltiN, \'\"Yh'!t-:1 , ll 'tCUSON I. S 'ltlt"~otfl 
AU('II-.1 '' •lt.Atlt' 
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;n Exhibit "A" attached hereto and hereby made a part hereof, in-
cluding all easements, right-of-way interests associated there-
with whether granted or by prescription, and any and all other 











installation, maintenance, operation and service of electricity, 
. . 
gas, s·ewer, 'telephone, water and other utility lines an·d for 
driveways an-d approaches to and from abutting ways for the use 
and bene'fit of the above described real proper-ty, including 
improverne·nts to be erected thereon (hereinafter· called the 
"lease'd liind"), situated in the County of Bannock, State of 
Idaho. 
1. 2 Term. The term of this Lease shall be for a period of -
thirty (30) years {her~inafter referred to as the "Term"), 
commencing on the: 1st oay of 1983, ·or on or 
c·· 
.. 
before thirty (30) days after a buildin permit i·s issued, r· -
whi·chever is iater, (the "Commencement Date"), with one (1) ten \. 
·(10) year option to extend such term to be exercised as pr·ovided 
in .1\.rticle 14, Paragraph 14.1, hereof. Such option to ext·end the 
term·is pefsonal to_ Lessee and rn'y not be.assigned ~r conveYed in 
any manner whatsoever to another,party. Lessee shall be entitled 
to possess ion of the lea.sed land pn the Commencement Date. 
1.3 Rent and Pavrnent Thereof . 
. , . 
(a) R-ental. Lessee shall pay the following ann·ual 
rental amount: 
.1\.n initial ann\)al r..ental shall be -calculated 
on the basis of fifteen percent {15~)· of the 
value of th'e leased land. For purposes of 
the first thr e~ ( 3) years from the Corn::lence-
ment Date of this Lease, the leased land 
shal'l be valued at the rate of Fifteen 
( 
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Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($15,000.00) ·per 
acre. 
(b) hdjustments Based on Property Value. The annual 
net rental as set forth above Shall be adjusted every three 
(3) years beginning on the Commencement Date of this Lease, 
referred to below as the rent adjust~ent date. 
The parties' written agreement ,_.ithin ninety (90) days 
before the applicable rent adjustment date shall be a 
conclusive determination bet,..een the parties of the fair 
market value for the period to which the adjustment applies . 
lf the parties have not so agreed by the applicable rent 
adjustment date, the determination shall be made as in the 
paragraph on Arbitration in Ar.ticle 13. 
The rent as adjusted shall be' equal to fifteen percent 
(15%) percent of the fair market value of the leased land, 
exclusive of the improvements on the premises. Determina-
tion of fair market value shall be based on the highest and 
best use of the land·on the applicable rent adjustment date 
'-'itnout tak.ing the leasehold into account. The determina-
tion shall tak.e into account the parties' agreement tnat the 
initial minimum rent is the above-stated percentage applied 
to a fair mar'k.et value of Fifteen Thousand and No/100 
Dollars ($15,000.00) per acre and shall also ta'k.e into 
account any determinations of mar'k.et value made under this 
lease for the purpose of adjustments for periods preceding 
the applicable rent adjustment date. 
If the determination of adjusted rent is made after the 
applicable rent adjustment date, lessee shall continue to 
pay rent at the rate a!?plicable to the preceding period 
until the adjusted rate is determined. The party indebted 
shall, promptly after the determination, pay any difference 
for the period affected by the adjustment. 
. -·· ·-
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(cl Definition of Lease Year; Jll le.e.se ·yen is either a 
calendar year or a fiscal year, as selecteo'by Lessee. c 
l. 4 !:!!g_ation of Partner~;hip.· ·Nothing .in this Lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any wa:t or for 1\nY purpose a 
partner, joint venturer, or· associate in any relationship with 
Lessee other than that of landlord and ten·aht, nor shall this 
Lease be construed to autho-riz.e either to ac:t as agent for the 
other, except as expressly pr·ovided to t:he contrary in this 
Lease. . . 
1.5 Plllc:e of Rental P;:Yment.s. :All payments of Rental 
required to be paid to Lessor under the terms of this' lease shall 
be made in lawful .money of the United'' States which at time of 
such payment shall be legal tender for 'the' payment of public: and 
private'debts, free from all c:'l'aims, demands, deductions, 
a.bl!tement.s, set-offs, .prior notices· or c:o·unterc:laims ot' any kind 
or: character against Lessor and shall be payable at' the followin9 
address or at such other place or 'places· as may· 'be from t irne to 
t irne desig_nated by Lessor by written· notic:e gi-ven to· Lessee: 
1.6 
Trust or 
Pocatello Regional ~!edic:al Center 
777 Hospital 'tl·ay 
Pocatello, ldaho 83201 
fee Mortctages; Lessor may 
o.ther security i·nterests 
grant mortgages, 





subordination agreement', provided, however, that such mortgages, 
D.ee.ds of 'rrust a.r security interests. sha'll· be subject to this 
lease and further provided that Lessee deliver a copy of any sueh 
proposed mortga.ge, t>eed of Trust or other security interest and 
related note to Leossor for prior examination and approval; 
provided, ht;>wever, that such examination and approval shall be 
accomplished by Lessor in a diligent manner. 
(_ 
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USE OF LtAStD LAND AND TITLE TO IMPROVEMENTS 
2.1 Use of Leased Land. Lessee shall use the leased land 
solely for the purpose of constructing, maintaining a.nd operating 
the hospital for psychiatric care and substance abuse treatment~ 
provided that Lessee may at any time use the leased land for any 
lawful purpose. Lessee shall commence construction of the 
hospital within forty-fiv~ (45) days after the commencement date 
of 'this Lease and the issuance of· a building permit. If Lessee 
• is delayed in commencing c.onstruction or receiving the parmi t by 
any cause or causl!s beyond Lessee's control, such causes 
i ncl\lding but not necessarily being limited to Acts of God, 
strikes, war, insurrections, and the like, said forty-five (45) - . 
day period·· to commence construction shall be extended for a 
period e~uivalent to the tirne lost by reason of any such cause or 
causes; provided, however, that no extensions shall be granted 
for any such delay which commences more than ten (10) days before 
Lessee notifies Lessor of·· such delay and the reasons there~or. 
Once construction is besun, Lessee shall, with reasonable 
diligence, prosecute to completion all construction of improve-
ments, additions, or alterations and shall h~ve substantially 
completed construction of the hospital within '/!2ie {..}__) years 
after date of this lease. "Substantial completion" shall mean . . . 
that the hospital is ready for occupancy and use as a hospital as 
evidenced by a Ce-rtificate of Occupancy or other li'ke document 
issued by an appropriate governmental authority. If Lessee is 
oelayed in substantial completion of the hospital by any cause or · 
causes beyond Lessee's control. such causes including but not 
necessarily being limited to J<cts of God, strikes, ...:.ar, 
insurrections, and the like, said date for substantial co~pletion 
of the hospital shall be extended ~or a period e~uivalent to the 
time lost by reason of any such cause or causes; provided,· 
however, that no extensions will be s-::anted for any such delay 
.. -· .• 
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':"hich copun.ences more -than te-n· ·(·).0) ··o-a:y·s -befo·te 'l::E:'.ssee notif.ies (-. 
Lessor of .such delay· and the reasons therefor. All wor'K shall be · 
performed in a good ind workmanli'Ke rnanner, shall substantially 
comply with plans and specifications submitted to Lessor as 
required by this lease, and shall comply with all governmental 
permits, laws, ordinances a.nd regulat.ions. Less-ee shall not 
bring, cause to be brought, or permit to be brought or· kept on 
the leased land anything which will in any way con:Uic:t ·with any 
law, orcainance, rule, or regulation~ or coi1Ullit or suffer to be 
• committed any waste upon tne lea .. ec land, or use or a"ilow the 
.-.leased land or ·hospital to be used for any immoral 'or· u~lawful 
.pu.t:pose. 
2. 2. Ari:nitectural Compatibility. It is understood and 
agr.eed t'hat the bospi tal will be architecturally compatible with 
the 1'\ed Center hospital. In order to insure · that· tliis be 
accomplishec, Lessee shal+ submit it'!' site plan,.; elev-ations, and 
architectural plans and s~ecifi7ations for the ho'spital to toe ( 
Boa.rd of Directors of the Ned Center hospital for approval before 
commencing construction.· The approval of the Board of-Directors 
shall·-.not be unreasonably -withh.eld and t:esponse s'hall be' given 
w-ithin £orty""five ('15) days following the submission of l:.e!lsee's 
pla~s abd specifications. 
2. 3 · · Requ'ired Pal;'king. Lessee agre·es that in des ignin9 the . 
site plans and' the plans and specifications for constnic\:.ion of 
the hospi t'al, i't: will incl \.Ice sufficient off-.street parking. 
spaces t:o 
2.4 
'accommodate the minimum 
Title tb Euilcinos. 
reguired by.local codes. 
Title to the h6spital and 
appurtenances thereto and all other irn.prove.ments and fixtures 
locatec on the leased lane or constructed or placed on the leasec 
land by Lessee or its tenants shall be and rer:'lain in Lessee 
during the Term. Lessee sh.a11 ·have tne right to rna);e 
alter·ations, changes and repairs as provided herein. No interest 
in any builc ings, per~:~anent improvements, or fixtures shall pass 
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to Lessor until the expiration of the Term or the prior 
( termination of this lease by default of Lessee giving Lessor the 
right to terminate this lease pursuant to "-rticle 10 hereof. 
Lessee covenants and agrees that upon expiration of. the Term it 
will yield up and deliver the leased land Ylith any such 
buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the leased 
land at such time free and clear of all liens and encumbrances of 
any kino, and upon such expiration title therein shall be in 
Lessor. ln the event of earlier termination of this lease, 
• Lessee covenants and agrees that it ....-ill yield up and deliver the 
leased land '"'i th any suc:'h buildings, permanent improvements, and 
fixtures upon the leased land at such time free and clear of all 
liens and indebtedness of any kind. Provided, hoY/ever, that such 
obligation to deliver the leased land and improvements free and 
clear of all liens and indebtedness shall not apply to the 
original lien of first encumbrance represented by the mortgage or 
Deed of Trust or other security interest referred to in Article 6 
hereof given to secure the· financing for the construction of the 
original buildings, permanent improvements, and fixtures upon the 
leased land. Upon suc:h earlier termination, title in the 
buildings, permanent improvements and fixtures upon the leased 
land shall be in Lessor. 
2.5 Deed at Termination. Upon termination of this lease, 
Lessee shall·, subject to the foregoing, execute a deed 
:form and content to satisfactory in 
title to any buildings, permanent 
the leased land at the therein, upon 
Lessor confirming Lessor's 
improvements, and fixtures 
time of termination. 
2.6 hdditional Real Propertv. At such time as Lessee shall 
require additional real proper-ty for the expansion of the 
hospital, Lessee shall so notify Lessor- and Lessor- shall in sooo 
faith consider the leasing of acditional r-eal pr-oper-ty to Lessee 
for such purpose. 
' _. 
'" 
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., . 2,, . .7,. Gr,ant. .. .o.f, Ces·t o.f .. · Utilities and Easements· Upon c·-~ 
requests being made, Lessor shall grant to public entities or · ' 
other public service· corporations·, for the ·-purpose of serving 
only the property, rights of way or easements on .or over the 
property for poles or conduits or both, for telephone, 
electricity, wat.er, sanitary or storm sewers or both, and for 
other utilities and municipal or special district services. 
The cost of utili ties, their installation and maintenance, 
are to be assumed, fully paid and katisfied by Lessee • 
ARTICLE 3 
CONSTRUCTION, ALTERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE 
3.1 General Maintenance. Throughout the Term, Lessee 
shall, at Lessee's· sole. cost and expense, maintain the premises 
and all improvements in good condition and repair, ordinary wear 
.and .teC!r .excepted, and in' accordance with all applicable la,.•s, 
rules, ordinances, orders and regulations of ( l) federal, state, · 
county, municipal, and other gciver·nmental agencies and bodies C 
having or claiming jurisdiction and all their respective 
departments, bureaus, and officials: (2) the ins~,trance 
underwriting board' or insurance companies insuring all or any 
part of the premises or improvements or both; and (3) Lessor, as. 
shall be in effect froni time to time·. Lessee sha~l rnanag~ and 
operate the hospital and the surrounding grounds in a competent 
and professio·na·l -manner. Lessee s'ha.ll maintain the sidewalks and 
roadways giving access to the hospital free and clear o£ ice and 
snow. 
Except as provided below, Lessee sha.ll promptly and 
diligently repair, restore and replace as required to maintain or 
comply as above, or' to r·emedy all damage to or d~struction of all 
or any part of the improvements resulting wholly or in part from 
causes required by this lease to be covered b)' fire or elCtended 
coverage insurance, if the cost of the work so required does not 
( 
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e~ceed seventy-five percent {iS\) of the ~eplacement value of all 
( of the improvements. If the cost does e ~ceed that percent, 
Lessee may nevertheless repair, restore and replace as above or 
may by notice elect instead to ~az.e the improvements damaged or 
destroyed. Within thi~ty (:30) days after such notice, Lessor may 
by notice elect 
Lessee shall not 
to repair, restore and replace 





Lessor's notice of election. Lessor · sha 11 not be req11ired to 
furnish any services ·or facilities or to make any repairs or 
alterations of any :kind in or on the premises. Lessor's election 
to perform any obligation of Lessee under this provision on 
Lessee's failure or refusal to do so sball not constitute a 
waiver o~ ~ny ~ight or remedy fo~ Less•e's.default, and Lessee 
shall promptly reimburse, defend, and indemnify Lessor against 
all liability, loss, cost, and expense arising from it. 
In determining -whether Lessee has acted promptly as 
required under the foregoing paragraph, one of the criteria to be 
considered is the availability of any applicable insurance 
proceeds. 
Nothing in this provision defining the duty of 
maintenance shall be construed as limiting any right given 
elsewhere in this lease to alter, modify, demolish, remove, or 
replace any improvement, or as limiting provisions relating to 
condemnation or to damage or destruction during the final year or 
years of the Term-. No deprivation, 
use resulting froro any evt;>nt or 
paragrapn shall entitle Lessee to 
impairment, or limitation on 
work co.ntemplated by this 
any offset, abater.~ent, or 
reduction in rent no;r to any termination or extension of the 
'l'errn. 
3.2 Relief for Substantial Less of hrea. lf any dar..age to 
or dest;ruction of tbe premises or the improvements is such that 
75% of the floor area is rende~ed unusable for purposes stated in 
the Lease, Lessee may, at Lessee • s election, cielay the .,;ork 
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Nothing ('· 
contained· in this paragraph shall be construed to negate o,; 
moclify an::t provision ·of this 'lease relating to dar:~age or 
destruction during the final year(s) of the term. 
3.3 Major and Minor Distinc::uished. Lessor's approval is 
not required fo.r Le!is~e • s .. minor repa.irs, a Iterations, or 
additions. "Minor" means a construction cost not exceeding Five 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($5,000.00), none of which is derived 
from funds advanced on the security of an encumbrance on the 
leaseht;>ld or the property. "Construction cost• includes all 
c::osts that. .,ould constitute the basis of a valid claim or c.laims 
under the mechanics' lien laws in effect at the time the worK is 
c'ommenced for any demolition and allY r~moval of e:t~.sting 
impr~vem;nt.s .o; pa~ts of improvements as well as ~9r preparatio;;, 
construction and. completion of all ne,.. i:mprovements or parts of 
irnprovemen~s. The dol~ar amount stated abo~e shall be adjusted 
by th.e percentage change in the index known as the united s~~.t~s. 
ne·part.ment of Commerce Composite con'struction Cost Index as 
published in the Survey of Current Business by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, or suc:cessor index. !f the index is 
discontinued and there is no successor index, 'the refe::ence 
figure shall be determined by the senior officer in the clo~est.. 
office of the u.s. Department of Commerce or ·successor departm~nt 
or agency. "M.ajor'' re.pairs, alterations, or additions ~re tho~e 
not cefined as mi-nor a.bove. for major repairs, alterations •.. o:s;. 
additions, Lessee shal·l receive Lessor's approvals of the plans 
as set forth ,above in Paragraph 2. 2. 
3.4. G~,ver.n,mental. Authorities. Lessee shall promptly comply 
wit'h all applicable laws, regulations, ordinances, req:uirements 
anc5 orders of governrnenta·l authorities, in·clu'ding 1 but net. 
lirnited to 1 the ~a'l;.ing, at its sole ex?ense, of any instal.,l.a ti-on, 
alteration, modification,. change or repair, structura.l .or 
( 
:.~ ·-
otherwise; j?rovided, bo..-ever, Lessee has the right to contest by ( 
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appropriate judicial or administrative proceedings, ~ithout cost 
or expense to Lessor, the validity or application of any la~. 
ordinance, order, rule, regulations or requirement (hereina ft.e r 
called "Law") that. Lessee repair, maintain, alter or. replace the 
improvements in whole or in part., and Lessee shall not be in 
default for failing to do such work until a reasonable time 
fcllo.,ing final detel."mination of Lessee's contest. If Lessor 
gives notice of request., Lessee sh.:.ll first furnish Lessor a 
bond, satisfc.ctol."y to Lessor in form, amol.lnt and insurer, 
suaranteeing cotnpl iance by Lessee with the contested la'-', and 
indemnifying Lessor against all liability that Lessor.may sustain 
by reason of Lessee's failure or delay in complying with the Law. 
Lessor may, b_ut is not required to,. contest any such Law 
indepeno~ntly o~ Lessee. Lessor may, ano on Le.ssee's notice of 
request shell, join in Lessee's contest. 
S.S Damage or Destruction During Final Years of ~errn. In 
the event of substantial damage or destruction to the hospital or 
any part thereof during the last five (5) years of the Term, 
Lessor shall have the right, exercisable curing the ninety ( 90) 
Clays following the date of such damage or destruction, to 
terminate this lease·. Lessor shall exercise such right by 
delivering to Lessee written notice of the oate of such 
termination, which date shall not be earlier than thirty (30) 
days following the date of Lessor's notice of termination. Upon 
exercise of such ....right, Lessor snall be entitled to recover the 
full proceeds of any policy of insuranc::e covering any such Clamage 
or destruction except such proceeds as rnay be attributable to 
Lessee's loss of personal property and/or to interruption of 
Lessee's business. 
If Lessor does not 
Lessee shall be responsible 
replacement of the hospital or 
destroyed as the case may be. 





te>minate this lease, 
repair, rebuilding or 
thereof so damaged or 
repairs, rebuilding or 
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. n:pl.acernen:ts shall· -:rent5re· ·t:fie'''ll.ospl'tal t:; ~he condition it was ( 
in· i~t~meoiately prior til> the event 'giving rise to the wo~l<.. 
3.6 Last Year of Term. Anythins herein to the contrary 
notwithstanding, Lessee shall not have the right during the last 
3'65 days 9f the Tem to alter, remove or demolish, in. 1,1'J,ole or in 
part, any buildings, structures or other improvements :wh,ich exist 
upon the leased land 365 days prior to the end of the 'l'erin. 
except with the written consent of Lessor. 
not impair the right o·f Lessee to' remove 
'• 
This provision shall 
any moveable· items of 
• personal prc;.perty ·,from the leased land as pro':',S,qe~ i.n, ·ll,rticl'e 3 
hereof. 
... ARTICLE 4 
LE.!'.SEH'OLI> LIENS 
4,1 Riqht to Gran~en ·on Leasehold Estate. So long as 
Lessee shall not be in. de'fill.llt under ··the termt;, .. of. this lei!ose•, 
Lessee shall. have the right 'to grant a lien ,upon or a security - . ( 
intere.st in its leasehold. estate under this lf!:ase; provided, 
ho'wevel:, that notwi.thstanding ·anf such instrur.~,nt grant,ing such 
lien or security interest, Lessor is bound on_ly by those 
obligat:i-911!? and enjoys all rights and privile~es w.hich ··ar~ set 
forth in this lease. . Any mortgage or I>eed of Tr.ust or otner 
sec\Jrity ipterest executed by Lessee pursuant to this authority 
is hereinafter oesigna:ted and referred to as tf\e "leil.seh6lQ. 
mortgage" and th,enolder or owner of such lea!}ehold rnort9a9e ~pen 
the lea~eh_old estate of Lessee, including the benefl,ci-ary .of a 
Deed of Tru~t. if such rnort(ilage be in the for;m of a Deed of Tr<\l·st 
; -... 
or . othe::, _o;ecu1:ed party, 
"leasehold mort.gage.e". A:rly 
is hereinafter designated .as t·'he · 
leasehold mortgage sha,l.l not be for a 
period exce_.edi-ng the T-erm. Lesso'r agrees, at any time .and from 
time to time, uxoon receipt C!>f not less' than ten (.10) days. pri.c.;>r 
written request therefor by Lessee or by the leasehold mort·gagee, 
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mortgagee a statement. in writing, certifying, if such is the 
case, that this lea:oe is then unmodified and unamended,~that it -is not in default, and that it is 
there have been modifications and 
in full force and effect. If 
amenoments to this· lease, said 
statement shall, if sucn is the case, certify that the same is 
not tnen in d efa ul t· and · is in full force and effect as then 
modified and amended. Said modifications and a~endments shall be 
set forth in full in said statement. Said statement shall 
further state the dates to which the basic rental er other 
• charges have been paid, and whether or not 
default by Lessee with respect to any 
agreement on the part of Lessee provided 
there is any existing 
covenant, promise of 
to be performed under 
::.nis lea~-.:\ and also "''hether a notice of such default h:as been 
served by Lessor. If any such statement contains a claim of 
non-perforJt.ance, ·insofar as actually known by Lessor, shall be 
summari~ed in said statement. Lessee shall make pa)~ent when due 
and before delinquency o.f all principal, interest and otner 
charges for which Lessee may be or become obligated under any 
leasehold mortgage upon the leasehold estate. 
4.2 foreclosure of Lien. Prior to com~encing any action to 
foreclose a leasehold mortgage, the leasehold mortgagee, or any 
assigns of such mortgage, shall notify Lessor in writing of tne 
default by Lessee witn a statement of the amount then due and 
offer to withhold any acceleration of ma t.uri ty of the promissory 
not.e, p20yment. of which is secured by the leasehold r.~ortgage. In 
the event Lessor shall, within tnirty (30) days o:: the :-eceipt of 
said notice, pay to said mortgagee all amounts then in arrears on 
said mortgage, then upon said payment said mortgagee shall rein-
state the ll)crtsage in al.l respects as if no default had. occurred. 
Lessor may, at its option, ma'ke such payments on said mort;;age, 
and t.he amounts of such payments shall be considered additional 
rental due Lessor from Lessee under this le:ase. S u':> sequent. and 
successive defaults by Lessee in making payr:.ents required by any 
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leasehold mortgage shall be subject to the foregoing provisions 
each time any ·such cefa~lt occurs. Lessee s~all insure that all 
provisions contained· -in this lease reguiring ·act ion by parties 
not a party hereto shal-l be incorporated into doc\lr:lehts to whi.ch 
such parties are a party and that executed copies of such 
documents be delivered tO Lessor within ten (10) Clays of 
execution thereof.· 
A.RTlCLE 5 
PROTECTlO~ OF MOR~GAGEE 
Lessee shall give notice to Lessor of any leasehold !liOrta!'le 
~hich Lessee grants as provided for in Article 4 hereof ~nd shall 
~eliv.er along wi t.h said notice a copy of· the -mortgage instrument. 
So long as any. sum remains owipg on any obligation secured by 
such a leasehold 'mortsage, Lessor. and Lessee agree: . ' 
(a) That no modification Ot' termination of this lease o.r 
surrender of the leased la~d may be made by't~e Lessor or Lessee 
without the prior written consent of the mortgagee; 
(b) ·That. the Lessor will give· to the mortgagee al.l notice 
of default sirnult.aneous~y with any notice given to the 
(c) That the mortgagee ..,ill have thi::-t~· {30) 
Les~ee: 
days a!ter 
notice of Clefault delivered to it "'ithin '-lhich to cure :Lessee.' s 
default: provided, 1>owever, that. said · per:iocf in ..,hich default may ' 
be correct.e~ may be extended to no more than ninety (90) days i~ 
the event the mortgagee requires such a period as a condition for. 
granting a loan to Lessee anc if lo'it:.hi'n forty (40) days after 
notice of default the ~:~0 rt.gagee g-ives notice to ·Lessor if it 
intends to cure Lessee's default ~ithin said extenC!eC! period; 
{d) That the Lessor will aecept performance by ttl~ 
mortgagee in lieu of performance by the Lessee; 
{e) That. the Lessor ..,ill not terminate the lease for those 
defaults, the cure of which requires that the mortg11gee be in 
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commences foreclosure and continues its action with due 
tliligence, and (ii) continues payment of rent and all other 
charges required to be paid by Lessee which have accrued antl 
"'hicn become due and payable during the period the. foreclosure 
proceeding is pending; 
(f) 'l'hat the Lessor shall not 
of any 
have the rignt to terminate 
of the events anticipated by this lease solely on account 
subdivision (d) of paragraph l of Article 10 without the written 
consent of the leasehold mortgagee, provitled that such mortgagee 
promptly commences foreclosure if it has tne right to do so and 
thereafter continues its action with due diligence; 
(g) That in the event tne Lessee's interest under this 
lease shall be soltl, assigned or other"'ise .transferred FUrsuant 
to the exercise of any rignt, power or remedy of any mortgagee or 
pursuant to judicial proceedings or pursuant to paragraph l of 
Article 10, and if no rent or other charges shall then be due an 
payable under this lease, and if such mortgagee shall have 
arranged to the reasonable satisfaction of the Lessor for the 
curing of any default susceptible of being cured, Lessor within 
sixty (60) days after receiving a written request therefor and 
upon receiving payment of its expenses, incl•Jding atton:eys' 
fees, incident thereto, will execute and deliver such instrument 
or instruments as may be required to confirm sucn sale, 
assignment or other transfer of Lessee's interest under tne 
lease; or 
{h) That in the event a default under an)' leasehold 
mortgage shall have occured, the mortgagee may exercise any 
right, po'Wer or remedy of tne mortgagee under the mortgage which 
is not in conflict with the provisions of the lease. 
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6.1 Subordination. The Lessor_ shall, promptly after the 
notice of request of Lessee, e);ecute and deliver a mortgage, Deed 
of Trust or other ~ecurity instrument {herein call eo mortgage) 
sufficient to subordh1ate, to the lien of a first encumbrance 
represented by t.'he !1\0rt'lJage, Lessor's fee title (which shall be 
'considered to h•c:lude fee t.i tle in the leased premises or any 
part or parts of t'he l~ase'd premises, including al~ rig'ry.ts and 
• appurtenances) to any mortgage lender who is prepared to rna.ke a 
•. 
mortgage loan to Lessee to be secured by a first mortgage or need 
of Trust covering sa.id I.essor's fee interest in the demised 
premises (or suc'h part thereof as may pe d!!signateo. by r.essee·) 
' ..... . .. 
p'rovided that said mortgage is oh 'terms not more onerous than t'he 
following: 
Principal .. : 
Maturity• 
Not mor·e than s~Jenty-fi ve percent .. {-7 5·%) 
of the value of the property tC!l be ( 
rnot-tgaged .,_s appraised.· b;t any 
i,nstitl:lti:onal lender prop~s.~n.g .. ~o rna'Xe 
the loan, 'Or as independently ·appraised 
if the lender be other .than an 
·.institution. An insti'tutional lender is 
a bank, insurance company, _charitable 
institution, c·ollege or other institution 
of learning, retirement system, welfare 
fune, O'r any other oraanizetion or .• 
institution similar to any of the 
fGregoi:ng. The principal mu.st be 
sel f-li·quidating by periodic payments 
over t'he term o£ t'he mortgage; 
Not more than thirty (30) years or 
alternatively not more than the period of 
the unexpired term bet.,.een the date of 
t'he mortgage and the end of the term, 
( 
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exercise of the renewal options herein 
provided for. 
6.2 X:~penses. All expenses in connection with the making 
of said mortgage or Deed of Trust shall be borne by Lessee, and 
Lessor will execute any and all documents that :may be required 
with respect ther etc. However, Lessor shall assume no persona 1 
liability for the underlying indebtedness, but the mortgage note 
• or other evidence of indebtedness shall be executed s?lely by the 
Lessee. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall e~tend to 
any construction mortgage loan applied for by Lessee, as well as 
any permam;nt mortgage loan, and any mortgages in substitlltion or 
in replacement thereof, and as often as during the term such 
loans are applied for by the Lessee. 
6.3 Non-Mortgage ~ Lessor. Lessor agrees not to place any 
m'ortgage on the premises, _or .permit the same to be encumbered in 
( any manner, without the prior written consent of the Lessee. 
6.4 Limitation on Subordination. Lessor's agreement to 
fee title to a first subordinate any given portion 
is limited to one such mortgage 
the fee title for the purpose 
of the 
mortgage on the given 
of enabling Lessee 
pcrtion of 
to obtain 
financing for the improvements as contemplated herein and located 
on the given portion of the leased land; provided that, for this 
purpose, mortgages securing 
permanent loans for the 
separate construction and take-out 
same work of improvement shall 
or 
be 
considered to be one mortgage. Both the note and the mortgage 
securing it shall expressly provide that there can be no 
extension of the due date, addition to the balance of the loan, 
alteration of any provision in the documents, release of any 
obligor, or any refinancing of the unpaio principal balance 
"ithout Lessor's prior written approval. Not.hing in this para-
graph shall prohibit mortgagee :from paying delinquent. taxes or 
. -. ~ 
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ess.essments or providir;g insurance coverage if Lessor fails to ( 
eure such defaults of Lessee. Lessor she.ll not. be required to 
subordinate Lessor's fee ti t.le to the 1 ien of an encumbrance 
securing a construction or interim loan exeept ·on l-essee • s 
presentation of evidence, delivereo as provided for giving 
notices, of a firm .• and-enforceable cornmi·tinent for a tal;e-out or 
permanent loan. 
6.5 Curinq of Defaults. The mortgage shall provide that 
the mortgagee or trustee lnll;Y not accelerate the due da':.e of the 
• balance· outstanding on any loan by reason of any default by 
Lessee ...rithout having first given Le:~~sor wri'tten notice .of, suc;h 
default and without having permitted 'Lessor thirtY ( 30) days in 
which to cure sucb default or, if more .'than. <;.'1-.irty (30), ~ays is . ·~ .... 
necessary to cure such default, without 'having given Lessor 
adequate 'time· to cure such default. 'I'he mortgage and related 
documents shall further prov~de t.')"lat:·.the pe'rforrnanc:re of any and· 
all o'bllgatio·n·s .of Le&see thereunder shall be accepted if .• 
tendered ·by Lessor. Nei~her Lessor's :i':ight to c::ure any default 
nor any· e:Xereise of such a right shall consti:tute an assumption 
of liability under the note or mortga9e. 
6. 6 Indemnificat-ion. On request ·by Lessor, Lessee :.:hall 
indemnify Lessor from al)y and all: liability and expense caused 
Lessor as a result of any .action of L>essee in connection ~>~ith t.'he 
mortgage or Deed o~ Trust• 
ARTICLE 7 
.INSURANCE 
7.1 Liability and ProPerty Damaoe. From the time ~>~hen the 
Lessee comrne!'lces construction on· the demised .prernis es or an}' part 
thereof, the Lessee will cause to be wri'"tt.en a policy or .Policies 
of insurance in t'he form and contents "generally Y.nown as pub,lic 
liability and/or owner't>, lanEllo.rd and :te·nant policies and boiler 
( 
. -'--~ 
insurance policies and elevator insurance policies, when there be ( 
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boilers and elevators i?cluded in any improvements located on the 
demised premises, insuring tne Lessee against any and all claims 
and demands made by any person or ·persons ~homsoever for ·injuries 
received in connection with the operation and mainte·nance of the 
premises, improvements, and buildings located on the demised 
premises or for any other risk insured against 1:ly such policies, 
each class o£ which policies shall have been ~ritten· within 
limits of not less than Five Hundred Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($500,000.00) for damages incurred or cla;med by any one person 
• for bodily injury, or ot.ner~~;•ise, plus One Sundred ~ousand and 
No/100 Dollars {$100,000.00) damages to prope:l:'ty, and for not 
less than One Million and No/100 Dollars ($1,000,000.00) for 
damages ~nt:;l\rrec'l or claimed by more .than one person for ".:lodily 
injury, or ·otherwise, plus One Eundred Thousand and No/100 
Dollars ($100, 000.00) Clat:~ages to property. All su<::n policies 
shall name the Lessee and the Lessor, as their respective 
interests may appear, as ~he persons assured by such policies: 
( and the original or duplicate original of each of such policy or 
policies shall he delivered by the Lessee to the Lessor promptly 
upon the writing of such policies, together with adequate 
evidence of the fact that the preniums are paid. 
7.2 Fire anc'l Wind Damaoe Insurance. 
(l} Lessee's Ohlioation. The Lessee covenants anc'l 
agrees with Lessor that from anc'l after the time when the 




and improvements upon the said premises 
or damage by fire anc'l '.dndstorm, and 
against 
what is 
termed in the insurance trade as .. extended 
coverage", which saic'l insurance "'ill be maintained in an 
amount which will be sufficient to prevent any party in 
interest from being or becoming a co-insurer on any part of 
the risk, ~hich a~ount shall not b~ less than eighty percent 
(80%) of the full insurable value, and all of such policies 
·-
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of insurance shall inc:luoe ·the ··nar.~e of· tf\E,-·'Less~r as one of( .. 
the parties insured thereby and shall fully protect both tne 
Lessor and the Lessee as their respective interest may 
appear. In the event of destruction ol the said buildings 
or improvements by fire, vindstorm, or other casualty for 
which insurance shall be payable and as often as su.ch 
insura·nce money shall have been paic to the Lessor and the 
Lessee, said sums so paid shall be deposited in a joint 
account of the Lessor and the Lessee in a bank located in 
Bannock County, Idaho, and shall be made available to the 
. - .· 
Lessee for the construction or repair, ll.s the case may be, 
of any building or bui~ding,s damaged or destroyed by fire, 
vindstorrn, or other casualty for which insurance money shall 
. ... . . ... . . . . 
be payable and shall 'be paid out by the Lessor and the 
.Lessee from said joint account from time to time on the 
estimate of any reliable architect licensed in the State of 
Idaho having jurisdiction of such reconstruc-tion ano repair, ( 
c-ertifying th.at the amount of such estimate is being applied 
to the payment of the reconstruction or repair <>nd at a 
r-easonable cost therefor; provided, however, that it fi-rst 
be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Lessor that the 
total amount of money necessary to provide for the 
reconstructi.on or repair of a.ny buii'cHng or buildings 
destroyed or injured, as aforesaid, according to the plans 
adopted the~for, has 'been provided by the Lessee for such 
purpose and its application for such purpose assured: and 
the Lessee covenants and agrees that iri .the event of the 
destruction or damage of the buildings a'nd improvements or 
any part· thereof, and as often as ·any buildil)g or 
improvement on said premises shall be destroyed or .dar:teged 
by f.ire, vindstorm, or other casualty, the Lessee shall 
rebuild and repair the same in such manner that the 'builcing 
or i~:~provemen't so rebuilt and repaired, and the personal 
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property upon the .demised premises prior to such damage or 
destruction, and shall nave the same rebuilt and ready for 
occupancy within fifteen (15) months from the time when the 
lou or destruction occurred. The fifteen (15) ·month period 
for reconstruction shall be enlarseo by delays caused 
without fault or neglect on the part of the Lessee by act of· 
God, strikes, lockouts, or other conditions beyond the 
Lessee's control. 
(2) Delivery of Policies. The originals of all such 
policies shall be delivered to the Lessor by. the Lessee 
along with the receipted bills evidencing the fact that the 
premiums the~:efore are paid; b\lt nothing herein contained 
shall .be construed as prohi'bitins the llessee from financing 
the premiums where the terms of the policies are for three 
(3) years or. more and in such event the receipts shall 
evidence it to be the fact that the installment pre~ium pay-
ment or payments are_ paid at or before their respective 
maturities. Where, however, there is a mortgage on the 
premises created pursuant to the provisions contained in 
this lease and if, under the terms of such mortgage, it is 
obligatory upon the Lessee to cause the originals of the 
policies to be delivered to the mortgat:;ee, then the Lessee 
shall deliver to the Lessor duplicate certificates of such 
policies. The policies or duplicate certificates thereof, 
as the cese may be, shall be delivered by the Lessee to the 
Lessor at least ten (10) days prior to the effective date of 
the policies. 
( 3) W.."ect of Mortcaae Subordination, All of the pro-
visions herein contained relative to the disposition of pay-
ments from insurance companies are subject to the fact that 
if any mortgagees holding a mortgage created pursuant to the 
provisions of this lease hereof elects, in 
the terms of such mortgage, to require that 
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the insurance be paid t.o the ll1ortgagee on account. of sueh 
·mortgage, then such payment shall be made, but in .such 
event, it shall- sti;ll be obligatory upon· ·the .. · Lessee to 
create the compl~te fund in the manner set forth in this 
section to assur.e and ~omplete the payment. for the work of 
reconstruction and r•pai~. 
(4) Pi!,maof(!s~ Insuran~e Proceeds! Joint !lank. t\ccount. 
I't. is agreed that any excess. of money recei.ved from insur-
ance remaining in the :joint bank account. after the recon-
struction or repair of such building or buildings, if there 
be no default on the part of the i.ess'ee in the perfor~r.ance 
of.the covenant~ herein, shall·be paid to the Lessee, and in 
case. of the Lessee not .. ,enterir1g. into the reconstruction or 
repair of the building Gr· buildings within a period •of six 
(6) months from the, date .o·f payment of the l<;J!!S,, after 
.-· . ' ' . ' ... 
damage or destruction .. oec:·a.sic:med by fire, windstorm, or 
other cause for \'lhich .. insurance· 'inoney shall be payable, and 
prosecuting the same thereafter with such dtspatc~ as.rnay be 
necessary to complete the same within fifteen (15) months 
after the occurr·ence of such dam'age or ~e.struction 
''·' r.>ccesioned as aforesaid, then the amount so collectecl, or 
the balance there,of. re!Tiaining in the joint account, as the 
'·· case may 'be, shall be paid· to ·the 'Lessor and it will be at 
the Lessor's opti,on .. ,to te:t'l:linat'e the leas~ and retain such 
'amount as liquida~ed. an.d a·greed upon dama9es resulting from 
the· failure ~f the Lessee to promptly, within the time spec-
ified, complete such work of reconstruction and repair. The 
fift.een ( 15) month period herein provided for reconstruction 
:.hall be enlarged [)y delays caused without fault or neglect 
on the part of th.e Lessee by· act .. of God, str~'kes, loc'kout, 
or other condi.tior>.s ( o.ther than matters o.f finance,) beyond 
the contr!=>l of Lessee. 
( 
( 
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(5) Direct Repayment, The foregoing notwithstanding, 
in the event the insurance proceeds are the sum of Twenty 





shall be paid directly to the Lessee without 
of creating the bani<: account as 
hereinabove set forth, and Lessee 
joint 
shall use such funds to 
make the replacements or repairs as required hereunder. 
i.J Lessee's Covenant to Pay lnsurance Premiums. The 
Lessee covenants and agrees with Lessor that the Lessee will pay 
premiums for all of tne insurance policies which the Lessee is 
obligated to carry under the terms of this lease, and ><~ill 
deliver to tbe Lessor evidence of such payme.nts before the 
payment of any. such premiums become .i.n. default, and the Lessee 
·~ . 
will cause renewals of expiring policies to be written and the 
policies or copies thereof, as tne lease may require, to be 
delivered to Lessor at least ten (10} days before the expiration 
date of such expiring policies. 
. -
?.4 lndemnification. 
(a} Defense and Pavment of Claims. 
defend, indemnify and hold Lessor harmless 
:Lessee agrees to 
together with all 
of its servants, agents, or employees, from and against all 
liability or loss for injuries to or deaths of persons or 
damages to property caused by Lessee'$ acts or omissions to 
act, use of. or occupancy of the leased land, or as the 
result of tessee' s operations on said leased land. Each 
party hereto shall give to the other parties prompt and 
timely notice of any claim 
l<:nowledge wh i c'h in any 
or suit instituted coming to its 
way, directly or indirectly, 
contingently or otherwise, affects or might affect another 
party, and all parties shall have the right to participate 
in the defense of the .same to the extent of each parties' 
own interest. 
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(b) Mechanic's Liens. ln the event any mechanic's or ( 
·other liens or orders f·or the payment of money shall be 
filed against the l~ased land or any building or 
improvements ):.hereon by reason of or arising· out of any 
labor, material furnished or alleged to have 'been furnished, 
or to be furnished to or for Lessee on the leased l~nd, or 
for or by reason of any change, alteration, or addition of 
the cost or expense thereof, or any contract. relating 
thereto., or against the Lessor as owner thereof, Lessee 
shalL within thirty (30} days after it receives notice or . . . 
'knowledge thereof, either pay or· bond the· same ~r provide 
for the discharge thereof in ·s·uch manner. as may be provided 
by ll!w. .Lessee· shall also defend· on ·behalf of Lesst~t· at -.. 
Lessee's ·sole e;:pense, any action, suit or proceeding Which 
may he brought thereon, or for the enforcer:~ent of '· sucb 
lien~, o·r orders, and 
discharg~ any judgrne~t 
Lessor from any and 
Lessee shall pay any damage and 
entered therein and save harmless . ' . 
all claims e>r ·danages resulting 
there£ rom. Lessor reserves .the right, however, to defend or 
to dhect the defense of any such suit· or proceedings. 
Les:>:ee shall pay all expenses of such dafense, incl:.u.lin9 
attorney's fees, and shall pay any ·damage and _discharge any 
judgment entered therein and save Lessor harmless from any 
and all claims or damag·es resulting 'therefrom •. 
(c) Resistinp C;I.g'ims. ln th~ event Lessee shall 
desire tc resist any mechanic's or r..at.erialmen's lieps., or ,. . 
any 'othe• claim against the hereinabove described premises .. \ 
on account of building, rebuilding, repairing, reconstruc-
tion or other.,•ise 'improving the leased land, Lessee shall 
bave the right to do s.o, provided Lessee shall first place 
funds into escrow in an amount sufficient to pay said claim 
or "lien, with said escrow directed to pay such clair.1 or lien 
in the event of a result adverse to Lessee. 
( 
( 
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7. S Insurer Cualified • The insurer shall be qualified and 
authorized through the· DepartJnent of Insurance of the State of 
ldaho. 
ARTICLE 8 
TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, L!ENS AND ENCUMBRANCES 
Lessee shall be responsible to pay and discharge all exist-
ing and future taxes and assessments which are or may become a 
lien upon or "'hich may be levied by the State, County or any 
other tax levying body upon the leased land or improver.~ents 
thereon or property located on the leased land. Lessee shall 
also be responsible for all insurance premiums. and for all 
liabilities •. charges, fees, obligations, liens and encumbrances 
associated ··.,.ith or relating to the existence and use of the 
leased l11nd including, but not lirr.ited to, all assessment 
installments due or payable after the date of this lease. All 
payr.~ents of taxes or assessments or both, 
installment payments, shall be prorated for 
except permitted 
the initial lease 
year and for the year in which the lease terminates. Lessee rnay, 
in its own name, or to the extent necessary under Lessor's name, 
contest in_good fait'h by all appropriate proceedings, the amount., 
applicability or validity of any tax. assessment or fine 
pertaining to the leased land, or to any building, structure or 
improvement upon the leased land, and in the event Lessee does in 
good faith conte.s..t the applicability or validity of any tax, 
assessment or fine, Lessor ~ill cooperate in such contest 
whenever possible with Lessee: !?rovided that such contest ~<till 
not subject any part of the leased land to forfeiture or loss, 
except that, if at any time payment of the whole or any part of 
such tax. assessment or fine shall bec:or.te necessary in order to 
prevent any suoh forfeiture or loss, Lessee shall pay the same or 
cause the same to be paid in tipe to prevent such forfeiture or 
loss. 
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·CONDEMNl'.TlON 
9.1 Priority. ln the event .of the taking or condemnation 
by any competent authority for any public or quasi-public use or 
purpose of the whole or matelfially all of the dernise·d premises at 
any time during·· the term a.na -after any outstanding first mortgage 
indebtedness ha·s ·'been paid and satisfied, then the rights of 
Lessor and Lessee to share in the net proceeds o,f any awa~:cis for 
land, bu il.ding s, irnprov'en\ents and· da,~age s ul?on. a!fy.. such taking, 
• shall be as ,follows and in the followina order of priority: -. 
' ' 
•' (a) Lessor. at all times I resard.less of when the ta'k.ing 
occur~. shall 'be entitled to receive, with iRterest thereon, 
tho:-.t po.rt~on of the a"w'ard as shall ~:epr~sent compens11tion -. .. . 
fo:r the value of. t·he demised premises, considered as va·cant 
and unimproved· land, such value being hereinafter referred 
to as. the ''land value•. Lessor shall also J:>e entitled to 
costs awarded in the condemnation procee~ing .. proportionately 
attributable .to such ia.rid value. 
(b) (1) Duri:ns all the term herein demised, e~cept the 
last five years of the term, Lessee shall .be -entitled to the 
entire balance of the award, which ba 1 anc:e is hereinaf-ter 
.•eferred to as "a"Ward balance•. 
(2) 'If· the taking or condemnation as above set 
forth shall occur at any time during the last five yea~:s of 
the term, Lessee shall ·be entitled to re9eive out of the 
award, ...,ith intere·st ···thereon, the award 'b~lan.1=e, diminished 
b_y twenty percent '(20\) · ci£ such aw~rd l:lal.a.nce for eac:'h full 
yea.r {and in proportion for a fraction of a yead that 
elapses from the firs·t day of said five year period to the 
da~~ of the vesting of title in the condemnor; the ~emaining 
award balanc;:e and interest thereon, as well as th-e a"·ard for 
la,nd value and intere'st the~:eon, shall belong to the Lessor. 
( 
-
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(3) For the purpose of computing the last five 
years of the term within the meaning of subpara9raphs (1) 
and (2) above, -J.t ··i-s agreed that said' "last five years" 
shall mean the last five years of the original ·term, or if, 
at or prior to the date that the award or the first partial 
payment thereof (if there be such partial payments) becomes 
payable, the parties shall have duly agreed to extend the 
term of this lease pu•suant to the options to renew herein 
containad or by a written instrument executed in the manner 
required for rf;COrding, then said last five years shall be 
deemed to mean the last five (5) years of the term as so 
extend ell. 
~ l.cl I..f the values of the respective interests of Lessor 
and Lessee shall be determined according to the provisions 
of subdivisions (a) and (b) of this Section in the pro-
ceeding pursuant to which the demised ~remises shall have 
been taken or condemn.ed, the values so determined shall be 
conclusive upon Les.sor and Lessee. lf such values shall not 
have been thus separately determined, such values shall be 
fixed by agreement between the Lessor and Lessee or if they 
are unable to agree, then the controversy shall be re3olved 
by arbitration under the ?l"O~edure to gove~n in Arbitration 
as set forth in this lease hereof under Article 13. 
{d) In the event of the taKing in condemnation of less 
than the ~hole of the demised premises but materially all of 
said premises as hereinbelow defined anc the part of the 
premises 
that was 
that remains includes a part of the improvement 
taKen, then as to the untaKen remainder of the 
improvement only, but not any remal.n:l.ng land, the pa::-ties 
shall endeavor to agree on the then fair t:~ari:et value ot 
such remainder of the improvement, and if they fail to agree 
then the controversy shall be resolved by arbitration. The 
value so agreed upon as the then fair .market value of such 
··· . 
< -.... 
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remainder of the improvel!lent or as determined in arbitra- c-
tion, but diminished in the same manner as provicl.ecl. for in 
"(b)" above relative to an ''a.,.ard balance", shall be paid by 
Lessor to Lessee, and until paid shall be a charge on the 
share of the a~o~ard for land value to which Lessor shall be 
entitled in the condemnation proceeding. 
(e) If title to the whole or materially all· of the 
demised _premises shall be taken or condemned, this lease 
shall. cease and terminate as to the provision so taken and 
shall terminate as to the entire parcel if in Lessee's 
judgment the taking materially and substantially affects the 
use and value of the re~ainder of the demised premises. 
···-. .. ·• 
ARTICLE 10 
DEFAULT l'ROVlS!ONS; REMEDIES; ATTORNEY'S FEES 
10.1 Default by Lessee.· Each of the following_ shall be 
deenied an event o£ default by Less•ee and i!. breach of this lease: (_ -
(a) Rent o;r Other Payments. If 'Lessee shall default 
in the paymen~ of 
according tO the 
correct the saJI\e 
rent or other payments her'eunder whe_n due 
terms of this l'ea·se and does not fully 
wit,:hin thirty (30) 'days after wd.<:.t.en 
notice thereof to Lessee. 
(b) Otf\er CQV·e,nant-s or c·ondi tions. If Lessee shall 
default in the performance -or observance of any other 
coven~;~nt or co-ndition of this' lease or of any .note, 
mortgag~, Deed of Tru$t, or 'other document reiating to the 
financing of the hospital ·to be performed or observed by 
Lessee, whether or not Lessor is a party to any such 
documents. and does not fully correct the same within 30 
days afte.r notice ·the;r:.eof to the Lessee. 
(c) Abandonment. Abandonment of the premises. 
(d) Bankruptcy l?·ro:ceedings, ll' during the Term of 
this le_ase, Lessee shall: 
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(i) Appointment of Receiver. Apply for 
or consent in writing, signed on behalf of ~essee 
or its duly authorized attorney, to the 
appointment of a receiver, trustee or liquidator 
of the ~essee or of all or a substantial part of 
Lessee's assets: or 
(ii) Voluntary l.lan'Kruptcy. File · a 
voluntary petition in bankruptcy or admit in 
writing its· inability 'to pay its debts as they 
become due; or 
(iii) Assignment for creditors. Ma'l<e a 
general assignment for the benefit of creditors: 
or 
{iv) Reorganization or Arranoement. File 
a reorganization or arrangement with creditors to 
take advantage of any insolvency law; or 
{v) .Admit Insolvency. File an answer 
admitting the material allegations of a petition 
filed against. ~essee in any bankruptcy, 
reorganization or insolvency ,proceetling, or 
during the Term of this lease, an order, judgment 
or decree shall be entered by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, on the application of a 
creditor, adjudicating Lessee ban~rupt or 
insolv.&nt or approving a petition see~ing a 
reorgani~ation of Lessee or appointing a 
receiver, trustee or liquidator of ~essee, or of 
all or a substantial part of its assets. 
10.2 Remedies. In the event of any breach or default of 
this lease by Lessee, then Lessor, besides other rights of 
re-entry may continue professional services to the patients of 
the hospital and use of the property upon the premises for these 
purposes. 
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Shoulo Lessor elect to re-enter as herein provided, or 
should Lessor ta'lte posses sian pursuant to legal proceedings, or 
pursuant to any notice provideCI for by la'-1, Lessor may t';!ither 
terminate this lease or Lessor may from tirne to t'ime, Without 
terrninatins this lease, relet said premises or any part thereof 
for such term or terms anCI at such rental or rentals ana upon 
such other terms an.:l conoitions as Lessor in Lessor's sole 
discretion m~y deem advisable, wit~ the right to make alterations 
ana repairs to 
such reletting 
the premises. Rentals received by Lessor from 
shall be applied: first, to payment of any 
indebtedness, other than rent, due Lessor hereunoer from Lessee: 
second, to the payment of rent due'and unpaid hereunder; third, 
to the payment- of ·any costs of such relett'ing; fourth, to the 
payment of the cost of any alterations and repairs to the 
premises made necessary by Lessee • s breach of the provisions of 
this lease: and the residue, if any, shall be'helo by. Lesser and ( 
applied in payment of future rent as the same may become due and 
payable hereunC!er. Shoulo S1JCh rental reee'ived from such 
reletting be less than the rental agreed to be paid that month by 
Lessee hereunoer, then Lessee shall pay such deficiency to 
Lessor. Such deficiency shall be ealculated. an.:! paid monthly. 
t<o such re-entry or taking possession of the prernis'es by Lessor 
shal.l be construed as an election on Lessor • s part to termintlte 
this lease unless a written notice of such intention is given to - . 
Lessee or unless the termination thereof be decreed by a cou~t of 
competent jurisdiction.. Notwithstanding any such reletting 
without termination. Lesllor may at any ·time thereafter elect to 
terminate this lease for such previous breach. 
Should Lessor at any time terminate this lease for any · 
breach, in addition to any other remedy Lessor may have, Lessor 
may recover from Lessee all damages Lessor may incur by reason of 
such breach, including the costs of recovering the premises, and 
including the wo't'th at the time of such termination of the 
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excess, if any, of the amount of rent. additional rent and 
charges equivalent to rent reserved in this lease for the 
remainder of the Term over the then reasonable rental value of 
the premises for the remainder of the 'l'erm. The remedies herein 
given to Lessor shall be cumulative, and the exercise of any one 
remedy by Lessor shall not be to the exclusion of any other 
remedy. With previous written notice or demand, separate actions 
may be rnaintained by .Lessor against Lessee from time to time to 
recover any rent or damages which, at the commencement of any 
such action, has become due and payable to Lessor without waiting 
until the end of the Term of this lease. 
10.3 I>.ttorney's Fees. In the event suit shall be brought 
.for an unlawfui detainer of the said premise.>, for the recovery 
of any rent due under the provisions of this lease, or because of 
the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or 
performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasonable 
attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee shall 
-.. . "' . 
be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and , :;: 
shall be paid whether or not such action is prosecuted to 
judgment. 
1\CTICLE ll 
COVENANTS ANP WI>.RRANTIES 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this lease, lessee 
agrees to tal<e possess ion of the leased land in an "as is" 
condition, provided hO"'ever, that Lessor covenants, represents 
and warrants as follows: 
ll.l Title. That Lessor has good and mar'ketable title to 
the leased land and said title is free and unencumbered.· 
Lessor's right, title and interest in and to the le .. sed land, 
except for this lease and for any lien or indebtedness incurred 
pursuant to Article 4, shall not be subordinated to any other 
claim or interest of Less~e or to any other claim or interest of 
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any rnortgegee or other.oreditor in connection with the financing 
c··· 
of the improvements 
· ll. 2 -~ 1\ioht ... to 
to be c.onstructed on the le~:~sed premises. 
E·xecl,lte. That· Lessor hu full r:fght ana 
power 'to execute and per.form this lease and to grant the estate 
leased 'herein and toe rights, ea semen·ts, privileges,. 
app~rterian~es and hereditaments belonging or pertaining thereto, 
·.\ 
·including. air-rights. 
11.3 Peaceful.Enjovnent. That Lessee, on ·J?'aying the .r~~t 
her·ein ·reserved and 
··. h·ereof on its p'art to 
performing the covenants 'and 
be per.formed, shall peaoefully 
provisions 
and qu'iet:J_y 
have ·and enjoy the leased land, ano·all such existing or future 
required rights, easen·;~~ts, privile·ges, appu:rrten~n~e's and 
?eredit~~~nts~ belonging or pertaining ~hereto, including . . . . . 
air-rights', during the 'l'~rrn1 provided, however, t:l'iat Lessor does 
not Wa}:'rant that 9overnrnental aUthority ma:y nOt 'at Some time 
during' t'he Term,· w.i. ~h;ut 1;.he con.sent . or permissidn oi .. Lessor, 
·pa·ss oidinances or perform acts whic'h may 'be prejudicial to 
Les·see 'through ~o fau~·~ of Lessor; pr.ovided, however. that' Lessor 
agrees·. ·to join with L~ssee in protest or opposition to such 
ordinances·· or acts, the expenses of such opposition to be borne 
by Lessee. 
.. ~C.LE 3:2. 
ASS!'GNM~NT, SUJ?LE:r''I'lNG · Allt> SJ\.LE 
'12.1 i\.~;signm~n:t, SP,.blet"t;ins anc ·Sal!!.'· Lessee may no.t 
as'sign or sublet this leas~ agreement ·,.·itbout ·the 'prior w~itt~:~ 
consent of Lessor, which consent shall not be unreasonably 
withheld; provided, however, that in ·t:he event I,e·ssox gives its 
.. 
conse'r:it for tbe assignment or sublettin.g .of this lease, Lessor is 
bot:m'd· only by such obligations an<l enjo:j>s ·.such rights e,nq 
privileges as 11re set for~h in this. leas·e. lt is el:presssly 
ag'reed t'hat Lessor may require, 
that the officers of the I.essee 
as a cGlndition of such consent, ... 
corporation agree to be person-
( 
( 
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ally liable for the performance of all obligations and covenants 
of Lessee's assignee(s} or subtenant(s) under this Lease. !n the 
event Lessee shall determine to sell all or any portion of the 
hospital, and/or any additions or expansions thereto or thereof, 
. gran~ed first righ~ of rafusai 
Lessor shall be )e(n:U;ilxe:ll!{ to purchase tne hospital as the fair 
market value which, unless agreed upon by the parties, shall be 
determined by an M.A.!. real estate appraiser appointed and paid 
by Lessor. lf Lessee is not satisfied ""ith the fair market value 
appraisal sUbmitted by the appraiser selected 




of tbe may, at its own expense 
receipt of the appraisal, select an M.A.I. real estate appraiser 
who, together with the appraiser selected by Lessor, shall choose 
.a third~ sl!ch appraiser 'Whose fees sha-ll be snared e·.;:ually by 
Lessor and Lessee. If Lessee fails to select a 1!-econd appraiser 
within the time allowed, the single appraiser appointed shall be 
the sole appraiser and shall set the fair market velue of the 
hospital. lf Lessee does timely act, and a majority cannot agree 
as to the fair rna r"ket value of the hospital, the three (3) 
appraisals shall be added together and their total divided by 
tnree (3). The resulting quotient shall be the fair market value 
of the hospital for the pu~pose of this purchase option. 
ARTICLE 13 
~BITAATION; Al'POJ;!.ITMEN'l' 
13.1 Arbitration. Either party may require the arbitration 
of any matter- arising under or in connection 'With this lease. 
Arbitration is initiated and required by giving notice specifyins 
the matter to be arbitrated. If action is already pending·on any 
matter concerning ..,hich the notice is given, the notice is 
ineffective unless given before the expiration of thirty (30) 
days after service of process on the person g·iving the notice. 
Except as provided . to the contrary in these provisions on 
arbitration, the arbitration shall be in conformity and subject 
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rules and procedures of t'he American 






Pleadings in any action pending on the same matter shall, if the 
arbitration is required . or consented to, be deemed amended to 
l.irnit the issues to those contemplated by t.he rules prescribed 
above. Each party shall pay half the cost of arbitration 
including arbitrator. s 
separately provided i~ 






h?oointrnent. Appointment shall be made in the manner 
for the appointment o.f arbitrators unless expressly 
to the c:oJ;1tre.ry in the !!pplicr.ble provisions of this 
'The.,::e,:;hall be three (3} arbitrators appointed as J:o~lows: 
(a) Within twenty ( 2.0) days after not.ice requ,iring 
arbitration, each party shall appoint one (l) arbitra~or and 
( 
give notice of the appointment. to the othe.r party. ( 
(b) The two (2) arbitrators shall choose a. third 
arbitrator within thirt·y (30) days after appointment of the 
second. 
(c) lf either party fails to appoint an arbitrator, 
or if the two (2) arbitrators fail to choc;-se a third, the 
appointment shall be made by the t.'hen presiding judge of the 
Superior Court for the county in which t'he premises are 
located, acting in his individual a·nd. nonoffS.cia.l. capacity 
on the appli"'cation of either party and on ·(30) days' notice 
to the other party: provided that ~i ther party :-'ay, by 
notice given before. commencement. of the arbitration 'h.earing, 
consent to arbitration. by t'he arbitrator appoint.~d by the 
ot'her party. In that event, no further appointments of 
arbitrator shall be ~ade .and any other arbitrators 
previously appointed shall be dismissed. 
( 
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1.11.1 Exercise. of Renewal Option. __ ;t.es~.e!t 
option to extend the Term granted under ~rticle 
1!\~Y exercise its ·-· -
I, paragraph 1.2, 
h~reof, by giving Lessor written notice thereof not later than 
120 days prior to the expiration date of the Term. Any option so 
exercised shall extend the leese on the same terms as are in 
effect at the time of the exercise of such options, subject to 
adjustment and notification in accordence herewith. 
14.2 Inspe,ction by Lessor. Lessor may enter upon the 
leased land at any reasonable time for any purpose necessary, 
incidental to or connected with verifications of the performance 
of Lessee's obligations hereunder, bUt subject to any provisions . .... . ... ' . . . 
with respect thereto otherwise contained herein-
14. 3 Necation of Partnershi-p. Nothing in this lease shall 
be construed to render the Lessor in any way or for any purpose a 
partner, joint venturer, or associate in any relationship with 
Lessee other than that of landlord and tenant. nor shall this 
lease be construed to authori~e either to act as agent for the 
other except as expressly provided to the contrary in this lease. 
14 • .11 Controllinc:; Law. This lease shall be deemed 'tn be 
made and shall 'be construed in accordance with the laws of the 
State of Idaho. 
1.11.5 Surrender of Possession. Lessee agrees to Y.ield and 
deliver to Les-sor possession of the demised lane at the 
termination of this lease or as other"'ise provided herein, in 
good condition and in accordance with the u:press obligations 
provided herein, except for reasonable wear and tear, and Lessee 
shall execute and deliver to Lessor a good and sufficient. 
document of relinquishment, if and when requested. 
14.6 Successors. This lease shall bincl and inure to the 
benefit of any successor or assignee of Lessor 
or assignees of Lessee whet:.her resulting 
.. 
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consolidation, 
otherwise. 
reorg.ani:Za tion, assisnment, foreclosure or 
14.7 Headinqs. The article and paragraph headint;~s 
containei! herein are for convenience and reference ";;~nd are not 
itnendecl to define or limit the scope of any pr.ovision of this 
lease. 
14. a Notices. All notices required to be given to Le.ssee 
under the terms of the lease shall be given by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, postage prepaid, addressed to Lessee as 
follows: 
STERLI~G DEVELOPMENT co., a 
Washington partnership 
1906 Broadway 
·-. ·· Vancouver, Washington ·98663 
wi t.h copy to: 
EOR£NSTEIN, WYNNE, FERGUSON & STOUHBOS 
1220 Main Street, Suite 300 
p. o. Box 694 
Vancouver, Washinston 98666 
or at such other addresses as Lessee may desisnate in writing 
delivered to Lessor. Similar notice shall be addressed to Lessor 
as follows: : 
with c:;opy to : 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH 
Suite 2200, 36 South 




POCATELLO REGIONAL HEOlC~L CENTER 
777 Hospital Way 
Pocatello, ldaho 83201 





or at such . other adC!ress as Le!!SOr may designate in· -....·riting 
Clelivered to Lessee. Notices shall be sent in a similar manner 
to any r:~o:rtgegee of Lessee at such address as rna~· be designated 
in writing.. ( 
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14.9 Amendment of Lease. Lessor and Lessee shall cooperate 
( and include in this lease 'l:ly suitable amendment from time to time 
any provision that may reasonably be requested by any proposed 
Leasehold Mortgagee for the purpose of implementing ~he Mortgagee 
protection provisi9ns contained in this lease and al.lo...,ing such 
mortgagee reasonable means to protect or preserve the lien of a 
Leasehold Mortgage on the occurrence of a default on the terms of 
this lease. Lessor and Lessee each agree .to execute and deliver 
and to acknowledge if necessary for recording purposes, any 
agreement necessary to effect such amendment.; provided, ho..,ever, 
such amendment shall not in any way affect the term or rent under 
this lease nor otherwise in any respect. atlversely affect the 
rights of the Lessor in this lease. . 
14.'10 ·~ecording. Lessor ano Lessee agree to execute and 
have ac'kno,.,ledged, and Lessee agrees to deliver to Lessor, a 
memorandum of this lease in the fo:rm attllched hereto as Exhibit 
"ll~ for the purpose of recort:Ung such memorandum with the County 
Recorder of Sannock County. 
IN W!TNESS WHEREOF, the parties have set their hands 
the day and year first above written. 
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LtSSOR: 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a 
Utah non-profit corporation 
authorized to do business in Idaho, 
dba Pocatello Regional Medical 
Center 
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By __________________________ ___ 
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STATE OF ~ ) 
c· · .. 
County of ~}J_ 
55
'. ~ 
On .this ,LZ.f~ay of ~-1 l~.. , ·19~ ., be£·ore rne, the ( 
under-signed, a Notary Public in a~ for said State, personally 
appeared d;4 IJ. th.~ ;e;mr .........,,_....,..,.......=---------.// . -r ./,7---e.;...~;;;::;;::::zo~-_,_ . 
known to me to be tp-e F'Ees:Ldent=anw Eeo;:rgtary, l!'espect:t•.•e.J.y, of 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., a Utah non-pro'Eit cor-pont ion 
a~tnv~i~ed to J~ business in idaho, d~a Pocatello Regional 
Medical Center, the "cor-poration ·that executed the foregoing 
instrument, -and acknowledged to me that sucn corpor-ation executed 
the same. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed 
my official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
wr-itten. 
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STI\TE OF tDA\!0 l 
: ss .. 
County of Bannock l 
On this ~May of 
undersigned, a Notary 
a'ppeared H. 1.. CANCELOSl 
General Partners of 
--~J~a~n~u=a~r~y ____________ , 19~, before me, the 
Public in and for said State, personally 
and .nt1 R. 'iUOl'!'SKY , kno"-"Tl to me to be the 
STERLING DEVELOPMENT CO., a Washington 
partnership, the partnership that executed the foregoing 
instrument, and acknowledged to me that such corporation executed 
the same • 
IN w.ITNESS 'WHEREOF, I have 'hereunto set my hand and affixed 
roy official seal the day and year in this certificate first above 
written. · .... -... 
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Michael D. Gaffney, ISB No. 3558 
John M. Avondet, ISB No. 7438 
Beard St. Clair Gaffuey P A 
21 0 5 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404-7495 
Telephone: (208) 523-5171 
Facsimile: (208) 529-9732 
Email: gaffuey@beardstclair.com 
javondet@beardstclair.com 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
L 4 ~ \0\ _tPtfP 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, AND THE PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, KENT L. 
HAWKINS AND R. WILLIAM HANCOCK, 109 NORTH ARTHUR-5TH FLOOR, P.O. 
BOX 991, POCATELLO, IDAHO 83204, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE 
ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above named Appellants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC and Forrest L. 
Preston, appeal against the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from 
the Judgment entered on October 23, 2013. 
2. The Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court and the Judgment from 
which this appeal is taken is appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 11(a)(l). 
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3. The issues raised on this appeal are as follows: 
a. Whether the district court erred by entering summary judgment for the plaintiff 
and by failing to apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel to the 
plaintiffs claims. 
4. The Appellants request a standard, hard copy transcript of the hearing held on October 21, 
2013. 
5. The Appellants request that the following documents be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those automatically included under Rule 2S of the Idaho Appellate Ru1es: 
a. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on September 5, 2013; 
b. Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on 
September 5, 2013; 
c. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 
submitted on September 5, 2013; 
d. Affidavit of Don Wadle submitted on September 5, 2013; 
e. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on September 23, 
2013; 
f. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment 
submitted on September 23, 20 13; 
g. Affidavit of John M. Avondet in Support of Defendants' Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment submitted on September 23, 2013; 
h. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment 
submitted on October 7, 2013; 
Notice of Appeal-2 395 of 447
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i. Affidavit of Michael D. Gaffney in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted on October 7, 2013; 
j. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
Summary Judgment submitted on October 8, 2013; 
k. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment submitted on October 14, 2013; 
I. Plaintiffs Reply in Support of its Motion for Summary Judgment submitted on 
October 15,2013. 
6. I certifY: 
a. That a copy of this notice of appeal and any request for additional transcript have 
been served on each reporter of whom an additional transcript has been requested 
as names below at the address set out on the Certificate of Service; 
b. That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for preparation 
of the reporter's transcript and any additional documents requested in the appeal; 
c. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 
20. 
Mich I . Gaffiiey 
John . Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I am a licensed attorney in the state ofidaho and on November 6, 2013, I served 
a true and correct copy of the NOTICE OF APPEAL on the following by the method of delivery 
designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Fax: (208) 236-7012 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
PO Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Fax: (208) 232-2499 
Stephanie Davis 
Court Reporter 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
Mich I . 
John vondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffuey PA 
Attorneys for Defendants 
/ 
~.U.S. Mail (QI, Hand-delivered ig Facsimile 
~.S.Mail ll:;J Hand-delivered ~~· Facsimile 
~.Mail ~· Hand-delivered ~· Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 






) Supreme Court No. 
) 
) 





) ____________________ ) 
Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County 
Honorable Judge Robert C. Naftz presiding 
Bannock County Case No: CR-2012-5289-0C 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Judgment filed on the 23'd day of October, 
2013. 
Attorney for Appellant: Michael C. Gaffney and John M. Avondet, Attorneys, 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY, P.A. Idaho Falls, Idaho 
Attorney for Respondent: Dave R. Gallafent and R. William Hancock, Attorneys, 
MERRILL & MERRILL CHARTERED 
Appealed by: Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and Forrest L. Preston, An 
individual. 
Appealed against: Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ Portneuf Medical Center, LLC 
Notice of Appeal filed: November 7, 2013 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
398 of 447
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Request for additional records filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Davis 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 100 
(Seal) 
DatedU o~w~ ~ ; --:2..0 \'>:> 
' 
DALE HATCH, 




Dave R. Gallafent (ISB # 1745) 
Kent L. Hawkins (ISB # 3 791) 
l c.,_;;; n 
R. William Hancock (ISB # 7938) 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
109 North Arthur- 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 991 
Pocatello, ID 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
(208) 232-2499 Telefax 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
















RESPONDENT'S REQUEST FOR 
ADDITIONAL RECORDS AND 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT 
COMES NOW the Repondent/Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical 
Center, LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to 
I.R.A.P. 19, and hereby requests the following additional records and reporter's transcript to be 
included in the clerk's record in the above-referenced appeal: 
1. The Respondent requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record 
in addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules and in addition to those documents previously requested by the 
Appellants: 
a. Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on February 7, 2013; 
b. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on 
February 7, 2013; 
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c. Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay or, in the alternative, 
Request for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013; 
d. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion 
for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted February 25, 2013; 
e. Affidavit of Don Wadle in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' 
Motion for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted on February 
25, 2013; 
f. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay submitted on 
March 1, 2013; 
g. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June 13, 2013; 
h. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on 
June 13, 2013; 
i. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel submitted July 
1, 2013; and, 
J. Minute Entry and Order entered on July 8, 2013. 
2. The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the 
hearing held on March 4, 2013. 
3. The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the 
hearing held on July 8, 2013. 
DATED this \q"''ll day of November, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD. 
v}iJ/;v 
R. William Hancock, Jr. 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
certifY that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this !'l.Jh day ofNovember, 
2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 








) Case No. CV-2012-5289 
) 
) 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, LLC, ) 
and FORREST L. PRESTON, an individual, ) 
AMENDED RESPONDENT'S REQUEST 






COMES NOW the Respondent/Plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical 
Center, LLC ("PMC"), by and through its counsel of record, Merrill & Merrill, Chtd., pursuant to 
I.R.A.P. 19, and hereby requests the following additional records and reporter's transcript to be 
included in the clerk's record in the above-referenced appeal: 
I. The Respondent requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's record in 
addition to those documents automatically included under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules and in addition ·to those documents previously requested by the Appellants: 
a. Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on February 7, 2013; 
b. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Defendants' Motion for Stay submitted on 
February 7, 2013; 
<,: 
c. Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for Stay or, in the alternative, Request 
for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013; 
d. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to Defendants' Motion for 




Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted February 25, 2013; 
e. Affidavit of Don Wadle in Support of Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion 
for Stay, or, in the alternative, Request for Bond submitted on February 25, 2013; 
f. Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Stay submitted on 
March I, 2013; 
g. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June 13, 2013; 
h. Affidavit of Counsel in Support of Plaintiffs Motion to Compel submitted on June 
13, 2013; 
i. Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Compel submitted July 1, 
2013; and, 
j. Minute Entry and Order entered on July 8, 2013. 
2. The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the 
hearing held on March 4, 2013. 
3. The Respondent requests a standard, hard copy of the reporter's transcript of the 
hearing held on July 8, 2013. 
4. I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcript(s) has been served on the 
Court Reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the address set out below and that 
the estimated number of additional pages being requested is less than one hundred pages for the 
reporter's transcript of the hearing held on March 4, 2013, and less than one hundred pages for the 
reporter's transcript of the hearing held on July 8, 2013. 
Stephanie Davis 
Court Reporter 
Bannock County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 4574 
Pocatello, Idaho 83205 
I further certify that this request for additional records has been served upon the clerk of the 
district court or administrative agency and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this ·Z,'ld'ey ofNovember, 2013. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE ST A.tE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 















Case No. CV -2012-5289 
ORDER REGARDING 
ATTORNEY FEES 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
This matter comes before this Court pursuant to a Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees 
filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a/ PortneufMedical Center, LLC ("PMC"). 
The motion is a result of this Court's decision granting PMC's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the subsequent Judgment. This Court heard oral arguments regarding this matter on 
December 16,2013. 
DISCUSSION 
The Plaintiff is basing its request for costs and fees on Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 
and Idaho Code§ 12-121, as well as this Court's granting of summary judgment in favor ofPMC 
and entry of the corresponding Judgment. With regard to its request for attorney fees, the 
Plaintiff additionally asserts it "is specifically entitled to an award of attorney fees ... as a matter 
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of contractual right under Section 1 0.3" of the parties' 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. (See 
Pl.'s Mot. for Costs and Attorney Fees, Nov. 6, 2013, 1.) 
1. ATTORNEY FEES 
Rule 54(e)(1)1 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) provides a court with the 
discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party when authorized by statote or 
contract. However, IRCP 54( e) also limits an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code 
("IC") § 12-1212. Attorney fees may be awarded under that section of the Idaho Code only when 
the court is left with the abiding belief the case was "brought, pursued or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation .... " IDAHO R. CN. P. 54(e)(1) (2012). "An award of 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-121 is not a matter of right to the prevailing party, but is 
appropriate only when the court, in its discretion, is left with the abiding belief that the case was 
brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." McGrew v. 
McGrew, 139 Idaho 551, 562, 82 PJd 833, 844 (2003)(citingNampa & Meridian Irrigation 
Dist. v. Washington Fed. Savings, 135 Idaho 518, 20 P.3d 702 (2001)). A trial court's award of 
attorney fees under the statute is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Madsen, 142 
Idaho at 639, 132 PJd at 396. However, even in cases where ''the losing party has asserted 
1 Rule 54(e)(l). Attorney fees. In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the 
discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defmed in Rule 54(d)(1)(B), 
when provided for by any statute or contract. Provided, attorney fees under section 12-121, Idaho Code, may be 
awarded by the court only when it finds, from the facts presented to it, that the case was brought, pursued or 
defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation; but attorney fees shall not be awarded pursuant to section 
12-121, Idaho Code, on a default judgment. 
2 § 12-121. Attorney fees.- In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing 
party or parties, provided that this section shall not alter, repeal or amend any statute which otherwise provides for 
the award of attorney's fees. The term "party" or "parties" is defined to include any person, partnership, 
corporation, association, private organization, the state ofldaho or political subdivision thereof. 
Order 
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factual or legal claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation", as long as "there 
is a legitimate, triable issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law, attorney fees may not be 
awarded" under IC § 12-121. Id. (internal citations omitted); Joyce Livestock Co. v. United 
States, 144 Idaho 1, 156 P.3d 502, 517 (2007). Furthermore, attorney fees may not be awarded 
under IC § 12-121 unless the losing party's entire case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without 
foundation. 
When deciding whether the case was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without foundation, the entire course of the litigation must be taken into account. Thus, if 
there is a legitimate, triable issue of fact, attorney fees may not be awarded under 1..Q,_§_ 
12-121 even though the losing party has asserted factual or legal claims that are frivolous, 
unreasonable, or without foundation. Nampa & Meridian Irrigation Dist. v. Washington 
Fed. Savings. 135 Idaho 518, 524-25,20 P.3d 702, 708-09 (2001). 
Vendelin v. Cost co Wholesale, Corp., 140 Idaho 416, 434, 95 P .3d 34, 52 (2007). 
As explained, the Plaintiff asserts it is "specifically entitled to an award of attorney fees 
... as a matter of contractual right under Section 1 0.3" ofthe parties' 1983 Ground Lease 
Agreement. 3 That section of the contract provides for the payment of reasonable attorney fees in 
the event an action is brought for the recovery of any rent due or because of the breach of any 
other covenant. The Defendant counters that attorney fees are not appropriate because this case 
was not brought, pursued or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. 
3 Section 10.3 Attorney's Fees: 
In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful detaiuer of the said premises, for the recovery of any rent 
due under the provisions of this lease, or because of the breach of any other covenant herein contained to be kept or 
performed, the prevailiug party shall be paid a reasonable attorney's fee by the other party, and such attorney's fee 
shall be deemed to have accrued at the commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action is 
prosecuted to judgment. 
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PMC is the prevailing party in this case. This Court ruled in favor of the Plaintiff on the 
motion for summary judgment and entered judgment to that effect, finding that the Defendant 
had clearly breached the ground lease by failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent as required. 
Judgment to that effect was entered, with the Defendant being ordered by this Court to pay the 
unpaid rent, plus interest. Thus, the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees pursuant to 
the parties' Ground Lease agreement, as set forth previously. Furthermore, this Court has 
determined the Defendant mounted an unreasonable defense in this case, as the motion for 
summary judgment and entry of the Judgment was necessitated by the Defendant's failure to 
comply with the order of the district court to "promptly" pay the rent due and owing under the 
parties' Ground Lease Agreement. Therefore, this Court hereby grants the Plaintiffs request for 
an award of attorney fees. Having thoroughly reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and 
Attorney's Fees and the supporting memorandum and affidavit, as well as taking into careful 
consideration the Defendant's objections and the oral arguments presented at the hearing, this 
Court hereby awards the Plaintiff the sum of$15,599.75 in attorney fees. This Court reduced the 
Plaintiffs request for fees by $197.25. 
2. COSTS 
IRCP 54( d)( I)( c) allows a court to award costs to a prevailing party in its discretion. As a 
matter of right, the prevailing party is entitled to costs related to filing fees, service fees, witness 
fees, travel expenses of witnesses, expenses for certified copies, costs for preparation of map, 
models, photographs or other exhibits, cost of bond premiums, expert witness fees, costs of 
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reporting and transcribing a deposition, and costs for a copy of a deposition.4 This Court has 
determined the Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and, as such, is entitled to costs as matter of right 
pursuant to IRCP 54( d)(l )(C). After reviewing the Plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees, this Court has determined the Plaintiff is entitled to $96.00 in costs as a matter of 
right for the filing fee. 
The Plaintiff has also claimed discretionary costs for Westlaw research incurred in 
bringing the Motion for Summary Judgment and in defending the Defendant's Cross-Motion for 
4 Rule 54( d)(!). Costs. Items allowed. 
(A) Parties Entitled to Costs. Except when otherwise limited by these rules, costs shall be allowed as a matter of 
right to the prevailing party or parties, unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(C) Costs as a Matter of Right. When costs are awarded to a party, such party shall be entitled to the following 
costs, actually paid, as a matter of right: 
I. Court filing fees. 
2. Actual fees for service of any pleading or document in the action whether served by a public officer or other 
person. 
3. Witness fees of $20.00 per day for each day in which a witness, other than a party or expert, testifies at a 
deposition or in the trial of an action. 
4. Travel expenses of witnesses who travel by private transportation, other than a party, who testifY in the trial of 
an action, computed at the rate of$.30 per mile, one way, from the place of residence, whether it be within or 
without the state ofldaho; travel expenses of witnesses who travel other than by private transportation, other than a 
party, computed as the actual travel expenses of the witness not to exceed $.30 per mile, one way, from the place of 
residence of the witness, whether it be within or without the state ofldaho. 
5. Expenses or charges of certified copies of documents admitted as evidence in a hearing or the trial of an action. 
6. Reasonahle costs of the preparation of models, maps, pictures, photographs, or other exhibits admitted in 
evidence as exhibits in a hearing or trial of an action, but not to exceed the sum of $500 for all of such exhibits of 
each party. 
7. Cost of all bond premiums. 
8. Reasonable expert witness fees for an expert who testifies at a deposition or at a trial of an action not to exceed 
the sum of $2,000 for each expert witness for all appearances. 
9. Charges for reporting and transcribing of a deposition taken in preparation for trial of an action, whether or not 
read into evidence in the trial of an action. 
10. Charges for one (I) copy of any deposition taken by any of the parties to the action in preparation for trial of 
the action. 
Order 
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Summary Judgment. The right to discretionary costs is governed by IRCP 54( d)(l )(D). 5 
"Discretionary costs are additional items of cost not enumerated in Rule 54( d)(l ), and cau 
include such items as long distance telephone calls, photocopying, faxes, travel expenses aud 
postage." Auto. Club Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 124 Idaho 874, 880, 865 P.2d 965,971 (1993). While 
the awarding of such costs is discretionary as explained previously, "the burden is on the 
prevailing party to make au adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary aud 
exceptional and reasonably incurred, and should in the interests of justice be assessed against the 
adverse party. Westfall v. Caterpillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918, 926, 821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991)." Id. 
Furthermore, "Rule 54( d)(l )(D) also provides that the trial court shall make express findings as 
to why each discretionary cost item should or should not be allowed." Id. However, "[e]xpress 
findings as to the general character of requested costs and whether such costs are necessary, 
reasonable, exceptional, aud in the interests of justice is sufficient to comply with this 
requirement." Hayden Lake Fire Prot. Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 314, 109 P .3d 161, 168 
(2005) (internal citation omitted); see also, Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 494, 960 P .2d 175, 177 
(1998)(affirming trial court's denial of discretionary costs for expert witness fees despite the fact 
that the court did not evaluate each cost item by item). 
5 {D) Discretionary Costs. Additional items of cost not enumerated in, or in an amount in excess of that listed in 
subparagraph (C), may be allowed upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional costs reasonably 
incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party. The trial court, in ruling upon 
objections to such discretionary costs contained in the memorandum of costs, shall make express fmdings as to why 
such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed. In the absence of any objection to such an 
item of discretionary costs, the court may disallow on its own motion any such items of discretionary costs and shall 
make express findings supporting such disallowance. 
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The Plaintiff asserts the claimed research costs "were necessary and exceptional costs 
reasonably incurred" in this case. After reviewing the Plaintiffs memorandum and considering 
the arguments in opposition presented by the Defendant, this Court has determined the research 
costs associated with this matter were a necessary and reasonable part of this case. This Court 
has also determined these were exceptional costs reasonably incurred. As such, the Plaintiff is 
also entitled to $1,135.18 in discretionary costs. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the preceding discussion and Section 10.3 of the 1983 Ground Lease 
Agreement entered between the parties, the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees is 
GRANTED. The Plaintiff is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees in the total sum of 
$16,830.93. 
DATED this 1._ day of January, 2014. 
Copies to: 
Order 
R. William Hancock 
Michael D. Gaffney 
Re: Attorney Fees 
Case No. CV-2012-5289 
~C.~ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 















Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Based on the decision entered by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED 
that Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of$416,812.50 plus interest of$45,221.30 for a 
total of $462,033.80. Plaintiff is also awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$16, 830.93. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this L day of January, 2014 
Copies to: 
R. William Hancock (Attorney for Plaintiff) 
Michael D. Gaffney (Attorney for Defendants) 
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Case No. CV-2012-5289-0C 
FINAL JUDGMENT 
Based on the decision entered by this Court, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGED 
that Plaintiff is awarded judgment in the amount of $416,812.50 plus interest of$45,221.30 for a 
total of$462,033.80. Plaintiff is also awarded attorney fees and costs in the amount of 
$16, 830.93. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this L day of January, 2014 
Copies to: 
R. William Hancock (Attorney for Plaintiff) 
Michael D. Gaffuey (Attorney for Defendants) 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Pottneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plailitifti'R.espondent, 
vs. 
QuJilil Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. PrcstOD, 
Defendants/ Appelbmts. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
STIPULATION RE: lU!CORP ON 
APPEAL 
P. 02 
The parties throush counsel of record hereby stipulate and agree that the attached 
documents are true and correct copies oftho Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendapt's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted on October 8, 2013, and 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, submitted 
on October 14, 2013. 
The parties further stipulate and agree that the Record on Appeal be augmented to include 
these documents as they were submitted to the Court on the dates identified in the Cortitioatcs of 
Service. contained in each respective document. 
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FAX NO. 208 232 2499 
Dated: February~, 2014 
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:w;;llam Hancock 
Merrill & Monill, Chattered 
Attorneys for the Plaintiff/Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify I am a licensed a.ttomey in the state ofldaho and on February,&{. 2014, I sel'Ved 
a true and col'rect copy of the STIPULATION RE: RECORD ON APPEAL on the following by 
the method of delivery designated below: 
Bannock County Courthouse 
624 E. Center 
Pocatello, ID 8320 I 
Fax: (208) .236-7013 
Dave R. Gallafent 
R. William Hancock 
Merrill & Merrill 
POBox991 
Pocatello, ID 83204 
Pax: (208) 232·2499 
Mic e D. Ga:ftl:tey 
John • Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffi:tcy PA 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF Tlffi 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
POCATELLO HOSPITAL, LLC d/b/a 
PORTNEUF MEDICAL CENTER, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
QUAIL RIDGE MEDICAL INVESTORS, 
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Pursuant to I.R.C.P. S6(c), the Plaintiff subtnits the following as its Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Cross-Motion for SlllllllUII'Y Judgment:' 
INTRODUCTION 
Although the parties do not dispute that this case arises from the failure of Quail Ridge 
Medical Investors ("Quail Ridge") to pay Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a PortneufMedical Center, 
LLC ("PMC'~ adjusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period, the parties certainly dispute 
when and how the present breach of contract action arose. 
Quail Ridge asserts that the present breach of contract action arose when PMC filed its 
Verified Complaint in Bannock County Case No. CV-20102724-0C- the action which Quail 
Ridge identifies in its Cross-Motion for Sllliiilllll'y Judgment as PMC I- seeking, among other 
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Although PMC did raise a breach of contract claim as part of its claims in P MC I, the court, 
without opposition from PMC, dismissed such claim for the reason that such claim was not ripe tbr 
determination by the Court. Indeed, Judge Brown had already opined from the bench in P MC I 
that a breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the court determined the amount of rent 
due under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the rents as adjlJ&ted by the court. 
Thus, while it is undisputed that these same parties have litigated the issue of adjusted rents 
for the 2010 rent adjustment period, it is also abundantly clear that this present breach of contract 
claim was not ripe for litigation until after the court in P MC I declared what atljusted rents were 
due and owing for the 2010 rent adjustment period and the tenant, Quail Ridge, thereafter failed to 
pay the rants as adjusted by the court. :Because this breach of contract claim was not ripe for 
adjudication in PMC I, it is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata in the present action. As will 
be discussed more thoroughly below, the Idaho Supreme Court has long recognized that ripeness is 
an exception to the doctrine of res judicata. 
RELEVANT MAJERlAL FACTS 
While Quail Ridge made reference to the Order on Form ofJudgment entered by Judge 
Brown in PMC 1, Quail Ridge failed to cite this Court to the relevant portion of that order which 
succinctly clarities the legal and factual basis for the present action. In that Order, Judge Brown 
states the following concerning the consequences of Quail Ridge's failure to promptly pay the 
acljusted rents for the 2010 rent adjustment period: 
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that 'the party indebted shall, 
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected by the 
adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the 
determination has been made as contemplated tmder the Ground Lease Agreement, 
the Otound Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under 
the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not 
define the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, !!: failure to nay this 
amount in a reasonable certainty would giye rile to an action for broach of 
coatracf. 
(Avondet Aff., Ex. F, at p. 3) (emphasis added). 
There can be no confusion from the above cited language that Judge Brown clearly 
understood that Quail Ridge's failure to promptly pay the adjusted rents declared by him as due 
and owing for the 2010 rent adjustment period "would give rise to an action for breach of 
contract." Further, it is clear within the context of this language that such breach of contract 
5975, Oppo!tltlun to Ci'Omi-MOtloll ror $1111\Ulllllry ,ludjlmtnt Page2 
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action would be separate and distinct from the action tried before Judge Brown in PMC !because 
the factual basis for such action could not arise until a:l\er the rents had been declared in that action 
and the tenant, Quail Ridge, thereafter failed to promptly pay the rents as adjusted by the court. In 
short, Judge Brown made it ab$olutely clear that his role was to deola:re the adjusted rent due for 
the 2010 rent adju$111'1ent period, which he did, and that the tenant. Quail Ridge, would therea:l:\er 
be obligated to promptly pay such adjusted rents. Judge Brown made it further abundantly clear 
that should Quail Ridge fall to promptly pay the rent as adjusted by the court, then "a fuilure to pay 
this ll.!llOunt in a reasonable certainty would give rise to an action for breach of contract." 
Because it is undisputed in this ease that Qual! Ridge and its personal guarantor, Forrest 
Preston, have not paid the outstanding adj\'!Sted rents for the 20 I 0 rent adju$111'1ent period (Wadle 
A.ff.) declared by Judge Brown as due and owing, it is also clear that this breach C1f contract action 
is now ripe for adj ~ldication and, as will be discussed more thoroughly below, Is not barred by the 
doctrine ofrcs judicata. 
ARQUMENI 
Plaintiff will spare this Court a long recitation of the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed, 
Plaintiff has previously briefed this doctrine in its Motion for Summary Judgn1ent. If, however, 
the Court wishes a more detailed review of this doctrine and the progression of its application and 
limitatious by the Idaho Supreme Court, then Plaintiff refers the Court to the opinion rendered by 
the Idaho Court of Appeals in Aldape v. Akins, 105 idaho 254, 668 P.2d 130 (Idaho App. 1983) 
(limited in part by Diamondv. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990)). 
For purposes of this discussion, it is important for this Court to understand that the Idaho 
Suprenie Court has long recognized two situations where the doctrine of res judicata does not 
apply: (1) in cases where mandamus and damages are sought as alternative or CUIIIulatlve forll'ls 
of relief; and (2) In cases where matters raised in the second action were not ripe for adjudication in 
the prior action. See Aldape, 668 P.2d at 149 (citations omitted). In the present case, the second 
exception applies and, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata does not btU' the action, 
Indeed, as has been demonstrated by the plain language of Judge Brown's Order on Fonn 
of Judgment, even Judge Brown appreciated the fact that if Qual! Ridge were to fail to promptly 
pay the adjusted rents for the 20 l 0 rent adjustment period based upon his declaration of such rents, 
then a breach of contract action would arlse from such failure. !11.0 filet that this action would not 
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arise until qfier Quail Ridge had failed to promptly pay such adjusted rents clearly demonstrates 
that this action could not arise at the time that P MC 1 was being litigated before the court. Thus, 
the present action was not ripe for litigation in P MC I. 
Notably, in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983), the Idaho 
Supreme Court recognized that there can be circumstances when facts occur subsequent to a first 
trial that !rigger the filing of a second suit and that the issue raised in the second suit was not ripe 
for adjudication in the first case, but rather was premature until after a determination had been 
made in the fll'st suit. Duthie, 104 Idaho at 754, 663 P.2d at 290. Such is the present case before 
tl:Us court. In this case, the complained of breach of contract could not arise until after Quail 
Ridge and Forrest Preston had failed to promptly pay the adjusted rents for the 20 I 0 rent 
adjustment period as declared by the court in P MC I as due and owing for the 20 I 0 rent adjustment 
period. Indeed, neither Defendant had a contractual duty to pay such rents until after Judge 
Brown had declared the rents due and owing for the 2010 rent adjuStment period. Therefore, 
similiU' to the issue before the Idaho Supreme Court in Duthie, the fltCts giving rise to this second 
suit could not have occurred until after the first determination had been made in the prior action. 
Because the present ltCtion is based upon new and distinct breaches of contract by these 
respective Defendants, the Plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to deny the Defendants' 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. This Court should find that this present action was not 
ripe during PMC I and, therefore, the Plaintiff's claims iU'e not barred by the doctrine of.res 
judicata against either Defendant. Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to grant it any such 
further relief the Court deems appropriate under the circumstances of this case including, but not 
limited to, attorneys' fees associated with defending this Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. 
DATED this f)!!> day of October, 2013. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHTD . 
.. 1{@fP 
~~ys for the Plaintiff 
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·CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undefsigned attomey for the Plaintiff in the above-referenced matter does hereby 
certify that a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this e'lb day of 
Septemlrer, 2013, served upon the following in the manner indicated below: 
Ocl;D'ot..V 
Michael D. Gaffney 
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY PA 
2105 Coronado Street 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404 
Honorable Robert E. 'Naftz 
624 E. Center, Rm. 220 
Pocatello,ldaho 83201 
(Chambers Copy) 
S975~ Opposition tu Croaa-Mullon for lihunmney ,Judr:ment 
UU.S.Mail 
U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Mail 
~Fax: (208) 529·9732 
UU.S.Mail 
U Hand Delivery 
U Overnight Delivery 
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Merrill & Merrill 
P.O. BoK 991 
Pocatello, ldaho 83204-0991 
(208) 232-2286 
l'lll<! (208) 232-2499 
FAX COVER SHEET 
FAX NUMBER TRANSMITTED TO: 208-236-7012 
Number of pages including tbis cover sheet: 6 
To: Bannock Cmmty District Court 
From: R. William Hancock/ Deborah 
Client/Matter: PMC v QuaU Ridge; CV-2012·5289·0C; Aceeptaneo of Service 
Date: October 8, 2013 
COMMENTS: 
P. 01/06 
· Following this fax cover sheet for filing please find the Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Dejimdant's Cross-Motion/at Summary Judgment regarding the above noted case. Please contact 
our office with any questions, thank you. 
Deborah Lafana 
Legal Assistant 
cc: Gaffney (208-529-9732) 
Honorable Robert E. Naftz Chambers (208·236-7290) 
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In the Sixth Judicial District of the State ofldaho, County of Bannock 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
The defendants (collectively Quail Ridge), through counsel of record Beard St. Clair 
Gaffney PA, respectfully submit the following reply memorandum in support of Quail Ridge's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, filed September 23, 2013. This memorandum is 
supported by Quail Ridge's memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary judgment 
filed by the plaintiff, Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC (PMC); the 
second affidavit of John Avondet, counsel for Qu~ Ridge; and other pleadings and affidavits in 
the record. 
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INTRODUCTION 
PMC's breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge is the second such claim brought by 
PMC arising from the parties' Ground Lease agreement. As explained in Quail Ridge's 
memorandum in support of its cross-motion for summary judgment, res judicata and collateral 
estoppel should preclude PMC' s present breach of contract action against Quail Ridge. In 
arguing otherwise, PMC relies on criticized case law that is factually inapposite to the present 
litigation while simultaneously ignoring PMC's procedural posture in PMC I. For the reasons set 
forth below, this Court should grant Quail Ridge's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Quail Ridge references and incorporates its Statement of Facts contained in its cross-
motion for summary judgment as if set forth fully herein. (See generally Defs.' Mem. Re: Defs.' 
Cross-Mot. Summ. J. at 3-6.)1 
ARGUMENT 
In its memorandum in opposition to Quail Ridge's cross-motion for summary judgment, 
PMC argues that its present breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge, arising out of the 
parties' Ground Lease Agreement, was not ripe for adjudication at the time of P MC I, and 
therefore res judicata does not preclude PMC from pursuing its current breach of contract claim 
against Quail Ridge. However, PMC's ripeness argument hinges on questionable and factually 
distinct case law while ignoring what occurred at trial in P MC I. 
In argning that its current breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge was not ripe at the 
time of PMC I, PMC relies on Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 
1 Submitted on September 23, 2013. 
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(1983). The facts underlying Duthie, however, are distinct from this litigation, and Duthie has 
been soundly criticized in subsequent Idaho case law. 
Duthie was the second litigation between the parties over the plaintiff Duthies' right to 
connect their residence to the defendant Gun Club's domestic water line. Id., 104 Idaho at 752, 
663 P .2d at 288. The Gun Club initially sued the Duthies for trespass, construction costs, and 
maintenance fees; the first trial court determined that a valid license existed and granted the 
Duthies' motion to dismiss with prejudice. !d., 105 Idaho at 752-53, 663 P.2d at 288-89. Almost 
two years after the conclusion of the first case, the Gun Club cut the Duthies' waterline, after 
which the Duthies brought the second action against the Gun Club, arguing that res judicata 
precluded the Gun Club from claiming that the Duthies' license was revoked in the second 
litigation. !d., 105 Idaho at 753, 663 P.2d at 289. 
In fmding that res judicata did not bar the Gun Club's argument that the Duthies' license 
was revoked, the Duthie court cited res judicata precedent, including the following language 
from Intermountain Food Equip. Co. v. Waller: 
"We think the correct rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon 
the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies 
not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but 
also as to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." 
Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753, 663 P.3d at 289 (quoting Intermountain Food Equip., 86 Idaho 94, 98, 
383 P.2d 612, 615 (1963) (internal citations omitted)). The Duthie court then determined that 
"because facts occurred subsequent to the fust trial that triggered the filing of the second suit, we 
hold that the issue of revocability was not ripe for trial in the first case, but rather, was premature 
until the license was actually revoked." This decision was constantly criticized by Justice 
Bistline, who wrote a scathing dissent in Duthie and subsequent case law: 
Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for Sununary Judgment- Page 3 
433 of 447
Today's opinion is surely the epitome of appellate ambivalence, arming the Court 
with opposing lines of precedent which serve the purpose of finding justification 
for whatever appellate result is desired. Today's opinion is result oriented; the 
Court's entire rationale for an incomprehensible result, wholly at odds with all 
notions of res judicata •.. 
Id., 104 Idaho at 754, 663 P.2d at 290 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 
The [Duthie] Court was then faced with the task of "discovery the correct theory." 
In doing so, it had to work around its own concession that the law of res judicata 
was firmly entrenched by prior Idaho cases, none of which were in the least 
equivocal. 
Walker v. Shoshone Co., 112 Idaho 991, 998, 739 P.2d 290, 297 (1987) (Bistline, J., concurring). 
The doctrine of res judicata is still alive in Idaho although it suffered 
serious injury at the hands of this Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 
Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983). In that case a majority of this Court, over the 
protest of a strong dissent, emasculated what had been until then one of the most 
strictly adhered to principles of Idaho jurisprudence by declaring that the doctrine 
of res judicata need not be applied where the circumstances were not "ripe," i.e., 
that after a judgment became wholly final, a second suit involving the same issues 
previously litigated could nevertheless be brought, provided that there was the 
interjection into the second law suit of some additional fact not present in the first. 
Here is Paul Harvey, again, with the rest of the story: After the Duthie 
case ending in a final judgment decreeing Duthie entitled to take and use water 
from a Gun Club supply line, and after all time for appeal had expired, the Gun 
Club severed the line to Duthie's residence. That was the "new fact." 
It would be a kindness to the trial bench and bar if two more votes were 
forthcoming to erase any precedential effect which may otherwise some day be 
accorded it. 
Olsen v. Olsen, 115 Idaho 105, 108, 765 P.2d 130, 133 (1988) (Bistline, J., concurring, n. 1). As 
evidenced by this language from Justice Bistline, the Duthie decision is not without its faults in 
addressing the applicability of res judicata. 
Duthie's obvious problems aside, it is also factually inapposite to the case currently 
before the Court. In Duthie, the parties' first litigation concerned the Gun Club's claims of 
trespass by the homeowners tapping into the Gun Club's water line. Ahnost two years after the 
first case concluded, the parties were again embroiled in litigation, this time to determine if the 
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homeowners' license to tap the water lioe was revoked. The facts, claims, and timiog of these 
two cases are far removed from each other in comparison to PMC I and the parties' current 
litigation. 
Unlike the claims in Duthie, PMC's breach of contract claims against Quail Ridge in 
PMC I and the present litigation constitute the same grievance: PMC's allegation that Quail 
Ridge breached the parties' Ground Lease Agreement. After the conclusion of P MC I in the trial 
court, PMC was quick to again sue Quail Ridge for allegedly breaching the Ground Lease 
Agreement, with the present lawsuit coming mere months after Judge Brown's decision in PMC 
I. The proximity and similarities between PMC's breach of contract claims against Quail Ridge 
!' 
suggest that PMC's present breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge was indeed ripe for 
adjudication in P MC I, and shonld therefore be precluded by res judicata. 
In arguing that its current breach of contract action against Quail Ridge was not ripe in 
P MC I, PMC argues that "Judge Brown had already opined from the bench in P MC I that a 
breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the court determioed the amount of rent due 
under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the rents as adjusted by the court." (Pl.'s 
Mem. Re: Defs.' Cross-Mot. Sunun. J. 2 (emphasis in original).) However, this statement ignores 
Judge Brown's language from the bench after PMC's case-in-chief and upon Quail Ridge's 
motion for a directed verdict on PMC's frrst breach of contract claim: 
I would agree with Mr. Gaffney that the evidence that was introduced yesterday 
was deficient in establishing that there has been a breach of contract associated 
with this matter. 
(Avondet Aff. Ex. E; PMC ITrial Tran. Vol. II, 86:25-87:3, May 15, 2012.) 
PMC presented its case-in-chief, including its breach of contract claim against Quail 
Ridge, in FMC I. "[T]he former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every 
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matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every matter which 
might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753, 663 P.2d at 289 
(quoting Intermountain Food Equipment Co. v. Waller, 86 Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 612, 615 
(1963) (internal citations omitted)). PMC made its choice- it elected to bring its claim for 
breach of contract against Quail Ridge in P MC I. In presenting its case-in-chief, including its 
breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge prior to dismissal of the breach claim, PMC offered 
the matter of its claim for breach of contract by Quail Ridge. PMC should be made to face the 
ramifications of its procedural strategy. This Court should find that res judicata therefore 
precludes PMC from again asserting its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge in this 
litigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing and previous pleadings and affidavits before the Court, Quail 
Ridge respectfully requests the Court grant its cross-motion for surmnary judgment. 
DATED: October 14, 2013. 
Michl.aey 
John . Avondet 
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney P A 
Attorneys for the Defendants 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba Portneuf 
Medical Center, LLC, 
Plaintif£'Respondent, 
vs. 
Quail Ridge Medical Investors, LLC, and 
Forrest L. Preston, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Case No.: CV-12-5289-0C 
ORDER RE: RECORD ON APPEAL 
This matter having come before the Court by means of the Stipulation Re: Record on 
Appeal executed by the parties, and good cause having been shown, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Record on Appeal be augmented to include the 
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, 
submitted on October 8, 2013, and Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion 
for Summary Judgment, submitted on October 14, 2013. 
Dated: February~ 2014 
~C.~ 
Honorable Robert C. Naftz 
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I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the 
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound 
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documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate 
Rules. 
I do further certify that there were no exhibits marked for identification or 
admitted into evidence during the course of this action. 
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